The Marine Helicopter And The Korean WarAUTHOR Major Rodney R. Propst, USMCCSC 1989SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Marine Helicopter and the Korean War After WW II, the Marine Corps introduced a new dimensionin the mobility of assault troops and logistically resupplywith the advent of the helicopter. Vertical envelopment wasdeveloped at the Marine Corps Base in Quantico and provenduring the Korean War. As a direct result of the atomic tests at Bikini Lagoon,in 1946, the Marine Corps sought innovative ways to disperseassault forces during amphibious landings. The Marine CorpsSchools at Quantico produced the concept for using thehelicopter and helped pioneer the development of HMX-1 as thevehicle for testing the new vertical envelopment concept. HMX-1 was the first Marine helicopter squadron and assuch virtually set the pace in the development of combathelicopter thinking. The laboratory at Quantico would in 31short months prepare the Marine Corps to go to war for thefirst time with helicopters. The five HO3S helicopters of VMO-6 proved themselvesalmost immediately upon their arrival in Korea, at Pusan.They became the "secret weapon" of the Marine Brigade'scommand and staff. These aircraft became the lifeline thatbrought thousands of wounded Marines to hospitals onlyminutes after being wounded. The HRS-1's of HMR-161, after their arrival in the fallof 1951, validated all of the thought that the Marine CorpsSchools at Quantico had put into the helicopter. HMR-161conducted the first vertical resupply of Marines and went onto fly the first tactical vertical envelopment, in combat. As a newcomer to Marine aviation, the helicopter proveditself as a valuable weapon in a balanced military force. THE MARINE HELICOPTER AND THE KOREAN WAR OUTLINEThesis Statement. After World War II, the Marine Corpsintroduced a new dimension in the mobility of assault troopsand supplies with the advent of the helicopter. Verticalenvelopment was developed at the Marine Corps Base, inQuantico and proven during the Korean War.I. Early History of Marine Helicopters A. Helicopter Program in 1947 B. Commissioning of HMX-1 C. Operations Packard II/III D. Marine Corps Requirement for Assault SupportII. Preparations for the Korean War A. 1st Provisional Brigade B. VMO-6III. Pusan Perimeter A. Missions B. Call for increased numbers of helicoptersIV. HMR-161 A. First vertical envelopment B. OperationsV. StatisticsVI. Lessons Learned/Future Developments THE MARINE HELICOPTER AND THE KOREAN WAR In August of 1945 the world entered the Atomic Age atHiroshima, Japan. The atomic bomb created a new era inwarfare and as a result of it the Marine Corps began toconcentrate on ways to increase dispersion and reducevulnerability to this new and very lethal weapon. In theyears immediately following World War II, the Marine Corpspioneered and developed a new concept in the mobility ofassault troops and logistical resupply with the advent of thehelicopter. Vertical envelopment was conceived at the MarineCorps Base, in Quantico and proven during the Korean War. In 1946, Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, CommandingGeneral , Fleet Marine Forces , Pacific viewed the atomictests at Bikini Lagoon. General Geiger felt strongly thatatomic weapons would impact on how the Marine Corps conductedamphipbious operations. In a letter dated 21 August, 1946that General Geiger sent to the Commandant he stated: It is quite evident that a small number of atomic bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now organized, embarked, and landed.. . [General Geiger urged the Commandant to] consider this a very serious and urgent matter [and that the Marine Corps] use its most competent officers in finding a solution to develop the technique of conducting amphibious operations in the Atomic Age.1 The Commandant, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, actedby referring General Geiger's letter to a special board ofGeneral officers with instructions to: ...propose, after thorough research and deliberation, the broad concepts and principles which the Marine Corps should follow, and the major steps which it should take, to wage successful amphibious warfare at some future date...2 On 16 December, 1946 the special board submitted anadvanced report to the Commandant recommending that parallelprograms be initiated to develop a transport seaplane and atransport helicopter. The board further recommended that anexperimental Marine