BATTLE OF THE APPLE ORCHARD

DAVID BUTLER

Service Details

David Butler was educated at the Wesley College, Perth, WesternAustralia and the Royal Military College Duntroon. A career officer in the AustralianArmy, after his Korean War Service, he progressively held senior appointments includingCommander 6 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) in South Vietnam 1969-1970. Commander 1 Task Force 1977-1978.Australian Army Attaché, USA & Canada and Defence Attaché, United Nations 1979-1981.GOC Training Command 1982-1983 attaining the rank of Major General. He is married with 1son and 2 daughters. His military service was recognised with the Silver Star (USA Korea -1950), the Distinguished Service Order (DSO-Vietnam-1970) and was admitted to the Order ofAustralia (AO) (Military Division) in 1984. He is now in active retirement and lives atPortsea in Victoria.

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Introduction

The first Australian battle in Korea, and the first for the infantRoyal Australian Regiment, was the now long forgotten "Battle of the AppleOrchard". Much to the relief of the young participants who had seized the occasion itwas a great success. No doubt there must have been comfort also for those in Governmentand in the Army who had the responsibility to commit and hastily mount the battalion.

As in so many battles the Royal Australian Regiment would fight in thefuture, Australians had no involvement in the direction of the campaign, made nocontribution to the military strategy employed or its application and had little influencewith tactical command at the highest level. The fate of that lonely battalion, oncecommitted, was for the large part in the hands of Allied leaders and their staffs. Theburden imposed on the recently appointed Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel C.H.Green, DSO., must have been heavy, to command a battalion in action and to look afterAustralia's interests at the same time..

In that baptism of fire, the Australian attack was but one action of alarge encirclement operation which involved the troops of four nations. While theoperation fell short of the strategic objectives sought, the tactical results wereoutstanding and the Australian attack, in effect the coup de grace, was a brilliantsuccess.

Background

Once the Eighth Army had crossed the 38th Parallel and was driving onPyongyang General MacArthur was determined to cut off the fleeing North Korean armiesbefore they reached the Yalu River and sanctuary. Even while Pyongyang was being investedhe inserted 187 Airborne Regimental Combat Team (187 RCT) by parachute at the two criticaljunction points 35 miles north of the city. Headquarters 187 RCT and the 1st and 3rdBattalions (1/187 RCT & 3/187 RCT) landed at Sukchon. Both towns dominated the roadand rail approaches to the Chongchon River which was 30 miles further north.

The Airborne Attack

Headquarters 187 RCT, 1/187 RCT and 3/187 RCT landed about 1400 hours20 October 1950 at Drop Zone WILLIAM, south east of Sukchon. 1/187 RCT quickly securedSukchon and established a road block north of the town. 3/187 RCT established a defensiveposition astride the road and the railway about two miles south of the town. At 1420hours, 2/187 RCT landed near Sunchon, 17 miles to the east and linked up successfully with6 ROK Division. The 187 RCT had come to fight ; the first air drop brought 6 X 105 mmhowitzers and 1125 rounds of ammunition which was reinforced next day by a further 12 X105 mm howitzers and 4 X 90 mm anti-aircraft guns. Nearly 600 tons of ammunition and othersupplies were delivered during the operation.

At this time the bulk of the North Koreans had crossed or were in theact of crossing the Chongchon and so evaded the noose.

However, the 239 North Korean Regiment (239 NK), the last formation outof Pyongyang, had taken up a rear guard position on the best defensive ground betweenPyongyang and the Chongchon River. The 2500 strong Regiment was astride the road and therailway just north of Yongyu and Op'a-ri. They deployed a battalion in each locality whichwere three miles apart.

At 0900 hours, 21 October, 1950, 3/187 RCT started two combat teamssouth, 1 Company towards Op'a-ri along the railway and K Company along the road towardsYongyu. At 1300 hours 1 Company reached Op'a-ri where it was heavily attacked by anestimated enemy battalion supported by 120 mm mortars and 40 mm guns. In a battle lastingtwo and a half hours, two Platoons of 1 Company were overrun and the company withdrew westwith 90 men missing. The enemy did not follow up and withdrew to defensive positions onthe high ground near Op'a-ri. K Company also encountered an estimated enemy battalion justnorth of Yongyu which, after a sharp contact, withdrew south and east of the town. KCompany continued on to Hill 163 just north of the town and into the town itself.

