June 1950. The great victory of World War II was still a vivid memory. Thedemobilization of America's wartime strength had been accomplished very rapidly.A growing fear of Joseph Stalin's ambitions was reflected in the new terms ironcurtain and cold war, but much energy and hope had focused on such developmentsas the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and NATO. Korea, left divided afterthe war into the Communist North and the U.S.-supported South, was a source oftension but not immediate concern.
The United States was content largely to leave to a UN commission the problemof North Korea's threatening stance toward South Korea. The Russians hadwithdrawn their troops from the North in 1948; at the UN's suggestion, Americarecalled its troops from South Korea in June 1949, though leaving behind muchmilitary materiel and some 500 advisers. In a speech in January 1950 outliningAmerican policy in Asia after the establishment of Communist China, Secretary ofState Dean Acheson did not include South Korea within the U.S. "defensiveperimeter"; those nations outside that perimeter would have to resist aggressionthemselves and then rely on the United Nations for support.
At four in the morning on Sunday, 25 June 1950, North Korea launched afull-scale invasion across the 38th Parallel into South Korea. The UN SecurityCouncil quickly passed a resolution calling on the North Koreans to ceasehostilities and withdraw. When they refused, the Security Council passed asecond resolution on the 27th recommending that UN members "furnish suchassistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armedattack and restore the international peace and security in the area."
Meanwhile, the North Korean forces were advancing rapidly. Seoul, the SouthKorean capital, would fall by 28 June. These events posed a major challenge tothe Truman administration and America's allies, for if the invasion was notchecked, a precedent would be set that could undermine the confidence ofcountries that relied on the United States for protection. The strength andavailability of America's armed forces, however, had been eroded by such factorsas the massive postwar demobilization, uneven and neglected training, antiquatedequipment, and, despite improvement, some residual racial segregation.
President Truman did not hesitate. He immediately instructed General of theArmy Douglas MacArthur at his Far East Command headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, tosupply South Korean forces with ammunition and equipment. On 26 June Truman thenauthorized MacArthur to use U.S. air and naval units against North Koreantargets below the 38th Parallel, and the next day, seizing on the new SecurityCouncil resolution, he extended the range of those targets to include those inNorth Korea. He also authorized the use of U.S. ground forces to protect Pusan,South Korea's major port. On 30 June, after MacArthur had gone to Korea toassess the situation, Truman authorized MacArthur to use all of his availableforces to repel the invasion and blockade the Korean coast.
When the Security Council on 7 July recommended the establishment of aunified command in Korea, under a U.S. commander, Truman appointed MacArthur asCommander in Chief, United Nations Command. Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker,Commander, U.S. Eighth Army, assumed command of all UN ground forces, whichincluded those of the Republic of Korea. U.S. ground forces available toMacArthur included the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th, 24th, and 25th InfantryDivisions in Japan and the 29th Regiment on Okinawa. The divisions lacked athird of their infantry and artillery units, and existing units wereunderstrength. Ammunition reserves were low, and training had been sacrificed tooccupation duties.
Given the momentum of the North Korean advance and the general unpreparednessof U.S. forces when they arrived, General Walker's strategy was to gain timethrough extended defensive delaying actions. The price of engaging the enemywith an inadequate force had been clearly demonstrated in early July when TaskForce Smith, flown in from Japan as an advance element of the 24th Division, wasattacked and had to retreat with heavy losses of men and equipment. In fightingthat grew as fierce as many World War II battles, Walker's combined UN forcesgradually fell back to the south under constant North Korean pressure. But inearly August Walker changed the strategy, ordering a final stand along a140-mile perimeter around the now well-stocked port of Pusan.
With great courage, determination, and adroit movements between defensivepositions, Walker's combined troops held the perimeter into September. At thesame time, the Eighth Army's strength was augmented by mid-August by the arrivalof the U.S. 2d Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, four battalions ofmedium tanks from the United States, and the 5th Regimental Combat Team fromHawaii. By the end of August a number of South Korean divisions had regrouped,and Great Britain committed its 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade from HongKong.
The stage was set. Under U.S. Army leadership, the UN force had checked amuch larger but now somewhat weakened enemy. With reinforcements in place,General MacArthur by mid-September was ready to go on the offensive.