helicopter squadron be organized to trainpilots and mechanics and that the Marine Corps Schoolsdevelop a tentative doctrine for helicopter employment.3 General Vandegrift concurred with the special board'sresults and began the actions to make Marine helicopters areality. General Vandegrift visualized the Vertical AssaultConcept as: With a relatively unlimited choice of landing areas, troops can be landed in combat formations and under full control of the flanks or rear of a hostile position. The helicopter's speed makes transport dispersion at sea a matter of no disadvantage and introduces a time-space factor that will avoid presenting at any one time a remunerative atomic target. It should also be noted that transport helicopters offer a means for rapid evacuation of casualties, for the movement of supplies directly from ship to dump and for subsequent movement of troops and supplies in continuing operations ashore.4The Commandant's goal for 1947 was to organize onedevelopmental helicopter squadron with 12 helicopters inorder to study helicopter employment in amphibiousoperations. On 10 March, 1947 the Marine Corps Schools' Committee ofthe Academic Board headed by Colonel Robert E. Hogaboomsubmitted its report on "Military Requirements of Helicopterfor Ship-to-Shore Movement of Troops and Cargo". The reportstated: "... it is more realistic to approach the problem inincrements, establishing initially the characteristics for apurely assault conveyance. . . "5 The Mogaboom report went onto list the specifications for the assault helicopter as: 1. 5,000 pound payload 2. 200 to 300 nautical mile range (500 miles with an auxiliary fuel tank) 3. 100 knot cruising speed 4. 4,000' hover ceiling 5. external hook and hoist 6. self-sealing fuel tanks 7. overall dimensions to be able to fit on the hangar deck and elevators of the aircraft carrier.6 On 1 December, 1947, in compliance with the Commandant'sgoal, Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) was commissionedat MCAS Quantico, Virginia. Colonel Edward C. Dyer, who hadbeen instrumental in establishing the Marine helicopterprogram, was the Commanding Officer. HQMC established themission for HMX-1 as: "1. Develop techniques and tactics inconnection with the movement of assault troops in amphibiousoperations, and 2. Evaluate a small helicopter as areplacement for the present OY aircraft. . .".7 On that firstday of December 1947 Colonel Dyer was the sole member ofHMX-1 and the squadron would not receive any aircraft until 9February, 1948 when two Sikorsky HO3S-1's would arrive. At the request of Lieutenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak,the Assistant Director of the Senior School of the MarineCorps Schools, HMX-1 participated in Operation Packard IIduring May of 1948. This operation was an amphibious commandpost exercise developed and planned by the Marine CorpsSchools. The operational plan was prepared by the studentstaff and provided for an element of the landing force, thestaff of a regimental combat team (RLT), and HMX-1 to beembarked on escort aircraft carriers. Utilizing 5 HO3S-1s,HMX-1 flew a total of 35 flights carrying 66 Marines and aconsiderable amount of communications gear ashore from theship.8 Operation Packard II provided the framework thatproved helicopters could play an integral part in amphibiousoperations. The Marine Corps Schools, by November 1948, haddeveloped the world's first manual entitled AmphibiousOperations--Employment of Helicopters (Tentative). This bookwas numbered 31 in a series of publications on amphibiousoperations.9 Phib-31 detailed many of the advantages of thehelicopter and vertical assault, but more importantly itprojected the concept of vertical envelopment well into thefuture, far outreaching the current capabilities of thehelicopters the Marines were flying in 1948. LieutenantColonel Krulak describes the approach that the Marine CorpsSchools used in preparing Phib-31: ...a propspective military philosophy. It consists of thinking in terms of the next war instead of the last ,. . . This means starting with ideas, when you have nothing more tangible, and developing them into the concepts, procedures and weapons of the future. 