Combat Support in Korea

Throughout the first six months of 1950, the 1st Cavalry Division was soscattered that it was difficult for its 15th Quartermaster Company to supportit. I recall that division headquarters, the 2d Battalion of the 7th Cavalry,and service troops were at Camp Drake; the 8th Cavalry and the 1st Battalion ofthe 7th were in Tokyo; the 5th Cavalry was at Camp McGill; Division Artillerywas at Camp Drew. Early in May the 8th Cavalry was shifted with elements goingto Camp Zama and Camp King.

About 25 January 1950, post quartermasters were assigned and army serviceunits began supplying each of those camps. This left the division quartermasterwith technical responsibility but no operational control of the division'ssupply operations. The extent to which this separation of functions took placeis illustrated in the case of the quartermaster of Camp Drake. When theexecutive officer of the 15th QM Company was assigned this task, he wastransferred to the 8013th Army Unit.

In 1950 the 1st Cavalry Division was emphasizing combat training of itsunits. The 15th QM Company, relieved of most of its operationalresponsibilities, spent most of its time learning combat principles. Littlepractical training was possible for the class II and class IV supply sections,but the class I and III groups were able to work in the maneuver area at CampMcNair. My company commander (Capt. Jenis C. McMillan) and I were working on aplan to train the quartermaster personnel by attaching them to the army serviceunits when the Korean action broke out.

I believe it was 1 July 1950 that the division was alerted for an amphibiouslanding in Korea. Our original landing site was described only as "somewherealong the west coast of Korea." The assault wave was to outload by 14 July, the second wave on the 16th or 17th, and the third waveseveral days later.

I had been taught at the Command and General Staff College that it requiredsixty to ninety days to plan and outload a division for an assault landing. Asthis operation was to be accomplished in eight to twelve days, it seemed to be atremendous task. It was.

The 1st Cavalry Division's strength was only 13,000 or 14,000, with aT/O&E in proportion. Quartermaster requirements for the landing were 22 daysof class I (7 days operational, 15 days class B rations); 30 days maintenancefactor of class II and class IV supplies; and 30 days of class III.

Although there was short supply of the operational rations, class I presentedfew problems. There were plenty of B rations available. Class II and class IVwere more difficult, but class III gave us the most trouble. There were twoproblems: how many trucks we would have, and how far they would go. First ourtank company was taken from us, then our vehicle strength was changed from dayto day. We guessed that ten gallons per vehicle per day would be normal at firstand, fortunately, we guessed fairly accurately.

I was charged with transporting class II and the operational rations of classI to shipside in the outloading. Army delivered the B rations. Class II andclass IV were to be loaded by my personnel coming in with the third wave.

I was allotted space for 65 officers and men and 28 vehicles in the assaultwave. I elected to go, and chose the purchasing and contract officer (Lt.Charles Lambert) and 4 men from the division quartermaster's office; the 2dTruck Platoon (Lt. James Evans); 28 men from the Supply Platoon (Lt. Albert N.Abelson); and the Field Service Platoon officer (Lt. George M. Gibbs). In thesecond wave my executive (Lt. Francis P. Cancelliere) and Captain McMillan wereto bring the bulk of the quartermaster troops, while the remainder were to comein the third wave on D plus 5.

Space for class I and class III supplies was authorized on each of the threewaves, but class II and class IV supplies were all to come in the third wave.Each individual was to carry two operational rations, two suits of fatigues, twopairs of combat boots, and necessary underwear and toilet articles. Otherclothing was to be carried in duffel bags. Vehicles were fueled and carriedextra cans of gasoline.

On the morning of 18 July the first landings were made without opposition,not on the west but on the east coast of Korea-near Pohangdong. The shore partyreceived class I and class III supplies and our supply section began to issuethem on D plus 1. All units were issued B rations to maintain the two-day levelper individual. Instructions were also given to use the B ration wheneverpossible.

I anticipated that the division would remain in the beachhead area until thesecond wave arrived. The urgent need for troops near Taejon, however, madenecessary the immediate commitment of our first wave. A typhoon delayed thesecond wave, and the third was still in Japan waiting for ships.

On the afternoon of the 20th, the 5th Cavalry Regiment started for Taejon. Atabout 2000 my truck platoon and a supply detachment followed. The trucks carried90 per cent class III and 10 per cent class I supplies, since we were lessconcerned with going hungry than with losing our mobility. I instructedLieutenant Lambert, who commanded this force, to establish a supply point in thevicinity of Kumchon or Kwan-ni, the situation to determine which was the mostdesirable. That night the supply platoon began loading class I and class III inrail cars for shipment forward. I left the Pohang-dong area on the morning ofthe 21st with division headquarters. Lieutenant Abelson kept a detachment tofinish the loading. At Kumchon I learned that Lieutenant Lambert had opened oursupply point at Kwan-ni, and I sent this information back to Abelson. By the 23dwe were receiving and issuing rations carried by rail from Pohang-dong.

On the 21st I placed my first order for class I and class III suppliesdirectly with the quartermaster of Eighth Army (Col. James M. Lamont). Althoughwe had fifteen days' B rations coming over the beach at Pohang-dong, these weredivided among the different waves and we dared not chance a shortage. Army toldme I could get B rations as I needed them, but few operational rations wereavailable. I made every effort to have our operational rations forwarded fromPohang-dong in full car lots. These shipments were issued only to units whosepatrols, drivers, and men were normally away from their kitchens at mealtime. Wealso had a heavy demand for the C ration because its greater variety of meatitems made it popular.

The quartermaster of Eighth Army told me I would receive little in class IIand class IV supplies, for his stocks were almost depleted. I didn't worry aboutthis because I knew I had a thirty-day maintenance factor coming in the thirdwave, and I knew each man had been well equipped when he left Japan. I would nothave been so unconcerned had I known that the thirty-day supply would notarrive, and that, because of confusion in shipment, 70 to 80 per cent of thepersonnel of the regiments would not receive their duffel bags. The rocky hillscut up a pair of boots in twelve to fourteen days, while the rain took its tollof boots, fatigues, and ponchos. It was 1 August before we received much classII and class IV assistance, and by then we needed clothing, shoes, stove parts,and cleaning and preserving materials.

On the 22d, at Kwan-ni, we opened the first cemetery for the division. We hadno graves registration section or trained personnel, and our few graves registration supplies were with the second wave. Eighth Army couldnot evacuate bodies, and we had to provide for our own dead. Not only were weshort of experience in graves registration, but I had no manual covering thesubject. Fortunately, the division Gl had a manual with some information and thedivision chaplain had a pamphlet. I sent Lieutenant Evans to Eighth Armyheadquarters at Taegu and there he obtained a supply of burial bottles,personal-effects bags, mattress covers, and burial forms.

I searched the Kwan-ni area for a cemetery site but most of the flat groundconsisted of unsuitable rice paddies. The most likely place for a cemetery was400 or 500 yards from our class I and class II supply point, which was notideal. G4 approved our location, and the first interments occurred on 23 July.We had no fingerprint kit, but we soon found that a regular stamp pad wouldwork. Every man buried in our cemeteries was fingerprinted, regardless ofwhether he was identified or not. We made a careful note of all identifyingmarks, scars, and tattoos. Some 32 or 33 bodies were interred at Kwan-ni, only 2of which were unidentified. Some bodies were returned by the regiments, some bythe companies, others evacuated through medical channels, and occasionally adriver would find a body along the road and bring it to us.

We had trouble with the personal effects. If the effects were still on thebody, we inventoried them. If the effects had already been inventoried, wechecked to see that all were present and then forwarded them to Eighth Army. Butarmy began to notice that our inventory of money sometimes did not tally withthe amounts it received. Several times there were shortages of five or tendollars, though never was the complete sum missing. We could not account forthis. After I left the division I heard that some of the men in the gravesregistration section had been caught stealing.

We also had a case where a ring had been removed from the finger of a Britishmajor, but this occurred before the body reached us. I had heard that the bodywas being evacuated through medical channels, and was present when it arrived.That night a friend inquired whether a signet ring was among the effects, for heknew the major's family attached great sentimental value to it. The inventorydid not list the ring, so we disinterred the body to make sure it had not beenoverlooked. It was obvious that the major had worn a ring a short time before,but it was not on his body when it reached our cemetery.

It was in Kwan-ni that our ration first included fresh meat. By mistake acarload of rations consigned to the 25th Division had been placed on our siding.The car, containing frozen ground beef, was not refrigerated, and it was obvioussome spoilage had already occurred. I called army and received permission toutilize whatever I could. Mr. Kummer and his food service personnel checked eachbox, discarding all meat about which there was the least doubt. The over-all loss was about 35 per cent. Theremainder would not feed the entire division, so we got in touch with the units'S4s and told them, "first come, first served." We had no trouble clearing theshipment.

The bulk of the quartermaster company, coming in the second wave, joined usin Kwan-ni during the night of the 24th. We selected a school building as abillet but never occupied it. The order came to displace our class I and classIII supply points to Kumchon because the infantry was being pushed back.

Our evacuation was somewhat confused in this, our first experience inwithdrawal. We issued two days of B rations to every unit that would acceptthem. This cut our load and at the same time insured against need if there wereany delay in opening our new supply point. We loaded both the railroad cars andthe trucks. There wasn't enough transportation, so we had to shuttle with thetrucks. We got all of the supplies out, but the last two trucks were still beingloaded after the infantry had cleared the area. Several rounds of mortar firelanded nearby but caused no damage.

We opened our new supply point in Kumchon without delay. Everything atKumchon was kept mobile and, as much as we could, we left supplies in boxcarsuntil we actually issued them. Rations were coming to us direct from Pusan, butcarloads of supplies from Pohang-dong, which had been delayed or misshipped,were still arriving.

In Kumchon I found that the quartermaster of the 25th Division (Major JohnPachomski) had his distribution point in the marshaling area. The desirabilityof our companies working together was obvious, and my company moved next to his.The 25th QM Company helped tremendously by giving us cleaning and preservingmaterials, soaps, mops, brooms, and a few items of clothing.

While we were in Kumchon we began to receive our first shipments of freshvegetables. These were airlifted from the hydroponic farms in Japan. Thevegetables came in limited quantity every second day. Rather than issue a littleto each unit, we rotated the delivery and gave enough for an ample serving. Wehad a standing priority on fresh foods for the hospital, then for the front-linetroops. These vegetables were a real morale-builder.

We opened our second cemetery in Kumchon on the 26th. It was our smallest,for by now it was nearly impossible for the infantry to recover its dead as itfell back. It was in Kumchon that the 1st Cavalry Division received EighthArmy's famous "last stand" order which forbade us to fall back. This order wasrescinded, however, and on the 31st we moved to Poksong-dong for two days.

In late August, division ordered 100 men and 4 officers of the quartermastercompany to be held on five-minute alert. These men were part of Task Force Allen-our last reserve. Fortunately, this force was neverneeded.

The Eighth Army supply points in Taegu were located in the railroad area. Wegot permission to locate our class I point nearby, and obtained the use of asiding and shed area for our class III supplies. The II and IV area was six oreight blocks away from the marshaling yards. Eighth Army had five largewarehouses for class II and class IV supplies, and it turned two of these overto us. In these warehouses we stored PX supplies and beer-when they wereavailable. To save needless handling, our supplies came directly from Pusan byrail instead of stopping off in the army depots.

The fighting came close to Taegu and several nights enemy tanks ineffectivelylobbed shells into town. It was a real convenience to have our warehouses nearthose of army. Army moved its depot troops out of Taegu several times, andturned its dumps directly over to me. In turn, I issued supplies to everyone inthe area. At one time or another I supplied the 9th Infantry (2d InfantryDivision), the 27th Infantry (25th Infantry Division), the 21st Infantry (24thInfantry Division), and numerous nondivisional units.

Each time the depot troops pulled out of Taegu they would tell meapproximately how many troops I would be expected to supply. When I submittedrequisitions to Pusan they were honored without question -- even when I drew for35,000 instead of 13,000. Class III items were usually in good supply except foran occasional shortage of 80-octane aviation gasoline. Some components of the Bration would build up and I returned flour and meat to Pusan whenever I fearedthe surplus was great enough to embarrass me if we had to move quickly.

At Taegu we received our first bath trailers. The third wave leaving Japanreceived these, though not in time to test them. We found that two of the fourdid not work, and the diaphragms and other parts could be repaired only inJapan. So back they went.

We used the civilian laundries in Taegu, but their capacity was insufficient.We hired men, women, and children, furnished them soap, and had them washingclothing by hand in the Sin-chon River. In September our first laundry unit wasin operation under the control of Capt. Carl D. Hennessy, who had recentlyjoined us. We continued to use the Taegu laundry, but now dispensed with thehand-washing.

Soon we received six ice-cream machines. These were much too bulky; two2-1/2-ton trucks were required to move each machine. We turned them back to armyimmediately. In 1951, the division received improved, portable machines whichsupplied ice cream to the entire division on a once-a-week basis.

Eighth Army took over operation of the Taegu ice plant. The medics approvedthe plant for sanitation and the engineers chlorinated the water. Ice was issued daily to every unit. An unusual use of the ice camewhen the enemy surrounded a company of the British 27th Brigade (attached to the1st Cavalry Division for logistical support as well as operations). The isolatedtroops suffered from a water shortage. Attempts were made to airdrop water inone-gallon canvas bags, but these split and the water ran out. One of myofficers (Lt. McGail C. Baker) suggested that we drop ice. We placed 15- to20-pound blocks in barrack bags and dropped them with great success.

