CHAPTER XII, The Front Line Moves South, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

While the battles of the Kum River and Taejon were being fought on themain axis south from Seoul, many miles eastward, the enemy 5th Divisionpressed forward against Yongdok, a key point where a lateral road camein from the mountains to meet the coastal road. (Map III)The ROK 3d Division had orders to hold Yongdok. It was certain that heavybattles would be fought there.

On 13 July Colonel Emmerich and the KMAG detachment with the ROK 3dDivision forwarded to Eighth Army a demolition plan for use on the coastalroad and bridges. Maj. Clyde Britton, one of the KMAG officers, was tobe responsible for giving authority to blow any of the bridges. The longbridge at Yongdok was recognized as the most important feature on the coastalroad, and it was to be held intact unless enemy armor was actually crossingit.

At this time interrogation of an enemy prisoner disclosed that the NorthKoreans had a plan to blow a bridge near An'gang-ni, on the lateral corridorfrom Taegu to P'ohang-dong and to blow both ends of the Ch'ongdo railroadtunnel between Pusan and Taegu. Destruction of the tunnel would constitutea serious blow to the logistical support for the front-line troops. TwoAmerican officers with two platoons of ROK troops went to the tunnel toprotect it.

On 14 July, Brig. Gen. Lee Chu Sik, Commanding General, ROK 3d Division,indicated that he wanted to move the division command post to P'ohang-dongand to withdraw his troops south of Yongdok. Colonel Emmerich told himthis could not be done-that the east coast road had to be held at all costs.General Walker had given a great deal of attention to the east coast situationbecause he knew it was isolated from the rest of the ROK command and neededclose watching, and Col. Allan D. MacLean of the Eighth Army G-3 staffwas in constant communication with Colonel Emmerich.

Support of the ROK 3d Division had stabilized to the extent that largefishing vessels moved from Pusan up and down the coast, supplying the ROK'swith ammunition and food, without being targets of the United States Navy. News that a railhead wouldbe established at P'ohang-dong and a daily supply train would arrive therefrom Pusan promised soon to relieve the situation still further. On land,each ROK commander had his own system of recruiting help and had largenumbers of untrained combat troops and labor groups carrying supplies intothe hills on A-frames. At this stage of the war, typical food of the ROKsoldier was three rice balls a day-one for each meal-supplemented alongthe coast by fish. The rice was usually cooked behind the lines by Koreanwomen, then scooped out with a large cup which served as a measuring device,pressed into a ball about the size of an American softball, and wrappedin a boiled cabbage leaf. Whether his rice was warm or cold or whetherflies and other insects had been on it, seemed to have little effect onthe ROK soldier. Apparently the Korean people had become immune to whateverdisease germs, flies, and other insects carry. [1]

As the east coast battle shaped up, it became apparent that it wouldbe of the utmost importance to have a fire direction center to co-ordinatethe 81-mm. mortars, the artillery, the fighter aircraft, and the naval gunfire.Such a center was set up in a schoolhouse south of Yongdok with Capt. HaroldSlater, the KMAG G-3 adviser to the 3d Division, in charge of it and CaptJohn Airsman as artillery adviser. The ROK 3d Division artillery at thistime consisted of three batteries of four 75-mm. pack howitzers and onebattery of 105-mm. howitzers.

On 14 July ROK troops withdrew in front of the advancing North Koreansand set off demolitions at two bridges, two tunnels, and two passes betweenYonghae and Yongdok on the coastal road. United States naval vessels bombardedroadside cliffs next to the sea to produce landslides that would blockthe road and delay the North Koreans.

Two days later the ROK 23d Regiment gave way and streamed south. TheKMAG advisers considered the situation grave. In response to an inquiryfrom Colonel Collier of Eighth Army, Colonel Emmerich sent the followingmessage:

On 17 July the North Koreans drove the disorganized regiment south ofYongdok. The loss of this town so quickly was a demoralizing blow, andEighth Army became at once concerned about it. During the day the firstUnited States artillery to support the ROK's on the east coast, C Batteryof the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, entered the fight. [3]

The enemy entry into Yongdok began three weeks of fighting for thiskey coastal town, with first one side and then the other holding it. Twoor three miles of ground immediately south of it became a barren, churnedup, fought-over no man's land. The first ROK counterattack came immediately.On 18 July at 0545 an air strike came in on the enemy front lines. Heavynaval gunfire pounded the Yongdok area after the strike. At 0600 the UnitedStates light cruiser Juneau fired two star shells over the ROK lineof departure. Newly arrived reinforcements took part in the attack as ROKtroops advanced behind the screen of naval gunfire to close rifle rangewith the North Koreans. At the same time, other naval guns placed interdictionfire on the North Korean rear areas. These heavy support fires were largelyresponsible for a North Korean withdrawal to a point about three milesnorth of Yongdok for reorganization. [4]

But this success was short lived. Elements of the N.K. 5th Divisionregained the town the next day, driving the ROK's back to their formerpositions south of it.

On to July Colonel Emmerich went to Yonil Airfield to discuss with Col.Robert Witty, commanding the 35th Fighter-Interceptor Group, the co-ordinationof air strikes at Yongdok. These promised to become more numerous, becauseon that day the 40th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron became operational at Yonil. General Walkerand General Partridge flew to Yonil Airfield from Taegu to join in thediscussions, and General Kean of the 25th Division also joined the groupthere. Emmerich briefed the commanders thoroughly on the situation. GeneralWalker ordered that the 3d ROK Division must retake Yongdok. When ColonelEmmerich relayed Walker's orders to General Lee of the ROK division thelatter was upset, but he received instructions from higher ROK authorityto obey the Eighth Army commander. [5]

The second battle for Yongdok began on the morning of 21 July. Thiswas a savage and bloody fight at close quarters. Naval reinforcements hadarrived off the coast during the night of 19 July, and Rear Adm. J. M.Higgins informed Emmerich that the destroyers Higbee, Mansfield,DeHaven, and Swenson, and the British cruiser Belfastwould add their gunfire to the battle. This naval gunfire, U.S. artilleryand mortar fire, and air strikes enabled the ROK's to retake the town,only to be driven out again by nightfall. In this action unusually accurateenemy mortar and artillery fire caused very heavy ROK casualties. The secondbattle of Yongdok left the area from Kanggu-dong to a point about two milesnorth of Yongdok a smoldering no man's land. The pounding of the artillery,naval gunfire, and air strikes had stripped the hills of all vegetationand reduced to rubble all small villages in the area.