At the end of the first campaign of the Korean War, the UN Defensive, GeneralDouglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, was ready toattempt to repel what had been the sustained advance of the North KoreanPeople's Army. Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army had been reinforced, itslogistical support had solidified, and it had checked the enemy along adefensive perimeter west and north of Pusan. This next campaign, the UNOffensive, would be a story of stunning success.
The risk of success, however, was that it might provoke Communist China. Butin mid-September 1950, Chinese military involvement was not a major concern foreither General MacArthur or President Harry Truman. The focus was on breakingout from the Pusan Perimeter and engaging the North Koreans. MacArthur believedthat the North Koreans' deep penetration south into the Republic of Korea (ROK)made their forces vulnerable to an amphibious encirclement. His plan called forMaj. Gen. Edward M. Almond's separate X Corps -- consisting of the 7th InfantryDivision (augmented with 8,600 ROK troops) and the 1st Marine Division -- to makean amphibious landing at Inch'on, a port on the Yellow Sea well behind enemylines twenty-five miles west of Seoul. A force landing at Inch'on would have tomove only a relatively short distance inland to cut North Korea's major supplyroutes, recapture the South Korean capital, and block a North Korean retreatonce the Eighth Army advanced northward from the defensive line at Pusan.
The landing at Inch'on was a considerable gamble. If the assault failed,MacArthur would be left with no major reserves and no prospect of immediatefurther reinforcement from the United States. But the landing, against lightresistance, worked. Starting on 15 September when a battalion of the 1st MarineDivision, covered by strong air strikes and naval gun fire, captured WolmiIsland just offshore from Inch'on, the two X Corps divisions steadily movedinland toward Seoul over the next two weeks.
Meanwhile, on 16 September the Eighth Army began its offensive. The ROK I andII Corps were positioned on the north of the Pusan Perimeter; the U.S. I Corps(composed of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade,the 24th Infantry Division, and the ROK 1st Division) moved from the Taegufront; the U.S. IX Corps, including the 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions andattached ROK units, was poised along the Naktong River. Walker's forces movedslowly at first, but by 23 September the envelopment threatened by X Corps andEighth Army became clear, and the North Koreans broke to the north. Elements ofX Corps' 7th Division and of the 1st Cavalry Division, Eighth Army, linked up on26 September just south of Suwon. Seoul was liberated the next day, andMacArthur returned the capital to President Syngman Rhee on 29 September. By theend of September the North Korean Army no longer existed as an organized forcein the southern republic. The border along the 38th Parallel had beenrestored.
The question now was whether to cross the border. To do so would clearly riskraising tensions with China and the Soviet Union. But the North Koreans stillposed a threat: some 30,000 troops had escaped from the South, and an additional30,000 were in northern training camps. President Truman and the Joint Chiefs ofStaff gave cautious initial approval. At the beginning of October the ROK I andII Corps crossed the 38th Parallel, moving up the east coast and through centralKorea. On 9 October an all-out offensive began after the United Nations GeneralAssembly voted for the restoration of peace and security throughout Korea,thereby tacitly approving the occupation of the North. On that day GeneralWalker's U.S. I Corps crossed the border on the west.
On 19 October the I Corps' 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st ROK Divisionentered P'yongyang, the North Korean capital. On the 24th MacArthur ordered hiscommanders to advance as quickly as possible, with all forces available, so thatoperations could be completed before the onset of winter. The press of theEighth Army in the west was relentless, as it sent separate columns north towardthe Yalu River, each free to press forward independently. On the 26th an ROKregiment sent reconnaissance troops to the town of Ch'osan, thereby becoming thefirst UN element to reach the Yalu.
Meanwhile, General Almond's X Corps had been withdrawn from combat to preparefor new amphibious landings, but this time on the east coast. The rapid advanceof ROK forces above the 38th Parallel and the fall of Wonsan, North Korea'smajor port, to the ROK I Corps on 10 October allowed the 1st Marine Division tomake an administrative landing at Wonsan on the 26th; on the 29th the 7thDivision landed unopposed at Iwon, eighty miles farther north. Adding the ROK ICorps to his command, Almond then attacked up the coast and inland toward theYalu and the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, focusing on the industrial,communications, and irrigation centers of northeastern Korea. As one Americannewspaper put it, "Except for unexpected developments . . . we can now be easyin our minds as to the military outcome."