The truck platoon I had brought with me in the first wave was nowstrengthened by the arrival of the other two. One platoon I did not control,however, for it was attached to the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry. This battalionwas kept mobile as a part of the Eighth Army "fire brigade" system. Although wewere short of trucks, we were not hampered since we depended on rail to bring usour supplies.

Early in August I discussed with the Eighth Army quartermaster the need forwinter clothing. Already it was cool at night in the hills where our infantrywas fighting. Eighth Army was aware of the need and had established athree-phase program for issuing winter uniforms -- contingent upon delivery ofclothing from the United States on the dates requested. The first phase includedthe delivery of winter underwear, M43 jackets, and gloves by 15 September. Thesecond phase was to bring wool clothing by 1 October. The last phase woulddeliver sleeping bags, pile-lined jackets, overcoats, and wet-cold climateclothing by 15 October.

The underwear, jackets, and gloves arrived about the middle of September andwe issued them as fast as possible. Unfortunately, before all our clothing couldbe issued to the units, the breakout from the Pusan perimeter took place and wehad no chance to complete delivery for some weeks.

By 24 September, the 1st Cavalry Division's progress was such that webelieved it was time to push out class I and class III distribution points.Lieutenant Cancelliere and one of our new arrivals (Lt. Earl W. Gallert) locatedthese at Chongju on the 25th. Our three truck platoons were with the infantry,and army furnished us two truck companies to move supplies. I stayed with thecompany in Taegu until 2 October.

It was about 130 miles to Chongju and bad roads made it a full-day trip eachway. On the 26th, the division advanced more than a hundred miles to make ajunction at Osan with the 7th Infantry Division, which had landed at Inchon. Onthe 29th, Cancelliere established another class I and class III point at Ansongto receive supplies that had been airlifted to Kimpo. I sent some B rations toAnsong by truck, but army stopped this.

Division supply points were located at Taegu, Chongju, and Ansong, with supplies furnished from both the north and south ends. I had nocommunications faster than messenger, and I soon lost touch with the situation.I hoped that class I and class III supplies were being issued, and I learnedlater that they were. One of our truck platoons returned on 2 October, and Imoved the company to Suwon. I left enough personnel in Taegu to operate theclass II and class IV points, for I wanted to be sure these items got forward tous. Small class I and class III distribution points remained in Taegu to supplythe division's rear-echelon troops, but had I known the situation forward Iwould have arranged for the rear echelon to use army supply points in Taegu.

Driving north we carried enough winter underwear, M43 jackets, and gloves tosupply the units that had not drawn them in Taegu. We did not get to issue theclothing until the troops were in Kaesong on 9 October. I found that on therapid march of the division those men who had received underwear and jacketstook care to hold on to them.

Our Suwon distribution points opened on 3 October. For about a week we wereissuing everything on hand and replacing nothing. Then we closed the I and IIIpoints in Taegu but left the II and IV supply personnel there until they couldget the clothing forward. The shortage of both rail facilities and trucks keptus from moving the clothing at this time, even though the weather was gettingcold.

In late September, 3d Logistical Command opened at Ascom City -- between Inchonand Seoul. I opened a class III distribution point at Yongdungpo on 5 October.On the 9th we started an all-class supply point at Kaesong, and here we openedour fifth cemetery. When we moved from Kaesong on the 15th we began a series ofclass I and class III supply operations that were little more than one-nightstands. Nothing was dumped on the ground, and we loaded from tail gate onto tailgate. We opened at Hanpo-ri on the lath and closed on the 18th. We opened atSinmak on the 18th and closed on the 21st. Hwangju opened on the 19th and closedon the 20th. On the 21st we opened a distribution point at Pyongyang and itremained open until 4 December. On 30 October we were to establish a dump justsouth of Unsan, but the men found the town in enemy hands, so they set up someeight or ten miles to the south. On 31 October, we opened a dump at Anju toreceive airlifted supplies landed at Sinanju for I Corps. We later turned thisoperation over to Eighth Army. On 2 November we opened a supply point at Pakchonbut we had to evacuate it hurriedly the next day. The quartermaster company didnot lose anything there. However, part of the 8th Cavalry, one company of thetank battalion, and one company of the engineers came out light and fast. We hadto replace a thousand sleeping bags, two or three kitchens, most of the messgear, and a lot of clothing.

The bulk of the division's winter clothing was still in the Taeguwarehouses -- 400 to 500 miles away. As soon as the railroads began operating as far north as Seoul, we moved several carloads of winter clothing tothat point. That meant the clothing was still 170 miles from us, but division G4began to canvass all units for trucks we could borrow to make the trip to Seoul.It was very cold now and everyone supplied trucks until it hurt. We sent 180from Pyongyang to Seoul in convoys of 30 and 40. The roads were so bad thatthere was about a 30 per cent truck casualty rate from broken springs.

Our boxcars had not been guarded on the railroad, and some pilfering hadtaken place. But we had anticipated a strength of 18,000 U.S. and 8,500 KATUSApersonnel in our requisitions, whereas we now had 18,000 U.S. and only 3,500KATUSA personnel. An officer in Pyongyang separated the clothing and issued itin the priority: infantry, engineers, artillery, other units. In no case did aservice unit or headquarters draw anything out of sequence, but a fast-talkingdivision headquarters supply sergeant almost succeeded until I learned about it.We outfitted U.S. and KATUSA personnel alike except that the OD7 overcoats wentto the U.S. soldiers and the men of KATUSA drew wool overcoats.

After the rail lines were open to South Pyongyang, we received the rest ofour own clothing from Taegu and also some from other sources. Soon we had anoverage in certain types of winter clothing. Instead of moving this clothing toEighth Army dumps we issued it to nondivisional units when directed by army. Wealso issued some clothing to British and other UN troops.

In September a wet-cold climate instruction team arrived from the UnitedStates. It consisted of Lt.Col. James P. Streetman and an enlisted man. We werein Pyongyang before they were able to instruct the troops, but fortunately thiscoincided with the issue of winter clothing. I believe their opportune lecturesdid much to prevent nonbattle casualties.

In Pyongyang an attached platoon of the 549th Laundry Company (Lt. UpshawSams) gave the division more laundry service than it could use. The tacticalsituation was so fluid that regiments often could not return their dirtyclothing. In their free time we let the laundry platoon work for anyone -- afterthey took care of the needs of the hospitals.

We opened class I and class III supply points at Sapyong-ni on 27 Novemberand closed them on the 29th. The 29th was the day Lieutenant Evans's truckplatoon got caught in a roadblock while carrying troops of the 5th Cavalry, andthe day we began our long withdrawal. On the 29th, we opened a supply point atSunchon, and hurriedly withdrew before we issued anything. At 1800 of that daywe were returning to Sainjang, and on 1 December our most advanced supply pointwas Pyongyang.

On 2 December we began to clear our class II and class IV supplies out of thePyongyang area. I got in touch with the assistant G4 of Eighth Army and requested ten or twelve boxcars to evacuate supplies, but hewas unable to furnish them. I had two partly loaded boxcars at my siding, so Ifilled them as quickly as I could and they were moved that night.

On the morning of the 3d, Colonel Streetman and Lt. W. T. Niedermeyer found 4empty boxcars and 2 gondolas of empty gasoline drums on the freight yard. Therail transportation officer agreed to let us unload the drums and use the carsand gondolas. We loaded them with class II and class IV supplies.

At 2045, before our cars were removed, an ammunition dump several blocks fromour warehouse caught fire. When the shells began to explode, the locomotivesleft our area. One or two of our warehouses burned and so did our gondolas. Theboxcars were spared.

On the morning of the 4th, the locomotives came to pull out our loaded cars.Unfortunately, the ties had burned under the track and our cars were derailed.We loaded all available trucks with class II and class IV supplies and I put aman out on the road to offer units anything they would take. The only II and IVsupplies we lost were those that burned in the fire.

On the night of the 3d, and during the 4th, we hauled class I and class IIIsupplies from Pyongyang across the river. Again we stopped vehicles and offeredgasoline and food. At 1800 on 4 December we destroyed the surplus gasoline andrations that we could not evacuate. This amounted to 15,000 to 30,000 gallons ofgas-all in drums. That was the first time in Korea our company had to destroyanything to keep it out of enemy hands.

On the 5th we opened a supply point at Namchonjon; we closed it on the 8th.On the morning of the 8th we moved to Kumchon (in North Korea) and sent all ourclass II and class IV supplies to Ascom City.

On 8 December 1950 I was relieved of my assignment and returned to the UnitedStates on emergency leave. Colonel Streetman was assigned in my place. After Ireturned to Korea from my leave I spent eight months in the operations divisionof Eighth Army's quartermaster section.

2. Quartermaster Problems and Services

Lt.Col. Homer P. Harris,Quartermaster, 2d Infantry Division

Korea is a paradise for the artilleryman, but not for the quartermaster. I'veserved with armored divisions and there the quartermaster component is a battalion. I feel that an infantry division needs more than aquartermaster company. The infantry division has been beefed up by the additionof numerous automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, bazookas, and a tank companyfor each regiment plus a tank battalion for the division. Our present ammunitionrequirements are beyond the hauling capacity of the using organizations, evenwhen they are augmented by the trucks of the division's quartermaster company.Artillery battalions are firing twelve thousand rounds a day, and the infantryis firing mortars and recoilless rifles at a prodigious rate.

In the spring and summer of 1951, to meet the overload placed upon the 2dQuartermaster Company, we had to have an overstrength unit. Instead of theauthorized 11 officers, 2 warrant officers and 216 enlisted men, the division G1knowingly let me accumulate a strength of 19 officers, 3 warrant officers and311 men. By this method we approached battalion strength.

Another way to support the division was to overload the equipment andoverwork the men. Overloading has to be supervised, for while a 2-1/2-ton truckwill easily carry a 100 per cent overload without injury, it does havelimitations. I caught people at an ammunition supply point trying to load 14tons on a 2-1/2-ton truck! After that I made out a weight chart for varioustypes of truck loads, and made the drivers responsible for seeing that extremeoverloading did not occur.

The overworking of men also occurred in Korea. In spite of an occasionalmovie or band concert, there was little release for the men, and no place to go.As a result, the tendency was for soldiers to work around the clock. Even nowthat I have returned, I find it difficult to break away from the habit ofsleeping three hours and then working eight or nine. But, under the stress ofoperations like these at Heartbreak Ridge, we had to work our truck drivers soconstantly hauling ammunition that three or four accidents occurred in themountains when the drivers fell asleep. The overloading of equipment and theoverworking of 'men will not pay off in sustained operations. I have reportedthis many times when I have recommended a quartermaster battalion for theinfantry division.

In addition to hauling huge quantities of ammunition in Korea, we wereresponsible logistically for too many persons. Normally I drew rations for35,000 troops and petroleum products for 44,000. Any way you figure it, that'san army-size job. We supplied our own division, men of KATUSA, Korean laborers,UN battalions of French, Dutch and Thailanders, and we were even saddled withthe job of drawing rations for the indigenous laborers of a Marine divisionlocated fifty miles away. At one time, we supported two Marine artillerybattalions with class I and class III supplies. The marines liked our supportand were disappointed when they had to return to their own supply channels.

The problem of supplying bulk rations was further complicated by the special rations and supplements we had to furnish the other UN troops.This varied from additional bread and potatoes for the French and Dutch tospecial spice supplements for the Thailanders.

Our food was the best any army in the field has ever received. One actuallygot tired of so much steak, chicken, and turkey, and I occasionally longed forstew. Fresh eggs, when on the menu, were issued 22S per 100 servings, with 5 percent allowance for breakage.

We served ice cream weekly to the troops. When the paper container supply wasexhausted, we distributed the ice cream in the regular insulated foodcontainers. I was always worried about the possibility of sickness should theice cream get contaminated, but we never had a case of this. My ice-cream manimprovised a device to sterilize our serving containers by using live steam, andit was by this method that we eliminated bacteria. I steered VIPs away from theice-cream plant to avoid contamination and to avoid serving samples of our work.News of that kind might cause a "run on the bank."

In the fall of 1951, Maj.Gen. Robert N. Young replaced Maj.Gen. Clark L.Ruffner as commander of the 2d Infantry Division. General Young soon showedevidence of his airborne training. We began experiments in airdropping suppliesand equipment to small detachments or units that had special needs. The flamethrower is one example. It is very useful to the infantry in certain operations,but is most often left behind because of its weight. General Young figured thatif we could airdrop a flame thrower to the right men at the right time, it wouldbe used. In addition, there was the need to air-supply patrols, outposts, andother groups in mountains too steep to be reached any other way.

The division air officer (Major Linton S. Boatwright) worked with me on aseries of experimental drops. I soon realized that the problem was complicated,so I suggested to General Young that two officers be sent to the 187th AirborneRCT to learn about airdrop. This was done. We received fifty parachutes, andafter each drop we repacked them ourselves. Our cargo planes were the division'sown L-19s, and using six different packs, we loaded as much as 120 pounds undereach wing. At the division airstrip we maintained a quartermaster detachment anda ready line consisting of priority supplies. When Eighth Army's air sectionlearned of what we were doing, it ordered us to stop, since our L-19s were notproperly braced to carry such a weight. When we received a group of new L-19s,this prohibition was lifted. So far as I know, we pioneered this divisionairdrop, but other divisions are using it now.

