Foreword
At the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the U.S. Army combat units nearest the scene were the four infantry divisions performing occupation duties in Japan. When the Army of the Republic of Korea, supported only by U.S. air and naval forces, was unable to halt the North Korean aggressors, these divisions, seriously understrength and only partially trained and equipped for fighting, provided the troops that were committed initially to action in response to the call of the United Nations Security Council.
Colonel Appleman's narrative portrays vividly the grimness of "limitedwar" against a fanatical enemy, and the tragic consequences of unpreparedness.His writing recaptures the dismay that most Americans experienced in therealization that a small, little-known country could achieve military successagainst a coalition that included this, the world's most powerful nation.
Here is the story of how U.S. Army combat units, thrown piecemeal intothe battle to slow Communist advances, fought a desperate and heroic delayingaction, buying time until the United Nations forces could attain the militarystrength necessary to take the offensive. When that offensive was launched,it quickly crushed the North Korean forces, only to be met with the massiveintervention of a more formidable adversary, Communist China.
This volume covers U.S. Army action in Korea from the outbreak of warto the full-scale intervention of the Chinese Communists. It is the firstof five volumes now planned for inclusion in UNITED STATES ARMY IN THEKOREAN WAR, a series patterned on the much more voluminous UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Subsequent volumes will complete the Korean combatnarrative as well as deal with related problems of command, strategy, logistics,handling of prisoners of war, and the armistice negotiations.
Washington, D. C. JAMES A. NORELL15 March 1960 Brigadier General, U.S.A. Chief of Military History
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The Author
Roy E. Appleman, a graduate of Ohio State University, magna cum laude,continued his education at Yale Law School and Columbia University,receiving from the latter the M.A. degree in History and completing allrequirements for the Ph.D. degree except the publication of a dissertation.
He entered the United States Army as a private in the infantry in 1942during World War II and after completing Officer Candidate School the followingyear was commissioned a 2d lieutenant. After a number of assignments, hewas sent overseas to the Pacific theater in 1944, assigned as a combathistorian with the United States Tenth Army and subsequently attached tothe XXIV Corps. Coauthor of Okinawa: The Last Battle, first combatvolume to be published in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II,he received the Army Commendation Ribbon in 1945 for performance of dutiesas combat historian in the Okinawa campaign and his subsequent contributionto the Okinawa volume.
Early in 1951 Colonel Appleman (then a major) was ordered from reservestatus to active duty with the Army and sent to Korea as a combat historianfor the purpose of studying the action there and preparing the Army's historyof the Korean War. A lieutenant colonel, he returned to civilian life inthe autumn of 1954. Upon completion of the manuscript for the present work,he received the Secretary of the Army's Certificate of Appreciation forPatriotic Civilian Service.
Author of Abraham Lincoln: From His Own Words and Contemporary Accounts,published by the Government Printing Office; coauthor of Great WesternIndian Fights, being published by Doubleday & Company, Inc.; andcoauthor of History of the United States Flag and Symbols of Sovereignty,being published by Harper & Brothers, Mr. Appleman is presentlyStaff Historian in the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior,and holds a commission as lieutenant colonel in the U. S. Army Reserve.
Preface
William Napier, upon finishing after seventeen years of painful toilthe six volumes of his Peninsular War, wrote in a parody of Chaucer:
"Easy ys myne bake to rede and telleth of moche fyte,
But then your easy rede is damned hard to wryte...." True it is that a historian's first business is grinding toil and drudgery.All of this it has been to the writer of this book. Nevertheless it wasa labor willingly undertaken, but accompanied throughout by the apprehensionthat he might fail in doing justice to the story of his countrymen whofought in Korea.
First and always, within the limits of his knowledge and ability, theauthor has neglected no effort nor passed over any evidence that seemedlikely to further his purpose of writing a true history of the Korean War.He accepted Parkman's dictum that faithfulness to the truth of historyinvolves far more than research, that one who is to write it "muststudy events in their bearings near and remote; in the character, habits,and manners of those who took part in them . . . and must himself be, asit were, a sharer or a spectator of the action he describes."
