THE "STATIC WAR"

"RON" HUGHES

Service details

Major General Ronald Laurence Hughes CBE DSO graduated in 1939 as asubaltern in the Darwin Mobile Force, New Guinea and Tarakan campaigns. He later commanded2 RAR in Puckapunyal and 3 RAR in Korea 1952-54. After a number of overseas and staffappointments he was appointed Commander 1 Task Force in South Vietnam 1967-68. Later heattended the Imperial Defence College and was Director of the Joint Staff 1971/73 andCommander 1 Division 1974-75 until retirement.

*********

On 20 June 1952 I left Sydney for Korea to take command of 3 BattalionRoyal Australian Regiment (3RAR). I had just spent eighteen months at Puckapunyalcommanding 2RAR which was engaged in training K Force and other Regulars as reinforcementsfor Korea. I traveled with Brigadier "Tom" Daly who was to become the firstAustralian commander of 28 British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade.

I arrived in Korea on 24 June 1952 to find the battalion in reserve butpreparing to move into the line to relieve the 1^st Battalion Royal CanadianRegiment 1RCR) in a position known as the Songgok position. My predecessor, LieutenantColonel (Lt Col) Frank Hassett, retained command of the battalion for the move into theline on 29 June 1952 and then handed over to me on 2 July 1952.

Unlike 1 and 2RAR who came to Korea as formed battalions and wererelieved as formed battalions, 3RAR remained for ever in Korea and was reinforcedcontinuously on what became known as the "trickle" system. This system has itsadvantages and disadvantages, but for me it had the advantage that I knew and had trainedmany of the officers, NCOs and men in Puckapunyal and most of the reinforcements joiningthe battalion in the next three months had been with me in Puckapunyal.

Immediately after we moved into the forward line the Brigade Commandermade a number of changes in the Brigade dispositions. This enabled 3RAR to reposition DCompany (Coy) into the forward left company area where it would be in close support of avery isolated platoon position we had inherited from 1RCR. As we moved into the line therains came and so D Coy found digging the new company position relatively easy. The othercompanies however had difficulties with their weapon pits and hutchies because, due to asevere lack of timber, existing works were not very secure and under the influence of rainand Chinese shelling many of these fell in. It was necessary to rescue Major Ralph Suttonfrom a collapsed hutchie, but we suffered no casualties. 1RAR was not so fortunate. Laterin the year the Engineers procured some very good eight inch timbers and very fine dugoutswere built with excellent overhead cover.

The defensive lines of both the Allies and the enemy were built onridge lines and tops of hills and in many places looked like sand bag villages. As we hadair superiority there was little need on our part to worry about camouflage or not beingseen walking around on the skyline. The enemy however was much more circumspect and whilsthis defences were obvious he was rarely seen to show himself.

The routine within the battalion in the line was not unusual. We stoodto just before first light and at last light. At night there were two sentries in eachsection while during the day there were two per platoon in the forward companies and oneper platoon in rear companies. We also manned a battalion OP (observation post).

All defensive positions were heavily wired and all approaches hadpreviously been mined. The minefields were fenced and red triangular markers were hung onthe fences. The heavy growth of vines and grass and the regular enemy artillery fireconstantly obscured or cut these fences and this caused us no end of worry, work andcasualties. As part of our defensive routine we regularly inspected and repaired thesefences.

Quite early in our tour in this position a patrol from A Companyreturning to base walked into one of our own mine fields and sustained very heavycasualties. The patrol was following a paddy bund which the patrol commander knew wascrossed by the mine field fence. His plan was to follow the bund until he came to thefence, then turn left and follow the fence to the mine field gate. In the dark the leadingscout did not see that the fence had been cut and lead the patrol into the mine field. Sixor seven of the patrol were killed by the 'jumping-jack' mine. Recovering thecasualties from the minefield in the dark was a very hazardous operation. As can beexpected from then on it became patrol-drill that no patrol relied on the minefield fencefor its navigation.

The war at this time was primarily a war of patrols and patrol clashesin no-mans-land. Our aim was twofold, to provide early warning of enemy attack and todominate no-mans-land. In the summer and early autumn weather this was not a major problemand there was no restriction on the duration of the patrol or the length of time an ambushcould remain in position. This changed dramatically during the bitter cold of winter.Patrols were at night and only twice did I have patrols out in daylight.