In the attack on the 21st, observers estimated that naval gunfire fromthe Juneau alone killed 400 North Korean soldiers. Even though enemytroops again held Yongdok they were unable to exploit their success immediatelybecause they were held under pulverizing artillery and mortar fire, navalgunfire, and almost continuous daylight air strikes. In their efforts toexecute wide enveloping moves around the flank of the ROK troops over mountainousterrain, barren of trees and other cover, they came under decimating fire.On 24 July alone the North Koreans lost 800 casualties to this gunfire,according to prisoners. One enemy battalion was virtually destroyed whennaval gunfire from the east and air strikes from the west pocketed it andheld it under exploding shells, bombs, and strafing fires. [6]

The reconstituted ROK 22d Regiment arrived from Taegu, and about 500men of the ROK naval combat team and its engineer battalion were sent tobuttress the east coast force. [7] All the troops on the east coast werenow reorganized into a new ROK 3d Division.

Beginning on 9 July a succession of American units had performed securitymissions at Yonil Airfield below P'ohang-dong; first the 3d battalion ofthe 19th Infantry, then the 2d Battalion of the 27th Infantry, next the1st Battalion of the 35th Infantry, and that in turn gave way to the 1stBattalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Thus, in the course of two weeks, battalion-size units of all three United States divisionsthen in Korea had constituted a security force in the P'ohang-dong areabehind the ROK 23d Regiment.

Lt. Col. Peter D. Clainos' 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had orders tosupport the ROK troops with fire only. But on 23 July, North Koreans surroundedthe 81-mm. mortar platoon of D Company, forcing it to fight at close range.That same day, C Company on Round Top (Hill 181), at the southern outskirtsof Yongdok, watched in silence as North Korean and ROK troops fought aseesaw battle in its vicinity. That night North Koreans surrounded thehill and C Company troops spent a sleepless night. The next day when theROK's regained temporary possession of Yongdok the 21st Infantry Regimentof the 24th Division replaced Colonel Clainos' battalion in the, blockingmission behind the ROK's at Yongdok. [8]

Despite the savage pounding it received from naval, artillery, and mortarfire and aerial bombardments, the N.K. 5th Division heldon to the hills two miles south of Yongdok. The ROK's adopted a plan ofmaking counter and probing attacks during the day and withdrawing to preparedpositions in an all-around perimeter for the night. The saturation supportfires delivered by the United States Navy, Air Force, and Army day andnight outside this perimeter caused many enemy casualties. Certain keypieces of terrain, such as Hill 181, often changed hands several timesin one day. Unfortunately, many civilians were killed in this area as theytried to move through the lines and were caught by the supporting fires.Just south of Hill 181 and its surrounding rough ground, a small river,the Osipch'on, descends the coastal range to the Sea of Japan. South ofit, sheer mountain walls press the coastal road against the shoreline forten miles in the direction of P'ohang-dong, twenty-five miles away. Ifthe ROK's lost control of the Yongdok area, this bottleneck on the coastalroad would be the scene of the next effort to stop the North Koreans.

At this time the KMAG advisers had serious trouble with "Tiger"Kim, the commander of the ROK 23d Regiment. He was extremely brutal inhis disciplinary methods. In the presence of several advisers he had hispersonal bodyguard shoot a young 1st lieutenant of his regiment whose unithad been surrounded for several days. This incident took place on 26 July.The next day Kim used the butt of an M1 rifle on some of the enlisted menof this unit. The KMAG advisers remonstrated at this action, and in orderto avoid possible personal trouble with Kim they asked for his removal."Tiger" Kim was removed from command of the regiment and thecommander of the 1st Separate Battalion, Colonel Kim, replaced him. [9]

ROK troops regrouped for another desperate counterattack, to be supportedby all available U.N. sea, air, and ground weapons, in an effort to hurlthe North Koreans back to the north of Yongdok. At this time General Walkerrequired hourly reports sent to his headquarters at Taegu. In action preliminary to the main attack, planned for themorning of 27 July, ROK troops during the night of the 26th captured seventeenmachine guns, but took only eight prisoners. The preparatory barrages beganat 0830. Then came the air strikes. The battle that then opened lasteduntil 2 August without letup. On that date at 1800 the ROK 3d Divisionrecaptured Yongdok and pursued the enemy north of the town. North Koreanprisoners said that U.S. naval, artillery, and mortar fire and the airstrikes gave them no rest, day or night. They said that in the two weeks'battle for Yongdok the N.K. 5th Division had lost about 40percent of its strength in casualties. [10]

During the last half of July 1950, this holding battle on the east coastby the ROK 3d Division was the only one that succeeded in all Korea. Itwas made possible by American air, sea, and ground fire power and the physicalfeatures of the east coast, which hampered North Korean freedom of movementand aided effective employment of American fire power.

Of particular note among the battles during the last part of July inthe central mountains was the duel between the N.K. 12th Divisionand the ROK 8th Division for control of Andong and the upper Naktong Rivercrossing there. This series of battles was closely related to the fightingon the east coast and the North Korean efforts to gain control of P'ohang-dongand the east coast corridor to Pusan.

After crossing the upper Han River at Tanyang, the N.K. 12thDivision advanced on the road through Yongju to Andong. The ROK8th Division attacked the 12th on 21 July between the two towns.From then on to the end of the month these two divisions on the road toAndong engaged in one of the bloodiest fights of the first month of thewar.