10Although, the Marine Corps was the last American militaryservice to have helicopters it became the first to institutea long-range program of working out helicopter combattechniques.11 (Phib-31 was copied by the U.S. Army, almostword for word, in its first helicopter manual.) The months between 1948 and August of 1950 saw HMX-1and the Marine Corps Schools continue to work on both theconcept of vertical envelopment and the machines used to flyit. There were more Packard Operations, new helicopters likethe HRP-1 and HTL-3, continued test and evaluation, and aMarine Air Ground Task Force demonstration for PresidentHarry S. Truman and the members of Congress. On 25 June, 1950 eight divisions of the North KoreanPeople's Army (NKPA), crossed the 38th Parallel brushingaside patrols of the army of the Republic of Korea (ROK) andrapidly moved south in order to unify the Korean peninsulainto a Communist state.12 In response to the Republic ofKorea's request, on 28 June 1950, the United Nations orderedmilitary sanctions against the North Korean invaders and by 7July the U.S. Marines were ordered to activate a RegimentalCombat Team. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade wasactivated under the command of Brigadier General Edward A.Craig and was built around the 5th Marine Regiment and the33rd Marine Air Group (MAG-33) of the 1st Marine Air Wing.6,534 officers and men prepared to go to Korea.13 HMX-1 was ordered, on the 7th of July, to send 8officers and 30 men to the 1st Provisional Brigade forassignment to Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6) ofMAG-33. These Marines would fly and maintain four HO3S-1helicopters and would be the first helicopter unit organizedfor combat. 14 July, 1950 saw VMO-6, commanded by Major Vincent J.Gottschalk, embarked on the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116)bound for Korea.14 After only 31 months of evaluation forboth the concept of helicopter employment and the aircraftthemselves the Marines were on their way to war for the firsttime with helicopters. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade landed at Pusan,Korea on 2 August, 1950. The next morning General Craig madea reconnaissance of the area in a HO3S-1. This flight begana new era in command and control. General Craig eventuallycame to call the helicopter the "emergency weapon" of theBrigade command and staff.15 The Brigade maneuvered rapidlywith the intent of counterattacking and stopping North Koreanpenetrations. The helicopters of VMO-6 proved their worth.General Craig said of them: Marine Helicopters have proven invaluable. . .They have been used for every conceivable type of mission. The Brigade utilized them for liaison, reconnaissance, evacuation of wounded, rescue of Marine flyers downed in enemy territory, observation, messenger service, guard mail at sea, posting and supplying of outguards on dominating terrain features and resupplying of small units by air. 16 General Joseph L. Stewart recalled the use of thehelicopter when he was a Lieutenant Colonel and the G-3 ofthe 1st Provisional Brigade at Pusan, Korea: ...I was the G-3 of the brigade in Korea that employed the first helicopters in combat. . .It was really dramatic to observe those who hadn't seen a helicopter operate before, to see the reactions and expressions of those who saw for the first time how the helicopter could be of such great assistance to us in planning these fast moving, put-out-the-fire type of operations.17 Major Gottschalk, the Commanding Officer of VMO-6,stated, with historical significance, that the helicopterbrought back a personal element to command and control on thebattlefield that had not been seen in modern times: ...perhaps the most important use of the helicopter in the early months of the Korean War concerned command and control. The flexibility provided the Brigade Commander to control his forces, change direction of movement, give personal instructions to subordinate commanders, and observe the resultant battlefield movement in a dynamic fast moving situation provided a new dimension to tactical control of the battlefield in a difficult terrain setting. 