Apart from the two man patrols at the minefield gates there werenormally several listening posts established on likely line of approach up the valleysbetween company positions. In addition, every night I sent out one or two fighting patrolsand one or two reconnaissance patrols. The routes of these patrols were very carefullycoordinated in place and time to ensure that even with faulty navigation there could be nopatrol clashes. The fighting patrols normally set up ambushes on likely enemy lines ofapproach while the recce patrols moved from point to point so as to be able to detectenemy movement.

The Australian battalions always sent out more patrols than the Britishor Canadian battalions. The Divisional Commander once said to me "I always wonder howyou find so many places to send your patrols to". I could have explained to him thatit was not a matter of sending patrols "to places" but of having eyes to seethat the enemy was not going to take 3RAR by surprise. 1RAR and 3RAR were never surprised,any potential attacks on our positions were broken up by artillery fire before they coulddevelop. 1RCR and an American battalion that took over from 3RAR on Hill 355 (LittleGibraltar - Kowang San) were both jumped while occupying Hill 355 and both nearly lost theposition which was the key to the whole divisional area.

During this tour in the line the battalion sent out only two deeppenetration patrols. The first was tasked to locate a Chinese battery position and obtainas much information of the enemy dispositions as it could. The patrol penetrated the enemyFDLs and lay up near the enemy artillery position. The patrol commander discovered that hewas very near to a Korean farm house. He investigated and discovered a Korean family of afather, mother, nineteen year old daughter and two sons about seventeen and eleven. Therewas also a donkey housed in the farm house. The patrol commander decided to take the elderson as a prisoner as he reasoned the son would be able to provide good intelligenceinformation. While the attempt was made to take the prisoner who struggled violently thewhole family set up a great outcry. Fearing that the noise would be heard by the soldiersat the nearby battery, the patrol beat a hasty retreat and returned empty handed.

Within the battalion great emphasis was placed on the passage ofinformation and each morning the Intelligence Officer briefed representatives fromcompanies on all previous night patrol activities and anything else of interest. Thecompany reps returned to their companies and passed this information to platoons, andfinally section commanders briefed their sections. The morning after this deep penetrationpatrol a section commander in D Coy was telling how the patrol commander had decided tobring the seventeen year old boy back as a prisoner. One soldier was heard to comment thatit would have been better to bring the girl. The Company Sergeant Major (CSM) D Coy whowas passing with a working party carrying wire and pickets and offered the thought that itwould have been much more sensible to have brought the donkey.

Twice during this tour in the line we were ordered to take a prisoner.The first attempt was by a platoon of A Company. This was not successful and we had a lotof casualties including the platoon commander, missing, believed killed.

The second attempt took the form of a company attack by B Coy on theenemy FDLs. The direction of the attack was along the forward defensive lines (FDLs) fromthe flank of the enemy's main position.

The attack was fully rehearsed, except for the fire support, on asimilar piece of ground in rear of the battalion position. The attack was to be on a oneplatoon front with a second platoon following immediately behind to mop up those positionsoverrun by the leading platoon. The third platoon was to form a firm base at the foot ofthe feature the enemy occupied.

On the night of the attack everything went smoothly and the leadingplatoon was soon onto the enemy position. The platoon moved forward close behind the closefire support which was being provided primarily by the tank guns of the 5 Dragoon Guardswhose tanks were sitting on the ridge line on our side of no-mans-land. The guns werefiring at right angles to B Coy's line of advance and our troops were able to moveclose up to the bursting shells. This was very effective as it kept the enemy's headsdown and the leading platoon advanced quickly. The fire plan provided that when the gunsreached the final enemy position within B Coy objective, the guns would lift theirtrajectory so that the scream of the rounds would be heard by the enemy in his pits butour infantry could close in for the kill without being hit by our own shells. This allworked to plan but the Company HQ which had been reporting progress suddenly lost contactwith the leading platoons and we began to worry about what was happening. There was anurgent need for information so that the fire support plan could be adjusted. After sometime with no reports coming back it appeared to us that the leading platoons were introuble so I took the decision to drop the tank fire onto the enemy position again. Withina few seconds of giving that order, communication with the leading platoon was magicallyrestored as they screamed for "cease fire". In their excitement they hadforgotten to report they were on their objective.

