KOREA REMEMBERED Chapter 24 |
AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN KOREA "PHIL" GREVILLE Service Details Brigadier Phillip J. Greville, CBE graduated from RMC in December 1944.He served with 2/8th Fd Coy and other RAE units in Wewak and Rabaul in 1945-46 beforeattending Sydney University. He served with 1RAR as Assault Platoon Commander in 1951-2.He served in various RAE appointments until appointed Commander 1ALSG in Vietnam in August1971. From December 1971 to March 1972 he was Acting Commander 1 ATF. His last appointmentwas Commander 4th Military District. ********* Historically the fate of the prisoner of war has been a function of hisvalue in a financial, political or military sense. Earlier civilizations valued theprisoner for his labour and thus he became a slave. In the 1939-45 War the Japanesetreated their prisoners as slaves, but unlike earlier civilizations, they did not valuethem and consequently starved and beat them to death. Since then Australians tend tomeasure the fate of prisoners of war against those of the 8th Australian Division andothers who were captured in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. There were twenty-nine Australians listed as prisoners of war in Korea,only one of whom died in captivity. The small numbers involved, the loss of only one incaptivity, and the lack of criticism of their behaviour (in contrast to that of the USPOWs) have all tended to keep hidden the nature of their experiences. As with other UNprisoners, the experiences of individual Australians depended upon the period in whichthey were captured, the circumstances of their capture, their rank and military role,whether they attempted to escape and the degree of overt opposition to their captors whichchance or choice thrust upon them. Captured individually or in small groups, incarceratedhaphazardly in numerous camps and annexes, their experiences are a series of individualsagas. They did share some common experiences, and these will be dealt with first. During the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries, there were attempts madeto establish the ways in which prisoners of war should be treated. Just prior to theoutbreak of war on the Korean peninsula, the 1949 Geneva Conventions were signed by mostnations, two notable exceptions being the United States of America and the Chinese PeoplesRepublic. On the outbreak of war, both belligerents - the United Nations Command and theNorth Koreans - declared their intention of abiding by those conventions. When the Chineseentered the war in October 1950 they also declared their intention to adhere to the GenevaConventions. Four of the many clauses of those conventions are worth quoting todemonstrate the shortfall in performance over that stated intention as revealed in thestories of individual Australians which appear later:
The first UN prisoners in Korea were captured by the North Koreans andtheir treatment was uneven and to no obvious pattern. At times the North Koreans summarilyexecuted American and South Korean prisoners. It was a similar story with the Chinese atfirst. For example on 21 January 1951, Lt A.P. McDonald and the four members of his patrolwere captured. After three weeks indoctrination, Lt McDonald, Cpl L. Buckland and Pte E.G.Light were released to make their way back to their own lines, while the other two, CplD.P. Buck and Pte T.H.J. Hollis remained prisoners. When the Chinese entered North Korea, they took over the accommodationoccupied by UN prisoners and the POWs were forced to march to other locations during avery severe winter. During this period many POWs died from malnutrition, dysentery,pneumonia, frostbite and neglected battle wounds. When talk of an armistice began inJanuary, 1951 the Communists, appreciating that the UN prisoners they held would bepolitically useful in the Truce talks, set in train some means of coping with theprisoners in their custody. Permanent camps were constructed and those who showed somesympathy for the communists were sent to Camp 12. The Koreans set-up a UnitedStates-British War Prisoners Peace Organization; prisoners in death camps such 'TheCaves' or 'The Bean Camp', were offered succour should they join. Once in Camp 12, theywere threatened with return to the death camps if they failed to comply with the Koreans'wishes. The Chinese, despite their declaration to adhere to the GenevaConventions, declared all UN POWs war criminals and therefore not entitled to be treatedin accordance with those conventions. On the other hand, should the UN prisoners confessto having been duped by their governments (the capitalist states) they would be treated inaccordance with the Chinese 'Lenient Policy'. Chaplain S.J. Davies of the 1stBattalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment described in his book In Spite of Dungeons,how the Commandant of Camp 2 described the Lenient Policy:
