CHAPTER XI, Taejon, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

Both North Korean divisions were now across the Kum River, both wereready to advance to the attack of Taejon itself. The 3d Division wascloser to the city and approaching it from the northwest. The 4th Division,in the Kongju-Nonsan area, was northwest and west of the city and ina position to join with the 3d Division in a frontal attack or tomove south and then east in a flanking movement that would bring it tothe rear of Taejon. The road net from Kongju and Nonsan permitted boththese possibilities, or a combination of them. After its successful crossingof the Kum on the 14th, the 4th Division apparently had been gatheringits forces and waiting on the 3d to complete its crossing effortso that the two could then join in a co-ordinated attack.

In the North Korean plan, a third division, the 2d, was supposedto join the 4th and the 3d in the attack on Taejon. Thisdivision was advancing on the east of the other two and had been heavilyengaged for some days with ROK troops in the Chinch'on-Ch'ongju area, whereit suffered crippling casualties. As events turned out, this division didnot arrive in time to join in the attack, nor did the other two need it.

Had it come up as planned it would have appeared on the east and southeastof Taejon, a thing that General Dean very much feared and which he hadto take into account in his dispositions for the defense of the city.

If past practice signified anything for the future, the North Koreanswould advance against Taejon frontally with a force strong enough to pindown the defenders and attack first with tanks in an effort to demoralizethe defenders. Thus far, their tanks had led every advance and nothinghad been able to stop them. While this frontal action developed, strongflanking forces would be moving to the rear to cut off the main escaperoutes. This North Korean maneuver had been standard in every major action.The N.K. 4th Division was in a favored position to execute justsuch a flanking maneuver against Taejon from the west and southwest. Hadthe 2d Division arrived on the scene as planned it would have beenin a position to do the same thing from the east and southeast. The 3dDivision was in position between these two divisions and undoubtedlywas expected to exert the main frontal pressure in the forthcoming attack.

In any deployment of his forces against the North Koreans in front ofTaejon, General Dean faced the fact that he had only remnants of threedefeated regiments. Each of them could muster little more than a battalionof troops. Osan, Chonui, and Choch'iwon had reduced the 21st Infantry tothat state; P'yongt'aek, Ch'onan, and the Kum River had left only a decimated34th Infantry; and 16 July at the Kum River had sadly crippled the 19thInfantry. In addition to numerical weakness, all the troops were tiredand their morale was not the best. General Dean braced himself for thejob ahead. He himself was as worn as his troops; for the past two weekshe had faced daily crises and had pushed himself to the limit.

After dark on 16 July, the 34th Infantry on orders from General Deanfell back approximately twenty miles from the vicinity of Nonsan to newdefensive positions three miles west of Taejon. Col. Charles E. Beauchamp,who had flown to Korea from Japan to take command of the regiment, establishedhis command post at the Taejon airstrip just to the northwest of the city.General Dean consolidated all remaining elements of the divisional artillery,except the 155-mm. howitzers of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion, intoone composite battalion and emplaced it at the airstrip for the defenseof the city. The airstrip itself closed to ordinary traffic. Early in theafternoon of the 17th the 34th Infantry took over the entire defensiveline north and west of Taejon. Except for General Dean and three or fourother officers, the 24th Division headquarters left for Yongdong, 28 milessoutheast on the main highway and rail line. Remaining with Dean at Taejonwere Lieutenant Clarke, an aide; Capt. Richard A. Rowlands, Assistant G-3;Capt. Raymond D. Hatfield, Transportation Officer and Assistant G-4; andtwo drivers. Dean instructed Maj. David A. Bissett to establish an officefor him at the 21st Infantry command post at Okch'on so that he could fromthere more easily keep informed of affairs east of Taejon. Dean said thathe would spend nights at Okch'on. "But," commented Bissett, "henever did, and indeed none of us there expected him to." [1]

Before the battle of the Kum, Dean had selected two regimental positionsthree miles west of Taejon for the close-in defense of the city. Thesepositions were on a 500-foot high, 3-mile long ridge behind (east of) theKap-ch'on River. Each extremity covered a bridge and a road immediatelyto its front. The position was a strong one and well suited to a two-regimentalfront. It was known as the Yusong position. A village of that name layacross the Kap-ch'on River about a mile from the northern end of the ridge.Dean's plan had been to place the 19th Infantry on the northern part ofthe line covering the main Seoul-Pusan highway where it curved around thenorthern end of the ridge and to place the 34th Infantry on the southernpart to cover the Nonsan-Taejon road where it passed along a narrow stripof low ground at the southern end of the ridge. But with the 19th Infantry combat-ineffective after the ordealof the 16th and at Yongdong for re-equipping, the defense of the entireline fell upon the 34th Infantry. [2]

General Dean had no intention of fighting a last-ditch battle for Taejon.He looked upon it as another in the series of delaying actions to whichthe 24th Division had been committed by General MacArthur to slow the NorthKorean advance, pending the arrival of sufficient reinforcements to haltand then turn back the enemy. Expecting that the North Koreans would arrivebefore the city just as soon as they could get their tanks across the KumRiver and carry out an envelopment with ground forces, General Dean on18 July made plans to evacuate Taejon the next day. Anticipating an earlywithdrawal, engineer demolition teams with Colonel Stephens' 21st Infantryat the Okch'on position prepared the tunnels east of Taejon for destruction.

But Dean's plan was changed by the arrival of General Walker at theTaejon airstrip before noon of the 18th. After the North Korean crossingof the Kum River, General Walker had asked his Chief of Staff, ColonelLandrum, to assemble troop and logistical data bearing on Eighth Army's capabilityin the face of the growing crisis in Korea. At his office in Yokohama,Colonel Landrum and his staff spent a hectic day on the telephone gatheringthe information Walker wanted. Then Landrum called Walker at Taegu andrelayed to him the status of all troops in Korea or en route there; anestimate of United States military build-up in Korea during the next tendays, with particular emphasis on the 1st Cavalry Division; the statusof supplies and especially of ammunition; and a report on General Garvin'sprogress in organizing the supply base at Pusan.

During the conversation Walker had at hand a set of terrain maps andterrain estimates of the roads, railroads, and corridors running from northto south and from south to north and their relationship to enemy operationsand Eighth Army's build-up in Korea. He repeatedly interjected the question,"When and where can I stop the enemy and attack him?" GeneralWalker's final decision in this conference was that the 24th Division andthe ROK Army should execute maximum delay on the North Koreans in orderto assure stopping them west and north of the general line Naktong Riverto Yongdok on the east coast. He hoped to get the 1st Cavalry Divisiondeployed in the Okch'on area and south of Taejon along the Kumsan road,thinking this might provide the opportunity to stop the enemy between Taejonand Taegu. Walker felt that if he was forced to fall back behind the NaktongRiver he could stand there until Eighth Army's troop and equipment build-upwould permit him to take the offensive. Upon concluding this conferencewith Landrum, General Walker particularly instructed him to keep this estimateto himself, although authorizing him to consider it in reviewing staffplans. [3]

General Walker had this concept of future operations in Korea in hismind when he talked with General Dean at the 34th Infantry command post.He spoke of the 1st Cavalry Division landing which had started that morningat P'ohang-dong on the southeast coast. Walker said he would like to holdTaejon until the 1st Cavalry Division could move up to help in its defenseor get into battle position alongside the 24th Division in the mountainpasses southeast of Taejon. He said he needed two days' time to accomplish this. After his conference with Dean, Walkerflew back to Taegu. He informed Colonel Landrum that he had told GeneralDean he needed two days' delay at Taejon to get the 1st Cavalry Divisionup and into position. Landrum asked Walker how much latitude he had givenDean. Walker replied, in substance, "Dean is a fighter; he won't givean inch if he can help it. I told him that I had every confidence in hisjudgment, and that if it became necessary for him to abandon Taejon earlier,to make his own decision and that I would sustain him." [4]

This conference changed Dean's plan to withdraw from Taejon the nextday, 19 July. Shortly after noon Dean informed the headquarters of the21st Infantry that the withdrawal from Taejon planned for the 19th wouldbe delayed 24 hours. The regiment passed this information on to the engineerdemolition teams standing by at the tunnels.

At this point it is desirable to take a closer look at the geographyand communications which necessarily would affect military operations atTaejon.

In 1950 Taejon, with a population of about 130,000 was in size the sixthcity of South Korea, a rapidly growing inland commercial center, 100o milessouth of Seoul and 130 miles northwest of Pusan. [5] A long and narrowcity, Taejon lay in the north-south valley of the Taejon River at the westernbase of the middle Sobaek range of mountains. Extensive rice paddy groundadjoined the city on the north and west. The railroad ran along its easternside with the station and extensive yards in the city's northeast quarter.Two arms of the Taejon River, the main one flowing northwest through thecenter of the city and the other curving around its eastern side, joinedat its northern edge. Two miles farther north the Yudung River emptiedinto it and the Taejon then flowed into the Kap-ch'on, a large tributaryof the Kum. (Fall Of Taejon Map)

The highway net can be visualized readily if one imagines Taejon asbeing the center of a clock dial. Five main routes of approach came intothe city. The main rail line and a secondary road ran almost due southfrom the Kum River to it. On this approach, 3 miles north of the city,a platoon of I Company, 34th Infantry, established a road and rail block.From the east at 4 o'clock the main Pusan highway entered the city, andastride it some 6 miles eastward the 21st Infantry held a defensive blockingposition in front of Okch'on with the regimental command post in that town.There were two railroad and two highway tunnels between Taejon and Okch'on.One of each of them was between Taejon and the 21st Infantry position.From the south, the Kumsan road entered Taejon at 5 o'clock. General Deanhad the Reconnaissance Company at Kumsan to protect and warn the divisionof any enemy movement from that direction in its rear. At 8 o'clock theNonsan road from the southwest slanted into the Seoul-Pusan highway a milewest of the city. Astride this road 3 miles southwest of Taejon a platoon of L Company, 34th Infantry, helda roadblock at the bridge over the Kap-ch'on River at the southern endof the 34th Infantry defense position. The Seoul highway slanted towardthe city from the northwest at 10 o'clock, and of all approaches it hadto be considered the most important. At the western edge of Taejon (700yards from the densely built-up section) where the Nonsan road joined it,the highway turned east to enter the city. The Taejon airstrip lay on alittle plateau north of the road two miles from the city. A mile in frontof the airstrip the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was in battle positionastride the highway at Hill 138 just east of the Kapch'on River. A milefarther west B Company occupied an advanced position.

