CHAPTER IKorea, Case History of a PawnThe Soviet-sponsored government of North Korea, having failed to conquer itssouthern neighbor by less violent means, invaded the Republic of Korea on 25June 1950. When the United States, with other United Nations, came to the aid ofthe South Koreans, a 3-year war resulted that cost more than 142,000 Americanbattle casualties.
The campaigns set in motion by the invasion of South Korea later werecharacterized as a "limited war." The fighting was deliberately confined ingeographic terms, political decisions placed restrictions upon militarystrategy, and none of the belligerents, with the exception of the two Koreangovernments, used its full military potential. But there was nothing limitedabout the ferocity of the battles.
Erupting from the rivalries of great nations, the Korean War was greatlyinfluenced by domestic conditions rooted deep in the history of Korea, and bythe topography of the peninsula where it took place.
The LandKorea is a harsh Asian peninsula inhabited by a hardy, harassed people whorarely if ever had been completely free. War and tragedy form the main theme ofKorea's history. Suppression and ill-use have been the heritage of itslong-suffering people. Few habitable areas of the earth are more unsuited tolarge-scale, modern military operations. The rugged landscape, a lack ofadequate roads, rail lines, and military harbors, the narrow peninsula, and, notleast, climatic extremes restrict and hamper maneuver, severely limit logisticsupport, and intensify the normal hardships of war.
Jutting from the central Asian mainland, the Korean peninsula has an outlineresembling Florida's. In the north, a river-mountain complex separates Koreafrom Manchuria and the maritime provinces of the USSR. Eastward, across the Seaof Japan, the Japanese islands flank the peninsula. To the west, the Yellow Seastands between Korea and China. The Korean peninsula stretches south for morethan 500 miles, while east and west, it spans only 220 miles at its widest.Thousands of islets, some scarcely more than large rocks, rim its 5,400-milecoastline.
In area, Korea equals the combined states of Tennessee and Kentucky, coveringabout 85,000 square miles. The facetious claim that Korea, ironed flat, wouldcover the whole world has an element of truth, for the terrain throughout thepeninsula is mountainous. Roads and railways wind through tortuous valleys.Ice-free ports exist on Korea's southern and western coasts, but the lattershore is distinguished by some of the most extreme tidal variations in theworld. On the eastern shore, there are only a few adequate harbors. Althoughgeographers place Korea in a temperate zone, the classification hardly mitigatesthe harsh winters, particularly in the wind-swept northern mountains, or thesweltering, dusty, and no less harsh summers in the south.
Korea's PastThe forces shaping Korea into a nation arose from its unfortunate proximityto three powers, China, Japan, and Russia. The periodic surges of ambition ineach of these neighbors turned Korea into a battleground and a spoil. Sometimesdescribed as a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," Korea became insteadJapan's steppingstone to the Asian mainland. For China and, later, Russia, Koreawas a back gate both to be locked against intruders and to be opened during anyopportunity for expansion. Korea's ice-free ports fronting the Sea of Japan wereespecially coveted by the Russians. Korea therefore has seldom been completelyfree of domination by one of its stronger neighbors. [1]
China reached the Korean scene first, making its impact felt on northernKorea several centuries before the beginning of the Christian era. By the 7thcentury, A.D., the Chinese had forced their thought, customs, and manners intothe Korean culture and had turned Korea into a virtual satellite. Late in thatcentury, a native dynasty, Chinese-controlled, unified the peninsula. Beforethen Japan had occasionally invaded southern Korea, but with little lastingeffect. Badly defeated by the Koreans in 663 A.D., Japan retired for nearly athousand years.