Just when it was encountering this stubborn resistance from the ROK8th Division, the 12th received orders from the N.K. II Corpsto capture P'ohang-dong by 26 July. This order doubtless was occasionedby the failure of the 5th Division to advance as rapidlyalong the east coast as had been expected. Ever since the invasion began,the N.K. Army Command had criticized its II Corps for failureto meet its schedule of advance. The Army reportedly demoted the IICorps commander, Maj. Gen. Kim Kwang Hyop, to corps chief of staff,about 10 July, replacing him with Lt. Gen. Kim Mu Chong. The order givento the 12th Division was almost impossible to carry out.The distance from Yongju to P'ohang-dong was about seventy-five air miles,and the greater part of the route, that beyond Andong, lay across highmountain ranges traversed only by foot and oxcart trails. Just to marchacross these mountains by 26 July would have been no mean feat. [11]

In an effort to meet the deadline given it for the capture of P'ohang-dong, the N.K. 12th Division resumed daylight marches. U.N.aerial attacks struck it daily. The ROK 8th Division at the same time foughtit almost to a halt. But, despite these difficulties the enemy divisionpressed slowly on toward Andong. At the end of the month it was engagedin a hard battle with the ROK 8th Division for the control of that keytown and the upper Naktong River crossing site.

The battle for Andong lasted five days. The river town finally fellon 1 August. The N.K. Army communiqué for 3 August, broadcast bythe P'yongyang radio and monitored in Tokyo, claimed the capture of Andongon 1 August with 1,500 enemy killed and 1,200 captured. It alleged thatcaptured equipment included 6 105-mm. howitzers, 13 automatic guns, 900rifles, and a large number of vehicles. [12]

The ROK 8th Division, and some elements of the Capital Division whichhad joined it, lost very heavily in these battles. Enemy losses also wereheavy. Prisoners reported that air attacks had killed an estimated 600North Korean soldiers; that the 31st Regiment alone lost600 men in the Andong battles; that the 2d Battalion of thedivision artillery had expended all its ammunition and, rather than beburdened with useless weapons and run the risk of their capture or destruction,it had sent them back to Tanyang; that of the original 30 T34 tanks only19 remained; and, also, that a shell fragment had killed their divisioncommander. This enemy crack division, made up of veterans of the Chinesewars, was so exhausted by the Andong battle that it had no recourse butto rest where it was for several days in early August. [13]

To a considerable extent the reorganization of the ROK Army influencedthe disposition of ROK troops and the U.S. 25th Division along the front.

Throughout the first part of July there had been a continuing effortby American commanders to assemble the surviving men and units of the ROKArmy that had escaped south of the Han River and to reorganize them forcombat operations. Generals Church, Dean, and Walker each took an activeinterest in this necessary objective. As a part of this reorganization, the ROKArmy activated its I Corps and with it directed ROK operations on the rightflank of the U.S. 24th Division in the first part of July. The 1st, 2d,and Capital Divisions had carried the fight for the ROK I Corps in thecentral mountains east of the Seoul-Taejon highway. By the time Taejonfell, these ROK divisions were each reduced to a strength of between 3,000and 3,500 men. The ROK I Corps at that time had only one 3-gun and two4-gun batteries of artillery. The three divisions reportedly each had ten81-mm. mortars without sights. [14]

On 14 July the ROK Army activated its II Corps with headquarters atHamch'ang. It was composed of the 6th and 8th Divisions and the 23d Regiment.This corps controlled ROK operations in the eastern mountains and, to theextent that it could, it tried to control the 23d Regiment on the eastcoast. [15] But this latter effort never amounted to very much.

Finally, on 24 July, the ROK Army reorganized itself with two corpsand five divisions. ROK I Corps controlled the 8th and Capital Divisions;ROK II Corps controlled the 1st and 6th Divisions. The 2d Division wasinactivated and its surviving elements were integrated into the 1st Division. Areconstituted ROK 3d Division was placed under direct ROK Army control.The principal reason for doing this was the division's isolated positionon the east coast, away from effective co-ordinated control by I Corpswith the 8th and Capital Divisions westward across the main Taebaek Range.

The ROK divisions held the east central and eastern parts of the UnitedNations line. To the right (east) of the American troops was, first, theROK II Corps headquarters at Hamch'ang, with the 1st and 6th Divisionson line in that order from west to east. Next, eastward, was I Corps headquartersat Sangju (briefly at Andong), with the 8th and Capital Divisions on linefrom west to east; and, lastly, the 3d Division was on the east coast underdirect ROK Army control. This ROK Army organization and position on lineremained relatively stable for the next two months. [16]

On 26 July, after large numbers of recruits and replacements had enteredthe ROK Army, it had an effective assigned strength of 85,871 men, witha total assigned strength of 94,570. The combat divisions at that timevaried in strength from just under 6,000 to almost 9,000 men. Table 2 showsthe organization and unit strengths of the ROK Army after the reorganization.

On the next major axis west of the Andong road, where at the end ofthe month the N.K. 12th Division was recuperating from itsheavy battles, lay the town of Sangju. It was a crossroads center for allthe mountain roads in that part of Korea. Situated south of the Mun'gyongplateau and the dividing watershed between the Han and the Naktong Rivers,it had a commanding position in the valley of the Naktong, forty-five airmiles northeast up that valley from Taegu. Sangju was a place of both confusionand activity during the third week of July. Refugees and stragglers pouredsouth into and through the town. Many ROK units were retreating to Sangjuand some had passed south through it. Fighting had already been joinedbetween North Koreans and ROK forces for control of the Mun'gyong plateauwhen the U.S. 25th Division received orders from General Walker to concentratethere to bolster ROK defenses of the central mountain corridors. [17] GeneralWalker looked to the 25th Division to help the ROK forces in central Koreaprevent a movement of major enemy forces into the valley of the upper Naktong.