Behind the 1st Battalion, a mile and a half away, the 3d Battalion,34th Infantry, held a ridge east of the airfield and between it and thecity. The composite battalion of artillery supporting the infantry wasemplaced at the airfield where it could fire on the expected avenues ofenemy approach. [6]

In the afternoon of 18 July General Dean went to the 24th Division command post at Yongdong and there in the evening he took steps to bolsterthe defense of Taejon for an extra day, as desired by General Walker. Heordered the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, to move back to Taejon from Yongdongand B Battery of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion to return to the Taejonairstrip from the vicinity of Okch'on. At the same time he ordered theReconnaissance Company to be released from division control and attachedto the 24th Infantry Regiment. Up to this time the Reconnaissance Companyhad been based at Kumsan. The division order to the Reconnaissance Companyreleasing it to regimental control moved it to Taejon the next day. Asa result, the division became blind to what the enemy was doing on itssouthern flank. General Dean subsequently considered his releasing theReconnaissance Company to the regiment as one of his most serious errorsat Taejon. His purpose in releasing it to Colonel Beauchamp's command wasto ensure the 34th Infantry getting direct and immediate information asto conditions on its southern flank; he had not anticipated that the divisionorder would send it to Taejon. [7]

General Dean also discussed again with Colonel Stephens the role ofthe 21st Infantry in the next few days. It was to keep open the withdrawalroad out of Taejon. Stephens pointed out that his troops were astride thatroad and on the hills between Taejon and Okch'on and asked if he shouldchange their disposition. General Dean answered no, that he did not wantthat done, as he also feared an enemy penetration behind his Taejon positionfrom the east through the ROK Army area there and he had to guard againstit. Dean decided that the 21st Infantry should stay where it was but patrolthe terrain north of the Taejon-Okch'on road and send patrols periodicallyup the road into Taejon. [8]

The North Korean attack against Taejon got under way the morning of19 July. The first blow was an air strike against communication lines inthe rear of the city. At 0720, six YAK's flew over the lines of the 21stInfantry and dropped four bombs on the railroad bridge two miles northwestof Okch'on. One bomb damaged the bridge, but by noon B Company of the 3dEngineer Combat Battalion had repaired it and restored rail traffic inboth directions. The YAK's strafed near the regimental command post anddropped propaganda leaflets signed by three American officers and threenoncommissioned officers captured at Osan two weeks earlier. Four planesthen strafed the Taejon airstrip. Later in the day, the crews of A Battery,26th Antiaircraft Battalion, supporting the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,shot down two YAK's near Yusong, just west of Taejon. [9]

The U.S. Air Force also went into action early on the 19th. It bombed and burned known and suspected pointsof enemy concentration west and southwest of Taejon. Aerial observers atnoon reported that the enemy had partially repaired the bridge across theKum River at Taep'yong-ni, ten miles north of Taejon, and that tanks andartillery were moving south of the river. The Air Force operated at considerabledisadvantage at this time, however, for there were only two strips in Koreasuitable for use by F-51 and C-47 types of aircraft-the K-2 dirt stripat Taegu and the similar K-3 strip at Yonil near P'ohang-dong. South ofChinju, the K-4 strip at Sach'on was available as an emergency field. Mostof the tactical planes flew from Japan. [10]

After completing its crossing at Kongju, the N.K. 4th Division splitits forces for a two-pronged attack on Taejon. The bulk of the division,comprising the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments, the ArtilleryRegiment, and most of the tanks, went south to Nonsan and there turnedeast toward Taejon. Some of the infantry of these regiments may have movedsouth out of Nonsan in a wheeling movement through Kumsan to the rear ofTaejon. Others apparently moved across back country trails to strike theKumsan road south of and below Taejon. The 5th Infantry Regiment, supportedby one tank company, left Kongju on the secondary road running southeastthrough a mountainous area to Yusong, and apparently was the first enemyunit to arrive at the outskirts of Taejon. [11]

At 1000, after the 24th Reconnaissance Company had arrived at Taejon,Colonel Beauchamp sent its 2d Platoon, consisting of thirty-nine men, southwestalong the Nonsan road. Half an hour later, three miles west of the Kap-ch'onRiver, enemy fire struck the patrol from both sides of the road. It withdrewto the river and there joined the platoon of L Company on the east bankof the stream. The remainder of L Company arrived and deployed. [12]

General Dean had left Taejon that morning intending to go briefly toYongdong. On the way he stopped at the 21st Infantry command post at Okch'on.There he said suddenly about 1000 that he was worried about the dispositionof the 34th Infantry and was going back to Taejon. [13] When he arrivedthere, action already had started at the L Company roadblock on the Nonsanroad. The battle of Taejon had begun. Dean stayed in Taejon.

The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, arrived at Taejon from Yongdong aboutthis time, just after noon. By 1300, Colonel McGrail, the battalion commander,had the unit ready to move out at the railroad station. There he receivedan order saying the North Koreans were breaking through L Company's blockingposition at the Kap-ch'on River and he was to attack there immediatelyand restore the position. When he arrived at the scene of fighting McGrailfound General Dean there with two tanks, directing fire. [14]

McGrail's battalion attacked immediately with two companies abreastastride the Nonsan road, E on the left (south) and F on the right (north).On the right an enemy force was in the act of enveloping the north flankof L Company, 34th Infantry. F Company raced this enemy force for possessionof critical high ground, taking and holding it in the ensuing fight. Onthe left, E Company moved up south of the road, and G Company occupieda hill position a mile behind it. Even with the newly arrived battalionnow deployed covering the Nonsan road, there was still a mile-wide gapof high ground between it and the left of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,to the north. [15]

Co-ordinated with the North Korean advance along the Nonsan road wasan enemy approach on the main Seoul highway. There in the Yusong area,B Company of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, came under heavy attack.Enemy flanking parties cut off two platoons half a mile north of Yusong.In the fighting there both platoon leaders were wounded and several menkilled. Colonel Ayres from his observation post east of the Kapch'on Rivercould see large groups of North Koreans assembling and artillery goinginto position in the little valley northwest of Yusong. He directed artilleryfire and called in air strikes on these concentrations. In the afternoonhe requested and received authority from Colonel Beauchamp to withdrawB Company from its exposed position at Yusong to the main battalion positionback of the Kap-ch'on River. The company successfully withdrew in the evening.[16]

Meanwhile, just before noon, the North Koreans began shelling the Taejonairstrip with counterbattery fire. This fire, coming from the north andnorthwest, built up to great intensity during the afternoon. That evening,General Dean told Major Bissett that he had seen as much incoming artilleryfire at the Taejon Airfield that day as he had ever seen in one day inEurope in World War II. Frequent artillery concentrations also poundedthe main battle positions of the 34th Infantry. [17]

By early afternoon, Colonel Ayres was convinced that a major enemy attackwas impending. At 1400 he recommended to Colonel Beauchamp that the regimentwithdraw that night. Beauchamp rejected this, thinking they could holdthe enemy out of Taejon another day, and he so told General Dean. Afterdark, however, Beauchamp moved his 34th Infantry command post from theairfield into Taejon. At the same time all the supporting artillery displacedfrom the airfield to positions on the south edge of the city. [18]

As darkness fell, Colonel Ayres ordered his motor officer to move the1st Battalion vehicles into Taejon. He did not want to run the risk oflosing them during a night attack. Only one jeep for each rifle company,two jeeps for the Heavy Weapons Company, the battalion command jeep, andthe radio vehicle were left at the battle positions.

On the left of the defense position F Company of the 19th Infantry hadbeen under attack all afternoon. After dark men there heard noises on theirright flank, and it became apparent that enemy soldiers were moving into,and possibly through, the mile-wide gap between them and the 1st Battalion,34th Infantry. [19]

Taejon was ominously quiet during the evening. Occasional showers fromthe edge of a typhoon that had narrowly missed the area settled the stiflingdust raised by the vehicular traffic in the city. As the night wore onthe quiet gave way to ominous noises. At his command post Colonel Ayresabout 2200 heard the rumble of tanks on his right. He sent a patrol outto investigate. It never reported back. Ayres telephoned Beauchamp andtold him he thought enemy troops were moving around the city and againrecommended withdrawal. [20]

Before midnight a report came in to the 34th Infantry command post thatan enemy unit was six miles south of Taejon on the Kumsan road. With ninemembers of the 24th Reconnaissance Company 1st Lt. George W. Kristanoffstarted down the road on a jeep patrol to investigate. Six miles belowTaejon an enemy roadblock stopped them. Kristanoff reported the beginningof the action by radio. At 0300, 20 July, a platoon of the ReconnaissanceCompany drove cautiously out of Taejon down the same road to check on security.Enemy fire stopped the platoon at the same roadblock. There platoon memberssaw the bodies of several men of the earlier patrol and their four destroyedjeeps. A little earlier, at 0300, word had come in to Taejon that a jeephad been ambushed on the Okch'on road. [21]

It would seem clear from these incidents that enemy units were movingaround to the rear of Taejon during the night-in just what strength mightonly be guessed. But for reasons that cannot now be determined these eventswere not so evaluated at the time of their occurrence. General Dean hasstated that he did not know of the enemy roadblock on the Kumsan road-apparentlyit was not reported to him. He did learn of the jeep incident on the Okch'onroad but dismissed it as the work of a few infiltrators and of no specialimportance because the road subsequently seemed to be clear. [22]

Shortly after 0300, 20 July, the S-2 of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,who since dark had remained in the battalion forward observation post, raninto Colonel Ayres' command post and said that the North Koreans had overrunthe observation post and penetrated the battalion main line of resistance.Ayres has said that this was his first knowledge of the enemy's generalattack. He could now hear small arms fire to the front and right and seeflares bursting at many points over the battalion position. There seemedto be no action on the battalion left in C Company's position. [23]

The enemy attack, infantry and armor, came down both sides of the highwayand rolled up the battalion right flank. Other enemy infantry attackedfrom the north against this flank. The North Koreans penetrated to the81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortar positions behind the rifle companies and thenstruck Headquarters Company. About 0400 small arms fire hit the Koreanhouse in which the 1st Battalion command post was located and riflemenfrom the overrun front line began coming into the Headquarters Companyarea. Ayres tried, and failed, to communicate with his front line companies.He sent a message to the regimental headquarters that tanks had penetratedhis position and were headed toward the city. There is some evidence thatthe infantry bazooka teams abandoned their positions along the road whenthe attack began. And rifle companies certainly did not fight long in place.In the growing confusion that spread rapidly, Ayres decided to evacuatethe command post. Maj. Leland R. Dunham, the battalion executive officer,led about 200 men from the Heavy Mortar Company, the Heavy Weapons Company,and the 1st Battalion Headquarters southward from the Yudung valley awayfrom the sound of enemy fire. Colonel Ayres and his S-3 followed behindthe others. Day was dawning. [24]

In Taejon, Colonel Beauchamp received Ayres' report that enemy tankswere in the 1st Battalion position. Later, telephone communication to the1st Battalion ended and Beauchamp sent linemen out to check the wires.They came back and said they could not get through-that enemy infantrywere on the road near the airfield. The regimental S-3 did not believethis report. Beauchamp went to his jeep and started down the road towardthe 1st Battalion command post to find out for himself just what the situationwas. At the road junction half a mile west of Taejon, where the main Seoulhighway comes in from the northwest to join the Nonsan road, an enemy tanksuddenly loomed up out of the darkness. The tank fired its machine gunjust as Beauchamp jumped from his jeep; one bullet grazed him, others setthe vehicle afire. Beauchamp crawled back some hundreds of yards untilhe found a 3.5-inch bazooka team. He guided it back to the road junction.This bazooka team from C Company, 3d Engineer Combat Battalion, set theenemy tank on fire with rockets and captured the crew members. It thentook a position to guard the road intersection. Later in the morning thisrocket launcher team and one from the 24th Reconnaissance Company destroyedtwo more T34 tanks approaching from the direction of the airfield. [25]

This action at the crossroads just west of Taejon in the pre-dawn of20 July is the first verifiable use of the 3.5-inch rocket launcher againstthe T34 tanks. This rocket launcher had been under development since theend of World War II, but none had been issued to troops because of thedifficulty in perfecting its ammunition. The ammunition had been standardizedand in production only fifteen days when the Korean War started. GeneralMacArthur on 3 July requested that the new rocket launcher be airliftedto Korea. The first of the launchers, together with an instruction team,left Travis Air Force Base in California on 8 July and arrived at Taejonon the 10th. The first delivery of the new weapon arrived at Taejon on12 July. That same day selected members of the 24th Infantry Division beganto receive instructions in its use. The 3.5-inch rocket launcher was madeof aluminum and weighed about fifteen pounds. It looked like a 5-foot lengthof stovepipe. It was electrically operated and fired a 23-inch-long, eight-and-a-half-poundrocket from its smooth bore, open tube. The rocket's most destructive featurewas the shaped charge designed to burn through the armor of any tank thenknown. [26]

When Beauchamp returned to his command post after his encounter withthe enemy tanks he found that there was still no communication with the1st Battalion. A little later, however, a regimental staff officer toldhim radio communication with the battalion had been re-established andthat it reported its condition as good. It was learned afterward that the1st Battalion had no communication with the regiment after Ayres reportedthe enemy penetration of his position. The only plausible explanation ofthis incident is that North Koreans used Colonel Ayres' captured radiojeep to send a false report to the regiment.