Like China, Korea endured the Mongol armies in the 13th century. For nearly ahundred years the savages from the steppes ruled and ravaged Korea. Kublai Khanlaunched two abortive invasions of Japan from Korea, ruthlessly squanderingKorean lives and property in his depredations. With the gradual dissipation ofMongol power by the mid-14th century, Korea again basked in the reflected gloryof a revitalized China. Adapting Chinese culture to their own talents, theKoreans
[1] Unless otherwise cited, material on Korea's history is based on thefollowing: H. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946); Yoshi Kuno, JapaneseExpansion on the Asiatic Continent, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1937), vol. I; Ernest W. Clement, A Short History ofJapan (Tokyo: Christian Literature Society, 1926); Andrew Grajdanzev,Modern Korea (New York: The John Day Company, 1944); Cornelius Osgood,The Koreans and Their Culture (New York: Ronald Press, 1951); Harold M,Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times (New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1941), pp. 123-24; A. Whitney Griswold, Far EasternPolicy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938); George M.McCune and John A. Harrison, Korean-American Relations, 3 vols.(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), vol. I; Tyler Dennett,Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922).
flourished. Skilled artisans, craftsmen, and inventors, as well asphilosophers and scholars, brought Korea a level of civilization rivaling thatof China. But the Japanese violently disrupted this happy era. In a brutalexpedition beginning in 1592, Japanese samurai under the brilliant Hideyoshipillaged the peninsula for seven years. Aided by China, the Koreans eventuallyexpelled the Japanese, but their home had become a wasteland. Their bestartisans and scholars, along with the greater part of their portable treasure,were taken home by the Japanese.
In the following centuries, Korea kept loose cultural and political ties withChina but withdrew from contact with the rest of the world. It never againreached the level of civilization the Japanese had destroyed. When Westerninfluence spread to Asia in the 19th century, China's peculiar relationship withKorea baffled the West. Western efforts to trade with Korea were thwarted bythis misunderstanding. The Koreans received Western overtures coldly. Theyimpartially murdered French missionaries and American and Dutch seamen. Severalpunitive expeditions by these Western nations against Korea failed to improverelations.
Unfortunately for Korea's privacy, in 1860 Russia reached Korea's borders andlater in the century westernization again whetted Japan's appetite forterritorial expansion. With China, Japan, and Russia fighting for control ofKorea throughout the rest of the 19th century, the Korean people had littlechance to learn self-government. They remained separate from the modern worldemerging around them.
Japan won Korea by defeating China and Russia, in turn, in short but decisivewars. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 Japan used Western military techniquesto beat its larger but tradition-bound enemy. Ten years later, Japan astoundedthe world by defeating Russia. Having occupied Korea to fight Russia, Japan leftits troops there. Ignoring Korean objections, Japan disbanded the Korean Armyand abolished the Korean Department of Post and Communications. It allowed asemblance of self-rule in Korea for several years, but remained the real master.Japanese seizure of governmental functions, the forced abdication of Korea'sEmperor, and encroachment in all aspects of Korean society culminated in anagreement in July 1907 placing Korea completely under Japanese control. Theannexation of Korea by Japan in August 1910 was simply a formality. [2]
The United States and KoreaIn the quarter century before the Japanese take-over, the United Statesshowed a mild interest in Korea and made some effort to support Koreanindependence, at least in principle. In 1882, an American naval officer,Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, negotiated a commercial treaty with the KoreanEmperor. The result of four years' effort, this treaty was achieved through thereluctant good offices of the Chinese
[2] An account of Korean life under the Japanese can be found in History ofthe Occupation of Korea, August 1945-May 1948, 3 vols. (hereafter cited asHistory of Occupation of Korea), prepared in 1948 by historians of the XXIVCorps, vol. I, ch. 2, copy in OCMH.
Government. It provided for exchange of diplomatic representatives,protection of navigation and of United States citizens, extraterritoriality, andtrade under a most-favored nation clause. The treaty could have given the UnitedStates overriding influence in Korea. But when the Emperor sought an Americanforeign affairs adviser and Army military advisers, the United States movedslowly. The matter dragged on for several years. The American representative inKorea repeatedly appealed to Washington for action. Although requested in 1884,military advisers reached Korea only in 1888.