The first action between elements of the 25th Division and enemy forcesappears to have occurred at Yech'on on 20 July. Company K, 24th Infantry,led by 1st Lt. Jasper R. Johnson, entered the town during the afternoon.When other units of the 3d Battalion failed to take a ridge overlookingthe town on the left, he requested and received permission to withdrawfrom the town for the night. [18]

Meeting at the battalion command post, the commanders of the variousunits planned a renewed assault for 0500 the next morning. Artillery andmortars zeroed in as scheduled, and soon the town was in flames. By thistime, however, Yech'on may already have been abandoned by the enemy. AtHamch'ang, Col. Henry G. Fisher, commanding the 35th Infantry, receivedearly that morning an erroneous message that the North Koreans had driventhe 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry from Yech'on. He started for the placeat once. He found the battalion commander about five miles west of thetown, but was dissatisfied with the information that he received from him.Fisher and a small party then drove on into Yech'on, which was ablaze withfires started by American artillery shells. He encountered no enemy orcivilians. The 3d Platoon, 77th Engineer Combat Company, attached to CompanyK, entered the town with the infantrymen and attempted to halt the spreadof flames-unsuccessfully, because of high, shifting winds. By 1300 Yech'onwas secured, and 3d Battalion turned over control to the ROK 18th Regimentof the Capital Division the task of holding the town. The Capital Divisionnow concentrated there the bulk of its forces and opposed the N.K. 8thDivision in that vicinity the remainder of the month. [19]

General Kean and his 25th Division had to guard two main approachesto Sangju if he was to secure the town. First was the main road that crossedthe Mun'gyong plateau and passed through Hamch'ang at the base of the plateauabout fifteen miles due north of Sangju. Next, there was the secondarymountain road that crossed the plateau farther west and, once through themountains, turned east toward Sangju.

On the first and main road, the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, held ablocking position northwest of Hamch'ang, supported by a platoon of tanksfrom A Company, 78th Tank Battalion, and A Battery, 90th Field ArtilleryBattalion. Colonel Fisher was unable to concentrate his two-battalion regimenthere for the defense of Sangju because the 1st Battalion had no soonerarrived on 25 July from P'ohang-dong than it was sent posthaste the nextday to reinforce the 27th Infantry Regiment on the next north-south lineof communications westward. Thus, in effect, one battalion of U.S. troopsstood behind ROK units on the Hamch'ang approach. On the second road, thatleading into Sangju from the west, the 24th Infantry Regiment assembledtwo, and later all three, of its battalions.

The 2d Battalion of the 35th Infantry took up a hill position northwestof Hamch'ang and south of Mun'gyong on the south side of a stream thatflowed past Sangju to the Naktong. On the north side of the stream a ROKbattalion held the front line. Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, Assistant DivisionCommander, insisted that F Company of the battalion should be insertedin the center of the ROK line north of the stream, and this was done overthe strong protests of Colonel Fisher and the battalion commander, Lt.Col. John L. Wilkins. Wilson thought the American troops would strengthenthe ROK defense; Fisher and Wilkins did not want the untried company tobe dependent upon ROK stability in its first engagement. Behind the ROKand F Company positions the ground rose in another hill within small armsrange. Heavy rains had swollen the stream behind the ROK's and F Companyto a torrent that was rolling large boulders along its channel.

On 22 July the North Koreans attacked. The ROK's withdrew from theirpositions on either side of F Company without informing that company oftheir intentions. Soon enemy troops were firing into the back of F Companyfrom the hill behind it. This precipitated an unorganized withdrawal. Theswollen stream prevented F Company from crossing to the south side andthe sanctuary of the 2d Battalion positions. Walking wounded crowded alongthe stream where an effort to get them across failed. Two officers anda noncommissioned officer tied a pair of twisted telephone wires abouttheir bodies and tried to swim to the opposite bank and fasten a line,but each in turn was swept downstream where they floundered ashore a hundredyards away on the same bank from which they had started. Some men drownedin trying to cross the swollen river. The covering fire of a platoon oftanks on the south side held off the enemy and allowed most of the survivorseventually to escape. In this fiasco, F Company lost 6 men killed, 10 wounded,and 21 missing. [20]

The next morning five enemy tanks crossed the river and moved towardHamch'ang. Artillery fire from a battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalionknocked out four of the tanks. The fifth turned back across the river,and there an air strike later destroyed it.

The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, was still in its position when it receivedorders on 23 July to withdraw to a point 5 miles north of Sangju. On the28th the battalion fell back 2 miles more, and the next day it moved toa position south of Sangju. On the last day of July the 35th Infantry was ordered to a blockingposition on a line of hills 8 miles south of Sangju on the Kumch'on road.In eleven days it had fallen back about thirty miles on the Sangju front.In these movements it did little fighting, but executed a series of withdrawalson division orders as the front around it collapsed. [21]

The ROK 6th Division continued its hard-fought action on the road throughthe mountains from Mun'gyong, but gradually it fell back from in frontof the N.K. 1st Division. In the mountains above Hamch'angthe ROK 6th Division on 24 July destroyed 7 enemy T34 tanks. Three dayslater the ROK 1st Division, now relieved northwest of Sangju by the U.S.24th Infantry and redeployed on the Hamch'ang front, reportedly destroyed4 more tanks there with 2.36-inch bazookas and captured 1 tank intact.The decimated remnants of the ROK 2d Division, relieved by the 27th InfantryRegiment on the Hwanggan=Poun road, were incorporated into the ROK 1stDivision. Thus, by 24 July the U.S. 25th Division had taken over from theROK 1st and 2d Divisions the sector from Sangju westward to the Seoul-Taeguhighway, and these ROK troops were moving into the line eastward and northwardfrom Sangju on the Hamch'ang front. [22]

By 27 July all the Mun'gyong divide was in North Korean possession andenemy units were moving into the valley of the upper Naktong in the vicinityof Hamch'ang. Prisoners taken at the time and others captured later saidthat the N.K. 1st Division lost 5,000 casualties in the strugglefor control of the divide, including the division commander who was woundedand replaced. The 13th Division, following the 1st,suffered about 500 casualties below Mun'gyong, but otherwise it was notengaged during this period. [23]

Simultaneously with his appearance on the Hamch'ang road at the southernbase of the Mun'gyong plateau north of Sangju, the enemy approached onthe secondary mountain road to the west. On 22 July, the same day thatF Company of the 35th Infantry came to grief north of Hamch'ang, elementsof the 24th Infantry Regiment had a similar unhappy experience west ofSangju. On that day the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, and elements of theROK 17th Regiment were advancing into the mountains twenty miles northwestof the town. With E Company leading, the battalion moved along the dirtroad into a gorge with precipitous mountain walls. Suddenly, an enemy lightmortar and one or two automatic weapons fired on E Company. It stoppedand the men dispersed along the sides of the road. ROK officers advisedthat the men deploy in an enveloping movement to the right and to the left,but the company commander apparently did not understand. Soon enemy riflefire came in on the dispersed men and E and F Companies began withdrawing in a disorderly manner.