With the United Nations (UN) forces driving into Pyongyang, the twoattacks on 239 NK from the north put them in a dangerously exposed position. The NorthKorean reaction was fierce. At midnight they launched the first of three attacks whichforced K Company to withdraw from Hill 163 and the town. At 0400 hours and again at 0545hours, 22 October, 1950, they launched further strong attacks on the Battalion CommandPost 3/187 Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and L Company, both located one mile north of Hill163. Despite suffering heavy losses in those attacks, at 0600 hours 239 NK launched 300men against L Company and 450 men against Headquarters Company. By daylight 22 October1950, 3/187 RCT was only just holding and the seriously depleted 239 NK must have beenclose to exhaustion.

27 British Commonwealth Brigade

At noon, 21 October, 1950, 24 United States Division, with 27 BritishCommonwealth Brigade leading, crossed the Taedong River at Pyongyang and headed north. TheArgyll and Sutherland Highlanders were in the van and by nightfall the Brigade halted onthe outskirts of Yongyu, 21 miles north of Pyongyang. A patrol from the Argyll's enteredthe town and made contact with elements of 3/187 Regimental Combat Team.

239 North Koreans' midnight attack on Yongyu came from the generaldirection of the road running south-west of the town. The Argyll's met the fringe of theattack and beat it off. The attack on 3/187 RCT was stronger and the enemy succeeded inentering the town before breaking off and moving away at 0300 hours.

Next day the Australians were to take the lead in the advance, CCompany was to be the leading company. The orders given in the early evening stressed theurgency to link up with the US Airborne. The company was not to be distracted at Yongyu,they were to press as quickly as possible as the Argylls continued to clear the town. Thenoises of the Airborne battles to the north were now very close and could be heard clearlythroughout the night. There was no doubting the morrow would bring battle.

C Company RAR was the only company to remain largely intact as thebattalion hastily absorbed reinforcements from the rest of the regiment and K Force andcame to strength. The newest 3 RAR company had been formed in late 1949, early 1950 fromthe young men who joined the Regular Army after World War 11. By the standards of theother companies C Company was very young and unblooded. Much of the banter within theBattalion was directed at them. The K Force arrivals ; older, confident and all with 2ndAIF experience , tended to make fun of the young regulars and their inexperience. Goodhumoured as it was, when it continued once the battalion commenced operations the youngregulars became all the more determined to show their mettle. For C Company was a welltrained sub unit and, unlike the other sub units still shaking down, was a cohesive team.

The Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO's) and senior soldiers wereexperienced, competent leaders who had raised and trained the Company. As an unexpectedluxury, a handful of K Force reinforcements joined the C Company during the advance andtook it over strength; a state never to be attained again by any unit in the campaign.

Whereas the Platoon commanders were young and inexperienced, all fromthe 1948 graduating class from Royal Military College - Duntroon, the Company Commander,who arrived only weeks before the battalion sailed, was a vastly experienced battleleader.

Captain Archer P. Denness had commanded a company at El Alamein,through the Islands and subsequently in the early days of the occupation of Japan. Highprincipled, he neither smoked, drank or swore. "Arch" Denness was accustomed tocommand ; woe betide anyone of his officers or NCO's who were in any way derelict in theexercise of their duties or any soldier who was profane within earshot. In the short timethat he had been in command he had quickly established his stamp on the company ; nobodywas in any doubt that only the highest standards were expected by "Armour PiercingArchie" as the soldiers soon christened him. Above all, his insistence on timelinesshad got through to every soldier and stood C Company in good stead through the long day ofits baptism of fire.

At 0700 hours, 22 October, 1950, C Company drove off, 7 Platoon leadingon tanks of D Company, US 89th Tank Battalion followed by the rest of the company in UStroop carrying vehicles. Not quite knowing what to expect the company drove carefullythrough the Argyll's and the scattered firing into the eerily deserted town. Yongyu wasquite large ; leaving it and getting into open country again was like entering sunshinefrom darkness. Nobody spoke much in the ten minutes or so the trip took and all wererelieved to be back in the country.