The United States treated Korea casually in the late 19th century. Its onlysignificance lay in the effect it had upon relationships with other major powersin the Far East. According to one authority, "The Korean Government was in theposition of an incompetent defective not yet committed to guardianship. TheUnited States was her only disinterested friend-but had no intention of becomingher guardian." [3]
When the Japanese took over Korea, the United States made no objection.President Theodore Roosevelt remarked, "We cannot possibly interfere for theKoreans against Japan. ... They could not strike one blow in their own defense."On 29 July 1905, Secretary of War William H. Taft negotiated a secret "agreedmemorandum" with the Japanese Prime Minister. The United States approved Japan's"suzerainty over" Korea in return for its pledge not to interfere with Americaninterests in the Philippine Islands. The Korean Emperor's appeal to the UnitedStates for help under the "good offices" clauses of the Shufeldt Treaty fell ondeaf ears. [4]
Between 1905 and 1910, uprisings and rebellions erupted frequently throughoutKorea. Japan crushed them with efficient savagery. The Koreans had few weapons,and Japan was a powerful and merciless nation. According to Japanese statistics,14,566 Korean "rebels" were killed between July 1907 and December 1908. By 1910,when Japan formally annexed Korea, little open resistance remained in the land;and no Western nation spoke out against Japan's seizure of the peninsula.
Complete suppression marked the ensuing thirty-five years of Japanese rule.The Japanese exploited the people and the land. But they also modernized Korea,building highways, railroads, dams, and factories. Much of this development wasdesigned for military use. The port of Pusan, for example, was built formilitary, rather than commercial, reasons; and the rail line running from Pusannorth to the Manchurian border had much more military than commercial value.
The Japanese integrated Korean industry into their own economy. Korea becamecompletely dependent upon Japan for semi-manufactured commodities, for repairparts, and for markets. Many key Korean plants produced only parts used in thefinal assembly of products in Japan. As Japan embarked on its program ofconquest in Asia in the 1930's, the Japanese turned Korean in
[3] Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 495.
[4] (1) Griswold, Far Eastern Policy of the United States, p. 125. (2)Robert T. Oliver, Verdict in Korea (State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press,1952), p. 37.
dustry almost exclusively to military use. The heavy, sustained use ofmachinery without adequate maintenance during World War II ruined Koreanfactories and equipment. The use of almost all chemical production, especiallyof nitrogen, in behalf of Japan's war effort caused severe soil depletion inKorea. [5]
Banning Koreans from responsible positions and from educationalopportunities, the Japanese controlled key governmental and economic functions.Comprising only 3 percent of the population of Korea, the 750,000 Japaneseresidents were absolute masters of the country. Nearly 80 percent of the Koreanpeople could neither read nor write. [6]
The Koreans deeply resented Japanese exploitation. Judged in Japanese courtsunder Japanese laws, they received severe sentences for minor offenses, moresevere than those given Japanese for similar infractions. TheJapanese-controlled Bank of Chosen charged Koreans interest rates 25 percenthigher than those assessed Japanese competitors. The Korean national debtincreased thirty-fold between 1910 and 1945, and the taxation of Koreans wasoppressive. In most industries, Japanese received twice as much as Koreans doingthe same work. Large numbers of farms were transferred from Korean to Japaneseowners. [7]
Despite iron-handed Japanese rule that sought to crush Korean nationalaspirations, the flame of patriotism and independence remained alive in Korea.Revolutionary groups and movements sustained the Korean hope for freedom,defying the Japanese whenever possible. One strong group working to free Koreafrom alien rule called itself the "Provisional Government of the Republic ofGreat Korea." It originated on 1 March 1919 when a declaration of independence,signed by Korean students, was read before a student gathering in Seoul. TheJapanese ruthlessly hunted down the instigators of this declaration, and manypatriots fled Korea to escape torture and death. On 10 April 19l9 some of theserefugees met in Shanghai and established the Provisional Government. Dr. SyngmanRhee headed the group as Premier. After the Manchurian incident in 1931, theProvisional Government moved to Nanking and, later, to Chungking.
This group sought to achieve complete independence for Korea and to establishitself as the Korean Government. Differences on how these goals should bereached brought frequent clashes in the leadership of the Korean ProvisionalGovernment. Two men, Rhee and Kim Koo, emerged at the top. When Kim Koo becamePremier in the mid-1930's, Rhee served as unofficial representative of theProvisional Government in the United States. The group acquired a considerablefollowing among Koreans in the United States and China and attracted widespreadpassive support within Korea. Both Rhee and Kim were revered by the Koreanpeople. [8]
A strong Korean Communist party also
[5] Testimony of Hon. Paul G. Hoffman Administrator of the EconomicCooperation Administration (ECA) before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,81st Congress, 1st Session, 8 June 1949, in House Report No. 962, KoreanAid, H.R. 5330, June 1949, p. 9.