Disturbed by reports of enemy penetrations of the regimental defenseposition, Colonel Beauchamp after daylight ordered the 3d Battalion toattack into the gap between the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and the 2dBattalion, 19th Infantry. K Company with part of M Company started to executethis order but it never reached the designated area. On the road leadingto the airfield it had a sharp encounter with an enemy force. Six T34 tanksand an estimated battalion of enemy infantry scattered part of the troops.In this action, SFC Robert E. Dare of K Company courageously covered anddirected the withdrawal of the advanced platoon at the cost of his ownlife. The entire force withdrew to its former 3d Battalion position. [27]

In its defensive positions on the ridge east of the airfield, the 3d Battalion remained undisturbed by enemyaction throughout the morning except for a small amount of mortar and artilleryfire. A peculiar incident had occurred, however, which no one in the battalioncould explain. The battalion commander, Major Lantron, disappeared. Lantrongot into his jeep about 0930, drove off from his command post, and simplydid not return. Colonel Wadlington learned of Lantron's disappearance about1100 when he visited the 3d Battalion. In Lantron's absence, Wadlingtonordered Capt. Jack E. Smith to assume command of the battalion. Some weekslater it was learned that Lantron was a prisoner in North Korea. [28]

The pre-dawn attack against the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, the firsttank approaches to the edge of Taejon, and the subsequent North Koreanrepulse of the K and M Companies' attack force near the airfield apparentlywere carried out by the 5th Regiment, N.K. 4th Division,together with its attached armored support. This regiment claims to havecaptured the Taejon airfield by 0400, 20 July. [29] But after these spectacularsuccesses which started the wholesale withdrawal of the 1st Battalion fromits positions west of the city, the enemy force apparently halted and waitedfor certain developments elsewhere. This probably included completion ofthe enveloping maneuver to the rear of the city. Only tanks and small groupsof infiltrators, most of the latter riding the tanks, entered Taejon duringthe morning. All these actions appeared to be related parts of the enemyplan.

Neither Colonel Beauchamp nor his executive officer at the time knewof the North Korean repulse of the K and M Company attack force that wassupposed to close the gap between the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, andthe 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. About the time this event was taking placenear the airfield, Colonel Beauchamp told General Dean of his early morningexperience with tanks at the edge of the city, and Dean also was informederroneously that the 1st Battalion was holding in its original battle positions.From the vantage point of Taejon everything seemed all right. At this time,however, General Dean instructed Beauchamp to plan a withdrawal after darkon the Okch'on road. Dean then telephoned this information to the 24thDivision command post at Yongdong. [30]

In the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, positions covering the Nonsan roadthere had been alarms during the night, and some false reports had reachedTaejon that the enemy had overrun the battalion position. Actually, E Companyheld its position near the bridge, but north of the road F Company underenemy pressure withdrew approximately 200 yards about daylight. [31]

When Major Dunham led the 1st Battalion and the 34th Infantry Headquartersgroup south, followed at a short interval by Colonel Ayres and his small party, it was just after daylight.These men passed along a protected route behind the high ground held byF Company, 19th Infantry. They had expected to reach the Nonsan road aboutthree miles away and there turn east on it to enter Taejon. As Ayres nearedthe road he could see F Company on the hill mass to his right (west) engagedin what he termed a "heavy fire fight." As he watched he sawthe company begin to leave the hill. He continued on and saw ahead of himthe main body of his headquarters group climbing the mountain on the otherside of the Nonsan road.

Major Dunham, on reaching the road with this group, met and talked brieflythere with Colonel McGrail who told him he had had reports that enemy tankshad cut that road into Taejon. Upon hearing this, Dunham led his partyacross the road into the mountains. When Ayres reached the road enemy machinegun fire was raking it and the bridge over the Yudung. Ayres led his partyunder the bridge, waded the shallow stream, and followed the main groupinto the mountains southward. These two parties of the 1st Battalion, 34thInfantry, united on high ground south of Taejon about an hour before noon.Even earlier, the rifle companies of the battalion, for the most part,had scattered into these mountains. [32]

The rumor of enemy tanks on the Nonsan road that caused the 1st Battalion,34th Infantry, group to go into the mountains instead of into Taejon hadcome to Colonel McGrail soon after daylight. A jeep raced up to his commandpost east of the Yudung bridge. The men in it said that three enemy tanksblocked the road junction just outside the city (they had seen the tanksfrom a distance, apparently, and had not known they had been knocked out)and that they had seen three more tanks approaching the junction from theairfield. Colonel McGrail could see smoke hanging over Taejon and hearexplosions and gunfire. He turned to 2d Lt. Robert L. Herbert and orderedhim to take his G Company's 2d Platoon and open the road into the city.On the way Herbert encountered a bazooka team which he persuaded to accompanyhim. He also passed a rifle company getting water in a streambed. Thisunit identified itself as Baker Company, 34th Infantry; it continued southtoward the mountains. Upon arriving at the road junction, Herbert foundtwo T34 tanks burning and a third one that had been destroyed earlier.Lieutenant Little and a reinforced squad armed with two bazookas held theroad fork. The burning wreckage of the Heavy Mortar Company, 34th Infantry,littered the road back toward the airfield. A mile to the north three enemytanks stood motionless. Some men of H Company, 19th Infantry, passed theroad fork on their way into Taejon. Herbert's platoon joined Little's squad.[33]

After Herbert's platoon had departed on its mission, Colonel McGraillost communication with Colonel Beauchamp's command post. He had now learnedfrom Major Dunham that the enemy had overrun the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,on the Yusong road to the north of him. His own F Company had started tofall back. The general feeling of McGrail's 2d Battalion staff was that enemy troops had cut the roadbetween the battalion and Taejon and were probably in the city itself.About 1100 Captain Montesclaros of the S-3 Section volunteered to try toget into Taejon and reach the regimental headquarters for instruction.Colonel McGrail gave him his jeep and driver for the trip. [34]

Montesclaros reached the road junction without incident, saw the burningenemy tanks, met Lieutenant Herbert's platoon at the roadblock, and, muchto his surprise, found the road into the city entirely open. At the edgeof the city, Montesclaros encountered General Dean. Montesclaros reportedto him, gave the position of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and askedfor instructions. General Dean patted Montesclaros on the back and replied,"My boy, I am not running this show, Beauchamp is." Dean tookMontesclaros to the 34th Infantry command post. Beauchamp was not present,but from a member of his staff Montesclaros obtained a written order. Beforeplacing it in his shirt pocket, Montesclaros glanced at the order. It directedMcGrail to bring his battalion back to the west edge of Taejon. [35]

Montesclaros drove back down the road to the 2d Battalion command post.He found it deserted. Not a living person was in sight; a dead Korean layin the courtyard. Puzzled, Montesclaros turned back toward Taejon. Afterdriving a short distance, he turned back to the command post to make sureno one was there; he found it the same as before. No one, neither friendnor foe, was in sight. A strange stillness hung over the spot. Again heturned back toward Taejon. He overtook E Company on the road and instructedit to go into position there. At the edge of Taejon, Montesclaros met 1stLt. Tom Weigle, S-2 of the battalion, who told him that McGrail had establisheda new command post on a high hill south of the road, and pointed out theplace. Montesclaros set out for it and after walking and climbing for forty-fiveminutes reached the place. Colonel McGrail and his command post were notthere, but a few men were; they knew nothing of Colonel McGrail's location.

Montesclaros started down the mountain with the intention of returningto Taejon. On his way he met Lieutenant Lindsay and E Company climbingthe slope. They said the enemy had overrun them on the road. Looking inthat direction, Montesclaros saw an estimated battalion of North Koreansoldiers marching toward the city in a column of platoons. A T34 tank wastraveling west on the road out of Taejon. As it approached the enemy column,the soldiers scurried for the roadside and ducked under bushes, apparentlyuncertain whether it was one of their own. Montesclaros decided not totry to get into Taejon but to join E Company instead.

What had happened at the command post of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry?Simply this, believing that the enemy had cut him off from Taejon, ColonelMcGrail decided to move his command post to high ground south of the Nonsanroad. He instructed E Company to fall back, and then his radio failed.McGrail and his battalion staff thereupon abandoned the command post shortlybefore noon and climbed the mountain south of Taejon. [36] Already F Company had given way and was withdrawinginto the hills.

Soon not a single unit of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was in itsbattle position west of Taejon. Nearest to the city, G Company was thelast to leave. its place. From his hill position, Captain Barszcz, thecompany commander, had seen enemy tanks two and a half miles away enterTaejon just after daylight and had reported this by radio to Colonel McGrail'sheadquarters. Later in the morning he lost radio communication with McGrail.Shortly after noon, Capt. Kenneth Y. Woods, S-3, 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,arrived at G Company's position and gave Captain Barszcz instructions tojoin the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, group that had passed him in themorning headed south, and to withdraw with it. The G Company 60-mm. mortarswere firing at this time. About 1300 Barszcz issued his orders for thewithdrawal. The 3d Platoon was to follow the Weapons Section and bringup the rear. In the withdrawal, however, unknown to Captain Barszcz, theWeapons Platoon leader asked the 3d Platoon leader to precede him, as hehad some mortar ammunition he wanted to expend. The Weapons Section nevergot out-the entire section of one officer and eighteen enlisted men waslost to enemy action. [37]

Except for the small group at the road junction half a mile west ofthe city, all the infantry and supporting weapons units of the two battalionsin the battle positions west of Taejon had been driven from or had leftthose positions by 1300. All of them could have come into Taejon on theNonsan road. Instead, nearly all of them crossed this road approximatelytwo miles west of the city and went south into the mountains.

Back at Taejon, the first North Korean tanks had reached the edge ofthe city before dawn. They came from the northwest along the Yusong roadand from the airfield. There is no evidence that the 3.5-inch bazooka teamsof the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, posted along the Yusong road engagedthese tanks.

Soon after daylight two enemy tanks entered the city from somewhereto the northwest. They were soon followed by a third. Enemy soldiers crowdedtheir decks. These tanks drove to the center of Taejon and there unloadedsoldiers who spread quickly into buildings and began the sniping that continuedthroughout the day. The two tanks then turned back past the large compoundwhere the Service Company of the 34th Infantry had established the regimentalkitchen and motor pool. The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, also had its kitchentrucks in this compound. Approximately 150 men were there when the twoenemy tanks opened fire on it with their tank cannon. This fire killedseveral men, destroyed vehicles, and set an ammunition truck on fire. Aftershooting up the compound, the tanks rumbled away and fired at various targetsof opportunity. [38]

Not until after the tanks had left the compound area did any of themen there locate a 3.5-inch bazooka. Then, in trying to drive out snipersfrom nearby buildings, someone fired a 3.5-inch white phosphorus rocketinto a building setting it afire. The fire spread rapidly to other woodand straw structures in the city until large parts of Taejon were burning,from this and other causes.

Bazooka teams from the 24th Reconnaissance Company set out after thetwo tanks. These tanks, meanwhile, encountered two jeep-loads of men atthe Medical Company headquarters, killed all but two, and wounded them.One tank ran over one of the wounded as he lay helpless in the road. Abazooka man finally got in a shot against one of these tanks, hitting itin the side and bouncing it off the ground, but the tank kept on going.At the railroad station, this tank fired into supplies and equipment, startinglarge fires. There, with a track off, it came to the end of its journeys.Rifle fire killed the tank commander. A rocket hit the second tank andknocked a piece of armor three feet square from its front plate. A thirdtank for a period survived a rocket that penetrated the top turret. Pfc.Jack E. Lowe and Cpl. Robert B. Watkins of the 24th Reconnaissance Companywere the bazooka men who scored the destructive hits on these tanks. [39]

General Dean and his aide, Lieutenant Clarke, had awakened about 0530to the sound of small arms fire. As Clarke made the bed rolls he remarkedto General Dean, "I don't think we'll sleep here again tonight."The general agreed. Sometime later an enemy tank passed close to the 34thInfantry command post headed west out of the city. General Dean immediatelystarted in pursuit of this tank accompanied by two 2.36-inch rocket launcherteams. The tank went through Lieutenant Herbert's roadblock without beingfired on. It was mistaken for a friendly tank until too late for action.When General Dean's party arrived at the road fork, Herbert explained whathad happened. Subsequently this tank re-entered the city and was destroyed,apparently by a 155-mm. howitzer, at the southwest edge of Taejon. Duringthe morning, Dean and his party lost an opportunity against 2 other tankson the airfield road when the bazooka man with them missed with his onlyrocket. [40] By 0900, 4 of the 5 tanks known to have entered Taejon hadbeen destroyed.