Along with General Young's airdrop idea came his plan for a daily launderingof socks. Here the division's policy of performing the maximum service for theindividual soldier applied. Each company sent to the laundry a barrack bagcontaining all the socks worn the previous day. We gave bundle service,returning the same socks to the unit that delivered them. I know that full use was not always made of this service, butGeneral Young insisted on a daily sock inspection and close attention to themen's feet. We had only sixteen cases of frostbite in the division during thewinter of 1951-52 -- and most of those cases didn't involve feet. Every report of afrostbite case was followed by an inspector general's investigation, and theblame determined.

Our quartermaster company set up a fix-it shop along with its other services.Weather, dust, and mistreatment took a heavy toll of typewriters, officemachines, fire units in field ranges, and Coleman stoves. We repaired all theseitems and centralized all replacement parts at division for that purpose.Unfortunately, we were often out of parts because our kits did not seem tocontain the parts we needed. Several investigations of this were made, but thesituation did not change. I did not evacuate any of our office machines, forgenerally if we didn't have a spare part, neither did the army service centerwhich supported

We did call on the service centers for covers for typewriters and officemachines. When a machine came to us for repair it was returned with a cover-anda strong suggestion that the cover be used. We pointed out that all machinesshould be covered, even during the short period when operators knocked off forlunch.

The 2d Quartermaster Company in Korea gave an outstanding performance. Itsupplied more men with more items and more service than our doctrine everanticipated.

3. Delivery by Air

Capt. William J. Dawson, Jr., 8081st QuartermasterAirborne Air Supply and Packaging Company

The 8081st Quartermaster Airborne Air Supply and Packaging Company is themost-decorated quartermaster company in the U.S. Army, and the only Army unit inJapan to earn combat credit. But if you ever saw these men at work, with theirtails hanging out of the rear of a C-119 while they got their cargo ready todrop, you'd know they earn their points, decorations, renown, and jump pay. Wedrilled into our men this motto: "Lives of individuals in combat depend on thesupplies we deliver. Risk yours, if necessary, to get them there."

I reported to Ashiya Air Base, on Kyushu, on 14 February 1951. At that timethe company had 4 officers and approximately 88 men. Capt. Cecil W. Hospelhorn,who organized the company, was in the United States presenting his packaging and airdrop experiences in lectures anddemonstrations. The operational procedures I mention are sometimes modificationsof the methods he initiated.

At this time the company was commanded by Lt. Claude A. Jones, and I becamehis executive officer. We had a company headquarters, a parachute maintenancesection, an air-supply section, a manifest section, and two air-deliveryplatoons.

The air-delivery platoons were responsible for loading the planes anddropping the cargo. The 1st Air Delivery Platoon (Lt. Paul E. Smith), inaddition to its general duties, was responsible for all heavy drops. These menwere all old-timers and persons Captain Hospelhorn had known for a long time.

The 2d Platoon (Lt. Billy G. Bishop) repacked all parachutes as its secondaryjob. Ashiya Air Base is on the beaches of the Sea of Japan, and the humiditythere is high. For this reason personnel chutes had to be repacked every thirtydays and cargo chutes every sixty days. We used Japanese employees to repack thecargo chutes, but the personnel chutes were never turned over to anyone outsidethe company.

When I arrived at Ashiya the company was working full-time. The men wereloading and dropping an average of 3S planes every day. That is beyond thenormal expected capability of an air-delivery company, but this rate continuedfor six weeks. In February 1951, X Corps turned to airdrop to build a stockpileof gasoline and rations, since land transportation was inadequate. We werepushed to operate at this level and could not have maintained it had we not beenassisted by several hundred Japanese civilians. Later our load leveled off atfive to ten planes a day, four or five days a week.

The air-delivery platoons worked in shifts. One platoon would do all theloading for a week while the other platoon had its men ride the planes anddischarge the cargo. Assignments changed every Sunday. During the time our workwas so heavy it was normal for our officers to spend their evenings in theorderly room, where they could play cards while waiting for the loading ordersto arrive. We rarely bothered to go to the movies since we expected to be pulledout before the first show was over.

Orders for an operation normally came to us between 2000 and 2400. Requestscame through G4 of Eighth Army, to 8247th Army Headquarters, Troop MovementSection, and then to us. Our first alert would tell us the number of planes tobe loaded and the type of cargo. Our manifest section, which operated on a24-hour basis, would receive the serial number of each plane, its capacity, theamount and type of cargo it would carry, and the on-station time (an hour beforetake-off). The capacity of planes varied greatly-largely because of fuel loads.The manifest section worked with these data, broke down the loads, and make a working manifest for each plane. They followed a few simple rules. Forexample, gasoline and rations were not to be loaded in the same plane, butgasoline and ammunition could go together.

While the manifest section was working, the commander of the loading platoonwould send out his alert squad to the planes to check the tie-down bolts and putin the rollers. Either the company commander or the executive officer called themotor pool and ordered the vehicles for hauling the cargo from the ready line tothe planes. We had available, on thirty-minute call, ten semitrailers and ninety2- l/2 -ton trucks. The drivers were Japanese who worked on an around-the-clockschedule. We always preferred the semis because they would carry more cargo, andtheir higher beds made it possible to slide the cargo straight into the rear ofthe plane. With the trucks we had about an 18-inch lift. It took four 2- 1/2-ton trucks to carry the cargo to one plane, while it took one and a half semisto do the same job. We never placed cargos for more than one plane on a truckfor fear of confusion. At the ready line the trucks were loaded by Japaneselaborers according to the working manifests.

While the trucks were being loaded and the alerted squad was placing therollers in the planes, the loading platoon was assembling. The loaders reportedto the hangars at the same time that the cargos arrived. From a central pointthe loading officer (platoon leader) ordered two American soldiers and fourJapanese laborers to each plane, with the trucks and cargo. As each truck wasunloaded it was released. Before the loaders left the plane they made up a whiteloading card giving all pertinent facts. They then returned to the hangar withthe last vehicle and reported to the loading officer to be assigned other trucksand cargo for another plane. The loading officer sent his platoon sergeant toinspect each loading job, and before leaving the field he personally checkedeach plane. No one left the area until all inspections were finished. Normally aplatoon could load five or six planes an hour.

It was informally understood that if the loading crews finished their workbefore 2400 they would not be called for training until 1300 the next day. Ifthey finished after 2400 they were off all day. Actually, however, it meant verylittle to give them the day off, for most of their loading was done at night.Finally, under the pressure of work the training schedule broke down anyway.

Shortly after we received an operations order we notified the consolidatedAir Force-Army mess of the number of in-flight lunches our men would need. Thehour of assembly for the platoon assigned to fly depended on the length of theflight. The normal time from Japan to drop zone in Korea varied between two andthree hours. An hour before take-off all crews and quartermaster flightpersonnel were due at the planes. An hour before on-station time the flightplatoon began drawing their parachutes, pistols, in-flight lunches, emergency rations, andequipment. For example, if the drop were scheduled for 0800 and the flying timeconsumed two hours, then take-off was at 0700, on-stations at 0500, and assemblyat 0400.

On arrival at their plane the quartermaster crew obtained the white loadingcard, checked the cargo to be sure it was safe, and then notified the crew chiefthey were ready. A copy of the manifest was turned over to the pilot, who hadthe final responsibility for proper loading. By the time I arrived at Ashiya thepilots had so much confidence in our men they rarely checked our work. I wouldsay the best pilots still checked and never took our word for it, but usuallythe check was omitted. Our pilots were first-rate.

After take-off the dropmaster and his assistant continued to check the cargo.While the plane was climbing they checked the front cables. When the planeleveled off they checked the rear cables. Periodic checks were made if there wasany unusual motion while in flight.

Usually the flight was monotonous and often uncomfortable. The turnaroundtime was four to six hours. The cabin of a C-119 contains only four seats, andthose are occupied by the crew. If the Army men moved forward, they had to siton the floor with their legs out straight -- and that is uncomfortable over aperiod of time. Lots of times there wasn't room up front because of cameramen,passengers, or flyers riding to get in their flight time. In the winter, or whenthe planes flew at high altitude, it was cold in the back of the plane. Andlooking out the open end of the plane always made me nervous in spite of mybeing called "Ace" Dawson.

Twenty minutes before we came over the drop zone the crew chief gave us asignal and our men moved to the rear of the plane to remove cables. The tiesbetween bundles were removed; then the forward cable safeties were severed butremained taut against the bundles. When everything was ready the dropmaster andhis assistant moved to the front of the cargo compartment and waited for thetwo-minute warning. At two minutes the bomb-shackle-release safety (a little reddisc) was removed, and the men returned forward to await the signal to drop.

Over the drop zone the plane came in at an altitude of about 800 feet and ata speed of only 110 miles an hour. This is dangerous flying because of the lowaltitude and near-stalling speed. When dropping right on the front lines theplane makes an excellent target for small-arms fire. The planes approaching thedrop zone came in trail at about 1,000 feet apart. This increased their accuracybut it also added to the danger of collision or other accident.

At the instant the bell rings the pilot pulls up the nose of the plane and jams the throttle open. This lurch causes the load to move down therollers in the floor and out the open end of the plane. The dropmaster and hisassistant run to the rear of the plane and count the bundles as they open, sothey can figure the number of malfunctions. The rate normally ran to about 3 percent. After the count it was necessary to reach out of the open end of the planeand pull in the static lines. If any of the cargo failed to clear from the planethe dropmaster informed the crew chief, who told the pilot to make another run.Then it was just a matter of flying home, checking in the equipment, and waitingfor the next day-unless there was a second flight.

These are the broad outlines of the air-delivery system, but of course therewere many ramifications and problems. To speed up operations we normally keptall classes of supplies packaged and ready to drop on our ready line. The readyline was actually a small dump with the supplies on skids and the ropes tied. Weran out of containers and used rope to hold the items together. In fact, we usednine million feet of rope-some 1,700 miles of it-in one year. Most of thepackaging was done by Japanese, and they were good at it. Without their help wecould have never packaged the loads we did.

Parachutes are expensive, the large G-11 costing $1,300. Some idea of thecost of our operation can be obtained from these figures: we dropped 73,000 G-1chutes (24 feet) which cost $43 each, and 70,000 G-9 chutes (18 feet), eachcosting $25. Dealing in those numbers and costs, it was essential to get thechutes returned from the drop zone whenever possible. Each division receiving adrop was supposed to get the parachutes to the nearest air base, and from thereit was up to the Air Force to return them to Ashlya. No one really knows howgood our recovery rate was, but I'd guess perhaps 40 per cent.

Although the Air Force was given the drop-zone location, the exact spot wasmarked on the ground with a T panel. Soon the Chinese got wise to this system,and-they placed panels and received several of our drops. Then it becamecustomary to have an Air Force Mosquito plane meet the C-119s ten minutes awayfrom the drop zone and escort them in. On rear-area flights we sometimes droppedcargo along the sides of airfields.

Our men tried to see how close the drop came to the T and sometimes theycould see that it went wide. When the unit being supplied was on the line thissometimes meant they could not gather the supplies. They immediately notifiedarmy G4, who passed the message to the 8247th, and then we got it. Thenotification of a bad drop normally reached the company before the planesreturned. If it appeared to have resulted from a pilot failure, the Air Forceusually made the same crew fly the second mission and hit the drop zone. Usuallywe sent our same men along. But when a plane developed engine trouble and had to jettison itscargo and limp home, we had someone else go on the replacement flight.

Sometimes the first effort to drop the cargo would be ineffective and theplane would have to make several passes over the DZ. One officer normally fleweach day for morale purposes, and when an officer flew he took the place of anenlisted man and carried out the same duties. In November 1951, CWO ByronKirkman and I were flying a mission together. We carried concertina wire for usealong the Imjin River. The coils were wide and the bundles overlapped in thecenter of the plane. Just as the plane started to dump its load we hit an airpocket and the wire jammed. Nothing went out on that pass, so we notified thecrew chief, then went to the rear to loosen the wire. The best we could do wasto drop one bundle from each side of the plane on each pass. It took five morepasses to complete the job.

On my last flight there were six planes in the flight and the drop was on thefront line. To hit the DZ we had to cross into enemy territory after the drop.The lead pilot did not give the signal to drop. Maybe the DZ wasn't marked,because the other pilots followed his lead. We moved over enemy territory going110 miles per hour at 800 feet. Enemy small arms cut up to thirty holes in eachplane. In my plane, the Plexiglas windshield was shattered and both pilots wereseriously cut in the face. The sergeant with mewas wounded, and only the chutehe wore saved his life. One other dropmaster was injured. In spite of the fireand their wounds, the pilots turned, made another sweep over the DZ, droppedtheir cargos, went again over the enemy, and flew back to Japan. When we reachedAshiya Air Base all the emergency crews and ambulances were waiting and I feltas though we had returned from a bombing mission.