[6] Ibid.
[7] History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. 2.
[8] Ibid., pp. 46-48.
sprang up in Korea. Organized in 1925, it pushed the underground movementagainst Japan. Communist power in Korea grew under the well-organized leadershipof the anti-Japanese underground. The Korean Communists were in contact with theRussian Communists through the Far Eastern Division of the Comintern. It isbelieved, however, that, owing to a secret agreement with Japan, the Russiansabstained from encouraging too greatly the Communists in Korea during Japaneseoccupation. Many Communist Koreans took refuge in Manchuria, China, and Russia.[9]
In this setting of turbulent and long-suppressed patriotic emotions, it wasinevitable that the political void caused by the fall of the Japanese Empire atthe end of World War II should touch off a struggle for power.
Korea 1945When World War II began, Korea was regarded by the Allies as a victim
of, not a party to, Japanese aggression. One of the earliest signs that theAllied Powers were concerned about Korea appeared in a Joint statement by theUnited States, China, and Great Britain in December 1943, after the CairoConference, which said: "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of theenslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Koreashall become free and independent." [10]
Divergencies between American and Russian policies appearing in the latterstages of World War II affected Korea. The destruction of the Axis in 1945 left
[9] Ibid., vol. II, ch. 2, pp. 7-20.
[10] Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: TheConferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, Dept., of State Publication 7187(Washington, 1961), p. 448.
power vacuums in many areas of the world and brought the differences betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union into sharp focus. Countries newly freedfrom German or Japanese domination assumed significance as possible targets ofclashing American-Soviet interests.
Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States attached little importance toKorea as a strategic area. Korea supported a relatively small population, andhad neither important industrial facilities nor many natural resources. If atsome future date Korea fell into hands unfriendly to the United States, theUnited States recognized that the occupation of Japan might be hampered andAmerican freedom of movement might be restricted in the general area. But withChina in 1945 under control of a friendly government, such a situation appearedunlikely. Russia, on the other hand, maintained its traditional regard for Koreaas a strategic area. As later events demonstrated, the Soviet Union would notcountenance control of Korea by another power and sought to control Koreaitself.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Premier Josef V. Stalin at the YaltaConference in 1945 touched upon Korea's future. Roosevelt advocated atrusteeship for Korea administered by the United States, the Soviet Union, andChina. Looking at American experience in the Philippines, he surmised that sucha trusteeship might last for twenty or thirty years. Stalin said he believedthat Great Britain should also be a trustee. No actual mention of Korea was madein the document recording the agreements at Yalta. The secret protocol developedby Roosevelt and Stalin and agreed to by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchillonly provided territorial and other concessions to the USSR in the Far East asconditions for Russian entrance into the war against Japan after the defeat ofGermany. Later, soon after Roosevelt's death, Stalin told Harry Hopkins,President Harry S. Truman's representative in Moscow, that Russia was committedto the policy of a 4-power trusteeship for Korea. [11]
Though American military planners ostensibly paid little attention to Korea,they had Korea in mind. On 25 July 1945, the Army Chief of Staff, General of theArmy George C. Marshall, sent a note to President Truman at Potsdam, advisinghim that some guidance on handling Korea would assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff.General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United StatesArmy Forces, Pacific, had already received instructions to prepare for occupyingJapan, and shortly before Potsdam these orders were broadened to include Korea.In response to the additional directive, General MacArthur suggested that Tokyoand Seoul have first priority for occupation, Pusan second priority, and theKunsan area on Korea's west coast, third priority. General Marshall theninformed the President that MacArthur should be able to land a division at Pusanwithin a short time of the end of the war. The other strategic areas in Korea,Mar-
[11] (1) Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: TheConference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Dept. of State Publication 6199(Washington, 1955), pp. 800, 984. (2) Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols.,vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc.,1956), PP 316-17.