During the first four of the nine years he devoted to writing this book,from 1951 to 1954, the writer was on active duty in the United States Armyand completed a first draft of the manuscript. In the following five years,as a civilian in Army reserve status, he devoted the time he could salvagefrom earning a living to several revisions and final completion of thework.
The writer was not entirely a stranger to Korea when he arrived thereearly in July 1951. Six years earlier, as a staff officer, he had accompaniedLt. Gen. John R. Hodge's U. S. XXIV Army Corps from Okinawa to Korea inearly September 1945. This was at the beginning of United States commitmentin Korea, when General Hodge accepted the surrender of the Japanese thereat the end of World War II and began the occupation of that country belowthe 38th Parallel. But it was in 1951 that the writer saw Korea's hillsat close quarter and felt his knees tremble and buckle as he climbed thesteeply pitched ridges.
Korea was at the same time both beautiful and sordid. The green hillsand patchwork-patterned rice paddies have an enchanting beauty when seenfrom a distance or the relative comfort of a vehicle on the roads. Sloggingover this same ground carrying a load of weapons and pack in scorchingheat or pelting rain, or in the numbing cold of a Siberian-type winter,with the enemy waiting around the next bend or over the next rise of ground,is another matter. Then the landscape loses its charm and becomes harshand deadly to the spirit and exhausting to mind and body.
From Pusan in the south to the United Nations line north of the 38thParallel, from the Imjin River in the west to the Iron Triangle, to. themountain line above the Hwach'on Reservoir, to Heartbreak Ridge and thePunchbowl, and on to the high Taebaek Mountains near the east coast inthe ROK sector, the writer traveled from command post to command post andoften up to battalions and rifle companies on the line. His companion duringthese travels in Korea was Capt. (now Major) Russell A. Gugeler, an experiencedsoldier who subsequently wrote Combat Actions in Korea. Wheneverpossible the earlier, 1950 battlefields were visited. Where lack of timeor other circumstances did not permit this, critical terrain was studiedfrom liaison planes that could dip low and circle at leisure around pointsof interest.
The writer came to know the stifling dust, the heat, the soaking rains,the aching legs, the exhausted body that was the common experience of themen who fought in Korea, although he seldom had to run any risk of knownpersonal danger as did they, and he could always look forward to food atnight and a safe place to sleep at some command post, which most of themcould not. It is easy for him now to close his eyes and see the rushingtorrents in the mountain gorges and everywhere the hills, scantily covered,if at all, in the south, and green with pine in the higher mountains ofthe north. In the lower ground were the rice paddies, small vegetable patches,the mud-walled and thatched-roof huts. How could one forget this Asiaticland where so many of his countrymen died or were maimed, where they enactedtheir roles of bravery and fortitude. In a sense, the Korean War experiencebecame a part of him.
Official records are indispensable for fixing dates and time of majorevents and troop movements. But anyone familiar with the way the recordsof combat units during battle are made up will know that they seldom tellthe essential facts of what happened, and how, and why. They are oftenthe products of indifferent clerks transcribing, at places remote fromthe scene of action, a minimum of messages for something-anything-thatwill satisfy the official requirement for a report. Those who know themost about an action or an event seldom take the time to tell, or write,about it. They are too tired, or too nearly dead, or they are dead.
In the early months of the Korean War there was little time for themilitary organizations committed there to keep adequate records of whatthey did, even had there been the desire to do so. Always they were stoppingonly briefly, fighting hazardous rear-guard actions, and then on the runagain. No one had time to write down what had happened and why, even ifhe knew. And no one in the various headquarters had the time or the energyor the will to search out those who survived each action and from themlearn firsthand of the event. Everyone was too much concerned with survival or of getting a moment of respite from exhaustion. A record for posterity,for history, weighed the least of many things on their minds. Even whenreports of military organizations are models of official records, the authoragrees wholly with Marshal Erich von Manstein, who believes that a historianof military matters and campaigns "cannot get the truth from filesand documents alone . . . the answer . . . will seldom be found-certainlynot in a complete form-in files or war diaries."