18 Major Gottschalk said, speaking of medevac flights,that: the availability of the helicopter to pick up wounded from units that were cut off some distance from the main body improved the morale of the men in the lines. [He added that rescue missions also] helped the morale of the fighter pilots in support of the Marine brigade.19 The night of August 8th found Captain Victor A.Armstrong flying the first night medevac by lifting a woundedregimental surgeon to safety. The HO3S proved to be a rugged aircraft that couldcontinue to fly regardless of hard landings in rough terrainand taking enemy small-arms rounds. Lieutenant GeneralLemuel C. Shepherd Jr., Commanding General, FMFPac, afterobserving the helicopters operate in Korea, said: Later in Korea I saw helicopters come in with a dozen bullet holes in their wings and bodies--unless they are hit in a vital part, they will continue to fly.20 During the month of August 1950, the helicopters ofVMO-6 logged 580 flights and a total of 348 flight hours withtheir HO3S's.21 General Craig was such an advocate of the use ofhelicopters he wrote the following regarding their use inKorea and in future conflicts: VMO-6 was flown to Pusan from Japan. These aircraft have been invaluable in reconnaissance and the helicopters are a Godsend in this type of terrain, not only for reconnaissance but for supporting of combat patrols in mountainous terrain; for supply of food, water, ammunition; but also for the evacuation of casualties. . By separate dispatch to you.. .a request has been made to bring out elements of the Helicopter Transport Squadron. It is believed that this innovation will meet with outstanding results in combat in this mountainous terrain for the landing of patrols on top of mountain ranges.. .The helicopters presently available have been invaluable beyond expression ...[However) I feel they will not be able to sustain all the demands.22 In September, 1950 VMO-6 prepared for the amphibiousassault at Inchon. The helicopters of VMO-6 would play nopart in the landing because there were not enough of them tolift the assault troops. On 16 September, D+3, CaptainArmstrong landed his HO3S at the newly captured Kimpoairfield with General Shepherd and Colonel Krulak as hispassengers.23 VMO-6 relocated to the airfield at Kimpo andbegan flying a dawn-to-dusk schedule in support of the 1stMarine Division as it fought its way across the Han river andon to northwest approaches to Seoul. Seoul was officially liberated on September 29, 195O andon 12 October the Marines of the 1st Marine Division werebackloaded on ships at Inchon to be moved to the other sideof Korea for a new adventure. After a noncontested landing at Wonsan, Korea the 1stMarine Division, in November of 1950, was so extended that ithad units at Hagaru, some 50 miles from the division CP atHungnam. Major General Oliver P. Smith, the DivisionCommander, realized that he had unusual command and staffproblems. General Smith ordered that the Main Supply Routeto the Chosin Reservoir be strengthend and that an airstripbe constructed at Hagaru. As a result of Chinese CommunistForces (CCF) attacks in late November the 1st Marine Divisionwas divided into five self-contained perimeters. Thehelicopters of VMO-6 provided the only means of contactbetween these isolated groups.24 The night of December 1st saw the Marines come outfighting their way from Yudam-ni to Hagaru, 14 miles thatwould take 59 hours to cross. On 6 December, 1950 the 1stMarine Division began its breakout attack from Hagaru toKoto-ri. By the evening of the 7th of December with the 7thMarines leading and the 5th Marines covering the divisionfought its way to Koto-ri. From there the division marchedto Hamhung with the lead elements reaching the sea late onthe 10th of December. Every day of the breakout from theChosin Reservoir the aircraft of VMO-6 were on call.Although the altitude reduced payloads and the bitter coldadded to the difficulties of upkeep and repair, thehelicopters of VMO-6 saved lives by flying medevacs andbringing in medical supplies. From October 28 to December 15 VMO-6 flew 1,544 flightsfor a total of 1,624.8 flight hours.25 The 1st Marine Division was backloaded from Hungnam,between 10 and 24 December, by the Navy ships of TF-9O. Thedivision was taken back to Pusan, which had been the firstassembly area of the Brigade. In five months the Marines hadmanaged to fight all around the Korean peninsula. The spring of 1951 saw VMO-6 continuing to support the1st Marine Division as it had in 1950. General Shepherdagain spoke of helicopters by saying: Due to the rugged terrain it would have been most difficult to operate in Korea without helicopters. They were a Godsend to the Marines.26 In the summer of 1951, as the first year of Koreanoperations drew to a close, Marine helicopters had flownevery mission except the one that had been envisioned forthem--vertical envelopment during an amphibious assault. Theremedy for this lack was to be filled by Marine TransportHelicopter Squadron (HMR) 161. HMR-161 was commissioned 15January, 