At noon another tank entered Taejon. A 3.5-inch bazooka team from the3d Engineer Combat Battalion hunted it down and destroyed it. Soon afterwardstill another penetrated into the city and rumbled past the regimentalcommand post. General Dean led a group, joined later by a 3.5-inch bazookateam from the 3d Engineer Combat Battalion, in pursuit of this tank. Afteran hour or more of climbing over walls and fences and dodging through houses stalking it, with enemy snipers firing atthem frequently, General Dean and his party brought this tank to bay. About1400 a group including General Dean, a corporal carrying the bazooka, anammunition bearer, and two or three riflemen entered a 2-story businessbuilding through a back courtyard and climbed to the second story. Lookingout from the edge of a window, they saw the tank immediately below them.General Dean has since written that the muzzle of the tank gun was no morethan a dozen feet away and he could have spat down its tube. Under GeneralDean's directions the bazooka team fired into the tank. Captain Clarkehas described what followed: "I remained by the corner of the buildingin front of the tank to use my Molotov cocktail on it if it began to move.The first round [3.5-inch rocket] hit the tank, and the occupants beganto scream and moan. The second round quieted most of the screaming andthe third made it all quiet. We all then withdrew to a better observationpost and observed the tank burning." [41] This was the incident thatled to the much-quoted remark attributed to General Dean that day, "Igot me a tank."

General Dean's personal pursuit of enemy tanks in Taejon was calculatedto inspire his men to become tank killers. He was trying to sell to hisshaky troops the idea that "an unescorted tank in a city defendedby infantry with 3.5-inch bazookas should be a dead duck." [42]

The number of enemy tanks that entered Taejon during the day cannotbe fixed accurately. Most of them apparently entered Taejon singly or insmall groups. It appears that American troops had destroyed 8 enemy tanksin Taejon or its immediate vicinity by 1100, 6 of them by 3.5-inch rocketsand 2 by artillery fire. Engineer bazooka teams destroyed 2 more T34 tanksin the afternoon. If this is a correct count, United States soldiers destroyed10 enemy tanks in Taejon on to July, 8 of them by the new 3.5-inch rocketlauncher, first used in combat that day. [43]

Not every round from a 3.5-inch bazooka stopped a T34 tank in the Taejonstreet fighting as has been so often stated. Three bazooka teams of the24th Reconnaissance Company, for instance, made seven hits at close range(30 to 70 yards) on 3 tanks and stopped only 1 of them.

Fifth Air Force planes also destroyed an undetermined number of enemytanks at Taejon. In the morning, soon after the initial penetration ofapproximately 15 tanks along the Yusong road, the Air Force knocked out5 before they reached the city. An enemy tank crew member captured duringthe day reported that planes destroyed others north of Taejon. It appears thatthe North Koreans lost at least 15 tanks at Taejon, and possibly more.[44]

The enemy tanks largely failed in their mission within Taejon itself;They did not cause panic in the city, nor did they cause any troops toleave it. They themselves lost heavily, mostly to the new 3.5-inch bazookawhich they encountered for the first time. Taejon demonstrated that forthe future there was at hand an infantry weapon that, if used expertlyand courageously, could stop the dreaded T34.

The sequence of events and the time of their occurrence in Taejon onthe afternoon of so July have been impossible to establish with certaintyin all instances. Participants and survivors have different recollectionsof the same event and of the time it occurred. Some recall incidents thatothers do not remember at all. Battalion and regimental records were alllost during the day and night and, except for an occasional message entryin the 24th Division journals made at Yongdong many miles to the rear,there is no contemporary record extant to fix time. Yet despite these difficultiesin reconstructing the story of that eerie and bizarre afternoon, it isbelieved the jigsaw puzzle has yielded to the long and laborious effortsto solve it.

When he returned to the ,4th Infantry command post after stalking anddestroying the tank in the center of Taejon, General Dean joined ColonelBeauchamp for a lunch of cooked C ration. They discussed the situation,which did not seem particularly alarming to them at the time. It wouldbe difficult to find a parallel to the bizarre situation-the two commandersquietly eating their late lunch in the belief that their combat forceswere still in battle position a mile or two west of the city, while actuallythe two battalions were scattered in the hills, completely ineffectivefor any defense of Taejon. Except for a few scattered enemy infiltrator-snipersin Taejon, the city was quiet. During the conversation, Dean told Beauchampthat instead of waiting for dark as they had planned earlier, he wantedhim to initiate a daylight withdrawal because the chances would be betterof getting the transportation out safely. The time of this instructionwas about 1400. [45]

Colonel Beauchamp immediately set about implementing the order. He instructedMaj. William T. McDaniel, the regimental operations officer, to send messagesby radio or telephone to all units to prepare to withdraw. He then wroteout on paper duplicate orders and sent them by runners to the three infantrybattalions. There was then no telephone or radio communication with the1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, or the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. The runners,of course, never reached these two battalions. But it appears that neitherDean nor Beauchamp received any report on this. The 3d Battalion, 34thInfantry, did receive the withdrawal order. It and the other miscellaneous units in and about the city received the withdrawal instructions about1500. The planned march order for the movement out of Taejon gave the 3dBattalion, 34th Infantry, the lead, followed by the artillery; the MedicalCompany; the 34th regimental command group; 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry;and last, the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. [46]

After watching Beauchamp get off the orders to his units to withdraw,General Dean stepped out of the command post. He could see and hear friendlyfighter planes overhead. He walked down to the end of the schoolhouse commandpost building where Lieutenant Hillery had set up the tactical air controlparty's equipment. In conversation with Hillery, Dean found that the formerwas having difficulty in getting target assignments from the 34th Infantryeven though the planes reported many below them. In the confusion of gettingout the withdrawal orders and making ready for it themselves the commandgroup apparently did not give much attention to the TACP reports. Thenthere was also a reluctance to give targets close to Taejon because ofthe many mistaken attacks in recent days and weeks on American and ROKtroops. General Dean remained with the TACP for some time and called severalstrikes on North Korean artillery and tank concentrations reported by theplanes.

About this time a young lieutenant of the 1st Cavalry Division TankCompany arrived in Taejon with P platoon of tanks. Dean expressed to himhis surprise at seeing him there and asked what had brought him. He repliedthat he had come in response to a request received at Yongdong from the34th Infantry for tank escort out of Taejon for administrative vehicles.The young officer in turn told what a start he had received on seeing thesmoldering T34 tanks in the center of Taejon. Various units had begun toform in the streets around the command post for the withdrawal, and thetank officer started with the first of them for Yongdong. This was about1530 or 1600. [47]

Several incidents took place shortly after noon that, properly interpreted,should have caused deep alarm in Taejon. There was the urgent telephonecall from an artillery observer who insisted on talking to the senior commanderpresent. Beauchamp took the call. The observer reported a large columnof troops approaching Taejon from the east. He said he was positive theywere enemy soldiers. The "road from the east" Beauchamp interpretedto be the Okch'on road. Beauchamp had misunderstood a conversation heldwith General Dean that morning to mean that Dean had ordered the 21st Infantryto leave its Okch'on position and come up to Taejon to cover the plannedwithdrawal. What Dean had meant was that he expected the 21st Infantryto cover the withdrawal from its Okch'on positions in such a way as tokeep open the pass and the tunnels east of the city. (With respect to thepass and tunnels, Dean miscalculated.) Now, receiving the report of theartillery observer, Beauchamp, with the erroneous concept in mind, thoughtthe column was the 21st Infantry approaching Taejon to protect the exit from the city. He toldthe observer the troops were friendly and not to direct fire on them. Eventsproved that this column of troops almost certainly was not on the Okch'onroad but on the Kumsan road southeast of Taejon and was an enemy force.[48]

Later in the afternoon, just after the 1st Cavalry Division platoonof tanks led the first vehicles out toward Yongdong, General Dean receivedan aerial report through the TACP of a truck column of about twenty vehiclesmoving north toward Taejon on the Kumsan road. Dean inquired of the 34thInfantry operations officer if they could be friendly and received thereply that they were the 24th Reconnaissance Company and not to directan air strike on them. Dean later became convinced that these were NorthKoreans who had come up from the rear through Kumsan. [49] But this isnot certain because a Reconnaissance Company group did drive in to Taejonfrom its patrol post about this time.

The movements of large bodies of men on the Kumsan road toward Taejonin the early afternoon of 20 July actually were seen at close hand by ColonelAyres, the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, buthe could not get the information to the men in the city. Just before noon,on the mountain southwest of Taejon, he had turned over command of theapproximately 150 men of the battalion with him to the executive officer,Major Dunham, with instructions to take them down to the Kumsan road threemiles south of Taejon and there establish a blocking position to protectthe rear of Taejon. Then he set off with a small party including Maj. CurtisCooper, his S-3; Capt. Malcolm C. Spaulding of the Heavy Weapons Company;a runner; his radio operator; an interpreter; and Wilson Fielder, Jr.,a Time Magazine correspondent. About 400 yards short of the Kumsanroad Ayres' party encountered North Korean soldiers on the hillside. Inthe scramble that followed, four men escaped-Ayres, Cooper, Spaulding,and the interpreter; the others were either killed or captured. Fielder'sbody was found some months later. Ayres and those with him who escapedhid in some bushes and during the afternoon watched North Koreans set upmachine guns near them. They also saw an estimated battalion of enemy troopsmarch north toward Taejon along the Kumsan road below them. That nightthe group escaped. [50]

Nor was this the only encounter with North Koreans close to the Kumsanroad that afternoon. Major Dunham led his men down toward the Kumsan road,as directed by Ayres. On the way they had a fire fight with what they tookto be a band of guerrillas. They disengaged and moved into the draw atKuwan-ni about three miles south of Taejon. Enemy troops there fired onDunham's party from nearby finger ridges. This fire hit Dunham in the neck,mortally wounding him, and there were other casualties. All in this partywho could do so now fled west to the Yudung valley at Masu-ri. But none of these incidents were known to Dean, Beauchamp, and themen in Taejon. [51]

Although the purpose was not apparent to the men in Taejon, enemy troopsto the west and northwest of the city shortly after noon began to closeon the city and exert increased frontal pressure to coincide with the movementof the enemy forces that by now had had time to get to the rear of thecity. In the early afternoon, Lieutenant Herbert's platoon sergeant calledhis attention to a large column of troops on high ground westward fromtheir roadblock position just west of Taejon. Herbert watched them fora while and decided that they were enemy troops. He then moved his mento a knoll south of the road and into defensive positions already dug there.The enemy force, which Herbert estimated to be in battalion strength, stoppedand in turn watched Herbert's force from a distance of about 600 yards.[52] This probably was the same column that Montesclaros had seen on theNonsan road about noon.

Back of Herbert's knoll position at the southwestern edge of the citywas a battery of 155-mm. howitzers. A runner from the battery arrived toask Herbert about the situation, and Herbert went back with him to talkwith the battery commander. At the artillery position he found howitzerspointing in three different directions but none toward the southwest, wherethe enemy force had just appeared. Herbert asked that the pieces be changedto fire on the enemy in front of him. The battery commander said he couldnot change the howitzers without authority from the battalion operationsofficer. Herbert talked to this officer on the field telephone but failedto secure his approval to change the howitzers.

By this time the North Koreans in front of Herbert's men had set upmortars and begun to shell his position and also the howitzers. This firekilled several artillerymen and caused casualties in the infantry group.Herbert sent a runner into Taejon to report and ask for instructions. Atthe 34th Infantry command post a group of fifty men was assembled fromHeadquarters Company and sent back under Lt. William Wygal, S-2 of the2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, with instructions to Herbert to hold wherehe was until the artillery could be evacuated. So Herbert's augmented forceexchanged fire with the North Koreans and held them to their ridge position.