Despite some individual experiences to the contrary, there was no realmedical attention available to POWs in most of the camps, the only inoculations given werejust prior to the prisoners going south for repatriation. Despite many POWs being sick andwounded, none of the doctor prisoners were permitted to practice. Chaplain Davies wasjailed on charges of 'illegal religious activities and a hostile attitude' Hewas the only Chaplain to survive captivity. Once truce talks began, there was a marked improvement in the treatmentof UN POWs, especially in food and accommodation, although neither were lavish. The NorthKoreans were forced by the Chinese to yield the custody of all POWs. It was during thisperiod July 1951 to May 1952 that the Chinese introduced compulsory indoctrination, in adrive to 're-educate' the prisoners and to enlist them in the 'peace campaign'. TheChinese made every effort to identify those who were sympathetic to them and those whowere anti-Communist. The former they labeled "Progressives" and the latter"Reactionaries". In October 1951, officers were put into a camp of their own,Camp 2, and NCOs labelled as 'reactionaries' were separated from private soldiers andinstalled in penal camps (such as Branch 2 to Camp 2) where discipline was severe, rationsharsh and punishment frequent. The Communists permitted mail to some POWs and not toothers - some never getting a letter despite relatives keeping up a flow of mailthroughout their captivity. Similarly, if POWs wrote in glowing terms of their captors andthe treatment they were receiving, such letters would be delivered into the internationalpostal system. In no way did the Chinese conform to the spirit of the Geneva Conventions. The study program was not a voluntary scheme as envisaged in the GenevaConventions. It was an attempt to re-educate the prisoners in Marxist philosophy asinterpreted by Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. All prisoners, not in solitary confinement,were forced to participate in lectures and protracted discussions. When the re-educationprogram was at its height, lectures lasted for as long as eight hours per day. Typical subjects were "The Democratic Reformation and DemocraticStructure in North Korea and the Peaceful Reunification Policy of the North KoreanGovernment" and "The Strength of the Democratic Camp, led by the great SovietUnion, is Incomparably Greater than that of the Imperialistic Camp, Led by the AmericanImperialists". The regulations of Camp 1 set the tone for the program "everybodymust be serious and in orderly manner. The bad behaviours of disobedience, free action,making noises, joking and dozing are strictly forbidden". Group discussions, a common technique in communist societies, were usedwhich put great pressure upon prisoners to conform, because opinions contrary to theofficial ones were discussed until all conceded to the official view, no matter how longit took. Periodically, prisoners were examined on such illuminating issues as:
` How successful was the re-education program? The fact that theChinese gave it up themselves is stark evidence of its ineffectiveness. About 10 percentof UN POWs may have been affected by the re-education programme, many of those affectedhad been communist or socialist prior to capture. The majority of POWs (say 80 percent)were unaffected by the program although they did not violently oppose it as did theremaining 10 percent. The 80 percent used their vast reserves of humour and ridicule tooppose the program. In the face of such stodgy stuff as Marxist propaganda, humour was thebest antidote and British officers made use of schoolboy pranks to harass the captor. Theycalled it Crazy Week. All the POWs acted as though they had gone mad for example at 0200hrs one night, three hundred of them dashed to the toilet. By day some walked around thecompound fondling imaginary females, riding imaginary bicycles, motor cycles or horses.One American officer clipped his hair into a mohawk warlock, did a war dance and demandedprotection as an oppressed minority. Although the Chinese were not devoid of humour, theydid not understand such craziness and it clearly worried them. In Branch 3 Camp 2, theprisoners noted the Communist world-wide program to save the Rosenbergs fromelectrocution; and drafted a sarcastic petition to save L (Love) P (Peace) Beria. Everyonesigned it and it was presented to the Camp Commander but it was never referred to again.It certainly did not save Beria - nor was it meant to. As the Truce Talks waxed and waned, the Chinese realized that theycould make political capital out of the prisoners of war in their keeping, in addition totheir ransom value during the negotiations. In fact the fate of the POWs on both sidesbecame the last stumbling bloc before Truce was achieved. Initially, the Chinese hoped toconvert UN prisoners to communism so that when released they would have friends in theWestern world. The economic and cultural gap was far too great and very few were affecteddespite some alarm in the United States, which was generated by a US Army psychiatristMajor William Mayer. His findings were sensationalized by a journalist Eugene Kinkead,firstly in an article in the highly influential magazine, "The New Yorker", andlater in a book, "In Every War But One". This line of thought was widelydistributed through the Armed Services and the communist presses of the world. The Communists waged a psychological war from 1951 to the Armistice topersuade the uncommitted nations that the US Government and its servants - the US