While no one was killed on this flight, we did have two dropmasters killed inMay 1951, when a failure to stop our artillery fire allowed one C-119 to be hit.A second plane crashed right behind the first. On this day, fortunately, we hadonly one soldier in each plane. We had five other emergency free-fall drops whenour men bailed out of falling planes. We had three or four more men wounded onflights, and of course we had the famous case of Sgt. Robert Hale and CorporalPage who "just happened" to fall out of their plane right after they had droppeda cargo to the 187th Airborne RCT. Page was back in two days, but Hale waswounded by a sniper and did not return to duty for weeks. We took nodisciplinary action, but we never believed their story of their "fall."

Jumping wasn't much to these men, for all were rated. We did a lot ofjumping -- even on Saturdays and Sundays if business wasn't too heavy. We landed onthe beach along the ocean, and sometimes we alerted the air-sea rescue peopleand jumped into the ocean for practice. We never had any casualties in our unit, but one lieutenant colonel who got permissionto jump with us was killed on a water jump when he became confused and inflatedhis Mae West before he got out of his harness.

We tested a lot of Japanese parachutes for G4, and some of them were prettygood. We also ran a lot of tests to determine what items could be given a freedrop. Concertina wire was dropped free but broke its securing wires andunraveled. What a mess! To counteract this we placed small chutes on thewire-just enough to slow it down. Canned rations smashed badly when droppedfree. The new rubber containers for water landed in good shape, but they weresmall and frequently were lost. Blankets and all types of clothing came throughthe free-drop process very well.

One of our men (Sergeant Gordon) devised a bomb-shackle release that workedwell in loosening cargo. The load was emptied by nosing the plane up. This wassimpler than the standard practice of having the pilot operate the glider-towdevice and sending out a pilot chute to pull out the cargo. We showed the Gordondevice to one observer who came over from The Quartermaster School, and we evengave him one, but it hasn't been adopted.

One thing our men were proud of was the magazine drops. Knowing that men onthe front appreciate any kind of reading, we used to tie bundles of magazinesinto the cargoes we dropped. We heard from those men at times, and theirappreciation made us feel good. In spite of continuous hazards and combatrating, we lived the Air Force life and came home to clean sheets, hot meals,and movies. Helping the infantry out there made us feel more a part of it.

4. Service Company Runs Depot Lt. John Douthitt, 545th Quartermaster ServiceCompany

The 545th Quartermaster Service Company was an integrated unit withNegro and white officers and enlisted men. At various times men of both racesheld the positions of company commander and first sergeant, but the whites helda greater relative proportion of the noncommissioned ratings. There was noproblem of the men getting along, although some dissatisfaction existed among asmall minority of whites because they were serving in an integrated unit. We hadonly one period of tension-after a fight-but it did not last long. At no timedid race antagonism impede our work.

The mission of a quartermaster service company is to provide a labor forcefor attachment to depots and other installations. But from the time the 545th withdrew from Pyongyang, it was assigned missions verydifferent from its intended one. For a year we operated major supply depotsourselves. This difference was especially evident at Chunchon.

The company reached Chunchon on 23 July 1951, with instructions to open aclass I and class III supply point. When we arrived we found only a rice paddy.We had just three days in which to receive our supplies, organize our depot, andbegin to issue rations. On the 26th we issued rations to 26,000 troops, and onthe next day to 50,000. During the fall of 1951 we were supplying 90,000 troops,including three divisions and adjacent units.

As soon as we arrived at Chunchon, we received ninety rail cars of supplies,and our battalion commander was yelling for the return of the empties. Littlelocal labor was available, so we put every man on the job, including the firstsergeant and the cooks. We cleared our siding in fortyeight hours!

On the 25th we received our first refrigerated supplies, and by the 26th wehad ten to twelve carloads of perishables. We had no refrigeration facilities oradditional ice, and this was the hottest part of the summer. We issuedperishables as fast as we could, and salvaged ice from every car unloaded.Eventually we received a half car of ice, and that was a help. It was a closerace between issuance and spoilage, but we won. We kept a veterinarian busyinspecting the food before we released it. A month later we received a number ofpermanent refrigerators and an engineer to service the machinery.

We opened our Chunchon supply point with 3 officers 165 men. In the next fewmonths we received 3 additional officers while the enlisted strength variedbetween 170 and 190. This becomes significant if two facts are kept in mind.First, this company was doing a job not suited to its organization, training, orstrength. Secondly, 90,000 troops were being supplied by one company. At Wonju,8,000 to 10,000 troops were supplied by a service company minus one platoon, asubsistence company minus a platoon, a petroleum platoon, and a refrigerationplatoon.

While we carried out our mission, our overload of work led to certainproblems. Security was one. We were augmented by a few Korean National Police,but they controlled only Koreans and would not halt Americans who entered ourarea illegally.

Our men also suffered from a lack of time off. They worked seven days a weekand had no other outlet for their energy. A leave in Japan every six months wasnot enough. Some visited that inevitable Korean shack which was set up in theneighborhood of our installations. There they found liquor and prostitutes. Wehad several men ill from bad liquor and several cases of venereal disease. Wealso had several cases of drug addiction.

A few men of the 545th were difficult to control. The working, living andrecreational facilities could not be improved, and Eighth Army would not allowus to use confinement to enforce discipline. Company punishment meant nothing,yet confinement was not authorized unless a dishonorable discharge or abad-conduct discharge followed. Our battalion tried to bring pressure onoffenders by ordering a delay in rotation for a man who committed acourt-martial offense. This was countermanded by Eighth Army, even though itbrought results.

In Korea the 545th had no shortage of reports. The company commander, thefirst sergeant, and two clerks were kept busy with paper work, and later anadministrative officer was assigned to us full-time. We had to preparetwenty-one different monthly reports, and many daily and weekly reports.Battalion finally had to send us a calendar each month showing the date on whicheach report was due.

5. Testing Equipment in Korea

Capt. Fred C. Jacoby, Observer for TheQuartermaster Board

I was sent to Korea with a detachment of enlisted men in March 1951 toconduct a special series of on-the-spot tests of equipment for The QuartermasterGeneral and The Quartermaster Board. After I received my instructions inWashington and Fort Lee, I entrained for Oakland, California.

At the Oakland Quartermaster Depot the equipment to be tested arrived directfrom the manufacturers. I received the following untested items: 130 unitburners for field ranges, 5 cabinets for a new field range, 1,000 one-burnerstoves for small detachments, 5 cleaners for 55-gallon drums, and 150 rainsuits. All this material was loaded on board a cargo vessel.

My men accompanied the equipment but I flew to Japan to report to thequartermaster of General Headquarters, Far East Command. In Tokyo I was told toreport to the quartermaster of Eighth Army and work out the details of thetesting program direct. Eighth Army designated the 7th Infantry Division as thetesting organization.

When the test equipment arrived at Yokohama it was transferred to a shipsailing to Korea. At Pusan all of my equipment, except the drum cleaners andfield-range cabinets, was loaded on trucks and taken to the 7th Division.

The men of the 7th Division were pleased to have been selected to make thetest. The division commander personally assisted in the selection of units to use the equipment. The burners for the field ranges (whichwere installed in the standard-type range) and the one-burner stoves wentprimarily to the infantry. The rain suits were issued to the engineers, militarypolice, and the reconnaissance company. I stayed most of the time in thedivision's area, checking the users' opinions of the equipment and examiningitems for evidence of wear.

The one-burner stoves, the burners for field ranges, and the rain suits werewell liked. I recommended one modification to the field-range burner as theresult of a fire. I left all the test items with the 7th Division when Ireturned to the United States, except representative samples brought back forstudy.

The gasoline-drum cleaners had been distributed in Pusan and Osan and werewell liked except that they would not work on nonstandard drums manufactured inJapan. I recommended a slight modification that would allow the cleaners to beused with any drum. The cabinets for the field ranges were recalled formodification before I finished my testing.

I feel that this testing program was quite successful. The realisticconditions were the key to this. The trip overseas, with its transshipments,demonstrated that the test items were capable of standing actual wear and tear.The men who made the tests lived or worked with each item all the time and notjust during work hours. Troops in the field are always critical in theirjudgment of equipment and most outspoken in expressing their likes and dislikes.When they said they liked a fire-burner, I knew they weren't trying to spare myfeelings or hold onto their lobs.

One element of the testing program deserves some consideration. The men whocame into contact with the program felt that the United States Army wassincerely interested in their welfare. They felt they were being consulted bythe high command about an item, and not being given something that looked goodto a desk soldier being pressured by a manufacturer's agent. The final seal ofapproval of a product came when men from adjacent units asked me when each itemwould be available for issue. I could only give the stock answer: "Soon, Ihope."

6. Rations in Korea

Major Lawrence Dobson, Observer for TheQuartermaster General. (From an oral report, 25 April 1951.)

To accomplish my subsistence and packaging mission, I visited the three corpsheadquarters, all division headquarters, and units within the divisions. In addition, I visited all the army supply points and themobile bakeries.

I would like to start with a discussion of the operational ration since Ifeel that was the major portion of my mission. As you have heard, the troops inKorea are fed two hot meals a day whenever it is tactically possible. It isdesirable, of course, to have three hot meals, but we say a minimum of two:normally, breakfast and supper. Noon meals are an operational ration. Hot mealswere started by necessity because of a shortage of operational rations. Today wehave plenty of rations, but the troops and the leaders appreciate the benefit ofkitchen-prepared meals. It is a terrific morale builder among the forwardelements.

First, I would like to discuss the 5-in-1 ration. During the last part ofFebruary 1951, Eighth Army asked that no more 5-in-1 rations be sent to Korea.That was quite a shock because we in the States had always considered the 5-in-1our most acceptable ration.

Its military description said it would be used to serve smalldetachments-tank crews, gun crews, isolated units. I found that Eighth Army didnot want the 5-in-1 ration because it was not satisfactory for the forwardunits. The men of these units do not have their mess gear or heating equipmentwith them; they travel as light as possible. Therefore, the 5-in-1 was difficultto break down and eat. I found that the ration was unacceptable when consumedcold. Still, that was the way it had to be consumed when it was issued toforward units.

I found that the armored battalions followed the same system of two hot mealsa day, so that a case of 5-in-1 rations would be the noon meal for three daysfor the five men of a tank crew. The first day they cooked a pretty good meal;on the second day it was fairly good; by the third day they had no food left.The tankers had to draw another ration, and there we have a terrific waste.Also, the men did not want to cook when they could take the C ration, open onecan, and be done with it.

The 5-in-1 was used in several cases as an emergency B ration. For example,the 31st Infantry was well advanced when a thaw hit. Roads were impassable, theregiment's kitchens were forward, and the men had to be supplied by air. So the5-in-1 ration was dropped and used as a B ration. It was quite successful, butthe mess stewards complained that there were not enough vegetables.

Before its cancellation request, Eighth Army decided there was insufficientfood in a case for five men, and changed the basis of issue from 5-in-1 to4-in-1. That again caused waste, since the accessory items -- candy, chewing gum,cigarettes, peanuts-were put into the ration on the basis of five men. Still,four men used it.

I said that the 5-in-1 was unacceptable cold. When heated, the men did notcare for the beef and gravy or the pork and gravy. They complained that therewas too much fat, too much gravy, and that the meat appeared over-processed -- just a mess of shreds and nothing to chew on. As forfruit and jam -- well, the best-accepted item is canned fruit. You can't give themen too much of it and, if you ask which is the most acceptable, they will thinka while and then they might say "peaches," or they might say any of the otherfruits. Vegetables are the same as in the B ration, and are a matter ofpreference. Canned puddings and desserts were well received. The precookedcereal in the ration was rated very low to fair. If the men had to add hot waterto it themselves, it had poor acceptance. If the mess sergeants added milk andheated the cereal, it had very high acceptance. If only cold milk was provided,it had fair acceptance.

In addition to the use of the 5-in-1 as a B ration, and because there was asurplus on hand, Eighth Army at present is making some forced issues of 5-in-1to the troops, and is also utilizing it as the ration to feed troops on trains.For troop-train feeding it again had very poor acceptance because of absence ofheating equipment and, in many cases, lack of mess kits.

I would therefore recommend that the 5-in-1 no longer be considered a combatration, but rather a ration to be used by small detachments in a semipermanentlocation with ample cooking facilities available to them; and that the rationalso be considered an emergency B ration -- one that can be moved in as I haveexplained.

When we started, we had the C-4 ration. We procured the C-6 ration and,later, we had a C-7.

The C ration is the most acceptable ration we have in use in Korea. Everyonelikes it. The relative acceptance ratings of the meat items are: (1) beans andfrankfurters; (2) beans with pork; (3) meat and beans; (4) ham and lima beans;(5) spaghetti and meat; (6) hamburgers with gravy; (7) pork sausage patties withgravy; (8) meat and noodles; (9) chicken and vegetables; (10) beef stew; (11)corned-beef hash.

This ration is a combat ration, and one of its characteristics is itscapability of being consumed hot or cold. The reaction of the men was that theonly items acceptable cold were the three bean items. The principal complaintswere against the meat-and-spaghetti and the meat-and-noodle combinations. Bothitems were too dry, and when heated they would burn. The hamburgers and thesausage patties had too much fat and too much gravy. It is difficult todetermine the acceptance of the chicken and vegetables. In the C-4 and the C-6we had a chicken-and-vegetables combination. The men disliked it. We hadpreviously received reports on this, and in the C-7 we have a product of thesame name but from a different formula. The men interviewed who have eaten theC-7 reported that the acceptance on the chicken-and-vegetables was very high. Itis a very good product.