General Dean observed this fire fight from the command post and thoughtit was going well for the American troops. He mistakenly thought, however,that it was McGrail's 2d Battalion troops that were engaged. About thistime, Dean walked back from the TACP to the 34th Infantry command postand asked for Colonel Beauchamp. It was about 1700. To his surprise hewas told that no one had seen Beauchamp since about 1500. Like Major Lantronin the morning, he had just disappeared. Dean remembered that he had expresseda great deal of concern to Beauchamp about the loss of communications withthe 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and that he had directed someone to getthrough and find Ayres. When he learned that Beauchamp had left the command post shortly after 1500 he concluded that Beauchamphad personally gone forward to contact Ayres. It was not until some threeyears later after he was repatriated from North Korea that General Deandiscovered that this was not the fact. [53]

What had happened to Beauchamp? About the time the first of the vehiclesstarted to form into convoy at the command post and the tanks from Yongdongled the first of them out of Taejon, Colonel Beauchamp got into his jeepand drove to the southeast edge of the city along the withdrawal route.There he came upon four light tanks of the 24th Reconnaissance Companyand ordered the tankers to defend the southeast side of the city and theOkch'on road exit. Starting back into Taejon, Beauchamp discovered on glancingback that the tanks were leaving their positions. He turned around andcaught up with them on the Okch'on road. But in running after the tankshe came under enemy small arms fire. After stopping the tanks, Beauchampdecided to climb a nearby knoll and reconnoiter the situation. From thiseminence he saw numerous groups of enemy troops moving across country southof Taejon toward the Okch'on road. Because he had been under fire on theroad he knew that some of them had already arrived there. Knowing thatthe convoys for the withdrawal were forming and that the first vehiclesalready had gone through, Beauchamp decided to go on with the two tankshe had with him to the pass four miles east of the city and to organizethere a defensive force to hold that critical point on the withdrawal road.At the pass, Beauchamp put the tanks in position and stopped some antiaircrafthalf-track vehicles mounting quad .50-caliber machine guns as they arrivedin the early phase of the withdrawal. Some artillery passed through, andthen a company of infantry. Beauchamp tried to flag down the infantry commander'svehicle, intending to stop the company and keep it at the pass. But theofficer misunderstood his intent, waved back, and kept on going.

Enemy sniper fire built up sporadically on the road below the pass.From his vantage point Beauchamp saw a locomotive pulling a few cars haltedby enemy small arms fire at the tunnel. This locomotive had departed Iwon-niat 1620, so the time of this incident must have been approximately 1630.Still expecting the 1st Infantry to cover the withdrawal route, Beauchampdecided that the best thing he could do would be to hurry up its arrival.He drove eastward to the command post of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry,and from there telephoned the 21st Infantry regimental command post inOkch'on. It chanced that General Menoher was there. He instructed Beauchampto come on in to Okch'on and give a detailed report. [54] But again, noneof these happenings were known in Taejon.

The locomotive had been sent to Taejon as the result of General Dean'stelephone request to the 24th Division a little earlier. In midafternoon,Captain Hatfield tried to send a rolling supply point of ten boxcars of ammunition out of the Taejon railroad yardto Yongdong. Returning to the rail yard at the northeast side of Taejon,Hatfield discovered that the Korean crew had uncoupled the locomotive fromthe supply train and fled south in it. It was then that Dean had telephonedthe division to dispatch a locomotive immediately to Taejon to pull outthis train. The nearest rail yard was at Iwon-ni, fifteen miles southeastof Taejon. Only armed guards had kept the Korean train crews there on thejob. Enemy fire on the locomotive from Iwon-ni punctured the water tender.

Though under sniper fire at the railroad yards, Hatfield awaited thearrival of the locomotive. When it pulled into the yards more enemy firehit it. The engineer said the locomotive was so damaged that it could notpull the train out. To Hatfield's dismay, the Korean engineer threw thelocomotive in reverse and backed speedily southward out of the yard. Atthe tunnel southeast of Taejon enemy fire again swept over the locomotiveand grenades struck it, killing the engineer. The fireman, although wounded,took the train on into Okch'on. Some American soldiers rode the train outof Taejon. According to 24th Division records, the time was 1645. Informedof this untoward incident, Dean again telephoned the division, and at 1700he received a telephone call that it was sending another locomotive, thistime under guard. Dean informed Hatfield of this and the latter waitedat the rail yard. Hatfield was killed by enemy soldiers there while waitingfor the locomotive that never arrived. The next morning at 0830 a U.S.Air Force strike destroyed the train load of ammunition and supplies stillstanding in the Taejon rail yard. [55]

About 1700 in the afternoon when he discovered that Colonel Beauchampwas not at the command post and that no one there knew where he was, GeneralDean turned to Colonel Wadlington, the regimental executive officer, andtold him to get the withdrawal under way in earnest. Wadlington calledin the 3d Platoon of the 24th Reconnaissance Company which had held a positiona few miles down the Kumsan road on the north side of the enemy roadblockthat had been discovered during the night. For their own reasons the enemyforces in that vicinity had seen fit not to attack this platoon and therebyalert the 34th Infantry to the enemy strength in its rear. In coming into Taejon to join the withdrawal convoy, the platoon drew machine gun firenear the rail station. Pvt. James H. Nelson engaged this enemy weapon witha .50-caliber machine gun mounted on a 2 1/2-ton truck and knocked it out.[56] In response to the earlier withdrawal order, Capt. Jack Smith hadbrought the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, in trucks to the designated initialpoint at the street corner in front of the regimental command post. Whenhe arrived there, Major McDaniel told him that General Dean wanted a perimeterdefense established to protect the initial point and to support an attemptto recover a battery of 155-mm. howitzers. Smith unloaded L Company for the perimeter defenseand sent the rest of the battalion on to join the convoy that was forming.

Instead of withdrawing their howitzers while Herbert's force held offthe enemy force at the west edge of Taejon, the artillerymen had shownno desire to limber up the pieces under fire. When Herbert left his positionto fall back to join the withdrawal he noticed the howitzers. The NorthKoreans quickly moved up and occupied Herbert's old position when he withdrewfrom it, and some advanced to the battery position. From these places theybegan firing into the city. Learning of the impending loss of the 155-mm.howitzers, General Dean ordered Colonel Wadlington to organize a counterattackforce from personnel at the command post to rescue the pieces. Major McDaniel,the regimental S-3, volunteered to organize and lead the counterattack.He drove the enemy soldiers from the battery position and kept down hostilefire until he could bring up tractor prime movers, hitch them to the howitzers,and pull out the pieces. Lack of tractor drivers prevented taking themall out; those left were rendered inoperative. [57]

By this time word came back to the command post that enemy small armsfire had knocked out and set afire two or three trucks at the tail endof the first group of vehicles to leave the city, and that they blockedthe street at the southeast edge of Taejon. Flames could be seen in thatcorner of the city, and the sound of small arms fire came from there. Deanthen rewrote a radio message to be sent to the 24th Division. It said ineffect, "Send armor. Enemy roadblock eastern edge City of Taejon.Signed Dean." Dean directed that the message be sent in the clear.

The general then went over to the Capitol Building with his interpreterto see if he could find a northward route out of the city that would passover the tableland east of the railroad station and swing around to hitthe Okch'on road some miles from the city. The Koreans in the buildingwere panic-stricken and he could get no information from them. Dean hastenedback to the command post and, being informed that Beauchamp had still notreturned, he directed Colonel Wadlington to close station and move out.

Enemy fire into and within the city had increased considerably. Oneresult was that an enemy mortar shell scored a direct hit on the collectingstation of the 24th Infantry, wounding ten men. Captain Smith from hisperimeter defense post reported that he could see North Koreans advancingfrom the airfield. Wadlington told him to hold them off until the convoycould escape. Wadlington showed General Dean his place in the convoy. Hetold Dean that he was going to lead the convoy with two jeeps, each carryingfive men, and that Major McDaniel was going to be at the tail of the column.With L Company already engaging approaching North Koreans, Captain Smithasked Dean how long he was to hold the company in position as a coveringforce.

Dean told him to give them forty-five minutes and then to withdraw.[55]

Dean looked at his watch as he drove out the gate of the command post.It was 1755. Outside in the street he talked briefly with Wadlington andthe senior officers riding the lead vehicles. He told them that very likelythey would get sniper fire in the city, but that once outside he thoughtthey would be all right. He instructed that if sniper fire was encounteredand the column stopped for any reason, everyone was to dismount and cleanout the snipers. It was a few minutes after 1800 when the large, main convoystarted to move. [59]

With Wadlington at its head the convoy rolled down the street. Someparts of the city were now blazing furnaces, and in places swirling smokeclouds obscured the streets. Soon the convoy stopped while those in thelead removed a burning ammunition trailer and telephone poles from theway. Then it continued on and swung into a broad boulevard. There the convoyencountered heavy enemy fire, both machine gun and small arms, sweepingup and down the avenue. Colonel Wadlington and the men in the two leadjeeps dismounted and opened fire. In about five minutes enemy fire slackened.Wadlington ordered the men in the second jeep to lead out, saying he wouldjoin them as soon as he saw that the convoy was moving. After the headof the convoy passed him, Wadlington and his men got into their jeep andstarted forward to overtake the head of the column. Not able to pass thetrucks, however, they swung off at a corner to go around a block. Thisroute led them to a series of misadventures-they found themselves in dead-endstreets, cut off by enemy fire, and eventually in a dead-end schoolyardon the east side of the city. There Wadlington and his companions destroyedtheir vehicle and started up the nearby mountain.

Meanwhile, the convoy hurried through the city, drawing enemy sniperfire all the way. One 2 1/2-ton truck in the convoy smashed into a buildingat an intersection and almost blocked the street for the rest of the vehicles.Then the first part of the convoy took a wrong turn through an underpassof the railroad and wound up in the same dead-end schoolyard as had ColonelWadlington. There were approximately fifty vehicles in this part of theconvoy. These men abandoned their vehicles. Led by an artillery major andother officers the group of about 125 started into the hills, first goingnorth away from the sound of firing and later turning south. During thenight the group became separated into several parts. Some of the men reachedfriendly lines the next morning, others on 22 July; some just disappearedand were never heard of again. [60]

After the first part of the convoy took the wrong turn, the remainderkept on the street leading to the Okch'on road. A little farther on theydrove through walls of fire as buildings burned fiercely on both sides.Just beyond this point, General Dean's vehicle and an escort jeep spedpast an intersection. They were scarcely past it when Lieutenant Clarkesaid to Dean that they had missed the Okch'on turn. Enemy fire preventedthem from stopping to turn around, so they kept on going south down theKumsan road. [61]

Just outside the city on the Okch'on highway the convoy encounteredenemy mortar fire. A shell hit the lead vehicle and it began to burn. Ahalf-track pushed it out of the way. The convoy started again. Enemy firenow struck the half-track, killed the driver, and started the vehicle burning.Machine gun fire swept the road. Everyone left the vehicles and soughtcover in the roadside ditches. Some in the convoy saw North Korean soldiersrise from rice paddies along the road and spray the column with burp gunfire.

When the enemy mortar fire stopped the column, SFC Joseph S. Szito ofthe Heavy Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, set up a 60-mm.mortar in the roadside ditch and fired at a group of North Koreans on ahill just south of the road. A little later he set up an 81-mm. mortarand fired about thirty rounds of smoke shells in an effort to cloak a proposedattempt to push the destroyed half-track off the road so the undamagedvehicles could proceed. But enough men would not go out into the streamof enemy fire to clear the road. Enemy mortars soon hit and destroyed threemore vehicles. The men then poured gasoline on most of their still undamagedvehicles, set them afire, and started for high ground to the north. [62]

Enemy mortars searched up and down the highway, making a shambles ofeverything on it. The latter part of the convoy now came up to the stalledand burning vehicles. These men scrambled out of their vehicles, soughtcover in the ditches, and prayed for darkness. One survivor of this groupestimates that there must have been 250 men bunched together in an areafifty yards square.