How easy it would have been to write a story of the war based on therecords alone, never stopping to get beneath that gloss! Such a book mighthave read smoothly and had a tone of plausibility to all except those whosepersonal knowledge would have branded it as inadequate at best and as almostwholly false at worst. Rather than produce such a book, the author chosethe nine years of work that resulted in this one.
Since it was only from survivors of the early battles in Korea thatone could hope to reconstruct the narrative of the first months of theconflict, the writer undertook to get their story. When he arrived in Koreain early July 1951, on active duty with the Army, he had orders from Maj.Gen. Orlando Ward, then Chief of Military History, to study the terrainof the action and to interview as many participants, of all ranks, as hecould find. He began then a process continued almost to the hour that thismanuscript went to press. He talked with hundreds of soldiers, from privatesto three- and four-star generals, about particular actions and decisionsaffecting the action of which each had personal knowledge in some degree.One interview would result in leads to others. Thus the snowball grew.Many officers and soldiers who had information were now in distant landson reassignment, or otherwise out of reach for personal discussion. Tothem went letters. Over the years, information came back from many cornersof the globe. The response was remarkable. The author had only to ask andhe received. The men were eager to tell their story-from the private inthe ranks to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Without this willinghelp of those who toiled, suffered, bled, and lost their comrades the storyof the Korean War in 1950 could never have been told satisfactorily. Ifthis narrative carries the mark of truth, it is to these men largely thatit is due. My debt to them is great.
Some major events almost defied comprehension. Such was the battle ofTaejon. The author spent seven years in attempting to solve that puzzlingand bizarre action. The first draft of the Taejon chapter, based on theofficial records, was nothing. Knowing this, the author sought out survivorsand throughout the years searched for, and gradually accumulated, moreinformation. Missing pieces of the puzzle came to light that made it possibleto fit others into place. The author rewrote this Chaptereight times.Finally he obtained from Maj. Gen. William F. Dean his comments on themanuscript and a statement of his contemporary thoughts and actions bearingon the events described. Some of them were not calculated to raise himto the level of an all-seeing military commander, but they marked Deanas a man of truth and honor. Then, with General Dean's contributions, theauthor felt at last that he had salvaged about all that ever would be learned concerningTaejon from American sources. Many other chapters reached their final formin much the same manner as this one.
The scope and scale of treatment change as the narrative proceeds. Atfirst only two reinforced rifle companies were committed to battle, thena battalion, then a regiment, then a division, finally the Eighth Armyand the reconstituted ROK Army. Against them was the might of the initiallyvictorious North Korean Army, and later the light infantry masses of theChinese Communist Forces. Gradually, United Nations troops from many partsof the world entered the lists, usually in small numbers to be sure, butin the case of Great Britain the force rose from two battalions to a Commonwealthdivision. As the larger forces came into action against each other thefocus of action necessarily broadened and detail diminished. Task ForceSmith, for example, in the first week of July 1950, received a detail oftreatment that could not possibly be continued for all of the Eighth Armylate in the year, nor even in August and September at the Naktong Perimeter.The use of detail necessarily had to be more selective. The ROK Army istreated in less detail than the American organizations, but enough is toldto relate its part in the over-all operations. Reliable information onROK action was nearly always very difficult to obtain, and sometimes impossible.
Throughout, the writer's sympathies have been with the troops who foughtthe battles at close range-the men who handled the rifles, who threw thegrenades, who caught the enemy's bullets, who fought their own fears inthe face of the unknown, who tried to do their duty as United States soldierseven though they were fighting for a cause they did not understand, andin a country to whose culture and interests they were strangers. He triedto be there with them.