The corned-beef hash and the beef stew had very low acceptance ratings. Part of this can be attributed to the fact that, when operationsstarted in Korea, we had a limited stock of meat items to be issued in the Bration. Supply Bulletin 10-495 has the menus we had planned to use, but wedidn't have the items in stock. We had quantities of beef stew and corned-beefhash on hand, so they were shipped. The men had corned-beef hash and beef stew;beef stew and corned-beef hash. So the principal objection to the corned-beefhash in the C ration is that it has become the Spam of the Korean campaign. Beefstew-well, too much fat; very poor acceptance when cold.

It had been reported previously that there was too much meat in the C ration.I found that for those men in the rear areas-those who used the ration only whenthey were making a movement-there may be too much meat. But we must rememberthat this ration was designed for the fighting man. He is a young man-old mencannot climb hills. Fighters work hard. They will eat practically all you cancarry up to them.

When talking to them, I asked, "Is there too much meat?"

"Is there too much in the ration?"

"No; we will eat it ale"

Even to the cocoa disc and the coffee. If they cannot prepare them at thetime they are eating the ration, they will save them for later. An interestingcomment was that they liked the cocoa but sometimes do not have the fire to heatthe water. So the cocoa is being eaten as a chocolate bar. They wondered if wecould not improve the eating quality of the cocoa disc and still save itsquality for reconstituting it into cocoa.

The B units-that is, bread-type units in the C-7 -- were slightly different fromthose in the C-4 and the C-6. In the C-7, we attempted to put in each can allthe components that would be required for a meal, so that a man would not haveto open a second can or open an accessory packet. As a result, the arrangementof components within the C-7 was very well received and liked better than ourprevious arrangement. Also, in the C-7 for the first time we had a soluble milkproduct for coffee and that had high acceptance.

The chocolate and the starch-jelly discs are liked. Complaints were made ofthe starch-jelly discs being too hard to eat during the cold months. Also, themen got a little tired of having the same thing repeatedly, and requestedadditional types of confection.

Before I went to Korea, complaints had been reported that there were notenough crackers. I could not substantiate this. Colonel Jackson, of theQuartermaster Section, Japan Logistical Command, stated that some of the menwanted more crackers with the hamburgers and sausage patties. I heard onemedical officer say he wanted more crackers, and he didn't like the candy. Hewas the exception to the rule. I would say the quantity of crackers we have isjust about right.

I would ask a soldier, "Do you want more crackers?"

The most acceptable item is fruit. In the C-4 and in theC-6 we had two 6-ounce cans of fruit. In the C-7 we had one 8-ounce can offruit. The first reaction soldiers have to the C-7 is: "What? Only one can offruit?" Mess sergeants, platoon leaders, and everyone else complained. It wastoo difficult to divide the ration. They tell of fights among the men over whois going to get the fruit. So I would recommend that in the future we changefrom the one 8-ounce can back to our two 6-ounce cans.

When I asked, "What do you think of the individual combat ration?" the firstthing said was, "Where is the spoon in the C-6?" And the next thing: "The C-7 isa lot better ration; it has a spoon."

As I mentioned before, the men carry nothing. Mess kits are kept in kitchentrucks. Soldiers are stripped down-no packs-just the clothes they wear. We alsoused to think a man would never lose his eating utensils. That is not so. Theylose them, and unit commanders cannot have them resupplied as fast as they areneeded. In many cases knives, forks and spoons are kept in the kitchen. At firstthe C ration came without spoons, and we got reports of men eating beans withtheir fingers. One Marine colonel cut his finger in trying to make a spoon fromthe top of a can. I would say-and I am stating the opinion of everyone Iinterviewed-that plastic spoons are a must in the operational rations.

In the past we included a can opener in each accessory packet. Every soldierI saw had a can opener in his pocket or on his dogtag chain. He was afraid hewould not have a can opener when he wanted to eat. If he had a can opener andgot hold of another, he saved it. My prize example is a colonel who had one canopener on his dogtag chain and nine in his pack. So my recommendation is thatthe can openers be reduced to either two or three per case and that they nolonger be packed in the accessory pack, but be placed on top.

The condiment issue in Korea has been very poor. The troops did not haveenough spices, and those they did have arrived spasmodically. Condiments reachedPusan in bulk, but there wasn't time to break them down. In Japan a spice packwas made up-three thousand rations to a pack. I feel there is a definite needfor a spice pack. If we ship loose condiments, they will get lost at a depot.They will not be broken down and sent forward. Supply points have difficulty inissuing them to small units.

The cooks were doing a great deal of extra baking, but they were not gettingcondiments. I found, in some companies, that when a soldier was going on rest and recreation in Japan, his company commander would havehim report to the mess sergeant to determine what was needed. The companycommander then gave him money from the company fund and the soldier boughtcondiments in Japan so the company's kitchen would have nutmeg, cinnamon,cloves, vanilla, maple, and the like. I think this shows a definite requirementfor a spice pack.

The fire units actually are holding up well, but spare parts are a problem.For instance, the 3d Infantry Division followed the book and issued all thespare parts. As a result, spare parts were all over the division but not in theplace where they were needed. In the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, thefood-service supervisors set up equipment repair shops. Faulty field ranges,Coleman lanterns, and one-burner stoves were turned in to the regimental supplyofficer, taken to the quartermaster when the regiments drew their rations, andexchanged for serviceable units at once. It was surprising how few unserviceableunits were in these divisions. The repair men are better mechanics and better atimprovising than the average cook.

The cooks in the forward areas appreciate their position. Part of that mightbe attributed to the policy in some divisions that each cook must go forwardonce a week and spend twenty-four hours with the riflemen of his company.

I found that the cooks are really doing more than I thought they would. Ourcooks are doing a marvelous job. They know how to prepare dehydrated eggs andmilk, and have made granular potatoes more acceptable when mashed than freshpotatoes. I recommend we reduce the quantities of fresh potatoes and limit theuse of fresh potatoes to French fries and an occasional boiled potato. Cooks arebaking pastry and rolls far more often than the menu calls for. The men like thebaked products.

I hope I have not left the impression that our cooks are perfect. Not all ourreplacement cooks are adequately trained. They can cook, but some do not knowhow to clean a field range. Others do not know how to light one. On care andmaintenance of field equipment, not all have the knowledge and training. Some donot know how to put up a tent, and it is quite difficult for a person who hasnever erected one himself to direct a crew of Korean laborers who don't knoweither. Field sanitation is sometimes poor. The plea of the people in the fieldto the food-service school is, "Give more field training."

The farther forward you go in Korea, the better you eat. In Pusan menus areplanned for three areas: Pusan, Taegu, and north of Taegu. In other words, northof Taegu is the fighting front; Taegu includes Eighth Army headquarters and itssupporting units; and Pusan is the dock area. When any item is in short supply,it is distributed first north of Taegu, then to Taegu, and finally to Pusan. Ifthe quartermaster had limited supplies of frankfurters and frozen turkey, thefrozen turkey would go north of Taegu, the frankfurters to Taegu, and corned-beef hash to Pusan.

I am sure you have been told before of the method of feeding forward elementsin Korea. The meals are cooked in the battalion areas, then carried forward injeeps as far as possible, and finally packed by the Korean bearers using carrierstraps or A-frames. Now, there are problems involved. Bearers cannot carry waterup to the top of the hill except for drinking, and they cannot carry a stove toheat mess-kit water, so no one on the hill keeps his mess kit. The kits are allkept back in the kitchen and are carried forward with the food. This is aproblem, since the meat cans do not nest very well. Fifty mess kits to take careof an average platoon will fill a foot locker, so the mess kits are carriedforward in foot lockers, boxes, or duffel bags. They are washed first in thekitchen, but they become dusty on the trip forward.

Everyone asked: "What are we doing with the mess kit? It is no good. Throw itout. Give us a tray."

All except one cavalry colonel who asked: "What would the men do if theyfound some eggs? How would they cook them?"

When I inquired where his unit carried their meat cans, his reply was thatthey kept the mess kits in the kitchen. I asked how they would cook the eggsthen, and he answered that they might have the meat can with them.

The bakeries are operating in the vicinity of the supply points. The bread isvery good and the bakeries are doing a fine job. They are having terrificmaintenance difficulties, but I found an additional problem. When I visited the1st Cavalry Division, it was 93 miles from its supply point. Its infantryregiments were 40 miles from the rest of the division. That meant the bread washauled about 130 miles over the dustiest roads I have ever seen. All the bakeryhad to pack the bread in was kraft paper bags sealed with gummed tape. Well,I'll grant the bags could have been handled a little more delicately, but it wasamazing to see the number of bags that became torn between the bakery and theunits. Several times the surgeon came along and condemned some of the bread.

There were a few people in Eighth Army who felt that the bakeries were notfar enough forward. In one sense I agree with them. The main problem was thatthe road nets are so terrible and the bakery had to supply so many units that itcould not get close to one division, because the other divisions would have toofar to go.

The average age of bread was five days when it was consumed by the men and,in some cases, it was running to seven days. Still, they liked it. To give youan example of how well it is liked, the French and Belgians, when they firstcame in, would not accept our bread, but would take bread ingredients and dotheir own baking. They are either getting accustomed to our bread or their cooksare getting lazy, because gradually they are reducing the quantity of bread ingredients they are drawing andincreasing the quantity of bread baked by us.

7. UN Approval of U.S. Products

Capt. Richard A. Johnson, Observer forThe Quartermaster General. (From an oral report, 22 August 1951.)

My primary mission was to determine the degree of acceptance of QuartermasterCorps clothing, equipment, and subsistence items by United Nations troops in theFar East Command other than those of the United States. I visited troops fromTurkey, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,Canada, India, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, and some forces of the Republic ofKorea.

There is an expression in Korea that if anything is "tops" -- if it is reallygood-it is called "Number One." When talking to UN soldiers, I asked how theyfelt about U.S. clothing, equipment, and subsistence. They answered, "It isNumber One." But we know there is still room for improvement on everything wehave.

First, I will talk about subsistence. The remark was made to me several timesthat no army has been as well fed as Eighth Army in Korea. I think theQuartermaster Corps deserves a hand for the amount of food being supplied andthe way it is prepared.

In my opinion, the U.S. rations are suitable for all UN troops with minorchanges, except for Oriental troops. The Turks will not eat pork, and the Greeksdelete sweet potatoes, corn, peas, and other items. Most European soldiers drawadditional bread, and those from Mediterranean areas draw vegetable oils andolives. Some of the extra issues are made from U.S. stocks, and others areshipped to them from their own countries. The Greek Government, for instance,ships olive oil to Pusan. It is then forwarded with the regular rations to thedivision supplying the Greeks. These supplementary foods are not a problem thatneed worry us in the United States unless we feed a much larger number of UNtroops.

Our rations are not suitable for Oriental troops because their basic food isrice. If they get rice they are happy. Anything else they draw merelysupplements the rice portion of the meal. If you give them a fine steak, theycut it up and boil it with rice, so I don't see the necessity of issuing themsteak when they are going to cook it in that way. I feel some work should bedone to develop a menu for Oriental troops if we are to continue to supply them.Start from scratch, find out what they like, and issue that instead of the U.S.menu plus rice. In our present system a lot of items are wasted.

A special operational ration has been developed for the South Koreans calledthe 12-in-1, or J. ration. It is made in Japan. The Korean soldiers like it;however, like all combat rations; it becomes tiresome when eaten over longperiods.

No particular difficulty is found with the package marking. At first, when aTurkish soldier got a can of U.S. food, he wouldn't know what was in it.However, after using a particular item for a month or so he learned to associatethe writing on the can with its contents. So, if the troops are going to use anitem over an extended period, there will not be any particular difficulty withmarkings.

Next, I will discuss clothing and equipment. I am not blowing theQuartermaster Corps horn by saying everything the U.S. has is the best in theworld. But the U.S. items are generally of better design and of better qualitythan those manufactured in other UN countries represented in Korea. For thatreason, the UN troops prefer the American items. The Turks, in speaking of manyitems will say, "We like the U.S. item because it is more convenient to use." Inother words, our design is better.

The main difficulty with U.S. clothing for UN troops is sizing. The Turks andGreeks are about the same size as American soldiers except that their feet arequite a bit wider. Oriental troops are smaller than the average American soldierand their feet are small but wide.

So far as equipment is concerned, many of the UN troops are not mechanicallyinclined or have not worked with mechanical equipment. For example, Thaiofficers say that many of their soldiers come from farms and have never usedanything mechanical. They probably have been following a plow all theirlives-and a wooden plow at that. So you will find they have difficulty with whatwe consider simple mechanical items such as the immersion heater, the Colemanlantern, and the fire unit. Rather than go through the ordeal of setting up theimmersion heater, they go down to the nearest stream and wash their mess gear.

Many UN troops do not understand the layer principle as we apply it to ourwinter clothing or, if they do understand it, they don't agree with us. Theytold me they like American equipment because of its lighness, but they felt thatfor warmth they should have much heavier clothing-something that will keep outthe cold. They don't believe that two layers of light clothing keeps out thecold much better than one heavy layer.

