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The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary PeopleHistory |
It appears that it is as necessary to provide soldiers with defensive arms ofevery kind as to instruct them in the use of offensive ones. For it is certain aman will fight with greater courage and confidence when he finds himselfproperly armed for defense. VEGETIUS: MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE ROMANS |
Restoring The Balance
Chipyong-ni
Posters Summarizing Phases of the Korean War
China's Campaign Sequence
Chapter 8
Chipyong-niBK: Chinese photo. Obviously posed, but showing the CCF commanding the high ground. This was usually the case in the movement stages of the war when the CCF were attacking, because of the difficulty of including the hills in a continuous perimeter defense. The CCF usually had only mortars to exploit their positions, but had excellent observation of our key defense points and flexibility in staging and directing their attacks.
* Chipyong-ni was defended because the commanding general of Eighth Army (Lt.Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway) decided to make a stand there against the ChineseCommunists.
In the chronology of Korean battles, the fighting for Chipyong-nifollowed the withdrawal from northern Korea at the end of 1950, a brief EighthArmy offensive that began on 5 February 1951, and a full-scale Chinesecounteroffensive that struck a week later.
The 23d Regimental Combat Team made the decisive defense of Chipyong-ni on 13and 14 February 1951. This action followed the patrol ambush and the subsequentbattle for the Twin Tunnels area some high ground three miles southeast ofChipyong-ni. After the Twin Tunnels operation, the 23d Infantry Regiment (2dInfantry Division) proceeded on the afternoon of 3 February to the town ofChipyong-ni and set up a perimeter defense. Chipyong-ni was a small crossroadstown half a mile long and several blocks wide, situated on a single-trackrailroad. Besides the railway station there were several other brick or framebuildings in the center of the town, but most of the buildings were constructedof the usual mud, sticks, and straw. At least half of the buildings were alreadyreduced to rubble as the result of previous fighting in the town.
Encircling Chipyong-ni were eight prominent hills that rose to an averageheight of 850 feet above the rice paddies and buildings in the valley. Thesehills provided excellent defensive positions, but to have occupied them wouldhave stretched the front-line defensive positions along 12 miles of ridgelinesand formed a perimeter with a 3- to 4-mile diameter. Instead, the regimental commander (Col. Paul L. Freeman) stationed his infantrymen onlower ground around a tight perimeter about a mile in diameter. On three sidesof the town the line followed small hills; on the northwest section theinfantrymen dug their holes across a half-mile strip of rice paddies.
During the ten days after going into position at Chipyong-ni, ColonelFreeman's regiment dug in and strengthened its positions. The 37th FieldArtillery Battalion (attached to the regiment) arrived on 5 February. Battery B,82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, joined the regiment,adding six M16 and four M19 flakwagons to the defense of the town. Several dayslater Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion (a 155-mm howitzer unit), wasattached to reinforce the fires of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion. [1]
The infantry companies dug in their machine guns, registered their mortars,sowed antipersonnel mines, and operated daily patrols to the encompassing highground. The regimental Heavy-Mortar Company divided he fires of its platoons andsections among the sectors of the perimeter, the artillery registered on allprobable avenues of enemy approach, and all units established goodcommunications lines. There was time to coordinate the infantry, artillery, andair support into an effective combat team. [2]
This narrative describes the fighting for Chipyong-ni that occurred in thatsector of the 2d Battalion's perimeter defended by Company G, 23d Infantry. Asit happened, the howitzers of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, were inposition at the bottom of Company G's hill so that the artillerymen were drawninto the same battle. The commander of the 2d Battalion (Lt.Col. James W.Edwards) placed all three of his rifle companies on the front line to cover thesector assigned to his battalion. This was the south rim of the perimeter.Within the companies, two company commanders committed their three rifleplatoons. The other company (F), to which Colonel Edwards assigned the centerand smallest sector, manned its part of the line with only two platoons, leavingits support platoon as the battalion reserve. [3]
The narrow supply road leading southwest from Chipyong-ni went under therailroad on the south edge of the town and then, within a third of a mile,passed two embankments of red clay where the road cut through the two ends of aU-shaped hill. Company G started at the second of these two road cuts andextended left (east) along the southern side of the U. It was not much of a hillonly a couple of contour lines on the map. Infantrymen could climb the smoothhump of earth in a few minutes. The 1st Platoon of Company G held the right endof the hill next to the road cut. The 3d Platoon had the center position (thehighest part of the hill) and extended its line left to the bend of the U. The2d Platoon was down in the rice paddies between the 3d Platoon and Company F.[4]
Men from the two platoons on the hill dug their holes just over the top of the forward slope. The positions restricted the fields of fire somewhatbut provided good observation, especially for the 3d Platoon, which could seeall areas to the south except for a dead spot in a dry creek bed just in frontof its right flank.
There were two other significant features near the 3d Platoon's area.
At the foot of the hill and just beyond the dry creek bed was a cluster of 15or 20 buildings that made up the village of Masan. The second feature was anarrow spur of ground that formed a link between the 3d Platoon's hill and alarge hill mass to the south. The 2d Platoon in the rice paddies lackedsatisfactory observation but had good fields of fire across the flat land to itsimmediate front.
In addition to its own Weapons Platoon, Company G's supporting weapons included a section of 75-mm recoilless rifles, a section of heavymachine guns from Company H, and a platoon of 88-mm mortars which was dug innear the edge of the town and had a forward observer stationed with Company G.There were also forward observers from the regimental Heavy-Mortar Company andfrom the 37th Field Artillery Battalion with Company G. During the daytime menfrom the 75-mm recoilless rifle section manned their weapons, but at night theyreplaced them with two caliber .50 machine guns to prevent having theirpositions disclosed at night by the back-blasts of the recoilless rifles.[5]
The Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon set up two fougasses (drums of napalm),the first on the road just south of the road cut, and the second in the ricepaddies in front of the 2d Platoon. The 1st Platoon, which was next to the road,also strung barbed-wire entanglements across the road and in front of itsposition. There was not enough wire available to reach across the company front.[6] Colonel Edwards supervised the siting of all weapons, and the digging of theholes which he insisted be of the standing type and deep enough for goodcover.
When Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Battalion, arrived, its 155-mm howitzerswent into position in the small bowl formed by the U-shaped ridge of whichCompany G occupied one side. The howitzers were laid by platoon to support theeast, north, and west sectors of the regimental perimeter. To the rear of thehowitzers, the artillerymen set up a tent for the fire direction center (FDC)personnel. Behind that, near the bottom of Company G's hill, were several othertents for the mess and supply sections. A liaison officer from the 37th FieldArtillery Battalion to Battery B (Capt. John A. Elledge), and the commander ofCompany G (Lt. Thomas Heath) worked out a plan for joint defense of the sector.This plan provided for the use of the artillery's machine guns on the front lineand, if necessary, the use of some artillerymen as riflemen while skeleton crewsmanned the howitzers. The two officers also set up an infantry-artillerymachine-gun post in the road cut with a six-man crew to operate two machine gunsone caliber .50 and one caliber .30. This road cut was also the dividing linebetween Colonel Edwards's 2d Battalion sector and that of the French Battalion(a regular battalion of the 23d Infantry).