The Apple Orchard

At 0900 hours (9 am) and a mile north of Yongyu, C Company came underfire from the apple orchard on the slopes of Hill 163 in YD 2354 (map grid location). Veryquickly it became apparent that C Company had driven into the North Koreans who were inthe process of forming up to attack the Americans. Enemy on the fringe of the battlefieldflushed from camouflaged positions started to bob up every where. The Commanding Officer(CO) Lieutenant Colonel Green, traveling well forward as was his want, was more quickly tothe scene and much more involved than he would have appreciated. His quick informal ordersgroup proceeded with Regimental Policemen engaging interlopers within yards of theassembled group. He did not have a lot of information. There was no contact with theAmerican Airborne who were believed to be located nearby. Without precise locations he wasunable to use any indirect weapons in the battle and this concerned him throughout theengagement. In this confusing scene his ability showed. The urgent need for link updictated his decision. He chose to try and bounce C Company, largely on their own.

Orders concluded, the CO looked at the scene of battle all around himand rather wryly suggested to "Arch" Denness, he had better get on with itquickly !.

The scene was made for Arch Denness and C Company were more than ableto match his mood. Quietly determined to be successful in their first battle, constrainedby the underlying excitement, there was some nervous conversation as weapons, ammunitionand equipment were checked and formations settled. At 0930 hours (9.30 am), 22 October,1950, 8 Platoon (Lieutenant C.M. "Mousey" Townsend) and 7 Platoon (LieutenantR.F. "Rob" Morison), attacked the high ground east of the road. 9 Platoon(Lieutenant D.M. "Dave" Butler) was in reserve and held the road and the flankto the north.

The Assault

The attacking platoons went in hard, uphill through the apple trees,and their dash was just too much for those in their path. Many of the enemy jumped out oftheir pits to engage the gallant young Australians and exposed themselves to therelentless surge of the attackers. Although considerably outnumbered, 7 and 8 Platoonspressed their attacks fiercely, impressing all those in a position to observe. The youngsoldiers were, if anything, over eager to get into their first fight, but the apple treeswere in full leaf and visibility was a real problem. Control was difficult and the lastthing wanted in the first engagement was a man shot by one of his mates. The NCO's and thesenior soldiers were absolutely splendid and quickly got the neophytes through themomentary confusions which everyone experiences in their first battle. With so many enemypresent there was a considerable threat of some remaining hidden and firing at the backsof the Australians as they passed. The platoons pushed on and in a stride were through tothe vital ground. Even a bunker which threatened 8 Platoon provided only a momentary delayas the young men grenaded it as if on a training exercise and pressed forward.

C Company's sudden arrival, even though it must have been expected tosome extent, and the speed with which the North Korean outposts were brushed aside, hadcompletely surprised the enemy. They were caught with all their attention directed northto a final frenzied effort to break out past the American forces. The CO's decisionto pass 3 RAR through Yongyu so quickly and bounce the enemy aside was bold and brilliant.Thereafter the enemy were incapable of presenting organised resistance to the vigorousthrust from the south. Nonetheless there were many determined individuals who opposed theAustralians every step of the way. So much so by 1000 hours the CO was forced to commit DCompany to clear the area to the west of the road.

Within C Company, as soon as success had been assured, the energeticDenness ordered us (9 Platoon) to push forward along the road. 7 and 8 Platoons continuedwith their consolidation. From the high ground they were able to engage the enemy to thenorth and east throughout the morning.

Shortly after, about 1000 hours, we came onto a cart and a badlywounded horse which effectively blocked the road. Under heavy fire, the road block wascleared and the platoon was able to move using the waist deep storm water drains on eitherside of the road for fire protection. The road led out of the heavily treed area and intoan extensive open area, mostly paddy field, which proved to be the disputed area betweenthe North Koreans and the Americans. It was in this area it seemed the North Koreans wereforming up for the final attack against the Americans.