shall added, were Seoul, near the west coast, and Ch'ongjin, in the north onthe Sea of Japan. Marshall expected that the Russians, if they participated inthe occupation, would occupy Ch'ongjin and would undoubtedly move into Manchuriaand perhaps into north China. He considered it desirable, therefore, toestablish early control over any areas to be held by the United States. [12]
Korea was only briefly considered at the Potsdam conference. Among thequestions discussed were the Soviet timetable for entering the war in thePacific and the Allied proclamation demanding Japan's unconditional surrender.Looking ahead to the surrender of the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland, theAllied military representatives drew a tentative line across the map ofManchuria, above which the Soviet Union was to accept surrender of Japaneseforces. No mention was at first made of Korea. But since thousands of Japanesetroops were stationed in Korea, there was a later discussion of Alliedoperations in that area. [13]
At Potsdam, the chief of the Russian General Staff told General Marshall thatRussia would attack Korea after declaring war on Japan. He asked whether theAmericans could operate against Korean shores in co-ordination with thisoffensive. General Marshall told him that the United States planned noamphibious operation against Korea until Japan had been brought under controland Japanese strength in South Korea was destroyed. Although the Chiefs of Staffdeveloped ideas concerning the partition of Korea, Manchuria, and the Sea ofJapan into U.S. and USSR zones, these had no connection with the later decisionsthat partitioned Korea into northern and southern areas. [14]
Russian entry into the war against Japan on 9 August, and signs of imminentJapanese collapse on 10 August 1945 changed U.S. Army planning from defeatingJapan to accepting its surrender. Military planners in the War DepartmentOperations Division began to outline surrender procedures in General Order No.1, which General MacArthur would transmit to the Japanese Government after itssurrender. The first paragraph of the order specified the nations and commandsthat were to accept the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the Far East.[15]
The Policy Section of the Strategy and Policy Group in the OperationsDivision drafted the initial version of the order.
[12] (1) Lt. Paul C. McGrath, U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict, n.d., pp.26-27, OCMH draft MS. (2) Memo, Marshall for President (delivered at Potsdam),25 Jul. 45, file OPD 370.9, Case 17/8.
[13] (1) Interv., 1st Lt. Paul C. McGrath with Vice Adm. M. B. Gardner, 28Jan 53, the Pentagon. (2) Interv., McGrath with Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Dir.of the Joint Staff, JCS, OSD, 27 Jan 53. Both in OCMH.
[14] (1) McGrath, U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict, pp. 24-25. (2) History ofOccupation of Korea. vol. II, ch. 3, p. 6. (3) Roy E. Appleman, South to theNaktong, North to the Yalu, UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR(Washington, 1961), pp. 2-3. (4) See also discussions of 24 and 26 July inDepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferenceat Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, 2 vols., Dept. of StatePublications 7015, 7163 (Washington, 1960), II, 345-52, 408-15. (5) There waswidespread misconception that the division of Korea had been agreed upon at thehigh-level conference of the Big Three. In June 1946, the Institute of PacificRelations published a categorical statement that this agreement had been made atYalta. The New York Times in October 1946 named Potsdam as the place where theagreement had been made.
[15] McGrath, U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict, p. 42.
Under pressure to produce a paper as quickly as possible, members of thePolicy Section began work late at night on 10 August. They discussed possiblesurrender zones, the allocation of American, British, Chinese, and Russianoccupation troops to accept the surrender in the zone most convenient to them,the means of actually taking the surrender of the widely scattered Japanesemilitary forces, and the position of Russia in the Far East. They quicklydecided to include both provisions for splitting up the entire Far East for thesurrender and definitions of the geographical limits of those zones. [16]
The Chief of the Policy Section, Col. Charles H. Bonesteel, had thirtyminutes in which to dictate Paragraph 1 to a secretary, for the Joint StaffPlanners and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee were impatiently awaitingthe result of his work. Colonel Bonesteel thus somewhat hastily decided whowould accept the Japanese surrender. His thoughts, with very slight revision,were incorporated into the final directive. [17]
Bonesteel's prime consideration was to establish a surrender line as farnorth as he thought the Soviets would accept. He knew that Russian troops couldreach the southern tip of Korea before American troops could arrive. He knewalso that the Russians were on the verge of moving into Korea, or were alreadythere. The nearest American troops to Korea were on Okinawa, 600 miles away. Hisproblem therefore was to compose a surrender arrangement which, while acceptableto the Russians, would at the same time prevent them from seizing all of Korea.If they refused to confine their advance to North Korea, the United States wouldbe unable to stop them.