1951 at MCAS El Toro, under the command ofLieutenant Colonel George W. Herring. With 43 officers, 244 men and 15 Sikorsky HRS-1helicopters HMR-161 sailed for Korea on 15 August, 1951. TheHRS-1 was a transport helicopter capable of carrying five orsix combat Marines.27 HMR-161 arrived at Pusan, Korea on 2 September, 1951 asthe 1st Marine Division launched an attack in the Punchbowlarea in eastern Korea. HMR-161 moved to the front and sharedField X-83, near Chondo-ni, with VMO-6. The observationpilots of VMO-6 briefed the transport pilots of HMR-161 onthe flying conditions in Korea.28 On 12 September, 1951 HMR-161 indoctrinated the Marinesof the 1st Shore Party Battalion in the techniques of loadingand giving landing instructions to the large transporthelicopters. The next day, in preparation for OperationWindmill I, supplies were sorted into 800 pound loads. At1550 that day seven HRS-1 helicopters lifted with suppliessuspended below each aircraft to fly a seven mile route inorder to resupply the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Uponlanding each helicopter picked up battle casualties and thewounded Marines were admitted to a hospital facility only 30minutes after being wounded. Operation Windmill I consisted of 28 flights for a totalof 14.1 flight hours. 18,848 pounds of cargo were lifted and74 casualties were medevaced.29 On 20 September, 1951 the first helicopter-borne landingof combat Marines took place in Operation Summit. Despitedense fog, HMR-161 lifted 224 fully equipped Marines to theobjective--Hill 884. The HRS-1's also transported 17,772pounds of cargo in support of Operation Summit. The entireoperation consisted of 65 flights, 31.2 flight hours, andtook a total of four hours overall.30 The official report ofOperation Summit, read in part: These initial efforts have demonstrated strikingly the great contribution to tactical and logistical flexibility that the assault helicopter offers ...[The report went on to say that]...helicopter functions will be progressively enlarged as time passes, and that the aircraft type must be recognized as a requisite component of a balanced military force.31 On 27 September HMR-161 conducted the first night trooplift of combat Marines in Operation Blackbird. The HRS-1'slifted 200 Marines of "E" Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marinesto the Punchbowl, on a night with no moonlight, in two hoursand ten minutes. Operation Blackbird was not an unqualifiedsuccess but many lessons were learned. The official reportstated: ...night troop lifts in mountainous terrain are feasible provided a daylight reconnaissance of the landing zone together with the avenues of approach and retirement can be effected. Present equipment indicates that under present conditions in Korea these night lifts should be limited to movementswithin friendly territory.32Operation Blackbird was the only large scale night lift ofcombat Marines in the Korean War. 11 October, 1951 saw HMR-161 make history and headlinesagain. Operation Bumblebee began that morning at 1000 whenthe lift of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and it equipmentcommenced. The statistics tell the story of OperationBumblebee: Number of helicopters: 12. Number of flights: 156. Total flight time: 65.9 hours. Over-all time: 5.5 hours. Number of Marines lifted: 958. Average weight per man: 240 lbs. Total weight lifted: 229,920 lbs. HMR-161 continued to support the 1st Marine Division inoperations like: Bushbeater, Rabbit-Hunt, Switch, Farewell,and logistical support in Muletrain. As 1952 passed HMR-161grew both tactically and in their ability to respond to theneeds of those they supported. On 23 February, 1953 the Marines of HMR-161 beganOperation Haylift II. This operation proved that thehelicopter was destined to have a unique place in logisticalsupport of combat Marines. Over a four day period, anaverage of 12 HRS-1's, flew from dawn to dusk carrying acombined total of 31,589 pounds per hour. Each aircraft made27 round trips of the 15 mile leg and carried 11 tons ofsupplies. It would have taken a large fleet of trucks toprovide this type of support and it would have taken fourtimes as long.33 Again HMR-161 and the helicopters from VMO-6 continuedto provide tactical and logistical support to the 1st MarineDivision in 1953 until the armistice was signed on 27 July,1953. Helicopter pilots and aircrewmen suffered a total ofnine operational deaths in Korea, proving that their machineswere not overly vulnerable. HMR-161, from the first landing in Korea to theArmistice in 1953, flew a total of 18,607 flights, 16,538flight hours, lifted 60,046 people, and transported 7,554,336pounds of cargo. The transport squadron also evacuated 2,748casualties in its 23 months in Korea. VMO-6 flew out 7,067casualties during its 35 months in combat. 