From then on 9 Platoon had to move forward under almost continuous fireand would have suffered heavy casualties but for the protection of the storm drains.Initially the platoon only attracted the attention of the enemy close to the road. Most ofthe enemy appeared to be focused north but their attention gradually shifted to theAustralians.

Further down the road the enemy started to engage from greater ranges,our platoon pressed on although unable to effectively suppress the enemy long range fire.Fortunately the road was built up and the we were able to dominate significant areas whichenabled us to keep moving. At this point 7 Platoon were ordered back to the road down theridge to the west to clean out pockets of enemy who were engaging us (9 Platoon) at longrange and the tanks were sent forward to 9 Platoon. Denness's reaction was timely as 9Platoon was deep into the enemy area.

It was a scene of continuous confusion. Many of the enemy clearly hadenough. Any lull in the firing would bring more and more of them forward to surrenderdespite a hard core fighting on.The appearance of the tanks tilted the balance. Theybrought fire down on positions some distance from the road and slowly the enemy becameaware of the futility of continuing. 9 Platoon was able to move and link up with theAmerican Headquarters shortly after noon.

Link up

It was a delighted Arch Denness who reported to the Commander of theAmerican troops C Company 3 RAR had arrived. He had every reason to be exhilarated. Hiscompany had met with every challenge and it was already clear that they had been involvedin a significant victory. Later 3 RAR reported approximately 150 enemy had been killed,239 wounded and 200 captured as a result of its action at a cost of seven wounded. Theoperations in Sukchon/Sunchon had achieved much more. The Americans (187 RCT) claimed, ata cost of 46 jump casualties and 65 battle casualties, it had captured 3818 North Koreanprisoners, killed 805 enemy and wounded 681.

It would be difficult to describe a more chaotic battlefield. Despitethe many casualties the Americans and C Company 3 RAR had inflicted, who lay where theyfell, there were still several hundreds of the enemy in and around the battlefield. NorthKorea paid a very heavy price in the battles north of Yongyu. There were, for example 69enemy bodies counted in the storm water drains alone which 9 Platoon had moved. They hadfallen in the overnight battles. The enemy dead lay much heavier in the open ground infront of the American Airborne positions.

There followed a period where enemy prisoners were rounded up on thattragic battlefield and there was momentary contact between the Americans and C Company.Strangely, the two units kept well apart. The Americans, 3 Battalion 187 Regimental CombatTeam had obviously suffered heavily and were overjoyed to be relieved but were suspiciousof the Australians. Some of them took the Australians, because of their strange garb andheavy overcoats to be Russian which led to momentary difficulty. The C Company soldiersquietly sat down in small groups and ate their lunch, unmoved by all else that was goingon around them.

With link up complete, re-deployment for the continuation of theadvance commenced. Within the Commonwealth Brigade, 1 Battalion Miiddlesex Regiment passedthrough and assumed the lead in the drive towards the Yalu River. The Americansreassembled and drove north to Sukchon to rejoin their regiment which returned toPyongyang by the other route. On cue with the departure of the Americans, the pressarrived and it was their sudden appearance to report the first battle of the RoyalAustralian Regiment which underscored the nature of the stunning success. All enjoyed thefuss the press made of us and the excitement of having our photographs taken.

Clearing West of the Road.

It was all brought to a sharp conclusion as the battalion re-deployedand 9 Platoon was directed to clear west of the road past where the contact had begun inthe morning. This patrol took the Platoon right through the paddy fields which, thoughwell clear, were still in full view of the road now being freely used. Many of the enemyhad fled to the west and were hidden, principally in rice stooks, and 9 Platoon had toflush them out. Some wanted to fight it out and were dealt with, but the bag of prisonersincreased. The scene of Australian soldiers in extended line pushing on through the openareas captured the imagination of observers on the road. The Brigade Commander was laterquoted ;

" I saw a marvelous sight. An Australian Platoon lined up in a paddy field and walked through it as though they were driving snipe. The soldiers, when they saw a pile of straw, kicked it and out would bolt a North Korean. Up with a rifle, down with a North Korean, and the Australians thoroughly enjoyed it."