At first Bonesteel had thought of surrender zones conforming to theprovincial boundary lines. But the only map he had in his office was hardlyadequate for this sort of distinction. The 38th Parallel, he noted, cut Koreaapproximately through the middle. If this line was agreeable to President Trumanand to Generalissimo Stalin, it would place Seoul and a nearby prisoner of warcamp in American hands. It would also leave enough land to be apportioned to theChinese and British if some sort of quadripartite administration becamenecessary. Thus he decided to use the 38th Parallel as a hypothetical linedividing the zones within which Japanese forces in Korea would surrender toappointed American and Russian authorities.
The determination of the surrender zones for the Pacific involved othercountries besides Korea. Since the job had to be done in a hurry, ColonelBonesteel had the paragraphs of the general order rushed through the Chief ofthe Strategy and Policy Group, Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln, to the Joint StaffPlanners who were meeting in an all-night session. This channel was the same asfor all important military policy papers in 1945. Drafts were routed in turnthrough General Lincoln, the Joint Planners, the State-War-Navy CoordinatingCommittee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of State, War, andNavy, until they finally reached the President.
[16] (1) Ibid. (2) See also Truman, Memoirs, II, 317.
[17] The remainder of this subsection is based on McGrath, U.S. Army in theKorean Conflict, pp. 40-53.
When Bonesteel's draft paper reached the Joint Planners in the pre-dawn hoursof 11 August, Admiral M. B. Gardner suggested moving the surrender line north tothe 39th Parallel, a recommendation that the planners believed the NavySecretary, James C. Forrestal, favored. Gardner pointed out that the 39thParallel would place Dairen in the military zone to be occupied by theAmericans. General Lincoln, however, felt that the Russians would hardly accepta surrender line that barred them from Dairen and other parts of the LiaotungPeninsula; besides, American units would have great difficulty reaching theManchurian port ahead of the Russians. Calling Assistant Secretary of StateJames Dunn, Lincoln ascertained that his opinion was shared. Mr. Dunn believedthat Korea was more important politically to the United States than Dairen, andhe felt this to be the view of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. As a result,the 38th Parallel remained in the draft when the Joint Planners handed thegeneral order to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.
While General Lincoln was shepherding the document through the State-War-NavyCoordinating Committee on 11 and 12 August, the Russians invaded Korea, landingon the northeast coast near Rashin. Russian troops then poured out of themaritime provinces of Siberia, down the Korean peninsula, and into theKaesong-Ch'unch'on area above Seoul, where they looted much equipment, includinglocomotives and rolling stock. Reports of the Russian troop movements reachingWashington underscored the need for concurrence in the proposed general order.Otherwise, the Russian advance would render academic the American acceptance ofthe Japanese surrender in southern Korea. At the same time, swift Russian troopmovements into key areas of southern Manchuria eliminated the possibility ofincluding Dairen in the American surrender zone.
Between 11 and 14 August, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and theJoint Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the surrender instrument.Meanwhile, General MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he wouldadhere to three priorities for the use of the forces under his command. Afterthe Japanese surrender, the occupation of Japan would come first, Korea second,China third.
In Washington, the War Department Operations Division rephrased General OrderNo. 1 to the satisfaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of theState, War, and Navy Departments. On 15 August 1945, clean copies of the draftorder were sent to Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy's White House office. Within afew hours President Truman gave his approval, directing at the same time thatGeneral Order No. 1 be sent also to the capitals of Great Britain and the USSRwith requests for concurrence by the heads of those states. The Joint Chiefs ofStaff telegraphed the general order to General MacArthur and directed that hefurnish an estimated time schedule for the occupation of a port in Korea.
Among the items it specified, General Order No. 1 stated that Japanese forcesnorth of the 38th Parallel in Korea would surrender to the Russian commander,while those south of the parallel
would surrender to the commanding general of the U.S. expeditionary forces.As Washington waited for the Moscow reaction to President Truman's message,there was a short period of suspense. Russian troops had entered Korea threedays before the President accepted the draft of General Order No. 1. If theRussians failed to accept the proposal, and if Russian troops occupied Seoul,General Lincoln suggested that American occupation forces move into Pusan.