In the meantime, while the 23d RCT built up its defenses, an Eighth Armygeneral offensive got under way on 5 February with X Corps, in the center of theline, attacking to make a double envelopment of the town of Hongchon, animportant enemy build-up area. The attack moved slowly until the night of 11February, when the Chinese launched a full-scale counteroffensive with twocolumns driving south aimed at the towns of Hoengsong and Wonju in X Corps'sector. [7] The vigorous enemy attack drove through two ROK divisions and turnedthe United Nations' attack into a withdrawal that rolled the front lines southbetween 5 and 20 miles. [8] Before the Chinese attack, the front lines of XCorps were well ahead of Colonel Freeman's Chipyong-ni perimeter, but as the units went south,sometimes fighting through enemy roadblocks, Chipyong-ni became a conspicuousbulge on the left of the corps' line.
At the 23d Infantry's perimeter, the usual patrols for the daylight hours of13 February reported increased enemy activity crowding close to Chipyong-ni onthree sides north, east, and west. The Air Force observation plane operatingwith the RCT reported enemy groups moving toward the perimeter from the northand east. Observers called for artillery fire against those enemy columns withinreach, while the tactical air control party directed forty flights of aircraftagainst other enemy groups beyond artillery range. [9]
Another indication of enemy strength and dispositions came from the 2dDivision's Reconnaissance Company. Reinforced by a rifle company, it was orderedon the morning of 13 February to patrol the road from Iho-ri straight north toChipyong-ni a distance of 15 to 18 miles. Even on this road there were Chinesein sufficient strength to halt this force and turn it back. [10]
Faced with this growing threat of encirclement, Colonel Freeman wanted togive up his positions and go back to Yoju, fifteen miles south. The commander ofX Corps (Maj.Gen. Edward M. Almond) flew into Chipyong-ni by helicopter at noonon 13 February and discussed with Colonel Freeman the advisability of such awithdrawal a move that had the approval of the corps and division commanders. Atnoon Colonel Freeman recommended that his regiment go south on the followingmorning (14 February). However, within an hour and a half after General Almondreturned to his command post to relay this recommendation to General Ridgway,Colonel Freeman changed his mind and his recommendation. The report from the 2dDivision's Reconnaissance Company describing enemy opposition to movement on themain supply road south convinced Freeman that it would be better to leave assoon as possible, and he presented his request to division headquarters. In themeantime, however, General Almond had submitted the original recommendation andrequest to leave Chipyong-ni on the following morning to General Ridgway.General Ridgway adamantly refused permission to abandon Chipyong-ni. [11]
Colonel Freeman immediately started to strengthen his position. He asked forair strikes and airdrops for the next day, set up a secondary perimeter to bemanned at night by a company of engineers, positioned his tanks near the outerperimeter, and ordered all gaps mined or blocked by lanes of machine-gun fire.[12] During the early part of the evening of 13 February, Colonel Freeman calledhis unit commanders together to warn them that the movement of enemy troopsprobably meant that they would soon be surrounded and attacked by theChinese.
"We'll stay here and fight it out," he said. [13]
The early part of the evening was quiet. At Battery B's position Lt. RobertL. Peters was sitting in a tent writing a letter. The battery executive (Lt.Randolph McKinney) went to bed after having decided to remove his shoes but tosleep in his clothes in case troubled started. Most of the men of Battery B wereinexperienced replacements who had joined the battery after the action atKunu-ri, where more than half of the men and all equipment had been lost. BeforeLieutenant Peters finished his letter he heard a burst of fire from what seemedlike several thousand yards away. He stepped outside to look. To the southwesthe could see what appeared to be six torches along a trail leading from a largehill. In a short time the machinegunners in the road cut opened fire at figuresthey could distinguish moving across the rice paddies to the south. Peterscalled back to Lieutenant McKinney: "Get up, McKinney; this is it!"
On the east end of Company G's sector, PFC Donald E. Nelson and Pvt. JackWard (members of the 2d Platoon) were sitting in their foxhole in the rice paddyarguing over which one of them had to stay awake during the first part of thenight. The company was required to be on a fifty percent alert at all times,which meant that one man in each foxhole had to be awake while the other slept.Suddenly they heard the sound of digging. It sounded as if it were severalhundred yards away.
Soon after this, two squads of Chinese soldiers attacked the center ofCompany G's line, hitting its 3d Platoon (Lt. Paul J. McGee). One of these enemysquads crawled along the spur of ground that led to the center of the 3dPlatoon's position. The enemy threw three grenades at a machine gun manned byCpl. Eugene L. Ottesen, and then opened with rifles. Corporal Ottesen beganfiring his machine gun. The other enemy squad, two hundred yards to the west,taking advantage of the dead spot in the dry creek bed, climbed the hill andattacked the 3d Platoon at the point where it joined the 1st Platoon. It wasabout 2200 when the first firing broke out.
Hearing the firing, PFC Herbert G. Ziebell awakened his foxhole buddy (PFCRoy F. Benoit) and said: "There's some firing going on. Get up and getready."
Ziebell did not fire immediately because he could see nothing to shoot, andhe was afraid the flash of his rifle would draw enemy fire. Along the line othermen heard the firing and sat in the darkness waiting for the attack.
When Lieutenant McGee heard Corporal Ottesen's machine gun open fire heimmediately telephoned his company commander (Lieutenant Heath). He then calledhis squad leaders by sound-powered telephone and informed them of the attack. Inorder to conserve ammunition, he ordered his men to fire only when they couldsee the enemy. Apparently making only a probing attack, the enemy withdrew aftera few minutes. Except for some firing by the 2d Platoon, there was a lull forabout an hour.
Around 2300 a Chinese squad worked up close to the center of the 3d Platoon.An enemy tossed a grenade in the hole of one of Lieutenant McGee's squad leaders(Cpl. James C. Mougeat), wounding him.
Corporal Mougeat crawled out of his hole and, shouting, "Lieutenant McGee,I'm hit!" started west along the hilltop toward the platoon's command post,twenty yards away.
The enemy threw several grenades at him, one of which knocked his rifle fromhis hand and tore off the stock. Fortunately for Mougeat, two men from his squadshot the Chinese. Recovering his damaged rifle, Corporal Mougeat ran on to thecommand post. There Lieutenant McGee calmed him down, and Mougeat decided toreturn to his squad.
"I'm not hit bad," he said.
Lieutenant McGee was watching several men about twenty yards below theplatoon's position. One of them called his name.
"Who is that?" he asked a BAR man beside him.
"It's a Chink," the BAR man said.
McGee tossed a grenade down the hill. The explosion apparently wounded theenemy soldier who rolled down the slope. Lieutenant McGee borrowed the BAR andkilled him.
Main activity near Battery B's position centered around the machine guns atthe road cut. As soon as these began firing, one of the artillery officers (Lt.John E. Travis) and his machine-gun sergeant (Cpl. William H. Pope) grabbedseveral boxes of ammunition and went to the road cut. The rice paddies in frontof these machine guns were completely covered with snow. On previous nights whenTravis had gone there to check the position, that area had been smooth andwhite, but now there were lines of dark forms moving across the fields. Theywere barely visible in the dark but appeared plainly when illuminating flareshung over the area.