ArmedServices were evil. As General Mark Clark wrote, "The basic objective of all [their]propaganda was to plant the idea in men's minds that Americans were the newNazis". There are varying versions about how the Germ Warfare allegationsoriginated, but they were quickly taken up by Communist propagandists world wide, but nonemore enthusiastically than the Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett. Captured airmen inparticular were subjected to a pattern of intimidation, deprivation of basic physicalneeds, isolation, physical and mental torture - the pattern varied. Many prisoners becamefilthy, full of lice, festered wounds full of maggots, unshaven and without haircuts formonths on end were faced with squads of trained interrogators, bullied, deprived of sleepand browbeaten. Of the 100 odd flyers subject to this treatment, 38 signed"confessions" believing them so silly that no one would believe them. These confessions were "cleaned up" by Burchett and theBritish Communist journalist Alan Winnington and paraded before a Communist nominatedScientific Commission, the members of which stated their satisfaction with the evidence.The success of this program can be measured by the fact that, in the General Assembly ofthe United Nations, the Americans and others had to refute these claims, even though theChinese would not give the International Committee of the Red Cross access to theevidence. An Australian, Private Horace William Madden was captured at Kapyong.Like many other soldiers in 3 RAR at the time, Madden had served in the second world warand on BCOF. He was discharged in 1947 and worked as a nursing orderly in the MorrisettMental Hospital. He re-enlisted on 19 August 1950 to join 3 RAR in Korea. He joined thebattalion in November and volunteered to become a linesman in the Signals Platoon. Duringthe battle of Kapyong he was with battalion headquarters when it was shelled and hesuffered concussion. When the Signals Platoon was ordered to withdraw, Madden droppedbehind, probably being stressed from his concussion. He was surrounded by Chinese andforced to surrender. Madden was slightly built and was known as "Slim", henonetheless recovered fairly quickly and demonstrated his fitness by helping otherprisoners as they marched to the rear. He shared the little food he had with others butrefused to cooperate with his captors and was beaten by them. Together with two otherAustralians captured at Kapyong, Madden eventually arrived at the "Bean Camp",which his mate Bob Parker described in these terms:
Madden was by this time so ill he could not join the other Australiansas they marched off to Camp 5. In late October all the sick and wounded prisoners werecollected at Kandong and forced to march to Pingechong-Ni a distance of 250 km. Maddencollapsed and had to be moved by cart as winter closed in. He survived this journey butdied some days later of malnutrition. 'Slim' Madden was awarded posthumously the George Cross, partof the citation reads:
Corporal Buck, captured earlier was now at the "Bean Camp"and together with the other Australians, Pte R. ("Bob") Parker and Pte. K.W.("Mo") Gwyther were marched off to Camp 5. As they moved northwards their mindsturned to escape. Don Buck and Bob Parker and a Frenchman made their plans while KeithGwyther and an American made theirs. The latter dropped out of the column somewhere to theeast of Pyongyang on the seventh day of the march. They moved north towards the TaedongRiver. the course of which they followed for some distance until they found a small boat.They set off for the far shore, but unknowingly struck an island and having cast off theboat, were then forced to swim to the far shore. They headed westward for the coast, moving along the flats by night andaiming to reach a high feature where they could lie up during the day and observe theroute for the following night's march. They were detected by an alert Chinese sentry,recaptured and gaoled along with delinquents from the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. After amonth in that gaol they were transferred to Camp 5, where they met Buck and Parker, aswell as Tom Hollis. In the meantime Don Buck and Bob Parker had dropped out of the march onthe second night and set off for the coast. They had scrounged a few vegetables and somebran, and with this managed to keep going for eleven days, when they took refuge in a hutoccupied by an aged Korean. He professed to dislike the Chinese and gave them everyassistance, but they decided to move off. Not long afterwards they were intercepted by aNorth Korean patrol and after a brief but energetic pursuit, they were overtaken andforced to surrender. The POWs were bound tightly with wire and subjected to manyindignities. Chinese troops "rescued" them, untieing them and taking them toCamp 12 via Camp 9. Surprisingly they were not punished but eventually were moved to theiroriginal destination, Camp 5. On 25 June 1952, all four Australians were involved in a break-outof twenty four UN POWs. It was organised by Corporal Buck. The parties escaped in smallparties, intending to converge on a selected rendezvous. Keith Gwyther using civilianskills magnetized some wire for compasses. Unfortunately one UN POW