The enemy fought fiercely and took casualties. He called down his ownmortars on his position and B Coy casualties started to mount. The Coy Commander orderedthe withdrawal. B Coy suffered one killed in action (1KIA), two missing in action (2MIA),and twenty four wounded in action (24WIA), some being wounded during the movement back tothe battalion position. This operation did not achieve its main aim of taking a prisoner.These raids seldom did.

We were all issued with steel helmets but they were seldom worn. Tinhats were not worn in New Guinea, they were not suitable for night patrols and theAustralian soldier tended to think it "sissy". No doubt because of the number ofhead wounds being evacuated through the medical system, the Divisional Commander orderedthat helmets would be worn forward of BHQ at all times. I issued the order but wonderedabout how to enforce it. As it turned out I was lucky. That very night we received a veryheavy shelling and in three separate companies men reported being hit on the helmet byshrapnel without suffering injury. After that we had no problems.

After 14 weeks in the line the battalion was pulled out and moved intoreserve. We were allotted an area below Gloucester Hill which was south of the InjimRiver. Here we built a camp in a very pleasant area not previously used as a camp site.The virgin area, the very pretty autumn tints of the shrubbery, the quiet and the lack oftension after a very long period in action were delightful. The battalion was weary andthis was a period of rest.

The Welsh Battalion was due to return to Hong Kong and they were beingrelieved in the Division by the Duke of Wellington's Battalion. In order to allow thenew battalion to acclimatize and to carry out country training 3RAR was temporarilytransferred from 28 British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade to the 29 UK Infantry Brigade torelieve the Welsh Battalion.

I would have been most upset at being ordered back into the line afteronly about three weeks in reserve if it hadn't been that we were to take over theSamichon position which was the quietest position along the whole divisional front. Thisnew position was immediately west of the Songgok position where we had just spent 14 weeksso we knew the area fairly well. This position was up to 2,000 metres from the enemy FDLsand traditionally was very quiet. However, I was not about to let my defences down and Iinstituted a busy patrol programme. It was in fact a very good training area. We had veryfew if any patrol contacts, and company commanders were able to familiarize all theirtroops with patrol operations. It must be remembered that 3RAR was reinforced by the"trickle system" and we always had new and inexperienced troops. Patrolling wasexciting but not too dangerous and even the Administration Company took their turn inpatrolling.

After a few weeks we handed over to the Duke of Wellington'sBattalion and reverted to under command of 28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade.

We moved to the reserve position known as Area 6 and became theBrigades counter attack force. Our role was to assist 1RAR hold Hill 355 in the event of amajor Chinese attack.

Whilst in reserve this time I devoted a lot of our training time tomobile operations and infantry-tank cooperation. The battalion had been occupyingdefensive positions for so long that I was a little worried that the unit would not beable to operate efficiently in mobile operations if they didn't get a littlepractice. I always had the worry that if the enemy broke through the line anywhere wemight find ourselves withdrawing down the peninsula as we had done after the interventionof the Chinese in 1950.

By this time we had been issued with our cold weather clothing whichwas a British pattern uniform. 3RAR retained the slouch hat as part of our uniform. 1RARwore the soft cap which was part of the British uniform. The decision to wear the cap wasmade by the CO 1RAR. I understand because he couldn't get a slouch hat to fit him.

I had never previously experienced the cold that we were to cope within Korea and I know most of the battalion had not experienced such cold either. Iremembered a British Army gunner telling me of the effect of cold on his battery in theAppeninine Mountains in Italy in World War II when the members of the whole battery becameuseless and the battery non-operational because of the cold. I also noticed the paralyzingeffect the cold appeared to have on the elements of the Divisional Engineers I had seenaround the divisional area. I was satisfied that the cold produced both a physical and amorale downturn. I therefore issued orders that during daytime both the balaclava and theheavy outer parka would not be worn by anyone unless they were traveling in an openvehicle or standing as a sentry in an exposed position. The aim of these orders were tocondition troops to the cold, persuade working parties to work hard to keep warm and tolet them realize they still had another layer of clothing and so were not likely to freezeto death. I realized these orders would not be popular. This was confirmed some yearslater by my wife who had been chatting with her chiropodist who had been a member of 3RAR.