Lieutenant Travis and Corporal Pope had been at the outpost position only ashort time when a mortar shell exploded in the cut, killing the two men closestto them, and wounding six, including Travis and Pope. Travis headed for the firedirection center tent and began yelling for some men to help-six to man themachine guns and another six to carry back the wounded.
Captain Elledge (the liaison officer) gathered up ten men and told them tofollow. Enemy mortar shells were also falling in the battery's area at this timeso that the artillerymen, most of whom were in action for the first time, werereluctant to leave their holes. Five of the men followed Captain Elledge; theothers dropped off on the way and went back to their foxholes. When they reachedthe outpost position, the caliber .50 machine gun was jamming, so CaptainElledge and PFC Leslie Alston returned for another gun, carrying one of thewounded men back as they went. They then made several trips between thebattery's position and the outpost, carrying ammunition out and wounded menback.
These two machine guns fired steadily for several hours, although no closeaction developed until about 0200 on 14 February when a platoonsized group ofChinese made an attack against the French Battalion just to the right of themachine-gun outpost. The enemy soldiers formed one hundred or two hundred yardsin front of the small hill which the French occupied, then launched theirattack, blowing whistles and bugles, and running with bayonets fixed. When thisnoise started, the French soldiers began cranking a hand siren they had, and onesquad started running toward the Chinese, yelling and throwing grenades far tothe front and to the side. When the two forces were within twenty yards of eachother the Chinese suddenly turned and ran in the opposite direction. It was allover within a minute. After this incident it was relatively quiet in the ricepaddies near the road cut.
The firing battery, meanwhile, kept up a normal volume of harassing andinterdiction fire, and also fired an illuminating round every five minutes forthe sector on the opposite side of the regimental perimeter. The gun sectionshad L-shaped trenches near their howitzers where the men stayed until LieutenantPeters or Lieutenant McKinney called out a fire mission.
During the night the enemy, signaling with whistles and horns, launched fourseparate attacks against Lieutenant Heath's company. Most of the action fellagainst the 3d Platoon. Toward morning the artillery battery commander (Lt.Arthur Rochnowski) sent twenty men up to help on Company G's line.
At first light on the morning of 14 February, there were Chinese near thefront line in front of the 3d and the 1st Platoons, although only three enemysoldiers actually reached it. One of these was killed and the other two capturedsoon afterward. Five or six Chinese remained near the road cut machine-gunoutpost until daylight, then tried to crawl back across the rice paddies. At thelimiting point between the 1st and the 3d Platoons, which had been under enemypressure for several hours, a small group withdrew, leaving 12 or 15 bodies onthe south slope of the hill. The platoon sergeant of the 3d Platoon (Sgt. BillC. Kluttz), in a foxhole next to the one occupied by Lieutenant McGee, spottedseveral Chinese in the creek bed just in front. He fired several times at them.Suspecting the presence of other Chinese, Lieutenant McGee ordered him to havethe rocket launcher fired into the creek bed. Sergeant Kluttz fired the launcherhimself. The rocket hit a tree, making an air burst over the creek bed. Aboutforty Chinese came out of the creek bed and began running across the ricepaddies in front of the 1st Platoon, which opened fire on them. By the time itwas completely light, all enemy activity had stopped.
During the day of 14 February, the artillerymen and infantrymen rebuilt theirdefenses in preparation for another attack. At 0900 Lieutenant McGee took out apatrol which captured 5 Chinese hiding in a culvert and 17 others who werewounded and lying in the rice paddies south of the company's position. McGee counted 18 enemy bodies. Near Masan, he walked up to asmall haystack. Near it was an abandoned enemy machine gun. As a wounded Chineseraised up in the haystack to shoot the platoon leader, Sergeant Kluttz shot andkilled the enemy soldier. Another Chinese, although handicapped by a badlywounded leg, was still trying to operate a Soviet burp gun when Cpl. Boleslaw M.Sander killed him.
Captain Elledge and several other artillerymen set out to examine the areaaround the battery's position. Eight hundred yards west of the machine guns inthe road cut, there was a house that Captain Elledge decided should be destroyedbefore the Chinese could occupy it if they attacked that night.
Since the house was visible from the howitzer position, the 5th Section (Sgt.James Webb) took it under direct fire, using white phosphorus shells.
After the third round the house began burning, and about fifteen enemysoldiers ran from it across the flat ground. The two machine-gunners and menfrom the French Battalion killed eight of them; the other Chinese escaped.
During the day the artillerymen dug new and deeper holes and personneltrenches around the howitzers, since they found many of the holes they had dugunsatisfactory during the first night's attack. The battery commander alsorelaid his howitzers so that, instead of the usual two platoons of threehowitzers each, they were laid in pairs. The two howitzers on the left were laidon an azimuth of 5,600 mils, the center laid on 6,400 mils, and those on theright were laid on 800 mils. The normal volume of harassing fires was scheduledfor the night of 14 February, about 250 rounds for the battery.
During the afternoon the commander of Company G (Lieutenant Heath) went overto Battery B's fire direction tent to work out plans with Lieutenant Rochnowskiand Captain Elledge for the defense of the company and battery position. Afterthe experience of the night before, all were confident of being able to hold ifthe enemy renewed his attacks. They decided the Chinese were most apt to attackthe center of the company's front the highest part of the perimeter whereLieutenant McGee's 3d Platoon was situated and to reinforce that area as much aspossible. Lieutenant Rochnowski agreed to set up three outpost positions and twoBAR teams on the 3d Platoon's right flank near the saddle directly behind hisbattery. This was in addition to the two machine guns the artillerymen manned onthe front line. If it became necessary, he offered to send some of hisartillerymen up to fight with Heath's men. Rochnowski planned to send half ofthe men from one platoon up on the hill first; if more were needed he would thensplit up the other platoon and thereby contribute a total of about forty men.Skeleton crews would continue to fire the howitzers.
During the day the 23d RCT received twenty-four airdrops of ammunition. Therewere also several air strikes, including three south of the Chipyong-ni perimeter where there appeared to be increased enemy activity.Inside the perimeter enemy mortar rounds fell intermittently.
Company G had a quiet day. Hot meals were served. Some of the men thoughtthat perhaps the Chinese had withdrawn. That hope disappeared soon after dark.First, flares appeared in the southern sky; then followed the sound of bugles.After about half an hour or longer, while the men of Company G waited tensely intheir holes, a small enemy group opened fire on the machine gun in the center ofLieutenant McGee's platoon, wounding the gunner. The previous night the enemyhad opened the fighting by firing on the machine gun. A squad-sized group ofChinese was trying to reach Corporal Ottesen's gun by working along the spurconnecting the 3d Platoon's hill with the enemy-held Hill 397 to the south. Anenemy machine gun fired overhead cover for the small force. Enemy flares poppedin front of the company, and the firing built up rapidly into a furious andnoisy fight with the strongest enemy thrusts apparently aimed at the center ofthe 3d Platoon and at the saddle between it and the 1st Platoon. Tracers archedover the artillery's gun position.