withdrew at the lastmoment and informed the Chinese of the intended break-out. the Chinese were waiting at therendezvous, capturing all of the escapees. The foiled escapees were punished by beinggaoled in the "sweat box', a small cell 4 metres square and 2.5 metres high,with small windows set high on three sides and a heavy door with a grill on the fourthside. Guards, following the example of the Provost Marshal of Pyongyang,would push a pencil through the grill and force one POWs to hold it between his teeth. Thesentry , occasionally and suddenly, would knock the outer end sideways, causing splitmouth and loss of teeth. Alternatively, the stick was driven quickly inwards to damagemouth or throat. Because of his part in organizing the escape Corporal Buck was taken intothe Guard House and beaten frequently over a period of two weeks. The four Australians Cpl Donald Buck and Pte Tom Hollis not repatriatedin January 1951, together with two Australians captured at the Battle of Kapyong on 24April 1951, were eventually released during the main POW exchange ("Big Switch"0in August 1953. All four were mentioned in dispatches for their uncompromising conductduring their long period of captivity. The Officer Commanding the British RepatriatedPrisoner of War Interrogation Unit made this observation of these four determinedAustralians:
On 23 April 1953, in an Operation known as 'Little Switch, somesick and wounded prisoners of both sides were exchanged including five Australians - PtesBrown, Davis, Davoren, Donnelly and Mackay. They had all been captured during operationsin January 1953 and severely wounded. Eric Donnelly's experiences are typical. Editors' Note Two Army officers were captured; . Captain P.J. Greville of 1 RAR was captured together with Pte DenisCondon on the evening of 22/23 August 1952. He was kept in solitary confinement undersevere interrogation for 90 days, first at a field interrogation centre where he was keptin a packing case, into which was eventually packed a South Korean soldier and a civilian.His next incarceration was at the "Caves" where he was put in a small lean-toattached to the side of a Korean House. A number of other POWs under extensiveinterrogation were kept in similar accommodation. He was forced to sit to attention allday unless under interrogation. He was eventually taken north to Annex 3 to Camp 2, untilhe was moved south to Kaesong for repatriation on 1 September 1953. The other officer was Lieutenant Charlie Yacopetti a platooncommander of 3 RAR. On 25 May 1953, he was leading a patrol near Hill 355 when it wasattacked by two groups of Chinese. Yacopetti was hit in both arms and legs, his rightankle being badly shattered. He lost consciousness and was captured. For about a month hewas held in the front line being interrogated up to eight hours a day. He was promisedmedical treatment provided he gave information. He was eventually sent north to the Caveswhere he had his wounds dressed for the first time. During a UN air attack on the Caves,Yacopetti, who could only crawl, assisted by a British NCO, dragged some UN POWs, who hadbeen wounded in the raid, to safety. When the Armistice was announced by the campauthorities, Yacopetti gave orders that the prisoners were not to join in the festivitiesarranged by the Chinese. He agreed that each prisoner could accept a glass of 'peacewine'. When each POW had some wine he was assisted to his feet and he proposed atoast to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth. Irrespective of nationality, all the POWs sprung totheir feet and joined in the toast. Charles Yacopetti was awarded a Military Cross for hisbravery leading the patrol on which he was captured, and was mentioned in dispatches forhis leadership as a prisoner. We should not forget our RAAF comrades, six of whom were captured,Flight Lieutenants G.R. Harvey, J.T. Hannan and RD Guthrie, Flying Officers V. Drummondand B.L. Thomson and Sgt. D.W. Pinkstone. Gorden Harvey was the first Australian to becomea prisoner in Korea being captured two days before Lt A.P. McDonald and his party. Harveyescaped with two Americans from Pyongyang, but they were apprehended some days later. RonGuthrie escaped with Captain Tony Farrah-Hockley, the adjutant of the Gloucesters. Theirstory is well told in Farrah-Hockley's "The Edge of the Sword". All the Australian prisoners who were exchanged in Operation Big Switchhad kept themselves fit and mentally alert. All had lost weight, but not theirself-respect. As the official report on their behaviour stated:
Their experiences and those of other UN Command prisoners gave fairwarning of the way future prisoners of Communist countries could be treated regardless ofthe provisions of International Law. The Australian POWs in Korea missed a great portion of the activeservice of their units but whilst in captivity fought battles of their own with greathonour and individual courage unsurpassed by any unit operation. Not many of us haveexperienced the terror and pain of interrogation whilst wounded and separated from ourcomrades. The Battle honour "POW Korea" is carried by the Regiment not on theColours but in the hearts of our serving soldiers.
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