As much as the UN soldiers like to wear the U.S. uniform, when they go onleave to Japan they want to be known as Turks, or Greeks, and not as U.S.soldiers. They are, however, very proud of their association with a U.S.division, and will wear the shoulder insignia of their own country on oneshoulder, and that of the U.S. division on the other.

I want to mention that I think the United States Army has forgotten that theAmerican soldier is also proud of the fact that he is an American soldier. Many American soldiers in Korea remarked, "Why doesn't theUnited States Army have a uniform of its own -- a uniform that every Tom, Dick andHarry in the world isn't wearing?" So I believe some thought should be given toesprit de corps in the U.S. Army, to give the American soldier a uniform he canbe proud of-and that only he will be wearing.

8. Wet-Cold Clothing Indoctrination

William F. Pounder, CivilianObserver for The Quartermaster General. (From an oral report, 19 January 1951.)

The primary reason for my trip to the Far East was to establish and execute abroad training program for all troops in Korea in the proper issuing, fitting,use, and maintenance of the wet-cold and dry-cold climate clothing. I left theUnited States for this mission on 22 September 1950, with 6 officers and 3enlisted men.

After arriving in Japan our party set about establishing a wet-cold trainingprogram. Since we sent troops to Korea through the replacement training centerin Japan, we first had to set up a training program in Japan itself. At CampDrake we had our most experienced officer (Capt. James D. Norman) establish awet-cold training program. We worked in spurts-sometimes from 0600 until 2100 or2200-then waited until new troops arrived. Sometimes we taught as many as threethousand during two-day periods.

During the slack periods we trained new instructors, for we realized that sixteams would not be adequate in Korea. After the training team had its programwell under way in Japan, the remaining teams left for Korea.

There we established a training program within Eighth Army, and within everycorps, division and separate unit. We had training teams in the 1st CavalryDivision, in the 2d, 3d, 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, and in the 1stMarine Division. As we moved from division to division, the unit "next door"would hear that we had trained instructors, and would immediately request ateam. We kept calling on the replacement training center for additionalinstructors and assigned them permanently to divisions.

We also worked with the logistical commands because personnel were beingtaken from rear-area units and sent into the combat zone. We didn't have enoughinstructors for every unit, so we used "indirect training." We did this in alarge church in Pusan, where we spread the gospel of wet-cold and dry-cold training to the 2d Logistical Command. At least twopersons came from each separate unit, and we trained 86 instructors. To helpthem conduct training in their own units, we equipped each with complete issuesof clothing, an outline of his talk, and all his training aids.

As the training progressed we realized there would also be the problem ofinstructing the other United Nations troops, so we began to expand even further.The first UN troops we came in contact with were the South Koreans. To augmentU.S. units, there were as many as eight thousand ROKs interspersed in each ofour divisions. Only a few of these could speak English. We had to translate ourtalks and our outlines into the Korean language and have them published. We alsohad the talks distributed to the ROK divisions.

Later we got in touch with the British brigade, the Turkish brigade, the Thairegiment, the Filipino battalion, and the French battalion. I have just receiveda letter saying they are now working with the Canadians and New Zealanders. Inall, the wet-cold and dry-cold gospel has been translated into Korean, Turkish,Spanish, and French.

I said that we had six teams. When I left Korea there were seventeen teams inoperation. We are proud that when the Chinese Communists attacked, we had teamswith the 7th Division at the Yalu River, with the 1st Marine Division in theChangjin Reservoir area, with the 1st Cavalry Division in the northwest, and atthe front line with every one of our divisions.

It was difficult to operate a wet-cold indoctrination program in the field,especially near the front lines, where we had to instruct units as they cameinto reserve for an overnight rest. In Japan, where we could seat 700 or 800 menin a theater and show our movie, it was far more satisfactory.

Our teams did more than just instruct the troops. Sometimes they helped thequartermasters prepare requisitions. At other times they aided in locating andexpediting shipments of winter clothing. It was a terrific problem to haul allthis clothing long distances, over a disrupted transportation system, and a fewshipments did get lost. Sometimes a unit had the clothing but could not move itforward because of the presence of guerrillas. Since the division quartermasterswere short of personnel, they gave our teams transportation and sent themhundreds of miles to locate the shipments and bring the clothing forward.

We made physical inspections of clothing and equipment to separate superioritems from old or inferior ones. This was extremely important, because we hadseveral types of footwear and clothing. The old shoepac is not as good as thenew type, and our men made sure the best were issued to combat troops.

The teams made certain that circulars about the prevention of cold injuries reached the company level. Then we made spot inspections, beginningwith the front-line private, to check on understanding and compliance with thecircular. When our teams found noncompliance, they reported it to Eighth Army.We also checked to see that each company had a cold-injury prevention team ofits own.

Our teams checked the progress and adequacy of the sock-exchange systemwithin the combat elements. Clean, dry socks are important in preventingcold-weather injury. It is not enough to put this in a circular. You must goforward and actually see that the units have set up a sock exchange program. Ourteams assumed almost complete responsibility for getting changes of dry socks upwith the rations.

We worked hard to insure adequate numbers of warm-up and drying out tents androoms. Again, you must go up there and be sure there are tents or rooms, andthat there are stoves. When a soldier feels or sees that he is getting acold-weather injury, he needs a place to go where he can warm up and get achange of socks.

The last function of our team was to report the cold-weather injuries thatoccurred. The 24th Infantry (25th Infantry Division) in a two-week period had169 cases of trench foot and frostbite, while a unit operating right next to ithad only 20! These units were in reserve. When this report arrived, it wasrelayed to the surgeon of Eighth Army. A member of his office and one from thequartermaster's office visited the regimental commander.

Now let's look at the results of the cold-weather indoctrination. We havelong been trying to get complete casualty reports from Korea, but it isdifficult and we are getting them only periodically. While I was there I made acheck into weather casualties and I found that from 28 November to 7 December1950 -- the period of the Chinese Communist breakthrough -- there were 1,500 suchcasualties. Of these casualties, 1,100 had to be evacuated to Osaka GeneralHospital in Japan. We have another report on weather casualties after thingsquieted down. For the week 22-29 December, we had 223 casualties, 184 of whichwere frostbite cases.

At the time I left Japan, we estimated that weather casualties during theworst of the fighting in Korea totaled about 4 per cent. In winter campaigns inEurope and Italy during World War II, under conditions not so severe, we foundthere had been an average of 8 per cent of such casualties. We like to thinkthat part of this reduction was due to our wet-cold indoctrination; not only byteam instruction, but by making sure that the sock-exchange system, the dry-outtent, and proper care were forced on the individual soldier.

Now let's look at some causes of cold-weather injuries in Korea. First, Ifeel that many staff officers are ignorant of proper clothing needs forcold-weather warfare. In October 1950, at the time of our northern push, the troops left Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan -- areas where the weather iscomparable to that of Washington or Baltimore -- and moved 150 or 200 miles northinto areas with the climate of Maine -- with only one layer of wool clothing. Wediscussed this with the staff while I was there, and told them that cold weatherwas coming soon. We explained that the supply of cold-weather clothing was acomplex affair. I was told that, at this time, ammunition, POL, and rations hadNo. 1 priority, and that when the cold weather came the supply of overcoatswould be taken care of in due course. "The supply of overcoats"! The supply ofovercoats is not all that is concerned in cold-weather clothing.

The second cause of cold-weather injuries was ignorance and lack ofsupervision by troop officers in the wearing of winter clothing. In some areas,where the temperature was zero, the officers told the troops to wear the combatboot in snow rather than the shoepac because it was lighter and would be betterfor marching. They did not know that a leather boot will get wet and soonfreeze. No matter how many times you change your socks, you do not get a drychange of footgear.

The third reason for injuries was that the temperature was extremely low at atime when enemy pressure made it almost impossible for some men to take propercare. We made a survey at Osaka General Hospital to find out how the patientsbecame casualties. We found three hundred of the weather casualties were men whohad been wounded and, in some cases, had been lying on the snow, ice, and frozenground for as long as two or three days. These men were in very seriouscondition and some needed amputations.

We talked to others who had been wounded, and asked if they had had thetwo-hour training. We found no one who had not been indoctrinated in properclothing. We asked why they didn't carry out their training and they gaveseveral reasons. First of all, they didn't know how close the enemy was to themand they didn't dare take off their shoepacs for fear they might get caught intheir stocking feet and have to continue without footgear.

Others, in the Marine division, had to go through a river about sixty yardswide and partially frozen over. One ten-yard section forced men to wade throughwater almost up to their knees. Some of the men were fortunate enough to get onvehicles and get through. Those who were well trained knew enough to take offtheir footwear and walk barefoot through that water, dry their feet, and put ontheir footwear at the far side. Others, who were not so well trained, walkedthrough the water with their footwear on. They might just as well have been hitby machine-gun fire. To make it worse, some of those who walked through thewater got on vehicles and rode for several hours without giving their feet anyexercise.

These were the main causes for the cold injuries, and it showed that we needed training. Before Korea, our troops did not receive wet-coldtraining.

Most of the troops we are sending into arctic and wet-cold areas have beentrained in the South.

We visited the units that had trained in cold-climate areas. In the Marineunits that had trained in Greenland, the Id Infantry Division units that hadtrained in the mountains of northwestern United States, and the 7th InfantryDivision units that had trained in northern Japan, not one man became acold-weather casualty! Think that over.

You cannot make clothing and equipment foolproof under all conditions, so wemust train our troops. That does not mean a two-hour instruction period. Itmeans living under actual wet-cold conditions. And living under those conditionsis an acquired skill you can get only through training.

9. Command Action in Korea

Prepared for the Army Field Forces CommandersPreventive Maintenance Course, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 1952

Soldiers of the United States Army are issued large quantities of clothingand equipment in accordance with existing tables of allowances. The soldierstores some of them in his duffel bag, some in his cargo pack, and some in hiscombat pack. When the time comes to shake down to minimum essential equipmentfor his first combat, the average soldier is reluctant to part with many of thearticles he has been issued. As a result, he attempts to carry on his backeverything which will contribute to his comfort in the field.

The soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division were no exception, and they wereoverburdened when they landed at Inchon in September 1950. The inevitable soonhappened: equipment was abandoned. The commanding officer of the 32d Infantry(Col. Charles E. Beauchamp) determined to do something about it. During theplanning phase of a later amphibious operation in which his unit was to land atIwon, Colonel Beauchamp limited the items his men could wear and carry to:

helmet, complete with liner; cotton field cap, with visor; wool muffler; twosets of winter underwear; high-neck sweater; pile field jacket; M43 fieldjacket, with hood; a pair of wool field trousers; a pair of cotton fieldtrousers; four pairs of ski socks; a pair of combat boots, fitted over skisocks; a pair of shoepacs, with two pairs of flat insoles; poncho; mountainsleeping bag, with case; cargo and combat field pack; cartridge or pistol belt; canteen, with cup and cover; first-aid packet, with pouch; toilet articlesand insecticides; individual arms and ammunition; C ration (three mealsmaximum).

Colonel Beauchamp compiled his list after a consideration of what a soldiercould carry and what was absolutely essential. Shelter halves, pins and poles,and intrenching tools were eliminated because the frozen ground would make themuseless. Flannel shirts were omitted because of their binding qualities.

In a showdown inspection, Colonel Beauchamp collected all items in excess ofhis list and turned them over to his S4. With the concurrence of the divisionquartermaster, quantities of some items were retained. Among these were 2,000suits of woolen underwear, 4,000 pairs of ski socks, and 2,000 pairs of woolentrousers.

A standing operating procedure was developed that established the variousarticles and combinations of articles to be worn. Experience had demonstratedthat the combat boot was better than the shoepac for marching and climbing therugged terrain; therefore, Colonel Beauchamp directed that combat boots be wornunder these conditions. When the march ended, or a static situation developed,the shoepacs, with two pairs of ski socks and a pair of felt insoles, weresubstituted for combat boots.

The regiment initiated a training program to insure that all troopsunderstood the layer principle of insulation. This was conducted by a wet-coldclimate instruction team assigned to the 7th Infantry Division.

Finally, Colonel Beauchamp directed that officers and NCOs make frequentinspections of their men to make certain his instructions were strictly obeyed.He placed particular emphasis upon the importance of foot care, includingchanging of socks at the conclusion of each march, and massaging the feet torestore circulation. Troops were also required to change underwear after eachperiod of exertion, when the situation permitted.

The results obtained in the 32d Infantry were noteworthy. Wanton abandonmentof equipment was practically eliminated; care and maintenance of clothing andindividual equipment improved. The incidence of frostbite, frozen feet, trenchfoot, and other cold injuries was extremely light. Through experience, theregimental S4 further reduced his clothing stocks. In time, other commanders inthe division adopted Colonel Beauchamp's methods.

10. Clothing Exchange

Lt.Col. Kenneth O. Schellberg, Quartermaster, 7thInfantry Division

We learned that the quartermaster's shower and clothing exchange was a greateconomy in spite of the additional equipment necessary to allow the men to batheand to launder their clothing.

The 7th Infantry Division began its clothing exchange in February 1951.Before that each man wore and carried two sets of clothing, and reserve suppliesin the division held at least one other complete uniform per man. When theclothing exchange began, we collected all the duffel bags and limited eachsoldier to the clothing on his back plus a change of underclothing and socks.Clothing at the shower points and laundry equaled one half uniform per soldier.Thus the total number of uniforms per man dropped from three sets to one and ahalf.