Down at Company G's kitchen tent members of the mess crew heard the firing.They had neglected to dig foxholes and now the closest and best protection wasthe garbage pit. Eight men crowded into it. None of them made any funny remarksabout the odor. An artilleryman with no protection of his own set out lookingfor any unoccupied foxhole. He finally found one with a man stretched out in thebottom, and jumped in.
"There ain't no room in this hole," the first man said; "not for nobody."
"No room hell!" said the second man. "We'll make room!"
Up on the hill two squads succeeded in penetrating the front line at the leftend of the 1st Platoon, occupying several foxholes next to the saddle.
The line was further weakened when these Chinese, having gained a foothold onthe hill, planted pole charges in two of the 1st Platoon's holes; the resultingexplosions killed four men. The enemy, now in control of the left side of the1st Platoon's sector, set up a machine gun and started firing across the area ofLieutenant McGee's 3d Platoon. The leader of the 1st Platoon had his commandpost in a hut a short distance from another hut being used by the companycommander. Without informing Lieutenant Heath, the leader of the 1st Platoonremained in his hut after the fighting started and did not join his platoon onthe hill. He did maintain wire communication with his platoon sergeant (Sgt.Donald R. Schmitt) on the hill.
Because of the fire coming from the 1st Platoon's area, Lieutenant McGeebegan to suspect that platoon had lost some foxholes in its sector. He calledthe company commander on the telephone.
"Heath," he asked, "is the 1st Platoon still in position?"
Heath at once called the leader of the 1st Platoon, who in turn calledSergeant Schmitt on the hill. Schmitt was on the right end of the 1st Platoon'sposition, next to the road cut, still holding and unaware that the enemy had taken the opposite end of the platoon position. He claimed the linewas still solid. Lieutenant Heath relayed the information to McGee.
Lieutenant McGee, however, still had his doubts. He and his platoon sergeant(Sergeant Kluttz) shouted over to the 1st Platoon area, "Anyone from the 1stPlatoon?"
There was no answer.
Activities in his own area now took up Lieutenant McGee's interest as enemysoldiers overran one of his own foxholes. On the right flank of his platoon'ssector, next to the saddle, he could see four Chinese soldiers with shovelsstrapped on their backs crawling on their hands and knees. They were aboutfifteen feet above and behind a hole occupied by the squad leader on theplatoon's right flank.
By this time the sound-powered telephone line to the squad leader was out, soMcGee shouted across to him: "There are four of them at the rear of your hole.Toss a grenade up and over."
A burst from a machine gun in the 1st Platoon's area one now manned by theenemy prevented the squad leader from standing up to lob the grenade. LieutenantMcGee and the other occupant of his foxhole (Pvt. Cletis Inmon, a runner),firing a BAR and rifle, respectively, killed the four enemy soldiers. The timewas now about 2200.
The right-flank squad leader's troubles were not yet over. Lieutenant McGeelooked down the slope and saw a group of Chinese crawl out of the dry creek bedand start up the hill toward the squad leader's hole.
McGee called to him, "About fifteen or twenty of them are coming up to yourright front."
With the enemy-manned machine gun firing frequent short bursts over his hole,the squad leader did not want to stand up high enough to see and fire at theenemy. Although Lieutenant McGee and Inmon kept firing at the Chinese, theycould not stop them, and the enemy continued to crawl up toward the squadleader's hole, which was on the 3d Platoon's right flank next to the saddle. TheChinese began throwing potato-masher grenades toward the hole, which the squadleader shared with two other men. The squad leader and one of the other men asergeant climbed out, ran to McGee's hole, and jumped in on top of him andInmon. The sergeant was hit on the way over. The enemy then threw a satchelcharge into the hole they had just left and killed the man who had remainedthere.
With these men on top of him, Lieutenant McGee could neither see nor fire."Get the hell out of here, and get back with your squad!" he yelled.
The squad leader did not budge, and McGee repeated the order. The squadleader then jumped out and was immediately shot through the shoulder. LieutenantMcGee called for a litter team, and the two men-the sergeant and the squadleader were evacuated under fire.
By this time other enemy soldiers had started crawling up the slopetoward Lieutenant McGee's position. One of them threw three grenades at McGeebefore the lieutenant killed the Chinese with a BAR he had taken from one of hismen who had just been hit. The BAR was jamming on every tenth round. LieutenantMcGee used his pocket knife to extract the case. Finally he dropped the knifeand was unable to find it in the dark. Quickly, he abandoned the automatic rifleand tried to fire his carbine at a Chinese who had crawled up to within ten feetof his hole. As the enemy soldier raised up on his knees, McGee pulled back thebolt to load the carbine, but at this critical moment the cold oil on themechanism stopped the bolt from going home, and the weapon would not fire. McGeegrabbed the operating handle and slammed the bolt in, fired four rounds at theChinese, killing him. Men in nearby holes killed three other enemy soldiers whogot close to Company G's front line.
It was now close to 2300. Lieutenant McGee needed help. Since wirecommunications were out, he ordered his platoon runner (PFC John N. Martin) toreturn to the company's command post and inform Lieutenant Heath that theplatoon urgently needed men, ammunition, and litter teams.
After receiving this request, Lieutenant Heath stepped outside and shoutedover to the artillery fire direction center asking Lieutenant Rochnowski forhelp up on the hill. The battery commander, in turn, called to is sections. In afew minutes fifteen artillerymen assembled. The runner (Martin) led them uptoward the 3d Platoon's hill. As they crossed the crest of the hill the enemyopened fire on them. Lieutenant McGee watched with a sinking sensation as amortar round killed one and wounded another, and the rest of the reinforcinggroup turned and ran back down the hill. Martin then returned to the rear areato guide the company's wire team, which was carrying ammunition up to theplatoon.
Lieutenant Heath stopped the artillerymen at the bottom of the hill, reformedthem, and led them back up the hill himself. By this time, fighting on the hillhad erupted into a frenzy of firing, with the enemy in full possession of thatsector of Company G's line near the saddle. Near the top of the hill LieutenantHeath's group fell apart again, the men running hard toward the bottom. With hismen all gone, Heath started back after them. He was angry, and was yelling soloudly the men in the fire direction center tent could hear him. Halfway downthe hill he stopped and stood there. Yelling for more help, ordering the men toreturn and re-form their line. When they didn't, he ran on to the bottom.
Heath grabbed a couple of the men by their clothing, yelling: "Goddammit, getback up on that hill! You'll die down here anyway. You might as well go up onthe hill and die there."
Tracers from the enemy machine gun stretched along the hilltop like redbeads. Flares popped overhead. The area was alternately dimly lighted, and darkas if someone were turning street lights on and off. When the artillerymen triedto find cover, Lieutenant Heath ran back and forth yelling and pulling at the men to persuade them to stand up and move. It was nowbetween midnight and 0100 on 15 February.