When darkness came, 2d Lt. Ralph C. Boyd, commanding a truck platoonof the 24th Quartermaster Company, with the help of some others, locatedsix vehicles that appeared to be undamaged and still able to run. Theywere a fulltrack artillery prime mover, two half-track vehicles, two 21/2-ton trucks, and a jeep. Boyd had the driver of the prime mover pushvehicles to the side of the road and clear a path while he and others loadedthe seriously wounded onto the half-tracks.

When the prime mover had cleared a path, the other vehicles startedforward with most of the men walking in the roadside ditches. Boyd toldthem to maintain silence and not to return any enemy fire. Boyd's groupturned into a narrow dirt road running north from the main highway andtraveled on it for some time without trouble. Then, suddenly, enemy machine gun fire ripped into the little group. It knockedBoyd off the prime mover. In falling, he struck a rock and lost consciousness.When he regained it sometime later everything was quiet and the vehicleswere gone. Upon discovering that a bullet had only creased his knee, hegot to his feet and ran two and a half miles into the lines of the 21stInfantry. [63]

Engineer troops of C Company, 3d Engineer Combat Battalion performedwell in the withdrawal from the city, but they suffered heavy losses. Twoexamples of their heroism should be mentioned. Enemy mortar fire destroyedPvt. Charles T. Zimmerman's jeep and wounded Zimmerman. Enemy soldiersthen directed small arms fire at his group. Although wounded by a mortarfragment and eleven bullets, Zimmerman killed five enemy soldiers and destroyedtwo machine guns. [64]

Another member of the engineers, Sgt. George D. Libby, was awarded theMedal of Honor posthumously for his heroic behavior that evening. Enemyfire at the roadblock area disabled the truck in which he was riding andkilled or wounded everyone in it except him. Libby got into the roadsideditch and engaged the enemy. Twice he crossed the road to give medicalaid to the wounded. He stopped an M-5 artillery tractor going through theroadblock, put the wounded on it, and then placed himself on the enemyside of the driver. He wished to protect the driver as he realized thatno one else present could drive the tractor out. In this position Libby"rode shotgun" for the tractor and its load of wounded, returningenemy fire. The tractor stopped several times so that he could help otherwounded on to it. In passing through the main enemy roadblock, Libby receivedseveral wounds in the body and arms. Later, the tractor came to a secondroadblock and there he received additional wounds in shielding the driver.Libby lost consciousness and subsequently died from loss of blood, butthe tractor driver lived to take his load of wounded through to safety.[65]

Just after dark an effort was made to break the roadblock from the Okch'onside. When Colonel Beauchamp reached the 21st Infantry command post thatafternoon he told General Menoher of the threatened roadblock. Menoherdirected him to take the rifle company that had come through the pass anda platoon of light tanks at the 21st Infantry command post and go backand hold the pass open. Beauchamp took the five tanks and on the way pickedup approximately sixty men of I Company, 34th Infantry. It was gettingdark when the group passed through the lines of the 21st Infantry.

Short of the pass, one of the tanks hit an enemy mine. Then a hiddenenemy soldier detonated electrically a string of mines. The riflemen movedcautiously forward. From a position near the pass they could see enemy mortars firing from both sides of theroad, but mostly from the western side. Some of the riflemen worked theirway as far forward as the highway tunnel, but they never got control ofthe pass or any part of the highway west of it. In about two hours thetankers and the men of I Company had expended their ammunition and withdrawn.[66]

While at the pass area, Beauchamp saw that most of the men in the engineerplatoon he had left there in the afternoon had been killed defending thepass-their bodies day strewn about on the ground. Among them was the lieutenanthe had instructed only a few hours before not to blow the tunnel but tohold it open for the Taejon troops. The two tanks and the antiaircraftvehicles had driven to the rear.

Although there were enemy troops scattered all along the escape routeout of Taejon, their principal roadblock began about two miles east ofthe city on the Okch'on road near the little village of Chojon. The roadblockextended a mile from there to the first railroad and highway tunnels eastof Taejon. In this stretch, the Seoul-Pusan highway and the double-trackMukden-Pusan railroad parallel each other along a little stream with highground closing in from both sides. Most of the enemy fire came from thewest side of the defile, but in the later stages of the roadblock actionthere were also enemy mortars, automatic weapons, and riflemen firing fromthe east side. [67]

All night long the several hundred men caught in the roadblock walkedsouth and east through the mountains. During the night the 1st Battalion,21st Infantry, aid station near Okch'on exhausted its medical suppliesin treating wounded men arriving from the Taejon area. Many finally reachedsafety at the 24th Division lines twenty miles farther east near Yongdongon 22 and 23 July. They came through singly and in small groups, but, inone or two instances, in groups of approximately a hundred men. ColonelWadlington was among those who reached friendly lines on the morning of22 July near Yongdong. [68]

While this disaster was taking place during the evening and night of20 July just east of Taejon, the 21st Infantry Regiment held its defensepositions undisturbed only three or four miles away. Only when Beauchamptelephoned the regimental command post at Okch'on and talked with GeneralMenoher there, and later, in person, reported in detail, did Colonel Stephensand his staff know of the serious trouble developing in Taejon and on theescape road eastward. [69] It would have taken several hours to get the 21st Infantry troops down from their hill positionsfor any effort to clear the Taejon exit road. And it was well after darkbefore it was known definitely at Okch'on that the enemy had in fact successfullyestablished a roadblock and that the Taejon troops were being decimated.It was too late then for the 21st Infantry to act in relief of the situation.To have accomplished this the regiment would have needed an order duringthe morning to move up to the eastern exit of Taejon and secure it.

That night at the 21st Infantry command post in Okch'on, General Menoherand Colonel Stephens discussed the situation. Stephens said he thoughtthe North Koreans would try to cut off his regiment the next day and thatif the regiment was to survive he wanted authority to withdraw it in adelaying action rather than to "hold at all costs." Menoher agreedwith Stephens and left it to his discretion when and how he would withdraw.General Menoher returned to Yongdong about midnight. [70]

At daybreak, 21 July, engineer troops set off demolition charges atthe railroad and highway tunnels just north of Okch'on that only partiallyblocked them. When full light came, observers and patrols from the 21stInfantry reported enemy troops in estimated regimental strength movingsouth around their west flank at a distance of two miles. Before long,an automatic weapons and small arms fight was in progress on that flank.[71]

Colonel Stephens gave the order for the regiment to withdraw. The 21stInfantry and 52d Field Artillery Battalion began leaving their Okch'onpositions shortly after 1100. Engineer troops destroyed the last bridgeacross the Kum River east of Okch'on to give some temporary security toROK forces on the east side of the river. The regiment successfully withdrewtwenty miles to prepared positions on the east side of the Kum River, aboutfour miles northwest of Yongdong. There it also established a strong roadblockon the road running southwest from Yongdong to Kumsan. [72]

Not all the troops withdrawing from Taejon followed the main Okch'onhighway, although they were supposed to. Many missed the tricky turn atthe southeast edge of the city and found themselves on the Kumsan road.Once on this road and under fire they kept going. After holding off theenemy at the Taejon command post perimeter while the convoy got away, CaptainSmith quickly loaded his L Company, 34th Infantry, into waiting trucksand started it on its way through the city. By this time enemy machineguns were firing across nearly every street intersection. Passing the Okch'onturn inadvertently, Smith kept on down the Kumsan road. Outside the cityhe found the road littered with trucks, jeeps, and various kinds of abandonedequipment. At an enemy roadblock he organized approximately 150 men, includingabout fifty wounded, and salvaged a prime mover, two 2 1/2-ton trucks,and four jeeps. The group fought its way south through several miles of smallroadblocks, clearing the last one just before dark. In this group Smithhad men from practically every unit that had been in Taejon. Some of themhad been with General Dean earlier in the evening.

Smith led his group south through Kumsan, Anui, and on to Chinju nearthe southern tip of Korea. From there he telephoned Pusan and a hospitaltrain was dispatched to him at Chinju. Smith left the wounded in Pusan,but continued on with the others to Taegu, where they joined other elementsof the 3d Battalion that had escaped. At Taegu on 23 July Colonel Wadlingtonhad assembled approximately 300 men who had escaped through the hills fromTaejon. [73]

Of all the incidents in the withdrawal, none was more dramatic or attendedby such gripping subsequent drama as the adventures of General Dean. Theybegan on the Kumsan road. When he missed the Okch'on turn, it was probablethat General Dean would not get far. There had been enemy roadblocks onthe Kumsan road since the night before. A mile from the city Dean stoppedhis jeep where a wrecked truck lay on its side in the ditch with severalwounded soldiers in it. He loaded these into his two jeeps and waved themon. He and two or three other soldiers soon clambered on to an artilleryhalf-track that came south on the road. Riding in one of the jeeps ahead,Lieutenant Clarke was hit in the shoulder by enemy fire a mile fartherdown the road. Another mile ahead his group came to a knocked out truckblocking the road. There an enemy force had established a roadblock withmachine gun and rifle fire. Clarke and the other men tumbled from the jeepsinto the right-hand ditch. Dean and those on the half-track did the samewhen they arrived a few minutes later.

General Dean and the others crawled through bean patches and a gardento the bank of the Taejon River where they lay concealed until darknesscame. It must have been at this time that Captain Smith and his L Companyparty fought their way through that roadblock. After dark Dean's partycrossed to the west side of the river and started climbing a high mountain.This was just north of the little village of Nangwol. General Dean andothers in the party took turns in helping a badly wounded man up the steepslope. Once, Clarke dissuaded Dean from going back down the mountain forwater. A little after midnight, at a time when he was leading the group,Lieutenant Clarke suddenly discovered that no one was following him. Heturned back and found several men asleep. He called for General Dean. Someonereplied that General Dean had gone for water. Clarke estimated that anunencumbered man could go to the bottom and back up to where they werein an hour. He decided to wait two hours. Dean did not return. At 0315Clarke awakened the sleeping men and the party climbed to the top of themountain, arriving there just before dawn. There they waited all day, fouror five miles south of Taejon, hoping to see General Dean. That night,Clarke led his party back down the mountain, re-crossed the Taejon River ina rainstorm near the village of Samhoe, climbed eastward into the mountains,and then turned south. He eventually led his party to safety through thelines of the 1st Cavalry Division at Yongdong on 23 July. [74]

It was some years before the mystery of what had happened to Dean thatnight after Taejon was finally cleared up. In going after water for thewounded men, General Dean fell down a steep slope and was knocked unconscious.When he regained consciousness he found he had a gashed head, a brokenshoulder, and many bruises. For thirty-six days General Dean wandered inthe mountains trying to reach safety, but this was the period when theNorth Koreans were advancing southward as rapidly as he was. On 25 August,two South Koreans who pretended to be guiding him toward safety led himinto a prearranged ambush of North Korean soldiers, and they captured theemaciated, nearly starved, and injured general, who now weighed only 130pounds instead of his normal 190. His capture took place near Chinan, thirty-fivemiles due south of Taejon and sixty-five air miles west of Taegu. Thenbegan his more than three years of life as a prisoner of the North Koreansthat finally ended on 4 September 1953 when he was repatriated to Americanofficials at P'anmunjom. [75] General Dean's heroic and fascinating chronicleas told in his book, General Dean's Story, is one of the great documentsto come out of the Korean War. That war was destined to add many illustriousnames to the roll of honor in United States military annals. But posterityprobably will accord to none as high a place as to General Dean in theexample he set as a soldier and leader in great adversity and as an unbreakableAmerican in Communist captivity.

A word needs to be said about the men of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,and the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, who were driven from or left theirpositions west of Taejon during the morning of to July and climbed intothe hills south of the Nonsan road. Most of them escaped. These men traveledall night. One large party of 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, troops, which included Captain Barszcz' G Company, 19th Infantry,was led by Captain Marks. It passed through Kumsan, where a few small partiesturned east toward Yongdong. But the main party continued south, believingthe enemy might have cut the road eastward. On the 23d this group encounteredsome ROK trucks and shuttled south in them until they broke down. The nextday the entire party loaded into a boxcar train it met and rode the last50 miles into the south coast port of Yosu, 110 air miles south of Taejonand 80 air miles west of Pusan. From Yosu they traveled by boat the nextday, 25 July, to Pusan. From there they returned north to rejoin theirparent organizations. [76]

Most of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, reached Kumsan and there turnedeastward to come through friendly lines at Yongdong. Included in theseparties were Colonels McGrail and Ayres and Captains Montesclaros and Slack.They arrived at Yongdong on 21 and 22 July.