Col. Horton V. White, the regimental commander, heard of the difficultyand drove hurriedly to the scene. He found the battalion coming back downthe road in disorder and most of the men in a state of panic. He finallygot the men under control. The next day the ROK 17th Regiment envelopedthe enemy position that had caused the trouble and captured two light machineguns, one mortar, and about thirty enemy who appeared to be guerrillas.[24] The ROK 17th Regiment fought in the hills for the next two days, makingsome limited gains, and then it moved back to Sangju in the ROK Army reorganizationin progress. This left only the U.S. 24th Infantry Regiment guarding thewest approach to Sangju from the Mun'gyong plateau.

The tendency to panic continued in nearly all the 24th Infantry operationswest of Sangju. Men left their positions and straggled to the rear. Theyabandoned weapons on positions. On one occasion the 3d Battalion withdrewfrom a hill and left behind 12 .30-caliber and 3 .50-caliber machine guns,8 60-mm. mortars, 3 81-mm. mortars, 4 3.5-inch rocket launchers, and 102rifles. On another occasion, L Company took into position 4 officers and105 enlisted men; a few days later, when the company was relieved in itsposition, there were only 17 men in the foxholes. The number of casualtiesand men evacuated for other reasons in the interval had been 1 officerand 17 enlisted men, leaving 3 officers and 88 enlisted men unaccountedfor. As the relieved unit of 17 men moved down off the mountain it swelledin numbers to 1 officer and 35 enlisted men by the time it reached thebottom. [25]

By 26 July the 24th Infantry had all three of its battalions concentratedin battle positions astride the road ten miles west of Sangju. Elementsof the N.K. 15th Division advancing on this road had clearedthe mountain passes and were closing with the regiment. From 26 July onto the end of the month the enemy had almost constant contact with the24th Infantry, which was supported by the 159th and 64th Field ArtilleryBattalions and one battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion. [26]

The general pattern of 24th Infantry action during the last days ofJuly was to try to hold positions during the day and then withdraw at night.On the evening of 29 July the 1st Battalion got out of hand. During theday the battalion had suffered about sixty casualties from enemy mortarfire. As the men were preparing their perimeter defense for the night,an inexplicable panic seized them and the battalion left its positions.Colonel White found himself, the 77th Combat Engineer Company, and a batteryof the 159th Field Artillery Battalion all that was left in the front line.He had to reorganize the battalion himself. That night the supporting artilleryfired 3,000 rounds, part of it direct fire, in holding back the North Koreans.

In these last days west of Sangju, Maj. John R. Woolridge, the regimentalS-1, set up a check point half a mile west of the town and stopped every vehicle coming from the west, taking offstragglers. He averaged about seventy-five stragglers a day and, on thelast day, he collected 150. [27]

By 30 July, the 24th Infantry had withdrawn to the last defensible highground west of Sangju, three miles from the town. The regiment had deterioratedso badly by this time that General Kean recalled the 1st Battalion, 35thInfantry, and placed it in blocking positions behind the 24th Infantry.The next day North Koreans again pressed against the regiment and forcedin the outpost line of resistance. In this action, 1st Lt. Leon A. Gilbert,commanding A Company, quit the outpost line with about fifteen men. ColonelWhite and other ranking officers ordered Lieutenant Gilbert back into position,but he refused to go, saying that he was scared. The senior noncommissionedofficer returned with the men to their positions. [28]

Finally, during the night of 31 July the 24th Infantry Regiment withdrewthrough Sangju. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, covered the withdrawal.In eleven days of action in the Sangju area the regiment had suffered 323battle casualties-27 killed, 293 wounded, 3 missing. [29]

In reaching the upper Naktong valley at the end of July, the enemy divisionsengaged in this part of the North Korean drive southward had not gone unharmed.The N.K. 1st Division in battling across the Mun'gyong plateauagainst the ROK 6th Division not only suffered great losses in the groundbattle but also took serious losses from U.N. aerial attack. Prisonersreported that by the time it reached Hamch'ang at the end of July it wasdown to 3,000 men. The N.K. 15th Division, according to prisoners,also lost heavily to artillery and mortar fire in its drive on Sangju againstROK troops and the U.S. 24th Infantry Regiment, and was down to about halfstrength, or approximately 5,000 men, at the end of July. In contrast,the N.K. 13th Division had bypassed Hamch'ang on the westand, save for minor skirmishes with ROK troops and the 2d Battalion, 35thInfantry, it had not been engaged and consequently had suffered relativelyfew casualties. [30]

At first General MacArthur and the staff of the Far East Command hadexpected that the 24th and 25th Divisions in support of the ROK Army wouldbe able to check the North Korean advance. Based on this expectation, initialpreliminary planning called for a third United States division, the 1stCavalry, to land in the rear of the enemy forces and, together with a counterattackfrom in front by the combined American and ROK forces, to crush and destroythe North Korean Army.

In furtherance of this plan, the Far East Command called Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, Commanding General, 1stCavalry Division, to General MacArthur's headquarters on 6 July and informedhim of plans for the 1st Cavalry Division to make an amphibious landingat Inch'on. From this briefing General Gay went to the G-2, Far East Commandoffice, where he was told, "You must expedite preparations to theutmost limit because if the landing is delayed all that the 1st CavalryDivision will hit when it lands will be the tail end of the 24th Divisionas it passes north through Seoul." [31]

The transfer to the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, in strengtheningthem for their combat missions in Korea, of approximately 750 noncommissionedofficers from the 1st Cavalry Division had weakened the latter. It hadbeen stripped of practically every first grader except the first sergeantsof companies and batteries.