But then the unexpected did happen. Resistance stiffened in the last week ofOctober in both the Eighth Army and X Corps zones. On the 25th an Eighth ArmyROK unit near Unsan northwest of the Ch'ongch'on River captured a Chinesesoldier. The extent of Chinese infiltration was not clear, but over the nexteight days Chinese forces dispersed the ROK troops who had reached the Yalu,battered the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division near Unsan, andforced the ROK II Corps to retreat. Time would quickly demonstrate that this wasnot just a temporary setback. The nature of the Korean conflict would nowfundamentally change.
The second phase of the Korean War, the UN Offensive, had been a story ofrelentless military success against the North Korean People's Army. The captureof a Chinese soldier on 25 October 1950, however, marked a fundamental change inthe nature of the conflict. When the presence in North Korea of CommunistChinese Forces (CCF) units was confirmed, there was much debate in the UnitedNations Command (UNC) and in Washington about China's intentions, but thatpresence was quickly felt on the battlefield.
In the X Corps zone Chinese forces in late October had stopped a Republic ofKorea (ROK) column advancing on the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. On 2 Novemberthe U.S. 7th Marines relieved the South Koreans and over the next four daysbroke through the Chinese resistance to within a few miles of the reservoir, atwhich point the Chinese broke contact. In the west, the Eighth Army fell backunder attack to the Ch'ongch'on River, though the Chinese again broke contactafter 6 November. By then three CCF divisions (10,000 men each) were estimatedto be in the Eighth Army sector and two in the X Corps zone. UN pilots were alsofor the first time encountering Russian-made MIG-15 jet fighters.
After 6 November a comparative lull lasted for several weeks. Estimates ofCCF strength rose through the month, but General Douglas MacArthur, the UNCcommander, felt that the Chinese were not strong enough to launch an all-outoffensive, particularly when North Korean's forces were battered andineffective. He thus prepared to press on with his plans to reach the YaluRiver. Moreover, MacArthur said, there was no other way to obtain "an accuratemeasure of enemy strength." Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker's Eight Army was to movenorthward through western and central Korea, while Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond'sseparate X Corps, now strengthened by the arrival of the 3d Infantry Divisionfrom the United States, was to move from northeastern Korea northwest to cutenemy lines of communication and support the Eighth Army. After taking time toimprove his logistical support, Walker launched his offensive on 24 November. Atfirst the Eighth Army encountered little opposition, but the next night theenemy launched a fierce counterattack in the mountainous terrain near thecentral North Korean town of Tokch'on. The X Corps, which had resumed itsadvance earlier, joined the planned attack on 27 November, moving slowly, butthat evening a second enemy force, moving down the Chosin Reservoir, struck the1st Marine Division and elements of the U.S. 7th Division.
It was clear that most of the enemy were Chinese, but the surprise was thesize of the two attacking forces. By 28 November MacArthur had his "accuratemeasure" of the enemy's strength: the Chinese XIII Army Group, with some 200,000troops, faced the Eighth Army; the IX Army Group, with 100,000 men, faced XCorps. Both had slipped into North Korea from Manchuria largely undetected. Onthe 28th MacArthur informed Washington that "we face an entirely new war," andthe next day he instructed General Walker to withdraw as necessary to escapebeing enveloped by the Chinese. He also ordered X Corps to pull back into abeachhead at the east coast port of Hungnam, north of Wonsan.
The main enemy attack in the Eighth Army zone was directed against the ROK IICorps. When the Chinese broke through the UN line, General Walker committed hisreserves (the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, the Turkish Brigade, and the British27th Commonwealth and 29th Independent Infantry Brigades), but they failed tostop the repeated wave of enemy troops. Walker first withdrew south across theCh'ongch'on River, suffering heavy casualties. The U.S. 2d Division fought adelaying action while other units regrouped in defensive positions near theNorth Korean capital of P'yongyang. On 5 December the Eighth Army fell back topositions about twenty-five miles south of that city, and by mid-December it hadmoved below the 38th Parallel to form a defensive perimeter north and east ofSeoul, the South Korean capital. At the same time, in early December, MacArthurordered X Corps to evacuate by sea to Pusan, where it would become part of theEighth Army. December thus saw the loss of all UNC territorial gains in NorthKorea.