Our quartermaster company drew its four shower units in Japan just beforeembarking for Korea, but we didn't establish a clothing exchange for six months.This delay was caused partly by inadequate laundry facilities. It was also amatter of selling the idea to regimental commanders.

There were many advantages to the clothing exchange system. It cut down theweight the soldier had to carry; it also eliminated duffel bags and thethirty-man detail in each regiment to guard and handle them. This increased ourmobility. The cleaner clothing improved the hygiene of the troops, and theautomatic exchange of clothing eliminated all requisitions below division.Exchange made possible early repair before shirts and trousers becameunsalvageable, and it eliminated the old practice of mutilating Governmentproperty in order to get the supply sergeant to issue a new item. Reduced stocksalso lessened the possibility of the enemy's capturing valuable supplies.

We learned that in combat there is no need to publish a shower schedulebecause company commanders preferred to send men to get showers whenever thetactical situation permitted. From experience we learned that the shower unitsshould not be moved farther forward than regiment. Some regimental commanderstried parceling out the showers for several days at a time to each battalion.This made for time lost in moving, wear on equipment, and irregular treatment ofthe operators. Moving the shower into a battalion zone made it unavailable tomost of the regiment; yet it was not always busy at battalion. It was easier totransport the men than to move the equipment.

The shower and clothing exchange was a great morale builder for the men.After an attack in which a regiment was unable to release men to get showers, wewould augment its bathing facilities and see that every man could bathe and change within four days. Normally, however, the men had ashower once a week.

Company commanders watched their men for signs of excessive fatigue and sentthem to the showers when a relief seemed necessary. Often a shower and a hotmeal at regiment were enough to restore a soldier's efficiency. If the fatiguewere dangerous, the soldier could be sent to the regimental rest camp for a dayor two of sleep, hot meals, and regular baths. This was an excellent way toprevent combat fatigue.

11. QM Service Center No. 3

Lt. Bevan R. Alexander, 5th HistoricalDetachment. (Narrative based on interviews of the following personnel of ServiceCenter No. 3: Capt. Alfred G. Rollins, Capt. Henry L. Cody, Lt. DeweyWashington, Jr., and Sgt. Carrol L. Veach.)

During World War II, U.S. Fifth Army in Italy developed what became known asthe quartermaster service center. The service center is a grouping, in one area,of separate quartermaster units that provide related services. After World WarII, no service center was established until the spring of 1951, when Eighth Armyactivated one for each of its corps.

The first to begin operations was Quartermaster Service Center No. 3, servingX Corps. From Eighth Army were assembled two and one half platoons of the 549thQuartermaster Laundry Company; one platoon of the 505th QuartermasterReclamation and Maintenance Company; one section of the 821st Quartermaster BathCompany; and the 580th Quartermaster Office Machine Repair Detachment. Officersof the several units took over duties in the service center, with the commanderof the laundry company (Capt. Alfred G. Rollins) as officer in charge. Theofficers and men of each unit cooperated so successfully that, to all intentsand purposes, the service center became a regularly constituted unit.

The service center was laid out in a compact area near a stream. The laundrywas close to the repair and maintenance platoon. The clothing exchange of thebath company was near the laundry. Mess facilities were centralized but apartfrom the operations area.

The most important service of a center is laundering. During the firstnineteen weeks of our operations (1 May to 8 September 1951), the laundryaveraged 13,617 pounds of wash daily, for a total of 1,968,730 pounds. Thus,1,462,890 individual items were cleaned.

The wash is normally received in bulk, laundered, put in stock, and reissued.When a unit or individual brings dirty clothing to the laundry, an exchange ismade from the company's stocks.

Trucks bringing soiled clothing arrive at the laundry's check point. Here achecker counts the individual pieces. The agent receives a turn-in slip which hetakes to the nearby stock tent and exchanges for an equal number of items ofclean clothing.

The clothing is exchanged rather than returned because of the time lag andaccounting. Since all clothing is of the same design and material, sizing is theonly problem. In addition to the bulk laundry, a small amount of bundle work isprovided for units or individuals near the service center.

At the laundry there are five separate washing machines. Each sectioncontains a washing machine and a dryer, which are individually mounted ontrailers. Dirty clothing is sorted and placed in front of each of the washers.After loading, it goes through a nineteen-minute cycle, during which it iscompletely washed and 75 per cent dried. Then the clothing is placed in a tumbledryer for eight to ten minutes. The entire laundering process lasts less than ahalf hour.

The dry clothing is next taken to a nearby inspection tent. Here each item ischecked to determine whether it should be placed in stock, repaired, ordiscarded. If a piece of clothing needs repair, it is sent to the reclamationand maintenance platoon.

The reclamation and maintenance platoon repairs clothing, canvas and heavytextiles, and shoes. A secondary function of office-machine repair is handled inconjunction with the center's office-machine repair detachment.

The clothing section is equipped with fourteen standard textile sewingmachines for use in repairing uniforms. All clothing received is inspected todetermine if it can be repaired. Most of the clothing received comes from thelaundry, but some repair work is submitted directly by units.

The textile section is equipped to repair tentage and other heavy textiles.The section uses two heavy-duty textile-sewing machines and tent-repair kits,which contain rubber cement, glue, and patches. .

The shoe-repair section is equipped to repair all types of service footwear.This section repaired 9,926 pairs of shoes and boots in nineteen weeks. Footwearis delivered to the section by the agents who bring laundry to the center. Ifthe boots and shoes can be repaired, they are processed and returned. If theycannot be repaired, they are returned to the sender for salvage through theregular supply channels.

The office-machine repair detachment repairs all types of office machinery.The typewriter is the machine most frequently repaired because it is the mostwidely used. However, almost anything may come in for repair -- adding machines,calculators, mimeograph machines -- and the detachment has even repaired a timeclock.

The greatest problem has been replacement of parts. Until the fall of 1951 the typewriter-repair kits received from the Zone of the Interiorwere not much use. Often only two or three parts of any of the kits were needed.For example, in one manufacturer's kit only the variable linespace clutch andthe line-space-wheel assembly could be used, although the kit contained ahundred separate typewriter parts. This was more or less true of other kits. Achange in the method of procuring replacement parts has been instituted, and allreplacement parts are now requisitioned individually. Typewriter platens havenever been available in Korea, however.

Expediency has proved the best way to obtain parts for office machines.Damaged machines have been cannibalized, and the machine shop of the reclamationand maintenance platoon has manufactured some unobtainable parts.

The heavy dust, the high humidity, and the extremes of temperature havereduced the effective operation of office machines, but the greatest unkeepproblem has been neglect.

"People just don't take care of their machines," said Sgt. Carrol L. Veach."Sometimes I'll clean up a machine and tell the person who comes for it to keepit covered. They often reply, 'Why should I worry about it? It's not mine."'

Another problem for the repairmen has been the misguided effort of the novicerepair mechanic. This character, when his machine begins to work improperly,takes it apart. He usually has it entirely disassembled before it dawns on himthat he cannot fix it. Then, in its still disassembled condition, he brings itto the detachment, losing about half the parts along the way. Sometimes such amachine can be repaired, but often it can only be used as a source of parts.

Showers and clothing exchange are provided for troops near the servicecenter. The single shower unit is capable of serving 4,400 men in a tenhour day.A man who wants a bath need bring only himself. The exchange provides cleanclothing, hot water, free towels, soap, and even shaving cream and razor blades.

12. Pukehon Cemetery

Major Jacob W. Kurtz, Graves Registration Officer,7th Infantry Division

The 7th Infantry Division did not have a graves registration section inJapan, and one had to be created before we made our assault landing at Inchon. Ireceived ten men from various sections of the quartermaster company -- none of whom had had any burial experience. I organized thesection with a section chief, two clerks, four body processors, two supervisorsof Korean labor, and a driver. Although these men developed competence in theirwork, one sergeant was disinterested and one other soldier was an Army misfit.

Before leaving Japan I assumed that casualties might be high and that burialitems might not be supplied for several months. I requisitioned five thousandmattress covers and large quantities of identification tags, burial forms,temporary grave markers, personal-effects bags, burial bottles, a fingerprintkit, and an addressing machine. The supplies were carried jointly by theinfantry regiments (as evacuators of bodies) and the quartermaster company.

At Inchon the graves registration section learned how to receive and processbodies. No channel existed for evacuating bodies beyond division, so we shared acemetery opened by the Marine Corps. Our large stock of burial items came inhandy here, for the marines exhausted their supply and called on us for more.

At Inchon we learned not only from our own mistakes, but also from those ofthe marines. The cemetery was located only 250 yards off the main supply roadand in view of all who passed. In the first days it was not possible even toscreen off the bodies awaiting burial. I believe this affected many who passed.

In October 1950 the 7th Division made its landing at Iwon. Here thedivision's casualties were evacuated directly to Navy craft and the gravesregistration section did not operate until the division headquarters wasestablished at Pukchon. Our section contained seven of the ten men who had beenat Inchon, and we were familiar with our duties. We remained at Pukchon, eventhough division headquarters moved to Pungsan, and the infantry regiments werescattered from the Yalu River to Chosin Reservoir.

Whenever possible, a division evacuates its dead to an army gravesregistration detachment. At Pukchon we did not have this army support. Onapproval of the division quartermaster (Lt.Col. Kenneth O. Schellberg) weestablished a division cemetery. I reconnoitered the Pukchon area and quicklyfound an adequate site, a half mile south of town and a half mile from the MSR.The dry, rocky soil had good drainage, and the area was not under cultivation.

In Pukchon my section was quartered with the other quartermaster troops. Wehad a clerical office with the quartermaster company and an obscure buildingnearby for processing the bodies. Our operation was so quiet that few peoplenoticed it.

When a body arrived we encased it in a mattress cover, if this had notalready been done. We checked to see that each body had an emergency medicaltag, and, if it did not, that the unit of the deceased supplied one. Fortunately, every American body received at Pukchon wasidentified. We then checked the personal-effects inventory to see thateverything listed was present, and made an additional search to be sure noeffects had been overlooked.

We hired a dozen laborers to dig graves. While a ten-man section is adequatefor operating a division graves registration point, it is inadequate foroperating a cemetery. The Koreans were employed voluntarily and workedfaithfully at a wage of two canteen cups of polished rice daily.

We opened our cemetery on 4 November 1950. Four or five open graves weremaintained at all times, and no body was taken from the processing building tothe cemetery until all preparations were complete. At the cemetery we maintaineda pyramidal tent to protect the crews against the weather, and to screen thebodies during the brief period between their arrival and burial. No equipmentwas ever left in the tent and no guard was left in the area at night.

When a body arrived it was lowered into the open grave, face up. Then one ofmy men would reach into the mattress cover and place the burial bottle,containing a report of interment, under the left arm. The grave was closed and atemporary marker placed.

Unless a chaplain happened to be present when the body was interred, therewas no ceremony at that time. Sometime during the day of interment, however, achaplain of the soldier's faith came to the grave for a short service. If thesoldier's faith was unknown, chaplains of all faiths visited the site. Severaltimes we had a ceremony in honor of an individual, but in each case it was afterthe grave was closed. A memorial ceremony was held each Sunday.

As division cemeteries are temporary, regulations do not provide for anybeautification. In digging graves our laborers turned up many stones. With thesewe built a cemetery wall. Three flags flew over the cemetery: the United Nationscolor at the front entrance, the United States color in the center of thecemetery, and the Republic of Korea color toward the rear.

We closed our cemetery about 1 December 1950, as the division began its marchtoward Hungnam. During November we had buried 50 Americans and 24 ROKs. Sketchesof the location of the cemetery and a register of those interred were forwardedto the Eighth Army's graves registration section.

13. Repatriation of American Dead

Lt. Bevan R. Alexander,5th Historical Detachment. (Condensed from an article based on informationsupplied by Lt. William F. Wurz, Sgt. James H. Deisenroth, and Cpl. Paul R.Imwalle, Id Quartermaster Company.)

[For more complete information, see theactual manuscript prepared by 1Lt Bevan Alexander, "QuartermasterField Service Platoon in Action"]

The evacuation of the dead resembles other quartermaster operations -- inreverse. Bodies of the dead are brought from their units to a division gravesregistration point, then evacuated through corps, army, and theaterinstallations to the United States.

The remains are processed at a division collecting point and forwarded withintwenty-four hours to a corps collecting point. Accompanying each body is anemergency medical tag, and with each shipment is an evacuation list. The listserves as a letter of transmittal.

At corps the remains are forwarded to the army's collecting point. Here thefingertips of the dead are embalmed and fingerprints are taken. The bodies arethen packed in ice and shipped to Pusan, then to Japan.

In Japan, unidentified bodies are examined by experts in anthropology,chemistry, and dentistry. Careful records are kept in hope that identificationcan be made. The bodies are totally embalmed, placed in military caskets, andshipped to the United States for burial either in a U.S. military cemetery ornear the soldier's home. Under present policy, no bodies are being permanentlyinterred either in Korea or in Japan.

Personal effects follow a similar path. The property of persons killed,wounded, or missing in action, those who die of natural causes, and those whoare evacuated through medical channels, is divided into two classes. Class Iincludes trophies, keepsakes, and items of sentimental value. Class II items arethose of specific value.