Captain Elledge heard Lieutenant Heath calling for help. He went out in thegun park and yelled for men to help fight. The inexperienced artillerymenresponded slowly. Captain Elledge went around the howitzers, pulled several menfrom their holes and, with a force of about ten men, set out for the left flankof the area still held by the 1st Platoon. Reaching the forward slope of thehill he found the caliber .30 machine gun there was silent; its three-man crewhad been killed. Elledge stationed three men in the machine-gun pit and spreadthe others along the hill, then examined the machine gun. It was binding,apparently having been hit. There was no ammunition. Captain Elledge put themachine gun on his shoulders and ran down the hill with it, after telling hismen there that he would bring another one back immediately. He exchanged thedamaged gun for an extra caliber .50 machine gun of Battery B. With it and a boxof ammunition, he returned to the hill. He set up the weapon, turned it over tothe three men, and then continued along the ridge, moving to the right towardthe road cut. He wanted to see what the situation was.
Positions still manned by the 1st Platoon were a few yards down the forwardslope of the hill, below Captain Elledge. Toward the west end of the hill heheard some odd noises, and stopped beside a three-foot-high grave mound near thetop of the hill. Nearby were several men whom he suspected were Chinese. Hecould not see them, but he could hear them making low whistling sounds, like anowl, probably as a signal to other enemy soldiers. He waited there on his handsand knees, listening. In a few moments he could hear someone crawling over thecrusted snow. Raising to look over the mound, he came face to face with an enemysoldier who was also peering over the mound. Captain Elledge was holding hiscarbine in his right hand. It was set to operate on automatic and was pointed inthe general direction of the Chinese. He pulled the trigger and hit the man inthe chest. Right behind this Chinese was another whom Captain Elledge shotthrough the head. A third enemy soldier threw a small "ink bottle" grenade whichexploded and hit Elledge in the shoulder. With his arm numb, and figuring he wasbadly hit, Elledge slid on down the hill and went back to the battery's messtent. [14]
Soon after 2200, Lieutenant Heath's main line of resistance began to break upwhen the enemy seized and held part of the 1st Platoon's sector. The three hoursthat followed were filled with fighting as intense and as frantic as any inwhich the infantrymen had participated. Although the entire regimental perimeterwas under attack, it appeared then that the main effort was directed againstCompany G. And within that company, the 1st and 3d Platoons were standingathwart the two routes by which the enemy tried to reach the top of Company G'shill. One of these routes followed the spur that led from Hill 397 into thecenter of the 3d Platoon; the other route ran from the dead space in the creek bed to the saddle at theboundary between the 3d and 1st Platoons. Loss of this saddle early in the nightseriously weakened the company's defenses, especially when the leader of the 1stPlatoon, not knowing that the enemy had wrested these foxholes from his men,claimed to be in possession of the area for an hour or two after the enemy hadbeen firing the American machine gun from there. This gave the enemy ample timeto organize the saddle before the Americans counterattacked.
Lieutenant Heath used all the supporting fire he could get. He had mortarfire from his own light mortars, the 81-mm weapons from Company H, and some helpfrom the regimental Heavy-Mortar Company. The explosions from these shells, mostof which fell in the area immediately south of Company G, sounded almosthumdrum. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion shelled the slope of Hill 397 1,500yards south of Company G. Enemy mortar shells fell on the north side of thehill, among Battery B's 155-mm howitzers, and on the French Battalion across theroad. At frequent intervals illuminating flares appeared in the sky, and onetime a plane dropped three large parachute flares which hovered in the sky aboveBattery B. They burned for thirty seconds or longer, turning the natural bowlfrom which the battery was firing into a large room flooded with bluish light.By this time the Chinese had a machine gun operating in the saddle and swung ittoward the howitzers, raking the area.
Up on the hill the main weapons were small arms, grenades and explosivecharges. The Chinese were fighting for each foxhole, receiving heavy casualties,but also taking some of the holes on Lieutenant Heath's front line and killingand wounding men from Company G and Battery B. The walking wounded slid down thehill and gathered at the building used as the company's command post or at oneof the tents set up by the artillerymen, or walked toward the medical clearingstation in Chipyongni.
Lieutenant Heath, realizing that the enemy now held the saddle and the flankof both the 1st and the 3d Platoons, tried unsuccessfully to form acounterattack force from the artillerymen. Several groups of artillerymen werefighting determinedly, including a caliber .so machine-gun crew and individualsalong the line. But those men Heath tried to build into a counter-attackingforce were the artillerymen who had been on the front line and left when heavyfighting commenced, or others who had avoided getting into combat in the firstplace.
After the first three attempts to reach the top of the hill failed,Lieutenant Heath went to the artillery commander for more men, and thenorganized his line for another counterattack.
"We're going up that goddam hill or bust," he wept yelling.
While Heath struggled to hold his men together and counterattack, McGee's 3dPlatoon gradually lost more men and foxholes. The enemy machine gun, firing froma position in the former sector of the 1st Platoon, sent a bullet through the left eye of Private Inmon (the platoon runner inMcGee's foxhole). He started shouting: "I'm hit in the face! I'm hit in theface! Get me back off this hill!"
Blood spurted from his eye as the platoon leader tried to calm him down.Lieutenant McGee told him to lie down. "I can't take you out now," he said. Heshouted across to his platoon sergeant for the medic. "Inmon's been hit."
Within a few minutes the aid man came over and bandaged Inmon's head.Lieutenant McGee wanted Inmon to keep on firing his rifle but the wounded mansaid he could not see well enough, so McGee asked him to load clips for hiscarbine while he fired.
The 3d Platoon's strongest weapon was Corporal Ottesen's machine gun locatedin the center of its sector. It fired along the spur over which the enemycrawled toward Company G's line, and enemy soldiers had tried repeatedly tosilence it. Some time after midnight two enemy soldiers managed to flankOttesen's hole and tossed in two grenades, knocking out the gun. CorporalOttesen became missing in action.
No longer hearing the machine gun, Lieutenant McGee called to his platoonsergeant (Sergeant Kluttz) who was between him and the gun.
"What's happened to the machine gun?" he asked. "It's quitfiring."
Sergeant Kluttz told him the position had been overrun and that Chinese werecoming through between Corporal Ottesen's squad and Cpl. Raymond Bennett'ssquad. Bennett's squad, holding the left flank of the platoon, had not beenattacked. McGee called him on the sound-powered telephone and ordered him toshift several men over to fill the gap left by the knocked-out machine gun. Healso sent his other runner (PFC John Martin) to find Lieutenant Heath and askfor ammunition and for replacements to fill the empty holes along his defensiveline. Heath, in turn, called Colonel Edwards, who immediately sent a squad fromCompany F's uncommitted platoon to bolster Company G's line. [15]
While this squad was on the way, Corporal Bennett succeeded in closing thegap where Corporal Ottesen's machine gun had been. A group of Chinese was stilltrying hard to seize that part of the hill. There was a bugler in the group whomBennett shot as he tooted his second note. In the melee, however, CorporalBennett was hit by a hand grenade which blew off part of his hand. Then a bullethit him in the shoulder, and shortly thereafter a shell fragment struck him inthe head. The soundpowered telephone went out, and Lieutenant McGee lost contactwith Bennett's squad.