By this time the UNC included troops from fifteen countries, but the sense ofcrisis in the command was heightened by the death of General Walker in an autoaccident north of Seoul on 23 December. Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway replacedhim, arriving in Korea on 26 December. Ridgway was determined to maintain theexisting line above Seoul, but on 30 December MacArthur told the U.S. JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) that the Chinese could drive the UNC out of Korea unlesshe received major reinforcement. He also proposed air and naval attacks onmainland China and the involvement of Chinese Nationalist forces. None of hisdemands and proposals were accepted. Washington was not prepared to let theconflict in Korea escalate into a larger war. President Harry S. Truman's morepressing concern was the global intentions of the USSR. The JCS told MacArthurto stay in Korea if he could but to prepare to withdraw to Japan ifnecessary.
On the other hand, despite a renewed enemy offensive that started on 31December and saw the abandonment of Seoul on 4 January 1951, General Ridgwaybecame increasingly convinced that his existing forces were sufficient. He notedthat the Chinese did not aggressively push south after marching into Seoul andthat North Korean forces ceased their offensive in central and eastern Korea bymid-January. He concluded that a rudimentary logistical system constrained enemyoffensive operations to no more than a week or two. Tactically his goal was thusto "wage a war of maneuver -- slashing at the enemy when he withdraws and fightingdelaying tactics when he attacks." When General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief ofStaff, visited Korea, he agreed with Ridgway. "As of now," Collins announced on15 January, "we are going to stay and fight."
As the third phase of the Korean conflict drew to an end, General MacArthurgave Ridgway unprecedented authority to plan and execute operations in Korea.Ridgway, in turn, was poised to return to the offensive.
As the third phase of the Korean War -- the CCF (Communist Chinese Forces)Intervention -- drew to a close on 24 January 1951, the United Nations Command(UNC) had come to the end of a series of tactical withdrawals. Starting inmid-December 1950, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway's Eighth Army had fallen backfrom the 38th Parallel, first to the South Korean capital of Seoul, then to aline below Osan and Wonju. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond's X Corps hadevacuated by sea on the east coast to Pusan, where it became part of the EighthArmy. All the territorial gains in North Korea of the earlier phases of the warhad been lost. But General Ridgway was convinced the enemy lacked the logisticalsystem to maintain offensive operations for any extended period, and he waspreparing to begin a counteroffensive. This fourth phase of the war wouldlargely shape the outcome of the conflict.
After two task forces had encountered little or no Chinese opposition inprobes to the north, on 25 January General Ridgway launched OperationTHUNDERBOLT, a larger but still cautious reconnaissance in force supported byair power. Resistance stiffened at the end of the month, but it gave way in thewest by 9 February. The next day UN forces secured Inch'on and Kimpo airfield,and the U.S. I Corps neared the Han River. Meanwhile, on the central front, asthe operation expanded, the X Corps met increasing opposition, and the Chinesestruck back on the night of 11-12 February, driving back Republic of Korea (ROK)forces north of Hoengsong. But when four Chinese regiments attacked thecrossroads town of Chip'yong-ni on the 13th, the U.S. 23d Infantry and theFrench Battalion conducted a successful defense for three days until the enemywithdrew. Ridgway regarded this valiant effort as symbolic of the renewedfighting spirit of his command.
In the west the U.S. I and IX Corps gradually seized the area up to the HanRiver, except for one enemy foothold between Seoul and Yangp'yong. By the 18thcombat patrols confirmed that Chinese and North Korean troops along the entirecentral front were withdrawing. General Ridgway then began a general advance(Operation KILLER) by the IX and X Corps to pursue the enemy. By the end of themonth the Chinese foothold below the Han River had collapsed. With the approvalof General Douglas MacArthur, the UNC commander, Ridgway continued his attacknorth by launching Operation RIPPER on 7 March. The objective was a linedesignated Idaho just south of the 38th Parallel. On the night of 14-15 March,UN patrols moved into a deserted Seoul. By the end of the month Ridgway's troopshad reached the Idaho line.