Stalin replied to President Truman on 16 August 1945. He said nothingspecifically about the 38th Parallel but offered no objection to the substanceof the President's message. He asked that the general order be "corrected" toauthorize Russian forces to accept the surrender of the Japanese in the northernhalf of Hokkaido. Stalin also reminded the President that the LiaotungPeninsula, upon which Dairen and Port Arthur are located, was part of Manchuriaand thus within the USSR military zone. Though President Truman parried Stalin'sproposal to place Russian forces on Hokkaido, Stalin's message settled thesurrender zones in Korea and canceled American plans to land troops at Dairen.
The New ZonesThe new dividing line, about 190 miles across the peninsula, sliced acrossKorea without regard for political boundaries, geographical features, waterways,or paths of commerce. The 38th Parallel cut more than 75 streams and 12 rivers,intersected many high ridges at variant angles, severed 181 small cart roads,104 country roads, 15 provincial all-weather roads, 8 better-class highways, and6 north-south rail lines. [18] It was, in fact, an arbitrary separation.
South of the 38th Parallel, the American zone covered 37,000 square miles andheld an estimated 21,000,000 persons. North of the line of latitude, the USSRzone totaled 48,000 square miles and had about 9,000,000 people. [19] Of the 20principal Korean cities, 12 lay within the American zone, including Seoul, thelargest, with a population of nearly 2,000,000. The American zone included 6 ofKorea's 13 provinces in their entirety, the major part of 2 more, and a smallpart of another. The two areas, North and South Korea, complemented each otherboth agriculturally and industrially. South Korea was mainly a farming area,where fully two-thirds of the inhabitants worked the land. It possessed threetimes as much irrigated rice land as the northern area, and furnished food forthe north. But North Korea furnished the fertilizer for the southern ricefields, and the largest nitrogenous fertilizer plant in the Far East was inHungnam. Although North Korea also had a high level of agricultural production,it was deficient in some crops. The barrier imposed serious adverse effects onboth zones. [20]
[18] Shannon C. McCune, "Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries," FarEastern Quarterly, No. 5 (May 946), pp. 286-87.
[19] (1) Andrew Grajdanzev, "Korean Divided," Far Eastern Survey, XIV(October 1945), 282. (2) "History of Occupation of Korea", vol. I, ch. 4, p. 16.
[20] The closing paragraphs of this chapter are based on information in (1)Testimony of Hoffman, 8 June 1949, House Report 962, June 1949, and (2) GeorgeA. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp.52-56.
South Korea had in 1940 turned out about 74 percent of Korea's light consumergoods and processed products. Its industry consisted of some large and manysmall plants producing textiles, rubber products, hardware, and ceramics. Manyof these plants had been built to process raw materials from North Korea.
North Korea, a largely mountainous region, held valuable mineral deposits,especially coal. Excellent hydroelectric plants, constructed during the last tenyears of Japanese domination, ranked with the largest and best in the world.Because of its power resources, North Korea housed almost all of Korea's heavyindustry, including several rolling mills and a highly developed chemicalindustry. In 1940, North Korea produced 86 percent of Korea's heavy manufacturedgoods. The only petroleum processing plant in the country, a major installationdesigned to serve all of Korea, was located in the north, as were seven of eightcement plants. Almost all the electrical power used by South Korea came from thenorth, as did iron, steel, wood pulp, and industrial chemicals needed by SouthKorea's light industry.
Sharp differences between north and south had traditionally been part of theKorean scene. South Koreans considered their northern neighbors crude andculturally backward. North Koreans viewed southerners as lazy schemers. Duringthe Japanese occupation Koreans in the north had been much less tractable thanthose in the south. Differences in farming accounted for some of the socialdifferences in the two zones. A dry-field type of farming in the north opposed arice-culture area in the south to produce marked variations in points of view.In the south were more small farms and a high tenancy rate, while in the northlarger farms and more owner-farmers prevailed. Those differences the 38thParallel promised to exacerbate.