Taejon must be considered a major victory for the North Koreans, eventhough two divisions with T34 tanks were operating against only about 4,000men of the U.S. 24th Division in and around the city. It appears that creditshould go to the N.K. 4th Division for carrying out the envelopmentof Taejon from the west and south by strong elements of its 16th and18th Regiments and imposing the disastrous roadblock on the Okch'onhighway east of Taejon. These elements had no tanks or artillery with them;theirs was a light infantry maneuver and tactic. Whether they came aroundby road through Kumsan from Nonsan or marched across country over the mountainssouth and southwest of Taejon from the Nonsan-Taejon road is not definitelyknown. There is some evidence that at least part of the enveloping forcecame through Kumsan.

The N.K. 3d Division joined the 5th Regiment of the N.K.4th Division in maintaining frontal pressure against Taejon in theafternoon of the 20th and enveloped it on the north and northeast. The3d infiltrated the city heavily in the latter part of the afternoon.The enemy tanks that penetrated Taejon in the morning apparently belongedto the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, attachedto the N.K. 4th Division ever since the crossing of the 38th Parallel.Some of the tanks that entered the city later in the day were probablyfrom the 203d Tank Regiment attached to the N.K. 3d Division.[77]

The N.K. 2d Division, which was supposed to have joined the 3dand 4th in the attack on Taejon, failed to come up in time.This all but exhausted division did not leave Ch'ongju until on or aboutthe 18th. It then moved through Pugang-ni southwest toward Taejon, apparentlyintending to cross the Kum River in the vicinity of the railroad bridge.It had yet to cross the Kum when it received word on 21 July that Taejonhad fallen. The 2d Division thereupon altered its course and turnedsoutheast through Poun, headed for Kumch'on. [78]

It is difficult to estimate enemy losses at Taejon. The North Koreaninfantry losses apparently were light. Their losses in armor and artillerywere considerable. The N. K. 4th Division, according to prisonerreports later, lost 15 76-mm. guns and 6 122-mm. mortars, together with200 artillerymen. The tank losses were relatively heavy; at least 15 ofthem were destroyed, and possibly the number may have been 20 or more.

Within five days the enemy, employing numerically superior forces, hadexecuted two highly successful envelopments of American positions at theKum River and at Taejon. In each case the North Koreans moved around theleft flank to impose roadblocks covering the rear routes of escape. Ineach instance the result was catastrophic for the units cut off. Theseenemy operations must stand as excellent examples of this type of militarytactic.

On the American side, the lack of information of the true state of affairscaused by the almost complete breakdown in all forms of communication wasthe major factor leading to the disaster. In battle, communication is allimportant.

When all the men who escaped from Taejon had rejoined their units, acount showed 1,150 casualties out of 3,933 of the U.S. 24th Division forcesengaged there on 19-20 July-nearly 30 percent. Of these casualties, 48were known dead, 228 wounded, and 874 missing in action. Most of the lastwere presumed killed and this was borne out by subsequent information.Among the rifle companies, L Company, 34th Infantry, the rear guard unit,lost the most with 107 casualties out of 153 men (70 percent). [79]

The equipment loss also was very great. Virtually all the organic equipmentof the troops in Taejon was lost there. Only B Battery, 13th Field ArtilleryBattalion, B Battery, 63d Field Artillery Battalion, and I Company, 34thInfantry, brought out their equipment substantially intact. They escapedjust before the enemy enforced the roadblock which caught everything behindthem. Approximately only 35 regimental vehicles escaped from Taejon. The24th Quartermaster Company lost 30 of 34 trucks; A Battery, 11th FieldArtillery Battalion, lost all 5 of its 155-mm. howitzers.

At noon on 22 July the 24th Infantry Division turned over the front-linepositions at Yongdong to the 1st Cavalry Division. The division's consolidatedstrength on that day was 8,660 men. Seventeen days had elapsed since divisiontroops had first met North Koreans in combat at Osan on 5 July. In thattime, two enemy divisions had driven it back 100 miles in a southeasterlydirection. In these two and a half weeks, the division had suffered morethan 30 percent casualties. More than 2,400 men were missing in action.It had lost enough materiel to equip a division. Losses in senior officersof field grade had been unusually severe. And then finally, at Taejon,the commanding general of the division was missing in action. Charged withcarrying out a delaying action, the division had held the enemy on itsfront to an average gain of about six miles a day. On 22 July, with GeneralDean still missing in action, Eighth Army ordered Maj. Gen. John H. Churchto assume command of the 24th Division. [80]

Soldiers of the 24th Division faced many handicaps in their early battleswith the North Koreans. Often the unit commanders were new to the unitsand did not know their officers and men; there were few qualified officerreplacements for those lost; communication was a most serious and continuingproblem-there was a lack of telephone wire, and the batteries for radioswere outdated and lasted only an hour or so in operation or they did notfunction at all; there was a shortage of ammunition, particularly for the60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortars; dysentery at times affected a fourthof the men; and always there were the rumors, generally absurd and groundless,which kept the men agitated and uneasy. The maps, based on the Japanesesurvey of 1918-32, were often unreliable, resulting in inaccurate artilleryfire unless directed and adjusted by an observer. Road and convoy disciplinewas poor. Driver maintenance was poor.

There were many heroic actions by American soldiers of the 24th Divisionin these first weeks in Korea. But there were also many uncomplimentaryand unsoldierly ones. Leadership among the officers had to be exceptionalto get the men to fight, and several gave their lives in this effort. Othersfailed to meet the standard expected of American officers. There is noreason to suppose that any of the other three occupation divisions in Japanwould have done better in Korea than did the U.S. 24th Division in July1950. When committed to action they showed the same weaknesses.

A basic fact is that the occupation divisions were not trained, equipped,or ready for battle. The great majority of the enlisted men were youngand not really interested in being soldiers. The recruiting posters thathad induced most of these men to enter the Army mentioned all conceivableadvantages and promised many good things, but never suggested that theprincipal business of an army is to fight.

When the first American units climbed the hills in the Korean monsoonheat and humidity, either to fight or to escape encirclement by the enemy,they "dropped like flies," as more than one official report ofthe period states. Salt tablets became a supply item of highest priorityand were even dropped to troops by plane.

One participant and competent observer of the war in those first dayshas expressed the conditions well. He said, "The men and officers had no interest in a fight which was noteven dignified by being called a war. It was a bitter fight in which manylives were lost, and we could see no profit in it except our pride in ourprofession and our units as well as the comradeship which dictates thatyou do not let your fellow soldiers down." [81]

As part of the historical record, it may be worthwhile to record GeneralDean's own judgment after turning over in his mind for several years theevents of Taejon, and after having read this chapter in manuscript. Manyof the things related in this chapter he did not, of course, know at thetime. Here are the words of this brave and honest soldier, written sevenand a half years after the event.

After the fall of Taejon the war was to enter a new phase. Help in theform of the 1st Cavalry Division had arrived. No longer would the 24thDivision and the ROK Army have to stand alone.

Notes

[1] Ltr, Bissett to author, 14 May 52; Ltr, Capt Arthur M. Clarke to author, 30 Jun 52; Interv, author with Col Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; ,4th DivWD, 16-17 Jul 50, and G-3 Jnl, entry 599, 161350 Jul 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, Msg at 2245, 16 Jul 50.

[2] Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 52.

[3] Ltr and Comments, Maj Gen Eugene M. Landrum to author, n.d., but received 23 Nov 53; Collier, MS review comments, 10 Mar 58.

[4] Ltr and Comments, Landrum to author, received 23 Nov 53; Comments, Landrum to author received 4 Jan 54; Interv, author with Beauchamp 1 Aug 52 (Beauchamp overheard part of the conversation on the 18th between Walker and Dean); Ltr, Clarke to author, 30 Jun 52; Ltr, Lt Col Layton C. Tyner (aide to Gen Walker) to author, 22 Aug 52; Interv, author with Lt Col Paul F. Smith (Comb Opn G-3, EUSAK, Jul 50), 1 Oct 52.

[5] National Intelligence Survey (NIS), Korea, 41, (1950) p. 4; JANIS 75(1945) ch. VIII, pp. 23-24.

[6] Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Overlay of 24th Inf positions 18 Jul 50, prepared by Beauchamp for author, Aug 52; Ltr, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52; Ltr, Maj Jack E. Smith (Actg CO 3d Bn, 34th Inf, 20 Jul 50) to author, 21 Jul 55.

[7] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58; 21st Inf WD, 18 Jul 50; 19th Inf WD, 18 Jul 50; Interv, author with Maj Leon B Cheek (Ex Off, 13th FA Bn, Jul 50), 7 Aug 51; 24th Recon Co WD, 18-20 Jul 50.

[8] Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 52; Gen Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58.

[9] 24th Div WD, 19 Jul 50, Narr Summ of Enemy Info; 21st Inf WD, 19 Jul 50, includes copies of this enemy leaflet; Btry A, 26th AAA (AW) Bn WD, 19 Jul 50; Antiaircraft Journal (January-February, 1951), article by Cpl John S. Aaron on 24th Div AAA claims three YAK's shot down; 3d Engr (C) Bn WD, 19 Jul 50, Narr Summ, Opn Highlights.

[10] 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 106, 190825 Jul 50; Ibid., G-2 Jnl, entry 1222, 191315 Jul 50; Hq X Corps, Staff Study, Development of Tactical Air Support in Korea, 25 Dec 50, p. 8; EUSAK WD, G-2 Daily Stf Rpt, 19 Jul 50, p. 2; FEAF Opn Hist, I, 25 Jun-1 Nov 50, 58-59.

[11] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), pp. 46-47.

[12] 24th Recon Co WD, 19 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, 19 Jul 50; Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Situation Overlay 34th Inf, 19 Jul 50, prepared by Beauchamp for author, Aug 52.

[13] Interv, author with Col Ned D. Moore, 20 Aug 52. (Moore was with Dean.)

[14] 19th Inf WD, 19 Jul 50; Interv, author with McGrail, 20 Aug 52; Interv, author with Montesclaros (S-3 Sec, 2d Bn, 19th Inf, Jul 50), 20 Aug 52.

[15] Intervs, author with McGrail and Montesclaros, [?] Aug 52; Situation Overlay, 1st Bn, 34th Inf, 19 Jul 50, prepared by Col Ayres for author.

[16] Ltr, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52; Interv, Mitchell with Bryant, 30 Jul 50.

[17] Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52: Ltr, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52; Ltr, Bissett to author, 14 May 52. General Order 112, 30 August 1950, 24th Division, awarded the Bronze Star Medal to Cpl Robert D. Jones, Headquarters Battery, 63d Field Artillery Battalion.

[18] Ltr, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52: Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52: Comments, Beauchamp to author, 7 Jan 53.

[19] Intervs, author with McGrail and Montesclaros, 20 Aug 52.

[20] Ltrs, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52 and 20 Feb 53: Interv, author with Ayres, 13 Jul 54.

[21] 24th Recon Co WD, 19-20 July 50: 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 1313, 201040 Jul 50; General Order 111, 30 August 1950, 24th Division, awarded the Silver Star to Lieutenant Kristanoff.

[22] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58.

[23] Ltrs, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52 and 20 Feb 52; Interv, author with Ayres, 13 Jul 54.

[24] Ibid.; Interv, Blumenson with 2d Lt George H. Wilcox (Plat Ldr, D Co, 34th Inf), 25 Aug 52; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, "Withdrawal Action," pp. 16-17, recording interview with MSgt Zack C. Williams of A Co, 34th Inf.

[25] Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; 3d Engr (C) Bn WD, 20 Jul 50; 24th Recon Co WD, 20 Jul 50.

[26] EUSAK WD, Prologue, G-4 Sec, 25 Jun-Jul 50, and WD, G-4 Sec, 17 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, Div Ordnance Off Stf Hist Rpt, 15 Jun-22 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-4 Daily Summ, Jnl entries 13-16 Jul 50; Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch. 4, p. 15.