The question now was whether to cross the 38th Parallel again. On 20 Marchthe Joint Chiefs of Staff had notified General MacArthur that President Harry S.Truman was preparing to announce a willingness to negotiate an end to theconflict with the North Koreans and the Chinese, an announcement that would beissued before any advance above the 38th Parallel. MacArthur preempted thatannouncement by issuing his own offer to end hostilities, but one that includeda threat to cross the parallel. President Truman never released his statement,concluding, however unhappily, that perhaps MacArthur's ultimatum would pressurethe enemy to the negotiating table. He also left the decision on crossing the38th Parallel to tactical considerations. Consequently, when Ridgway receivedintelligence about enemy preparations for an expected spring offensive, he begana new attack, with MacArthur's approval, in early April. The objective was aline designated Kansas about ten miles above the 38th Parallel. By the 9th theU.S. I and IX Corps, and the ROK I Corps on the east coast, had reached thatline, and the U.S. X Corps and the ROK III Corps were nearing it. The I and IXCorps then continued their attack beyond Kansas. At the same time, on 11 April,President Truman relieved MacArthur after the UNC commander said he wouldwelcome the use of Nationalist Chinese forces since there could be "nosubstitute for victory" in Korea. Ridgway replaced MacArthur, and on 14 AprilLt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army.
Eight days later four Chinese army groups and two North Korean corps beganthe enemy's spring offensive, attacking most heavily in the west, with a majorfocus on recapturing Seoul. Withdrawing in stages to previously prepareddefenses several miles north of Seoul, General Van Fleet finally stopped theadvance. On 15 May the enemy attacked again. Van Fleet had expected anotheradvance on Seoul, but the brunt of the assault was in the east-central area. Byrepositioning units and using unrelenting artillery fire, he stopped the attackon 20 May after the enemy had penetrated thirty miles. To prevent the Chineseand North Koreans from regrouping, Van Fleet immediately sent the Eighth Armyforward. Meeting light resistance, the Eighth Army was just short of the Kansasline by 31 May. The next day Van Fleet sent part of his force farther north, toa line designated Wyoming in the west-central area known as the Iron Triangle.By mid-June the Eighth Army was in control of both the Kansas line and theWyoming bulge.
Given this strong defensive position, Van Fleet was ordered to hold andfortify it while Washington waited for the Chinese and North Koreans to offer tonegotiate an armistice. The enemy in turn used this lull to regroup and to builddefenses opposite the Eighth Army. The days settled down to patrols and smallclashes. On 23 June, Jacob Malik, the Soviet Union's delegate to the UnitedNations, called for talks on a cease-fire and armistice. When the People'sRepublic of China endorsed Malik's statement, President Truman authorizedGeneral Ridgway to arrange the talks. After a series of radio messages, thefirst armistice conference was scheduled for 10 July in the town of Kaesong. Thetime of large-scale fighting was over.
Years Of Stalemate
PHASE 5: 9 July 1951-27 July 1953
(UN Summer-Fall Offensive 1951)
(Second Korean Winter)
(Korea, Summer- Fall 1952)
(Third Korean Winter)
( Korea, Summer 1953) |
Armistice talks began at Kaesong on 10 July 1951. North and South Korea werewilling to fight on, but after twelve months of large-scale but indecisiveconflict, their Cold War supporters -- the People's Republic of China and theSoviet Union on one side, the United States and its UN allies on the other -- hadconcluded it was not in their respective interests to continue. The chiefnegotiator for the UN was American Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy; his counterpart wasLt. Gen. Nam Il, the chief of staff of the North Korean People's Army. At thefirst session it was agreed that military operations could continue until anarmistice agreement was actually signed. The front lines remained relativelyquiet, though, as the opposing sides adopted a cautious watch-and-waitstance.
Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet's Eighth Army had fortified its positions alongLine Kansas and along Line Wyoming, a bulge north of Kansas in the west-centralarea known as the Iron Triangle. Both the Kansas line in the east and theWyoming bulge were above the 38th Parallel, the prewar boundary between the twoKoreas. On the west, the front line dipped below the 38th Parallel north ofSeoul, the South Korean capital, and then continued to fall toward the coast.This uneven line led to the first impasse in negotiations, when the North Koreanand Chinese side argued that the armistice line should be the 38th Parallel,while the UN negotiators called for a line reflecting current positions, whichthey argued were more defensible and secure than the old border.