34 As a newcomer to Marine aviation, the helicopter provedto be a valuable tactical weapon in Korea. It met andexceeded the expectations the pioneers of verticalenvelopment had for it. The tactical technique of hit andrun had proved most effective when used in major troopmovements and not when used in small lifts. The conceptsdeveloped at Quantico, Virginia in the late `4Os by HMX-1 hadstood the test of war and had been proven in Korea.Amphibious operations of the future would owe much of theirsuccess to the pilots and men of VMO-6 and HMR-161 who flewin Korea. For the Marine Corps today, perhaps the words ofhelicopter designer Frank N. Piasecki spoken in 1953, areexceptionally pertinent: The most dramatic progress will be increased speed of vertical-lift aircraft, [during the next half century]. This will come from two directions: helicopters designers will add speed to their machines; conversely, airplane designers will add vertical-lift capabilities to their high-speed aircraft. The result will be a blending of the two types of flight into machines fully capable of both helicopter flight as we know it today and high-speed flight at velocities far beyond today's experimental supersonic speeds. . .35The Marines of today have as great a challenge ahead of themas the Marines of HMX-1 and the Marine Corps Schools had inthe years between WW II and the Korean War. FOOTNOTES 1Lieutenant Colonel Eugene W. Rawlins and Major William J.Sambito, Marines and Helicopters 1946-1962 (Washington D.C.:History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. MarineCorps,1976), p.11. 2Ibid.p. 12. 3Ibid.p.14. 4Ibid. 5Ibid.p.15. 6Ibid. 7Ibid.p.20. 8Ibid.p.25. 9Ibid. 10Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, (New York: Harper &Brothers, 1954),p.7. 11Ibid. 12Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, (New York: MacmillanPublishing Co.),p.475. 13Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.107. 14Rawlins and Sambito, Marines and Helicopters1946-1962, p .42. 15Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.121. 18Rawlins and Sambito, Marines and Helicopters1946-1962, p .43. 17General Joseph L. Stewart USMC, Oral HistoryTranscript, interview conducted 8 August, 1968(WashingtonD.C.: Historical Division,Headquarters U.S. MarineCorps, 1973),p.51. 18Rawlins and Sambito, Marines and Helicopters1946-1962,p.43. 19Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.118. 20General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Oral HistoryTranscript, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division,HeadquartersU.S. Marine Corps,1967),p.208. 21Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.120. 22Rawlins and Sambito, Marines and Helicopters1946-1962,p .44. 23Lynn Montross, Flying Windmills in Korea", Marine CorpsGazette, (September 1953),p.22. 24Ibid. 25Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.146. 26Shepherd, Oral History Transcript,p.209. 27Montross, Marine Corps Gazette,(September 1953),p.23. 26Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.159. 29Ibid.p. 162. 30Montross, Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1953),p.24. 31Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.165. 32Ibid.p. 167. 33Ibid.p.200. 34Ibid.p.217. 35Ibid.p.225. BIBLIOGRAPHYMillett, Allan. Semper Fidelis. New York: MacmillanPublishing Co.Montross, Lynn. Cavalry of the Sky. New York: Harper &Brothers, 1954.Montross, Lynn. "Flying Windmills in Korea." Marine CorpsGazette, (September 1953)Moskin, J. Robert. The U.S. Marine Corps Story. New York:McGraw-Hill, 1977.Rawlins, Eugene and Sambito, William. Marines and Helicopters1946-1962. Washington D.C. :History and Museums Division,Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,1976.Shepherd, Lemuel C. General. Oral History Transcript.Washington D.C. :History and Museums Division, HeadquartersU.S. Marine Corps, 1967.Stewart, Joseph L. General. Oral History Transcript.Washington D.C. :History and Museums Division, HeadquartersU.S. Marine Corps, 1973.Wray, Robert P. Colonel. Letter regarding Close Air Supportand Helicopters during the Korean War, 31 January 1989.