An inventory of the property of each casualty is made by his commandingofficer or some other officer. Every item is listed -- even if it consists of onlytwo pennies or fifteen pictures. If the money belonging to the individual isworth $4.99 or less, it is sent with his effects, regardless of whether it is indollars, scrip, Avon, or yen. If the money is worth $5.00 or more, it isconverted into a U.S. Government check.

The effects of a person killed in action must be forwarded to his division'spersonal effects section, usually within eight days. For a person missing inaction, the time is twenty to thirty days. From the division's personal effectssection the articles follow channels to the rear until they reach the EffectsCenter at Kansas City, Missouri. Here they are checked again and arrangementsare made for transmission to the next of kin.

14. Supply Lessons

Lt.Col. Charles R. Scherer, Assistant G4, 7thInfantry Division

Korea made several things very obvious. We had forgotten many of the lessonsof mobility and small detachment operations learned in World War II, and we hadto relearn them. We found that units must expect to serve more troops and workwith less corps and army support than Quartermaster Corps doctrine prescribes.Above all, we learned about distance.

The occupation of Japan prevented normal training. Understrength battalionsand regiments were scattered in small garrisons around the islands. Regimentsmaintained separate posts and S4s operated the combined technical services.Commanders forgot that division would normally provide most of their suppliesand services. Once the dependence on S4s was formed, it was hard to break.

In Japan some of our technical services were performed by Japanese civilians.This was necessary because of troop shortages and the lack of qualified Armytechnicians. Our own men were thus prevented from getting the necessary trainingand experience. This, coupled with inadequate SOPs and field training, preventedthe technical service troops on occupation duty from being ready for combat.

The 7th Infantry Division was the last of the occupation divisions to leavefor Korea. As the other divisions left, we were levied for personnel and lostmany of our key officers and NCOs. This didn't hurt the service troops as muchas it hurt the infantry and artillery, but it did lower the efficiency of ourdivision. We were preparing to go to Korea with a strength of about 9,000 when,about three weeks before our departure, we received 10,000 American and 8,000Korean replacements to integrate into our division.

The Koreans we received looked as though they had been herded together to getthem off the streets of Pusan. They spent their first week in Japan inquarantine, since they had to be deloused and cleaned. Then we had to equip themcompletely. Japan Logistical Command did a wonderful job of getting the articlesof clothing and equipment to us, but it was a real problem to teach the Koreanshow to live in a camp.

They could not speak English and we had few interpreters. Our instruction wasgiven primarily by sign language and making simple motions for them to watch andimitate. We had a long way to go in two weeks. These men had no idea ofsanitation, let alone the more complicated activities of military life. Yethigh-level policy dictated that we treat them as our equals in every respect.They were to receive the same clothing and equipment, the same treatment, the same rations. Later, theyeven had to have chocolate bars and "comic" books!

We Americans have much to learn about handling troops of the so-calledbackward nations who may come under our control. They do not understanddemocracy, our ideals, our methods of discipline, and the forces that motivateour actions. The Koreans have not lived as we have, and our easy-goingdiscipline did not work with them. In their own army discipline was strict,arbitrary, and often brutal. They had been reared under such discipline andseemed to understand no other kind.

The integration of Koreans was unsatisfactory. They ate our rations, rode ourtrucks, used our supplies. But except for menial tasks, they were a performancecipher.

We lost a great deal of mobility because of our overload of supplies. Our menhad too much equipment in Japan and they did not strip down to prepare forcombat. Regiments committed the same error. Used to depending on their own S4sections for garrison supplies, they continued to carry large stocks of clothingand equipment in their own trains. S4s made "deals" in Pusan and carried theiracquisitions around in their trucks. At Pukchon we found one regiment hidingthree hundred cases of C rations among the men's duffel bags, while the divisionquartermaster was trying unsuccessfully to obtain operational rations! When the31st Infantry was overrun near Chosin Reservoir, it lost ten to twentytruckloads of clothing. Critical types of ammunition would be concealed by oneunit while greatly needed by another.

During our first six months in Korea, the infantry regiments did not trustthe ability of their divisional service units to keep them adequately supplied.Occasionally a regimental commander would test our ability to produce. Oneregimental commander, while advancing to the Yalu River against moderateresistance, insisted on 50 tons of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition. We figured hedidn't need that much, but we piled it right in his front yard so he could seewe could deliver it. Unfortunately, we could not evacuate it when we withdrew,and it had to be destroyed. The artillery battalions near the Yalu Riverrequested two extra basic loads of fire to be stored in a division ammunitionsupply point, and they gave strong arguments for it. I had mental reservationsabout getting so much heavy ammunition so far forward when resistance was light.When the fighting around Chosin Reservoir forced us to leave our exposedposition on the Yalu River, this ammunition too had to be destroyed.

All the hoarding and all the demands for extra supplies took extratransportation at the very time such great operating distances put vehicles inshorter supply. When we first came to Korea, division headquarters could move in25 trucks, but soon it took 50. Everyone had acquired a Korean desk and chair. Regiments called for 200 additional trucks when theymade a move, although movement tables show they should have been able tomotorize themselves with a 90-truck augmentation.

Lest it seem our regiments alone were guilty of poor supply discipline, Iwill point out that some of the patterns of waste were established at the top.Higher headquarters sometimes caused us to overload our units. Once, whileinspecting a unit, a general officer found a man who had only two pairs ofsocks. He ordered that every man in the division carry six pairs! We had toissue these over the protest of commanders who knew that their men would soonthrow away the extra pairs. Colonel S. L. A. Marshall (in The Soldier's Load andthe Mobility of a Nation) is right in his statement that when you overload asoldier you decrease his efficiency. Yet we had pressure in 1950 to draw everypiece of impedimenta that the Army designed.

In Korea there were some increases in our loads that were very necessary andjustifiable, such as tents and stoves. The extreme cold of northern Korea madeit absolutely essential to have shelter throughout the division. It wasnecessary that each infantry platoon have a squad tent and stove so it couldrotate its men and allow them to get warm. But enough tents for a divisioncertainly complicated our transportation situation.

The distance from army supply dumps to us made it necessary forquartermasters to carry more clothing, shoes, mess gear, stove parts, and othersupplies than normal. We tried to get permission to store these stocks inboxcars on sidings, but this was refused.

We usually think of the company or platoon as being the smallest work unitamong service troops. In Korea we learned the need to operate in smallerdetachments. The quartermasters often had to maintain four or five class I andclass III supply points, and maybe two II and IV points. It took a lot ofdetachments to accomplish this. Typically, one officer and a composite squadwould run a small distributing point. The ordnance company sent semipermanentdetachments to the regiments because of the distances separating them. Here wasa place where leadership was necessary on the part of junior officers and NCOs.We often hear of the need for leadership among combat troops. It is no lessnecessary among service troops.

The rations in Korea were out of this world. I had more fresh meat in Koreain a month's time than I received in three and a half years of Pacific servicein World War II. We also had fresh vegetables in limited quantities. The foodwas so good that we got few complaints from commanders except about anoccasional shortage in Worcestershire sauce, catsup, or black pepper! I doubt ifwe could have maintained this quality of food were we operating on the scale ofWorld War II.

15. The Failure of Support

Major James W. Spellman, Executive Officer tothe Quartermaster, 24th Infantry Division. (Condensed from a statement writtenon 15 November 1950.)

From the first day they spent in Korea, members of the 24th Division'squartermaster section have had mixed feelings about quartermaster support. Weremember with pride the difficult being done immediately, and the impossibletaking a little longer. Then we shudder as we recall how often we failed inthose hectic days of defeat, victory, and stalemate. We don't like to rememberhow many times we have had to turn down requests. "How about the mantle for myColeman lantern?" "How about a generator for my field range?" "How about . . ."stencil paper, GI soap, trousers, tent poles, paper clips, underwear,cigarettes?

We seldom had to make excuses for lack of rations or gasoline. But yeast,baking powder, shoestrings, toilet paper, and forks were not available. It hasbeen weeks since many of the small but very important items have been received.Shoes are tied with scraps of cord and kitchens are using toilet soap receivedfrom home by mail. I do not doubt that hundreds of soldiers are writing home foritems of quartermaster issue because they are not available, or because theycome more quickly by mail. After all, our requisitions are often still unfilledafter a month of waiting.

From the tragic days in Tacjon we have sensed a passive indifference to ourrequirements for individual and unit equipment. In the heat of summer we beggedfor even salvaged fatigue jackets and trousers to be shipped from Japan to coverour semi-naked soldiers, for salt tablets, and for mess kits to replace thoselost by our troops as they withdrew over the mountains, carrying only theirrifles.

It was understandable that supply confusion should exist at first. But I donot understand why the supply authorities should resist our legitimate requestswith criticisms that we were using too much. How were we using too much? Whatknown yardstick of modern U.S. logistics could be applied to this long series ofdefeats and withdrawals?

From the first telephone request -- ignored -- for minimum clothing and equipment,through the present requirement of six copies of every requisition, we have feltthe antagonistic, unsympathetic reaction on the part of Eighth Army's minorquartermaster personnel. They have minutely questioned every item of evenemergency requirements, and deliberately delayed supplies while they checked andrechecked requests against noncombat-type statistical status reports. There hasbeen an almost comical questioning of requirements, delving into the microscopicdetails of why a company, outnumbered 30 to 1, did not evacuate kitchenequipment under small-arms fire. A directive stated that when damaged equipmentwas not submitted for exchange, a formal certificate must be submitted givingall details of loss.

So long as Pusan remained within truck distance, it was possible to bypassapproving authorities and go directly to the mountains of supplies in the port.Often we obtained supplies in Pusan that were impossible to get through thered-tape maze of proper channels. Personnel in charge of warehouse operationsfrequently begged us to take supplies so they could make room for those beingunloaded from ships.

After we crossed the Naktong River, efforts of the army quartermaster tosupply class II and class IV items to the 24th Division were conspicuous bytheir absence. It is true that great efforts were made to supply class I andclass III items, but it only made the indifference to II and IV more apparent.Even now, if a unit is willing to send its trucks 230 miles to Ascom City, or400 miles to Pusan, supplies can be obtained. But the price in broken springsand deadlined trucks is prohibitive.

As the drive passed Kaesong, Pyongyang, and points north, frantically wordedrequests to Pusan awaited the opening of a shaky rail system for delivery. On 10November, the 24th Division had just completed a forty-mile withdrawal of itsforward elements. The quartermaster section, then at Sukchon, received a placidnotification of a boxcar of class II and class IV supplies -- complete with car,engine and train numbers, and hour of departure from Pusan on 9November -- destined for "24th Division, Waegwan." Our rear echelons had clearedWaegwan nearly two months earlier.

A long time would be required to list the major deficiencies in our supplyline. In the prosecution of a war the lack of a generator for a field range isnot vital. But the result of poor meals is lowered morale -- which is vital. Whenrepeated supply failures occur, when indifference is shown, troops often becomediscouraged and indifferent. Supply failures at this level cost men their lives.

The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary People

History On Line

Combat Photos

PART VII Quartermaster Corps

1. Division Supply Operations

Back to Combat Support In Korea

2. Quartermaster Problems and Services

3. Delivery by Air

4. Service Company Runs Depot Lt. John Douthitt, 545th Quartermaster ServiceCompany

5. Testing Equipment in Korea

6. Rations in Korea

7. UN Approval of U.S. Products

8. Wet-Cold Clothing Indoctrination

9. Command Action in Korea

10. Clothing Exchange

11. QM Service Center No. 3

12. Pukehon Cemetery

13. Repatriation of American Dead

14. Supply Lessons

15. The Failure of Support

Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation

KOREAN WAR TIME LINE

     Tanks and Fighting Vehicles

               Enemy Weapons

Korean War, 1950-1953

  Map and Battles of the MLR

                 SEARCH SITE

The Foundations of Freedom are the Courage of Ordinary People and Quality of our Arms

- A VETERAN's Blog -
Today's Issues and History's Lessons

Danish Muslim Cartoons

Guest Book

The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary People

History On Line

Combat Photos

PART VII Quartermaster Corps

1. Division Supply Operations

Back to Combat Support In Korea

2. Quartermaster Problems and Services

3. Delivery by Air

4. Service Company Runs Depot Lt. John Douthitt, 545th Quartermaster ServiceCompany

5. Testing Equipment in Korea

6. Rations in Korea

7. UN Approval of U.S. Products

8. Wet-Cold Clothing Indoctrination

9. Command Action in Korea

10. Clothing Exchange

11. QM Service Center No. 3

12. Pukehon Cemetery

13. Repatriation of American Dead

14. Supply Lessons

15. The Failure of Support

Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation

KOREAN WAR TIME LINE Tanks and Fighting Vehicles Enemy Weapons

Korean War, 1950-1953 Map and Battles of the MLR SEARCH SITE

The Foundations of Freedom are the Courage of Ordinary People and Quality of our Arms

- A VETERAN's Blog - Today's Issues and History's Lessons

Danish Muslim Cartoons

Guest Book

KOREAN WAR TIME LINE

Tanks and Fighting Vehicles

Enemy Weapons

Korean War, 1950-1953

Map and Battles of the MLR

SEARCH SITE

- A VETERAN's Blog -
Today's Issues and History's Lessons