The writer is indebted to many officers who, while serving in the Officeof the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, have read themanuscript in its various stages and offered comments and criticisms. Theyinclude Maj. Gen. Richard W. Stephens, a leading participant in the action;Col. George G. O'Connor; Col. S. W. Foote; Col. Carl D. McFerren; Col.Joseph Rockis; Col. Warren H. Hoover; and Lt. Col. Eugene J. White.
The sympathetic and generous viewpoint of Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield,who gave valuable help in directing the critical panel review of the manuscriptand evaluating needed final revisions, is gratefully acknowledged. Dr.Louis Morton gave detailed and critical review to the manuscript. Dr. StetsonConn, who succeeded Dr. Greenfield as Chief Historian, and his Deputy,Dr. John Miller, jr., have been most helpful in reviewing the final draftof the manuscript.
To Miss Ruth Stout, the editor, and Mr. Thomas J. Seess, the copy editor,the writer especially wants to express his appreciation for their friendly,necessary, and painstaking editing of the manuscript and guiding it throughthe printer. Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, as Editor in Chief, has contributedfrom his wide editorial experience and wisdom. Mrs. Norma Heacock Sherris assisted in finding suitable illustrations for the volume.
Mr. Billy-Mossman, assisted by Mr. Elliot Dunay and the draftsmen whoworked under his supervision, produced the maps in this volume. The authorturned over to Mr. Mossman a large number of sketch maps and overlays whichhe had prepared while writing the text. Mr. Mossman, a former infantryofficer with World War II experience in the Pacific Theater, and lateron active duty in Korea during the Korean War, has a wide knowledge ofmilitary matters and of Korea itself. This background combined with histraining in military cartography made him an ideal choice for the layoutand supervision of the map work on this volume.
Mr. Israel Wice and his staff in the General Reference Section, Officeof the Chief of Military History, cheerfully and efficiently gave theirservices in obtaining official records and other materials requested bythe writer for his use. Mr. Stanley Falk prepared a useful digest of theFar East Command Daily Intelligence Summary, July through November 1950,relative to the Korean War. In an early stage of the work, Mrs. GwendolynTaylor as typist and general assistant gave valuable help.
The writer is much indebted to Mrs. Joy B. Kaiser. Many a complicatedtroop movement she has reconstructed on an overlay from coordinate readingsgiven in S-3 and G-3 journals and periodic reports. The author never triedto write up the story of an action until after it had been plotted on aterrain map. Thus, Mrs. Kaiser in a two-year period saved him much labor,doubling as typist for an early draft of the manuscript, preparing overlaysfrom journal co-ordinates, and otherwise contributing to the work.
Another whose dedication benefited the writer is Mrs. Edna W. Salsbury.She assumed the task of typing what turned out to be the last two revisionsof the manuscript, and she performed that task ably. Throughout the tediouswork of typing a heavily footnoted manuscript she made many suggestionsthat resulted in improving readability and her careful attention to detailcontributed much in maintaining accuracy.
Notwithstanding the considerable assistance given the author by so manyindividuals and organizations, he alone is responsible for interpretationsmade and conclusions drawn in this volume as well as for any errors ofomission or commission.
The person to whom the author owes most is Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward. AsChief of Military History, Department of the Army, in 1951, he orderedhim to Korea to start this work. He opened the door for him to all commandersin Korea and the Far East Command. His experience as Secretary of the GeneralStaff from 1938 to 1941, and subsequently as commander of the 1st ArmoredDivision in North Africa, had given him broad knowledge of military mattersand firsthand experience of battle and how it affects men.
General Ward's constant injunction to the author was to seek the truthof the Korean War and to tell it, no matter whom it might touch unfavorably.He wanted the facts made known, because only from them, he thought, couldthe United States build a better army for its defense. How well the writer remembers his statement one day in casual conversation, "Truthis the first casualty in battle." He has tried not to have it thefirst casualty in this account of the Korean War.
Washington, D.C. ROY E. APPLEMAN 15 March 1960 Lieutenant Colonel, USAR