[27] Ltr, Maj Jack E. Smith to author, 18 Jun 55; Comments, Wadlington for author, 1 Apr 53; Ltr, Wadlington to author, 23 Jun 53; Comments, Beauchamp for author, 3 Jan 53. Department of the Army General Order 16, 20 March 1951, awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously to SFC Robert E. Dare, K Company, 34th Infantry, for heroism at Taejon, 20 July 1950.

[28] ATIS Interrog Rpts, Issue 12, Rpt 1708, p. 26, 1st Lt Bill M. McCarver, and Rpt 1775, p. 214, 1st Lt Henry J. McNichols, Jr.

[29] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), pp. 46-47.

[30] Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58.

[31] Intervs, author with McGrail and Montesclaros, 20 Aug 52: Intervs, Blumenson with 2d Lt Joseph S. Szito (81-mm. Mortar Plat, H Co, 19th Inf, 25 Aug 51, and 2d Lt Robert L. Herbert (G Co, 19th Inf), 31 Jul 51.

[32] Ltrs, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52, and 20 Feb 53; Interv, author with Ayres, 13 Jul 54; Interv, author with McGrail, 20 Aug 52.

[33] Interv, Blumenson with Herbert, 25 Aug 51.

[34] Intervs, author with McGrail and Montesclaros, 20 Aug 52.

[35] Interv, author with Montesclaros, 20 Aug 52.

[36] Interv, author with McGrail, 20 Aug 52.

[37] Ltr, Capt. Michael Barszcz to author, 6 Sep 52.

[38] 3d Engr (C) Bn WD. 20 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 1367, 19-20 Jul 50 (I&R Plat Rpt with sketch map); Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1Aug 52; Interv, Blumenson with 2d Lt Robert E. Nash (S-4, 2d Bn, 19th Inf, July 50), 22 Aug 51. Nash was in the compound at the time of the tank attack.

[39] 24th Recon Co WD, 20 Jul 50 and Summ, 25 Jun-22 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 1304, 200850.

[40] Ltr, Capt Arthur M. Clarke to author, 31 May 52 (consists mostly of a copy of notes Clarke made shortly after he returned to friendly lines, on 23 July, while events were fresh in his mind); Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Debriefing Rpt 42, Dept of Training Pubs and Aids, 11Dec 51 (contains some of Clarke's recollections of Taejon); Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, pp. 30-33; Interv, Blumenson with Herbert, 25 Aug 51; 24th Recon WD, 20 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 1304, 200850 Jul 50.

[41] 3d Engr (C) Bn WD, 20 Jul 50; Ltr, Clarke to author, 31 May 52; Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, pp. 34.-35; New York Herald Tribune, July 24, 1950, Bigart interview with Clarke. The author sawthree T34 tanks still standing in Taejon in July 1951, each bearinga bold inscription painted in white on its sides reading, "Knocked out 20 Jul 50 under the supervision of Maj Gen W. F. Dean." One tank was in the center of Taejon at a street corner; this apparently was the one destroyed under General Dean's direction. The other two were at the Yusong and Nonsan roads' juncture west of the city.

[42] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58.

[43] 34th Inf WD, 20 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entries 1315, 201107, and 1367, 20225 Jul 50; 24th Div Ordnance Off Stf Hist Rpt, 20 Jul 50. A 24th Division report of 19 July erroneously states that by that date the 3.5-inch bazooka had destroyed several enemy tanks. 24th Div WD, G-4 Daily Summ, 18180-198000 Jul 50.

[44] 24th Div WD, 20 Jul 50; Ibid., G-2 PW Interrog File, interrog of Kim Chong Sun, 202300 Jul 50.

[45] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58; Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52.

[46] Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Ltr, Smith to author, 18 Jun 55; 24th Div WD, 20 Jul 50; 34th Inf WD, 20 Jul 50.

[47] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58.

[48] Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Interv. author with Ayres, 13 Jul 54; Ltr, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52; Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58. Ayres watched a large column march along the Kumsan road toward Taejon about this time.

[49] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58.

[50] Ltr, Ayres to author, 3 Oct 52; Interv, author with Ayres, 13 Jul 54.

[51] Ltr, Barszcz to author, 6 Sep 52 (he met the group in the Yudung valley); Interv, Blumenson with 2d Lt George W. Wilcox, Plat Ldr, 75 mm. Rec Rifle, D Co, 34th Inf, 25 Aug 51 (Wilcox was a member of Dunham's group).

[52] Interv, Blumenson with Herbert, 25 Aug 51.

[53] Dean, MS Review Comments, 20 Jan '58

[54] Interv, athor with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Beauchamp, Comments for author, 7 Jan 53; 24th Div WD, G-4 Daily Summ 20 Jul 50

[55] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58: 24th Div WD, G-4 Daily Summ, 20 Jul 50: Ibid., G-2 Jnl, entry 1372, 202140 (interv with personnel on locomotive): entry 1350, 201907: and entry 1401, 210950 Jul 50; Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, p. 37.

[56] 24th Recon Co WD, 20 Jul 50.

[57] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58; Comments, Wadlington to author, 1 Apr 53; Ltr and Comments, Wadlington to author, 1 Jun 53; Interv, Blumenson with Herbert, 25 Aug 51; 24th Div Arty WD, 20 Jul 50; 3d Engr (C) Bn WD, 20 Jul 50. General Order 121, 5 September 1950, 24th Division, awarded the Silver Star to McDaniel.

[58] Ltr, Smith to author, 18 Jun 55; Ltr, Wadlington to author, 1 Apr 53.

[59] McDaniel was among those captured at Taejon. In prisoner of war camps McDaniel strove to protect the rights of American prisoners. According to accounts brought back by repatriated prisoners in 1953, the North Koreans, unable to break his will, finally took McDaniel away and he disappeared from view. Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, pp. 36-37; 32d Inf WD (7th Div), 26 Sep 50. McDaniel's name was on a roster of prisoners' names captured at Seoul, 26 September 1950.

[59] Dean, MS review comments, 20 Jan 58.

[60] Ltrs, Wadlington to author, 1 Apr, 1 Jun 53. General Order 116, 3 September 1950, 24th Division, awarded the Silver Star to Wadlington for action on 20 July 1950. Interv, Blumenson with Herbert, 25 Aug 51. Herbert was in the part of the convoy that took the wrong turn into the schoolyard.

[61] Ltr, Clarke to author, 11 Dec 52; Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, p. 39.

[62] Interv, author with Maj Clarence H. Ellis, Jr. (S-3 Sec, 11th FA Bn Jul 50), 22 Jul 54; Interv, Blumenson with Szito, 31 Jul 51.

[63] General Order 126, 12 September 1950, 24th Division, awarded the Silver Star to Lieutenant Boyd. Interv, Capt John G. Westover with 1st Lt Ralph C. Boyd, 13 Mar 52, copy in OCMH. This interview was published in U.S. Army Combat Forces Journal (September, 1952), pp. 26-27.

[64] 3d Engr (C) Bn WD, 20 Jul 50.

[65] Department of the Army General Order 62, 2 August 1951, awarded the Medal of Honor to Libby.

[66] Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 52: 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 196, 201930 Jul 50; 21st Inf WD, 20 Jul 50; New York Herald Tribune, July 21 and 23, 1950.

[67] Various interviews with survivors from the roadblock and the records of the 21st Infantry and the 24th Division place the eastern limit of the enemy roadblock at the first railroad tunnel southeast of Taejon.

[68] 21st Inf WD, 20 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, 20 and 23 Jul 50; Ibid., G-2 Jnl, entry 4, 230115 Jul 50; Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 52; Ltr, LtCol Charles B. Smith to author, 6 Nov 51; 34th Inf WD, 25 Jul 50; Interv, Blumsenson with Szito, 31 Jul 51; Interv, author with Pfc Alvin Moore, 34th Inf, 23 Jul 51; Ltrs, Wadlington to author, 1 Apr and 1 Jun 53.

[69] Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 52; Ltr, Bissett to author, 14 May 52.

[70] Ltr, Bissett to author, 14 May 52.

[71] Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 52; Ltr, Lt Col Charles B. Smith to author, 10 May 52; 21st Inf WD, 21 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, 21 Jul 50.

[72] Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 52; Ltr, Smith to author, 10 May 52; 24th Div WD, 21 Jul 50.

[73] Ltrs, Smith to author, 18 Jun and 21 Jul 55. General Order 123, 9 September 195O, 24th Division, awarded the first Oak Leaf Cluster to the Silver Star to Capt. Jack E. Smith for gallantry and leadership on 20 July 1950.

[74] Interv, author with Capt Ben Tufts, 2 Aug 51; Ltrs, Clarke to author, 11 and 22 Dec 52, together with sketch map of escape route he followed; New York Herald Tribune, July 24, 1950, dispatch by Homer Bigart.

[75] The Department of the Army awarded General Dean the Medal of Honor for his courage and exploits at Taejon on 20 July. DA GO No. 7, 16 Feb 51. The first information that Dean might be alive as a prisoner of war came from a North Korean soldier, Lee Kyu Hyun, who escaped to American lines (his claim) or was captured near P'yongyang in North Korea in late October 1950. He had been assigned to live with General Dean and to serve as interpreter. Col. William A. Collier of the Eighth Army Staff who had established the Advanced Headquarters in P'yongyang was the first American officer to interview Lee. He was convinced that Lee had lived with Dean and made a detailed report to Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, then Chief of Staff, Eighth Army. Capt. Ben Tufts also interviewed Lee extensively, first at P'yongyang and subsequently early in 1951 at Pusan. In the summer of 1951 Tufts furnished the author with a copy of his interview notes with Lee. Lee's story proved to be substantially in agreement with the account given later by Dean himself. But in 1951 the author could find scarcely anyone in Eighth Army or in the Far East Command who believed that General Dean might still be alive.

[76] Ltr, Barszcz to author, 6 Sep 52; Interv, Blumenson with Wilcox, 25 Aug 51.

[77] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 106 (N.K. Arty), p. 66; Ibid., Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), pp. 46-47; Ibid., Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), pp. 31-32; ORO-R-1, FEC, Employment of Armor in Korea (8 Apr 51), vol. 1, p. 127, citing Sr Capt Kwon Jae Yon, and pp. 112-13, citing 2d Lt Kim Ji Soon.

[78] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 2d Div), p. 36.

[79] Casualties of some of the major units at Taejon were as follows:

Unit	Casualties	Percentage
Hq, 34th Inf	71 of 171	41.5
1st Bn, 34th Inf	203 of 712	28.5
3d Bn, 34th Inf	256 of 666	38.4
2d Bn, 19th Inf	211 of 713	29.5
C Co, 3d Engr (C) Bn	85 of 161	53.0
A Btry, 11th FA Bn	39 of 123	31.7

See 24th Div Arty WD, 20 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, 20 Jul 50 and G-3 Jnl, entry 198, 202000 Jul 50; A Btry, 26th AAA Bn WD, 21 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-1 Stf Hist Rpt, 22 Jul 50; 3d Engr (C) Bn WD, Narr Summ, Opnl Highlights, 20 Jul 50, and Unit Hist, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50; 34th Inf WD, 22 Jul-26 Aug, Logistical Rpt; The Rand Corp., Dr. J. O'Sullivan, 24th Division Casualties at Taejon.

[80] 24th Div WD, Summ, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50; Ltr, Smith to author, 6 Nov 52; 21st Inf WD, 25 Jun-22 Jul 50, Incl III, Act Rpt, 3d Bn, 24 Jul 50; 34th Inf WD, 22 Jul-26 Aug 50, Logistical Rpt; EUSAK WD, 13-31 Jul 50, Summ, Sec II, 22 Jul 50. Church was promoted from brigadier general to major general on 18 July 1950.

[81] Ltr, Stephens to author, 17 Sep 52. The author has heard essentially the same thing from many others who fought in Korea during the summer of 1950.

[82] Ltr and MS review comments, Dean to Maj Gen Richard W. Stephens, Chief of Military History, 20 Jan 58.

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