It was nearly 0200 when Sgt. Kenneth G. Kelly arrived with a squad fromCompany F's support platoon. This squad had the mission of recovering the partof Company G's line that had fallen to the enemy, especially the saddle betweenthe two platoons. Sergeant Kluttz guided the men west toward the enemy-occupiedfoxholes and immediately started a fire fight that wounded or killed the entiresquad from Company F within ten minutes. [16] After killing two Chinese who fired burp guns at him but missed,Sergeant Kluttz returned to tell Lieutenant McGee what had happened.
"Lieutenant," he said, "we've got to stop them!"
The enemy attack continued without let-up. It was not one calculated tooverrun the entire hill but a persistent, gnawing assault that progressed fromone hole to the next. The Chinese held most of the holes on that part of thehill between the road cut and the saddle, and those on the right flank of theweakened 3d Platoon. Then, between 0200 and 0300, the 2d Platoon, which was notunder heavy fire, pulled back its right flank from its position in the ricepaddies, thus breaking contact with Lieutenant McGee's platoon and taking away amachine gun that had been supporting the 3d Platoon. Only a few men from the 3dPlatoon were left.
Lieutenant McGee shouted over to Sergeant Kluttz to ask how CorporalBennett's squad was making out.
"I think three or four of them are still left," the Sergeant answered.
McGee's platoon was low on ammunition and Sergeant Kluttz was having troublewith the machine gun he was firing.
Growing discouraged, Lieutenant McGee called to his platoon sergeant, "Itlooks like they've got us, Kluttz."
"Well," Sergeant Kluttz called back, "let's kill as many of these sons of bitches as we can before they get us."
Once in possession of part of Company G's hill, the Chinese fired into thebowl-shaped area among the artillery and mortarmen, causing several casualties.The leader of the 4th Platoon (Lt. Carl F. Haberman) moved his mortars to aditch a hundred yards or more to the rear. He then set out to find men to helpretake the hill and eliminate the enemy fire. He walked into a squad tent filledwith artillerymen.
"Hell," he said, "a squad tent won't stop bullets."
Haberman persuaded five or six men to accompany him. They went outside withhim but none would climb the hill.
Some time between 0230 and 0300 Company G lost the rest of its hill. SergeantSchmitt and the remainder of the 1st Platoon came down from the west end of thecompany's sector. In the center of the company's front, Sergeant Kluttz'smachine gun jammed. He and Lieutenant McGee decided to try to get out. Theycalled to the other men, threw what grenades they had left, and climbed over thecrest of the hill. Lieutenant McGee and five other men, all who were left fromthe 3d Platoon, walked on down the hill.
Lieutenant Heath called his battalion commander (Colonel Edwards) to reportthe loss of his company's position. Since a break occurring anywhere around thesmall regimental perimeter was serious, Colonel Edwards ordered a counterattackand promised to send help. His battalion reserve now consisted of the supportplatoon of Company F less the squad that had been lost while attacking the saddle. After ordering this platoon to move toCompany G's area, Edwards appealed to Colonel Freeman (CO, 23d Infantry) formore help. Colonel Freeman was fixed no better for reserve strength. An attachedRanger company constituted his reserve, but because of another severe enemythrust at his 3d Battalion, Colonel Freeman was reluctant to commit his entirereserve in Company G's area. He agreed to furnish one platoon from the Rangercompany and a tank. [17]
Since so few of Company G's men were left, Colonel Edwards decided to put oneof his battalion staff officers (Lt. Robert Curtis) in command of the twoplatoons. Curtis set out to meet the Ranger platoon and guide it intoposition.
While these two platoons were on the way, Lieutenant Heath attempted to forma defensive line along a four- or five-foot rib of ground that crossed thecenter of the bowl-shaped area just behind the artillery position. At the firedirection center several artillerymen were firing an illuminating mission whenthey heard Heath's voice outside. Heath was now speaking in a normal voice as hestationed one of his men on the new defensive line.
"We'll form our line right along here," he explained to the man, "just back of this tent."
The artillerymen looked at one another for a few seconds.
"I guess it's time to get out of here," one of them said.
They pulled a blanket over two wounded men who lay on the ground, andprepared to leave. Just then the telephone rang. It was the S-3 of the 37thField Artillery Battalion inquiring about the illuminating mission he hadrequested.
"Where the hell are my flares?" he asked.
"Excuse me, sir," answered the artilleryman, "but our position is being overrun."
He dropped the telephone, followed the others outside, and crossed to theopposite side of the road in front of the howitzers. A three-foothigh embankmentthere afforded good protection. Other artillerymen were already behind it. Theartillerymen did not abandon their howitzers; they could still cover thebattery's position by fire.
Lieutenant Curtis, with the platoon from Company F and the Ranger platoon,reached Company G about 0330. [18] Lieutenant Curtis took command of the twoplatoons but immediately encountered trouble from the commander of the Rangercompany. The latter officer had come with the platoon from his company. Heclaimed that the platoon, being a part of regimental reserve, was to take ordersonly from the regimental commander. Curtis immediately called his battalionheadquarters to explain the situation to Colonel Edwards, who solved the problemby putting another staff officer this time a captain in command of the compositeforce.
It was between 0345 and 0400, 15 February, when Capt. John H. Ramsburg left the long, tin-roofed building that housed the battalion's commandpost and set out for Company G's area. Except for Company G's sector where therewas brisk firing, the regimental perimeter was relatively quiet at the time. Aquarter of a mile beyond the railroad tracks Ramsburg turned left, following atrail that led from the road to the house where Lieutenant Heath had establishedhis command post.
Along the trail there was a quad caliber .so halftrack. An hour or two beforethe crew with the vehicle had accidentally run into a ditch, nearly tipping thehalftrack over. Unable to get it into firing position, the crew had abandonedthe weapon and vehicle. Lieutenant Curtis was standing near he halftrack. Therewas enough light in the area for Captain Ramsburg to recognize him at a distanceof ten or fifteen feet.
"Christ, John," Lieutenant Curtis said, "but I'm glad to see you here! Can't do anything with these Rangers."
He went on to explain that the commander of the Ranger company objected tohaving a platoon from his company attached to another unit, to having itparticipate in a counterattack, and that he refused to take orders from anyonebut the regimental commander.
Captain Ramsburg went first to Lieutenant Heath's command post where hecalled Colonel Edwards in order to report that he and both platoons were at theposition. He then talked with the commander of the Ranger company to establishhis position as commander of the infantry units in that sector.
At the time the few men left from Company G and those from the platoons fromCompany F and the Ranger company were all mixed together just a line of bodieson the ground firing against the hill to discourage the enemy from attempting afurther advance. Captain Ramsburg had the platoon leaders separate their unitsand sort out the artillerymen whom he sent across the road where most men fromthe battery had assembled. Since none of Company G's communications facilitieswas working at the time, Captain Ramsburg asked Lieutenant Curtis to send men toChipyongni for more radios. He then asked Lieutenant McGee to have the mortarsmoved closer to the line of departure so that he could call out orders to thecrew.
In the meantime, the two platoon leaders re-formed their men. There were 36men in the platoon from the Ranger company, 28 in the platoon from Company F. Inaddition, there were 6 or 7 mortarmen, 2 machinegun crews, and 4 or 5 men leftfrom Company G. To the two platoon leaders he outlined his plan: following ashort mortar concentration, the two machine guns would commence firing at thetop of the ridge and over the heads of the attacking men who were to move onCaptain Ramsburg's signal. The Ranger platoon, on the right, was to attack thehill formerly held by the 1st Platoon of Company G, while the platoon fromCompany F was to assault Lieutenant McGee's former position.