When the Communist side broke off negotiations on 23 August, General MatthewB. Ridgway's United Nations Command (UNC) responded with a limited newoffensive. General Van Fleet sent the U.S. X Corps and the Republic of Korea(ROK) I Corps to gain terrain objectives in east-central Korea five to sevenmiles north of Kansas -- among them places that resonate with veterans, such as thePunchbowl, Bloody Ridge, and Heartbreak Ridge. In the west, five UN divisions(the ROK 1st, the 1st British Commonwealth, and the U.S. 1st Cavalry and 3d and25th Infantry) struck northwest along a forty-mile front to secure a newposition beyond the Wyoming line to protect the vital Seoul-Ch'orwon railway.The U.S. IX Corps followed by driving even farther north to the edge of Kumsong.
By the last week of October the UN's objectives had been secured, and on the25th the armistice talks resumed -- now at P'anmunjom, a hamlet six miles east ofKaesong. When the North Koreans and Chinese dropped their demand that thearmistice line be the 38th Parallel, the two sides agreed on 27 November thatthe armistice demarcation line would be the existing line of contact, providedthat an armistice agreement was reached in thirty days. A lull now settled overthe battlefield, as fighting tapered off to patrols, small raids, and small unit(but often bitterly fought) struggles for outpost positions. When the thirty-daydeadline came and went, as negotiations stalled over the exchange of prisonersof war, among other issues, both sides tacitly extended their acceptance of thearmistice line agreement. The continuing absence of large-scale combat allowedthe UNC to make several battlefield adjustments, withdrawing the U.S. 1stCavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions from Korea between December 1951 andFebruary 1952 and replacing them with the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, thefirst National Guard divisions to serve in the war. General Van Fleet alsoshifted UN units along the front in the spring of 1952, giving more defensiveresponsibility to the ROK Army in order to concentrate greater U.S. strength inthe west.
Meanwhile, the Far East Air Forces intensified a bombing campaign begun inAugust 1951, supported by U.S. naval fire and carrier-based aircraft. In August1952 the largest air raid of the war was carried out against P'yongyang, theNorth Korean capital. Both sides exchanged heavy artillery fire through 1952,and in June the 45th Division, in response to increased Chinese ground action,engaged in an intense period of fighting with the Chinese, successfullyestablishing eleven new patrol bases along its front. By the beginning of 1953,however, the larger picture was still one of continuing military stalemate, withfew changes in the front lines, reflecting the deadlock in the armistice talksthat had led the UN delegation to call an indefinite recess in October 1952.
Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor took command of the Eighth Army on 11 February1953. By March he was faced with renewed enemy attacks against his frontlineoutposts. Despite the fact that the armistice talks had resumed on 26 April,accompanied by a major exchange of sick and wounded UN and enemy prisoners,flare-ups occurred again in late May and on 10 June, when three Chinesedivisions attacked the ROK II Corps defending the UN forward position just southof Kumsong. By 18 June the terms of a final armistice agreement were almostsettled, but when South Korean President Syngman Rhee unilaterally allowed some27,000 North Korean prisoners who had expressed a desire to stay in the South to"escape," the final settlement was further delayed. The Chinese seized on thisdelay to begin a new offensive to try to improve their final front line. On 6July they launched an attack on Pork Chop Hill, a 7th Division outpost, and onthe 13th they again attacked the ROK II Corps south of Kumsong (as well as theright flank of the IX Corps), forcing the UN forces to withdraw about eightmiles, to below the Kumsong River. By 20 July, however, the Eighth Army hadretaken the high ground along the river, where it established a new defensiveline.
As the UN counterattack was ending, the P'anmunjom negotiators reached anoverall agreement on 19 July. After settling remaining details, they signed thearmistice agreement at 10 o'clock on the morning of 27 July. All fightingstopped twelve hours later. The cease-fire demarcation line approximated thefinal front. It ranged from forty miles above the 38th Parallel on the eastcoast to twenty miles below the parallel on the west coast. It was slightly morefavorable to North Korea than the tentative armistice line of November 1951, butcompared to the prewar boundary, it amounted to a North Korean net loss of some1,500 square miles. Within three days of signing both sides were required towithdraw two kilometers from the cease-fire line. The resulting demilitarizedzone has been an uneasy reality in international relations ever since.