Between 12 and 14 July the division loaded on ships in the Yokohamaarea. But, by this time, the steady enemy successes south of the Han Riverhad changed the objective from a landing in the enemy's rear at Inch'onto a landing on the east coast of Korea at P'ohang-dong, a fishing townsixty air miles northeast of Pusan. Its mission was to reinforce at oncethe faltering 24th Division. A landing at P'ohang-dong would not congeststill further the Pusan port facilities, which were needed to land suppliesfor the troops already in action; also, from P'ohang-dong the divisioncould move promptly to the Taejon area in support of the 24th Division.The date of the landing was set for 18 July. [32] The command ship Mt.McKinley and final elements of the first lift sailed for Korea on15 July in Task Force 90, commanded by Rear Adm. James H. Doyle. The landingat P'ohang-dong was unopposed. Lead elements of the 8th Cavalry Regimentwere ashore by 0610 18 July, and the first troops of the 5th Cavalry Regimentcame in twenty minutes later. Typhoon Helene swept over the Korean coastand prevented landing of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the 82d Field ArtilleryBattalion until 22 July. For three days ships could not be unloaded atPusan and Eighth Army rations dropped to one day's supply. [33]

Even though it had received 1,450 replacements before it left Japan,100 of them from the Eighth Army stockade, the division was understrengthwhen it landed in Korea and, like the preceding divisions, it had only2 battalions in the regiments, 2 firing batteries in the artillery battalions,and 1 tank company (light M24 tanks).

On 19 July, the 5th Cavalry Regiment started toward Taejon. The nextday the 8th Cavalry Regiment followed by rail and motor, and closed inan assembly area east of Yongdong that evening. Brig. Gen. Charles D. Palmer,division artillery commander, commanded these two forward regiments. On22 July the 8th Cavalry Regiment relieved the 21st Infantry, 24th Division,in its positions at Yongdong and the 1st Cavalry Division thereby assumedresponsibility for blocking the enemy along the main Taejon-Taegu corridor. [34]

In a conference at Taegu General Walker gave General Gay brief instructions.In substance, Walker told Gay: "Protect Yongdong. Remember there areno friendly troops behind you. You must keep your own back door open. Youcan live without food but you cannot last long without ammunition, andunless the Yongdong-Taegu road is kept open you will soon be without ammunition."In the week that followed, these words of Walker's rang constantly in GeneralGay's ears. [35]

Leaving Taegu, General Gay joined his troops and General Palmer at Yongdong.Colonel MacLean, from the Eighth Army G-3 Section, was present and hadgiven instructions that one battalion should be posted four miles northwestof Yongdong on the south side of the Kum River, and that another battalionshould be placed two miles southwest of Yongdong. The first would coverthe approach along the main Taejon-Taegu highway, the second the approachon the Chosan-ni-Muju-Kumsan road. General Palmer had protested this dispositionof troops to Colonel MacLean on the ground that the enemy could encircleand cut off one battalion at a time and that neither battalion could supportthe other. Palmer wanted to place the 1st Cavalry Division on a line ofhills just east of Yongdong and then have the 24th Division withdraw throughit. General Gay agreed with General Palmer and stated that he could notcomply with Colonel MacLean's instructions unless Eighth Army confirmedthem over the telephone. The army headquarters did confirm the orders,and the two battalions of the 8th Cavalry Regiment went into the two blockingpositions, the 1st Battalion on the Taejon road northwest of Yongdong andthe 2d Battalion southwest of Yongdong. General Gay placed the 5th CavalryRegiment on the high ground east of the town in a blocking position. [36]

The strength of the Eighth Army at this time, with the 1st Cavalry Divisionin the line, was about 39,000 men. Less than three weeks earlier, whenthere were no American troops in Korea, such a number would have seemeda large force indeed. [37]

The enemy paused but briefly after the capture of Taejon. After a day'srest in that town, which it had helped to capture, the N.K. 3d Divisiondeparted the city on 22 July, advancing down the main highway toward Taegu.The next morning, 23 July, the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, in front of Yongdong, reported it had destroyed threeenemy T34 tanks with 3.5-inch rocket launchers in its first use of thatweapon. [38] The enemy division was closing with the 1st Cavalry Divisionfor the battle for Yongdong.

During 23 July the 7th and 9th Regiments of theN.K. 3d Division began their attack on the Yongdong positions.The enemy made his first penetration southwest of Yongdong, establishinga roadblock a mile and a half behind the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, atthe same time other units heavily engaged the 1st Battalion northwest ofYongdong in frontal attack.

The next day four different attempts by three American light tanks failedto dislodge the enemy behind the 2d Battalion, and Lt. Col. Eugene J. Field,the 2d Battalion commander, was wounded at the roadblock. General Palmersent the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and the 16th ReconnaissanceCompany toward the cutoff battalion. By noon, enemy troops were attackingthe 99th and 61st Field Artillery Battalions which were supporting the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, indicatingthat the infiltration had been extensive. [39]

On the other approach road, northwest of Yongdong, heavy automatic firefrom quad-50's, 37-mm. fire from A Battery of the 92d Antiaircraft ArtilleryBattalion, and artillery fire from the 77th Field Artillery Battalion helpedthe 1st Battalion there to repel enemy attacks.