On 29 December 1952 we moved to Hill 355 to relieve 1RAR on theDivisional vital ground. 1RCR had nearly lost the position and 1RAR had fought hard andwell to restore the situation. The enemy was still very active but he didn't dominateno-mans-land to the extent he had before 1RAR arrived. 1RAR had located and re-fenced theback side of the minefields and had located and fenced the minefield gates. Our job was tocontinue the patrol battles until we dominated no-mans-land, and to complete the wiring ofthe minefields. This latter job naturally fell to the Pioneers under Captain JohnHutcheson. Hutch was an unusual person, he knew no fear and he always carried his toiletgear when on a minefield patrol because he couldn't bear the thought of not beingable to shave if he was taken a prisoner. The Pioneers did a magnificent job in locatingand marking the outer perimeter of the minefields. I always gave them protective patrolsto help screen them, but in this position the FDLs were down to 200 metres and the outerminefield fence in one position was only 50 metres from the enemy positions.

Early one morning when returning through A Coy position, Hutcheson andhis patrol were fired on by a trigger happy sentry, despite the fact the company was inradio contact with the Pioneers. Major Norrie the Coy Commander went down to apologies to"Hutch" whose only comment was "That man fires high and to the right".

The defences we occupied on Hill 355 were the best we had everexperienced. The engineers had built dugouts using eight inch timbers for uprights andbeams. The roofs were sand bags and earth, sometimes up to eight feet thick. Thecommunication trenches were about seven feet deep and the weapon pits had good overheadcover. Because the weather is dry in Korea the sides of the trenches would crumble alittle every time someone brushed along them. It was a routine to sweep out dugouts andtrenches every day and remove the resultant dust/dirt. The Operational Research Unit withthe Division estimated that without this sweeping, the accumulated dust/dirt would raisethe bottom of the trench 2 inches per week. At this rate it wouldn't be all that longbefore the soldiers head would show above the trench - hence sweeping was accepted with agood grace.

The third occasion I was ordered to capture a prisoner occurred inJanuary 1953. A very full account of the operation is contained in the second volume ofBob O'Neill's official history of the Korean War (Pages 258-260).

The operation consisted of a small snatch patrol and two protectivebase patrols to give support after the snatch. The snatch was unsuccessful and the Chineseflooded the area with a large number of troops. The outcome was a lot of desperatefighting and a lot of casualties on both sides.

Three times I was ordered to take a prisoner and on all three occasionsthe snatch failed with heavy Australian casualties. This sort of operation invariablyfailed. Even when prisoners were taken they usually died before they could beinterrogated. It is an operation to be avoided if possible.

Patrols in winter provided more problems than in the warmer months. Inwinter, even with all the excellent cold weather clothing and equipment we had, we couldnot leave a patrol in position for more than about 30 minutes. Ambush patrols wererequired to lay ambushes in several places because we couldn't afford to have them inposition for more than 30 minutes, and man power and security wise we couldn't affordto send them out for just one 30 minute ambush. As a result I tended to ensure thebattalions security by sending out a larger number of small recce (reconnaissance)patrols. In warm weather a recce patrol could stay out nearly all night. In the wintertime I had to send two patrols, one before and one after midnight to ensure the samedegree of surveillance and security.

At the end of January the whole of the Commonwealth Division, less someartillery units was relieved in the line by the 7^th US Division. Before handingover all units were ordered to remove all British equipment and ammunition except for onefirst line of ammunition. This proved to be a major task as every unit had added to thestock of ammunition in the position. I think we removed from our position alone enoughammunition to keep the division going for a two week battle. I am sure all the other unitshad the same problem.

It was a great relief to pull back about 30 miles to a place known asCamp Casey where the whole Brigade concentrated and where for the first time wecouldn't hear the guns.

While in Camp Casey, 2RAR arrived to relieve 1RAR. 3RAR continued on inKorea and was named "Old Faithful" by the Brigade Commander Brigadier"Tom" Daly. I also returned to Australia from Camp Casey.

********************