It was still dark when a man returned with three SCR-536 radios one each forCaptain Ramsburg and his two platoon leaders. The enemy was fairly quiet at thetime and had not interfered with organizing the attack. After testing the radiosand getting all men in position on the line of departure, Captain Ramsburgcalled for mortar fire. The first round, fired from a range of not more than 150yards, landed squarely on the crest of the ridge.
"That where you want 'em?" one of the mortarmen asked.
"That's exactly right," Captain Ramsburg yelled back. "Now go ahead and sweep the hill in both directions."
He asked for a five-minute concentration. The mortarmen doubted that theirammunition would last that long. After two or three minutes, Captain Ramsburgsignaled for machine-gun fire. The two guns went into action, but after a fewbursts enemy mortar rounds landed nearby, and both the friendly mortars and themachine guns had to cease firing. Eight or ten rounds landed between the line ofdeparture and the mortar crews about twenty yards behind it. The explosionswounded at least six men, including the leader of the platoon from CompanyF.
The commander of the Ranger company, thinking that friendly rounds werefalling short, called for the mortar crews to cease firing. The shoutinginterfered with efforts to get the attack under way. Captain Ramsburg becameangry. He ordered the Ranger commander to gather up and evacuate his woundedmen, hoping thereby to get rid of the commander as well as the wounded men.
The platoon sergeant took command of the platoon from Company F, the machineguns opened fire again, and Captain Ramsburg signaled for the jumpoff.
"OK, let's go!" he shouted.
The men stood up, commenced firing, and walked forward through crusted snowwhich, in the low ground in front of the hill, was knee-deep in places. In aminute or two the advancing line, with Captain Ramsburg moving in the center,started up the hillside, the Rangers in the lead since men from that platoon,all yelling loudly, pushed their attack fast.
Several enemy mortar rounds and a few grenades exploded on the slope of thehill. In the middle of the attack, two guns located near the French Battalion'shill fired into the Ranger platoon. The guns appeared to be either automaticrifles or light machine guns, but Captain Ramsburg could not tell if the Frenchwere firing by mistake, or if Chinese soldiers had set up guns in that area. Nordid he later learn who was firing. The first burst was a long, steady one asolid string of light from the gun to the Ranger platoon. After that there wereshort bursts for a minute or longer while Captain Ramsburg and several othermen, believing this to be friendly fire, screamed to have it stopped. SeveralRangers were wounded by this fire.
Just before the attack jumped off, Lieutenant Curtis had gone to each of thethree tanks in that area to tell the tankers of the counterattack plans, and towarn them not to fire without orders. He had just returned when the machine gunfired into the Ranger platoon. One of the tank crews, having apparently decidedthe machine gun firing from the French Battalion's hill was friendly and theRangers were enemy, disregarded orders and also opened fire, aiming the tank'scaliber .50 machine gun at the Ranger platoon. While Captain Ramsburg yelled atthe tankers, Lieutenant Curtis raced back and halted the machine gun, which hadfired for 20 or 30 seconds, only long enough to sweep across the hill once.Besides creating more confusion, this caused additional casualties among theRangers, the remaining ones of whom, by this time, were near the top of theirhill still yelling among themselves.
Another gun this one definitely manned by the Chinese had meanwhile openedfire into the left flank of the platoon from Company F, causing serious damagein that area. The gun was in the rice paddies near the place where the 2dPlatoon of Company G had been, and gave the attacking force its first indicationthat friendly troops had vacated that position. The commander of Company Fspotted the tracers from this enemy gun and directed mortar fire at it but wasunable to knock it out. As he afterward learned, the Chinese crew had been therelong enough to dig in and provide overhead protection for the gun.
Captain Ramsburg, occupied with the machine-gun fire hitting the right flankof his line, did not know of the trouble the platoon from Company F wasexperiencing on the opposite end. Lieutenant Curtis succeeded in silencing thetank's fire. Several men from the Ranger platoon were already on top of theirobjective shouting for help.
"We're on top!" they yelled. "Come on up! Get some men uphere!"
Other members of that platoon were still climbing the hill, but a third ormore were casualties by this time, the result of either friendly or enemyfire.
A grenade exploded beside Captain Ramsburg just as the tank's fire ended andhe turned to go on up the hill. A fragment struck him in the foot. At the momenthe was holding a caliber .45 submachine gun in his right hand and at first hethought that, in his anger and excitement over the machine-gun fire from his owntanks, he had squeezed too hard on the trigger and shot himself through thefoot. He wondered how he would explain the accident to Colonel Edwards. He thenrealized his gun was on full automatic and, had he pulled the trigger, it wouldhave fired several times. He also recalled seeing a flash and decided he hadbeen hit by a grenade fragment. He removed his glove and sat down to examine hisfoot. The two machine-gun crews came by on their way to the top of the hillwhere they were to relocate their guns. A little later Lieutenant Heath came upthe hill and stopped where Ramsburg was sitting.
(data lost here, sorry) permission to fire from the infantrymen. At the command post, CaptainRamsburg had just given the order to pull out.
"Go ahead and fire," he told Captain Elledge. "No one's left up there."[28]
Captain Elledge returned to the quad .50 and swept the length of theenemy-held hill. The tank commander (MSgt. Andrew Reyna) appeared at that timeto ask for help in recovering sixteen wounded men artillerymen and infantrymenwho had been left at Battery B's supply tent near the foot of the hill anddirectly under the enemy's guns. While Captain Elledge kept pounding the enemyhilltop with fire from his four machine guns, Sergeant Reyna and his crew drovethe tank under the fire to the base of the hill, carried the wounded men fromthe tent, piled them on the tank, and returned.
Captain Elledge had been firing so steadily that, in the first gray light ofthe morning, artillerymen across the road could see heat waves shimmering abovethe four guns. [24] Elledge scanned the area, looking for targets. He noticedseveral enemy soldiers standing on the hill between the saddle and the road cut,and suddenly realized they were preparing to fire a 75-mm recoilless rifle thatthe 1st Platoon of Company G had left there. It was aimed directly at him.Captain Elledge could see daylight through the tube. He watched as the Chineseshoved a round into the breech, then he quickly turned his machine guns in thatdirection and destroyed the enemy crew. [25]
Two wounded men had been left under a blanket in the fire direction centertent. While one tank, firing from the road, covered the rescue, PFC Thomas S.Allison and PFC Isaiah W. Williams (both members of the artillery wire section)drove a 3/4-ton truck to the tent, loaded the two wounded men onto it, andbacked out again.
Lieutenant Curtis urged the remaining wounded men to start walking towardChipyong-ni, then ran to the road to tell the artillerymen that the infantrymenwere pulling back.
"You're the front line now," he told them.
The artillerymen, concerned about the safety of their howitzers, decided tostay behind the road embankment where, by fire, they could keep the Chinese outof their battery's position. Two tanks on the road separating the artillerymenfrom their howitzers regularly fired short machine-gun bursts into theblackened, chewed-up top of the hill.