The large numbers of Korean refugees crowding the Yongdong area undoubtedlyhelped the enemy infiltrate the 1st Cavalry Division positions. On 24 July,for example, a man dressed in white carrying a heavy pack, and accompaniedby a woman appearing to be pregnant, came under suspicion. The couple wassearched and the woman's assumed pregnancy proved to be a small radio hiddenunder her clothes. She used this radio for reporting American positions.Eighth Army tried to control the refugee movement through the Korean police,permitting it only during daylight hours and along predetermined routes.[40]

By the morning of 25 July enemy forces had infiltrated the positionsof the 1st Cavalry Division so thoroughly that they forced a withdrawal.Northwest of Yongdong, Lt. Col. Robert W. Kane's 1st Battalion executedan orderly and efficient withdrawal, covered by the fire of the Heavy MortarCompany and the two batteries of Lt. Col. William A. Harris' 77th FieldArtillery Battalion. The mortar men finally lost their mortars and foughtas infantry in the withdrawal. [41]

Meanwhile, the situation worsened on the road southwest of Yongdong.Concentrated artillery support-with the shells falling so close to thetd Battalion positions that they wounded four men-together with an attackby the battalion, briefly opened the enemy roadblock at 0430, s5 July,and the bulk of the battalion escaped to Yongdong. But F Company, 8th Cavalry,the 16th Reconnaissance Company, and the 1st Platoon, A Company, 71st TankBattalion, at the rear of the column were cut off. Only four of elevenlight tanks broke through the enemy positions. Crews abandoned the otherseven tanks and walked over the hills in a two days' journey as part ofa group of 219 men, most of them from F Company. All equipment except individualarms was abandoned by this group. Others escaped in the same manner. [42]

On this same road, but closer to Yongdong, the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry,in trying to help the cutoff units of the 8th Cavalry, ran into trouble.Through some error, its F Company went to the wrong hill and walked intoa concentration of enemy soldiers. Only twenty-six men returned. Altogether,the 5th Cavalry Regiment had 275 casualties on 25 July. [43]

The N.K. 3d Division used against the 1st Cavalry Divisionat Yongdong essentially the same tactics it had employed against the 24thDivision at Taejon-a holding attack frontally, with the bulk of its forceenveloping the American left flank and establishing strongly held roadblocksbehind the front positions. The enemy division entered Yongdong the nightof 25 July; at least one unit was in the town by 2000. The North Koreansexpected a counterattack and immediately took up defensive positions atthe eastern edge of the town. Prisoners reported later that the divisionsuffered about 2,000 casualties, mostly from artillery fire, in the attackon Yongdong on 24-25 July. [44] This brought it down to about 5,000 men,approximately half-strength.

Closely related to the Yongdong action was the enemy advance southwardon the next road eastward, the Poun-Hwanggan road. The N.K. 2d Division,arriving too late on the east of Taejon to help in the attack on that city,turned toward Poun. Unless checked it would pass through that town andcome out on the main Seoul-Pusan highway at Hwanggan, about ten miles eastof Yongdong. This would place it in the rear of the 1st Cavalry Divisionon the latter's main supply road.

The task of defending this road fell to the 27th Infantry Regiment ofthe U.S. 25th Division. Upon first arriving in Korea that regiment wentto the Uisong area, thirty-five air miles north of Taegu. On 13 July itmoved from there to Andong to support ROK troops, but before it enteredaction in the heavy battles then taking place in that area it suddenlyreceived orders to move to Sangju. En route to that place it received stillother orders to change its destination to Hwanggan, and it closed therein an assembly area the night of 22-23 July. General Walker had begun thequick and improvised shifting of troops to meet emergencies that was tocharacterize his defense of the Pusan Perimeter. The 27th Infantry's missionat Hwanggan was to relieve the decimated ROK troops retreating down thePoun road. [45]

In carrying out Eighth Army's orders to block the Poun road, ColonelMichaelis assigned the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry the task of makingcontact with the enemy. On the morning of 23 July, Lt. Col. Gilbert J.Check moved the 1st Battalion northward toward Poun from the Hwanggan assemblyarea. He took up defensive positions in the evening near the village ofSangyong-ni, south of Poun. The battalion assumed responsibility for thatsector at 1700 after ROK troops fell back through its position. [46] ColonelCheck was unable to obtain from the retreating ROK troops any informationon the size of the North Korean force following them or how close it was.

That night he sent 1st Lt. John A. Buckley of A Company with a 30-man patrol northward to locate the enemy. Near Poun Buckley saw an enemycolumn approaching. He quickly disposed his patrol on hills bordering bothsides of the road, and, when the column was nearly abreast, opened fireon it with all weapons. This fire apparently caused the enemy advancedunit to believe it had encountered a major position, for it held back untildaylight. When the enemy turned back, Buckley and his patrol returned tothe 1st Battalion lines, arriving there at 0400, 24 July. Six men weremissing. [47]

Check's 1st Battalion prepared to receive an attack. It came at 0630,24 July, shortly after daybreak in a heavy fog that enabled the North Koreansto approach very close to the battalion positions before they were observed.Two rifle companies, one on either side of the road on low ridges, heldthe forward positions. Enemy mortar and small arms fire fell on the menthere, and then tanks appeared at the bend in the road and opened firewith cannon and machine guns as they approached. Enemy infantry followedthe tanks. Although the two rifle companies stopped the North Korean infantry,the tanks penetrated their positions and fired into the battalion commandpost which was behind B Company. This tank fire destroyed several vehiclesand killed the medical officer. Capt. Logan E. Weston, A Company commander,armed himself with a bazooka and knocked out one of the tanks within theposition. In this close action, tank fire killed a man near Weston andthe concussion of the shell explosion damaged Weston's ears so that hecould not hear. Weston refused to leave the fight, and Colonel Check laterhad to order him to the rear for medical treatment.

On the right (north) of the road the enemy overran the battalion observationpost and B Company's outpost line. This high ground changed hands threetimes during the day. While the infantry fight was in progress, and shortlyafter the first tank penetration, five more T34's came around the roadbend toward the 71st Battalion. When the first tanks appeared Colonel Checkhad called for an air strike. Now, at this propitious moment, three F-80jet planes arrived and immediately dived on the approaching second groupof tanks, destroying 3 of them with 5-inch rockets. Altogether, bazooka,artillery, and air strikes knocked out 6 enemy tanks during the morning,either within or on the edge of the 1st Battalion position. In this, itsfirst engagement with American troops, the N.K. 2d Divisionlost all but 2 of the 8 tanks that had been attached to it a few days earlierat Chongju. [48]

Late in the evening after dark the 1st Battalion disengaged and withdrewthrough the 2d Battalion immediately behind it. Both Check and the regimentalcommander, Colonel Michaelis, expected the enemy to encircle the 1st Battalionposition during the night if it stayed where it was.