9 Platoon got back to the new company position just on dusk. It hadbeen a long day.

Conclusion

Nonetheless it had been a superb baptism of fire for the young regularsof C Company and for the Battalion which, in truth, was still feeling its feet. Just asC.E.W. Bean made particular comment on the profound effect of ex-Imperials among the ranksof those who landed at Gallipoli, so it was the leavening of battlefield experience fromthe 2nd AIF which tempered 3 RAR's first action. Lieutenant Colonel Green and CaptainDenness proved to be very experienced and uncompromising battle leaders. Green'sdetermination to drive hard once the Battalion took the lead in the advance and, inparticular, his insistence on a rapid move through Yongyu provided the inestimableadvantage of surprise which was never lost once the battle was joined. In the way of greatleaders his determination passed to every member of the Battalion, particularly to thebabes of C Company. Green's prompt commitment of C Company in the midst of the initiallyconfusing scene was masterly.

Arch Denness marched without hesitation to the sound of the guns.Whilst not faced with the tactical problems of the CO, he was able to get on with thingspromptly as Company Commanders should. His determination to close with the enemy overcameany residual confusions which may have arisen in that first contact of his unblooded subunit. In the face of superior enemy numbers his aggressive handling of C Company wasfaultless. We were all proud to be part of the team.

The enemy were unable to withstand the sudden fierce assault to securethe first feature (163) which just brushed aside the enemy outposts, followed so promptlyby the determined thrust up the road. The injection of the tanks and the supporting driveof 7 Platoon from the high country were timely. The Company achieved exactly what the CO,must have wanted.

Clearly the 3 RAR effort was much too good for the North Koreans whomust have been nearly at the end of their tether after the prolonged series of attacksagainst the Americans in the encounter battles the day before. The exhausted, depletedKoreans just did not have the manoeuvre skills to match the determination and flexibilityof the disciplined Australians next day. For so many of them to leave their fighting pitsin an attempt to engage the Australians charging up the hill suggests little battleexperience and poor junior leadership for which they paid heavily. Subsequently theirinability to react in a coordinated way against the thrust along the road suggestsleadership at all levels had collapsed as they fought themselves to a standstill.Certainly it was too much for the individuals of the Korean units; their individualtraining and discipline did not hold up. Their standards of weapon handling andmarksmanship, fortunately for us were poor throughout the engagement.

Within C Company, the experienced NCO's and senior soldiers setstandards of battlefield leadership and bravery which quickly settled the young regulars.They learned by splendid example how to move on the battle field. It was no accident thatmany of the young men of C Company were to later play a significant role in thedevelopment of the growing Regiment and in its many subsequent battles maintainedthroughout the war and those to come.

Subsequently, in November 1950, it was announced the late LieutenantColonel C.H. Green, DSO had been awarded the US Silver Star and Private Cousins from 9Platoon the Bronze Star. In early 1951, the award of the Military Cross (MC) to CaptainDenness and the Military Medal (MM) to Private McMurray of 7 Platoon were announced.

(Editors note: The author Lieutenant Butler was also awarded the SilverStar for courage in this significant military action.)

Sources

I am indebted principally to Colin Townsend, and "Rob"Morison for their assistance with this story. My research really began in 1971 when Iundertook to write an article on the battle for Major :"Don" Parsons (SectionCommander of 9 Platoon, 1950). Much of the information gathered at that time left me withsome confusion about the events which have taken a lot of part time unstructured effort toresolve. Don Parsons had to wait twenty years for this article.

Over the years, I corresponded with Major General B.A. Coad, Roy E.Appleman, author of the United States official history, "South to the Naktong, Northto the Yalu" (1961), and Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall author of "The Riverand the Gauntlet" (1953), who spent considerable time with the American 187 AirborneRegimental Combat Team. Warrant Officer Bandy (Rtd), the 8 Platoon Sergeant in 1950,provided me with a well documented account in 1972. Reference to "Rob"O'Neill's History of the Korean War was invaluable.

Over the years I have spoken with many members of the Battalion andaccumulated a wealth of memories which have shaped this article.