At the command post only nine wounded men were left not counting CaptainRamsburg, who stayed behind to supervise the withdrawal. All nine were seriouslywounded and waiting for litters and a vehicle to carry them to the battalion'said station. They were lying on the ground near the straw-roofed buildings. AsLieutenant Curtis returned to the command post, a bugle sounded and he saw 10 or12 Chinese soldiers coming down the highest hill the one originally defended byLieutenant McGee's platoon. Curtis pointed out the enemy to the wounded men.
"If you fellows don't leave now," he told them, "you'll never leave. There aren't enough men left to protect you."
All nine men left, somehow or other moving with only the help they could giveone another or get from Lieutenant Curtis, who followed them, heading back tothe new defensive position. [26]
Only two men both sergeants remained at the command post with CaptainRamsburg. The sergeants pulled out the telephones and the three men startedtoward Chipyong-ni, moving across the frozen rice paddies. Before they had gonefar, however, an enemy machine-gunner fired at them. They broke into a run.Captain Ramsburg, disregarding his broken ankle which was now stiff and sore,sprinted the entire distance to the new hilltop.
The quad .50 still manned by Captain Elledge and the three tanks pounded theenemy hill with machine-gun fire. One of the artillery officers yelled for a guncrew to man a howitzer, and half a dozen men scrambled over the road embankmentand dashed to one of the 155-mm howitzers. Turning it around, they fired sixwhite phosphorus shells that blossomed into white streamers of smoke and firealong the hillside. At such close range, the sound of the propelling charge andthe sound of the shell burst were barely separated. [27]
At the new position, Captain Ramsburg joined the survivors of the ten hourenemy attack, as well as the remaining two platoons of the Ranger companyattached to Colonel Edwards's battalion. All of the men experienced a feeling ofrelief when daylight came on 15 February, because the enemy soldiers usuallywithdrew then. This time, however, the Chinese did not withdraw. They conducteda determined defense against an attack made by the Ranger company and Company B,supported by air strikes, artillery, and tanks, and directed by Colonel Edwards.It was evening before the enemy was defeated and withdrew.
Several inches of snow fell during the night of 15-16 February, coveringseveral hundred Chinese bodies on the hill originally defended by LieutenantHeath's Company G. At Chipyong-ni the Chinese suffered their first defeat sinceentering the Korean war.
(BK: Maybe by Army troops. The 7th Marines had earlier met and defeated an entire CCF division)
* DISCUSSION
If the commander of an attacking force disregards casualties, he will usuallybe able to attain at least local successes. The commander of defending troopsfaced with such an opponent must be prepared to limit any such successes. Heholds the shoulders of any penetration. He uses supporting fires and positionsin depth to blunt, slow down, and finally to stop the spearhead of the attack.Once the penetration has been contained, the defending commander thencounterattacks to eliminate it.
A counterattack plan is based on the answers to these questions: When?Where? How many?
Prematurely launched counterattacks meet the enemy head on,before the enemy attack has lost its impetus, and before the enemy has beensoftened by fire. Tardy counterattacks meet the enemy entrenched and reinforced.Thus, ill-timed counterattacks no matter how gallantly executed often fail.Terrain and the disposition of the enemy within the penetration probably willdictate where the counterattack should strike. But a knowledge of all the manyfactors that go to make up both the enemy and friendly situation is necessary todetermine the strength of the counter-attack. The entire reserve should not becommitted to action unless necessary. Nor should "a boy be sent to do a man'sjob."
Some highlights of the action at Chipyong-ni bear emphasizing byrepetition.
Note that Company G was first alerted to an attack by the sound of digging.Note also the use of the machine gun to replace the recoilless rifle at night amove that not only kept the rifle blast from disclosing the position but alsoused the available personnel to the maximum with a weapon much better suited tothe requirements of close-in night fighting.
The reprehensible actions of some of the men of Battery B, 503d FieldArtillery Battalion, cannot be attributed to inexperience alone. Few men willperform well when they are formed into an impromptu group of individuals to doan unfamiliar job. The infantry squad needs teamwork and an interdependencewithin itself attributes that must reach the maximum in assault combat. Aninfantry squad will fight its best only when each member has confidence in allother members and in the commanders and leaders over it. Twenty artillerymen whohave not demonstrated to one another their individual abilities as infantrymenand who are placed under the leadership of a stranger cannot be expected tobehave with distinction. Captain Elledge, who obviously enjoyed the fight, is ofa type that occurs not very often. If artillerymen are to be used as infantry,they must be so trained and so organized.
* NOTES
- 2d Division Artillery: S-3 journal, entry J6, 110910, February 195l.
- 2d Division, command report: 23d Infantry Regiment, February 1951, appendix 1, section D.
- Lt.Col. James W. Edwards, "The Siege of Chipyong-ni" (unpublished manuscript on file in OCMH), p. 1.
- Edwards, op. Cit. (Sketch maps of these positions prepared by Colonel Edwards, battalion commander at the time of the action, on file in OCMH). Unless otherwise noted, that part of this account describing the actions of Company G, 23d Infantry, is based upon a manuscript by Major Edward C. Williamson ("Chipyong-ni: Defense of South Sector of 23d Regimental Combat Team Perimeter by Company G, 13-l5 February 195l"), prepared in Korea frominterviews with personnel of the battalion. That part describing theactivities of Battery B, 503d FA Battalion, is based upon interviews by theauthor with key personnel of the battery, and upon several with Capt. John A.Elledge, 37th FA Battalion.
5. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 15-l6.
6. Edwards, loc. cit.
7. X Corps: command report, February 1951 (narrative section). See also map zin that report.
8. Ibid. See also map 4 in that report.
9. 2d Division, command report: 23d Infantry Regiment, February 1951.
10. X Corps: command report, February 1951 (Enclosure 1, "Battle ofChipyong-ni"); hereafter cited as X Corps: Chipyong-ni.
11. For details on the question of holding Chipyong-ni, see X Corps:Chipyong-ni; 2d Division: G3 journal, entry J79, 131422 February, entry J80,131428 February, and entry J56, 131055 February 1951.
12. X Corps: Chipyong-ni.
13. Statement by Capt. John A. Elledge.
14. Capt. John A. Elledge, in an interview by the author upon which thisaccount is based.
15. Edwards, op. cit., p. 29.
16. Edwards, loc. cit.
17. Edwards, op. cit., p. 3o.
18. Capt. John H. Ramsburg, in an interview by the author. Unless otherwisenoted, the account of the second counterattack to retake Company G's sector isbased upon that interview. For more details on the difficulties created by thecommander of the Ranger company, see Edwards, op. cit., and Lt Robert Curtis,letter to the author, 22 July 1952.
19. Lt. Donald 0. Miller, letter to Major Roy E. Appleman, 18 October195l.
20. Curtis, op. cit.
21. Ramsburg, op. cit.
22. Ibid.
23. Ramsburg, op. cit., Elledge, op. Cit. 24. Ibid.
25. Elledge, op. cit.
26. Curtis, op. cit.
27. Ramsburg, op. cit.
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