The North Koreans apparently were unaware of the 1st Battalion withdrawal,for the next morning, 25 July, two enemy battalions in a double envelopment came in behind its positionsof the evening before but in front of Maj. Gordon E. Murch's 2d Battalion.There they were surprised and caught in the open by the combined fire ofAmerican tanks, artillery, and mortar, and the 2d Battalion's automaticand small arms fire. The North Koreans suffered severely in this action.Surviving remnants of the two enemy battalions withdrew in confusion. The2d Battalion took about thirty prisoners. [49]

Despite this costly setback, the enemy division pushed relentlesslyforward, and that afternoon elements of it were flanking the regimentalposition. Colonel Michaelis issued an order about 2200 for another withdrawalto high ground near Hwanggan. The withdrawal started near midnight withheavy fighting still in progress on the right flank. Major Murch took controlof all tanks and put them on line facing north. There the nine tanks ofA Company, 78th Tank Battalion, fired into visible enemy troops approachingon the road. Enemy mortar fire, estimated to be eight or ten rounds a minute,fell along the battalion line and the road behind it. F Company and thenine tanks covered the 2d Battalion withdrawal. [50]

The next day, 26 July, the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry,on the 27th Infantry's right flank eased the precarious situation. Butthe following day the regimental left flank came under attack where a largegap existed between C Company, the left-hand (west) unit of the 27th Infantry,and the 7th Cavalry Regiment, the nearest unit of the 1st Cavalry Division.C Company lost and regained a peak three times during the day. More than40 casualties reduced its strength to approximately 60 men. B Company alsolost heavily in action, falling to a strength of about 85 men. By the morningof 28 July the enemy had penetrated the 1st Battalion's line, forcing CCompany to withdraw. [51]

At this point Colonel Michaelis went to the 1st Cavalry Division commandpost in Hwanggan and asked General Gay for permission to withdraw his hard-pressedregiment through that division. General Gay telephoned Colonel Landrum,Eighth Army Chief of Staff, and described the situation. He asked if heshould attack in an effort to relieve the enemy pressure on the 27th Infantry,or if that regiment should withdraw into the 1st Cavalry Division's area,move south to Kumch'on, and then turn toward Sangju to rejoin the 25thDivision. Colonel Landrum called back later and said, "Let Mike withdrawthrough you." Colonel Collier drove from Taegu to Hwanggan to discussthe situation with General Gay who said, "We are in what they calla military mousetrap." [52]

Before dawn, 29 July, the 27th Infantry Regiment withdrew through the1st Cavalry Division lines at Hwanggan to a position about a mile eastof Kumch'on. That afternoon Colonel Michaelis received orders from EighthArmy to move to Waegwan on the Naktong River near Taegu, as army reserve,instead of joining the 25th Division in the Sangju area.

In its five days of delaying action on the Poun-Hwanggan road, the 27thInfantry Regiment lost 53 men killed, 221 wounded, and 49 missing, a totalof 323 battle casualties. The N.K. 2d Division suffered heavilyduring this time, some estimates placing its loss above 3,000 men. [53]

During the battle for Yongdong the 7th Cavalry Regiment headquartersand the 2d Battalion arrived from P'ohang-dong and took up a position westof Kumch'on. Reports reached them the night of 25-26 July of enemy gainsin the 27th Infantry sector northward, which increased the uneasiness ofthe untested staff and troops. After midnight there came a report thatthe enemy had achieved a breakthrough. Somehow, the constant pressure underwhich the 27th Infantry fought its delaying action on the Poun road hadbecome magnified and exaggerated. The 7th Cavalry Regiment headquartersimmediately decided to arouse all personnel and withdraw. During the withdrawalthe 2d Battalion, an untried unit, scattered in panic. That evening 119of its men were still missing. [54]

In this frantic departure from its position on 26 July, the 2d Battalionleft behind a switchboard, an emergency lighting unit, and weapons of alltypes. After daylight truck drivers and platoon sergeants returned to thescene and recovered 14 machine guns, 9 radios, 120 M1 rifles, 26 carbines,7 BAR's, and 6 60-mm. mortars. [55]

While this untoward incident was taking place in their rear, other elementsof the 1st Cavalry Division held their defensive positions east of Yongdong.The 7th Regiment of the N.K. 3d Division, meanwhile,started southwest from Yongdong on the Muju road in a sweeping flank movementthrough Chirye against Kumch'on, twenty air miles east-ward. That night,elements of the enemy division in Yongdong attacked the 1st Cavalry troopseast of the town. Four enemy tanks and an infantry force started this actionby driving several hundred refugees ahead of them through American minefields. Before daybreak the 1st Cavalry Division had repulsed the attack.[56]

Patrols reported to General Gay's headquarters that enemy troops weremoving around the division's left flank in the direction of Chirye. Onhis right flank at the same time there was a question whether the 27thInfantry could hold. These developments caused General Gay to decide thatalthough he was under no immediate enemy pressure he would have to withdrawor his division would be cut off from Taegu. Accordingly, he ordered awithdrawal to the vicinity of Kumch'on where he considered the terrainexcellent for defense. This withdrawal began on 29 July after the 27th Infantry had passed east through the division's lines. [57]

The 1st Cavalry Division took up new defensive positions around Kumch'on,an important road center thirty air miles northwest of Taegu. The 8th CavalryRegiment went into position astride the Sangju road north of the town;the 5th Cavalry blocked the Chirye road southwest of it; the 7th CavalryRegiment remained in its Hwanggan position until the other units had withdrawn,and then it fell back to a position on the Yongdong road about six milesnorthwest of Kumch'on.

The enemy flanking movement under way to the southwest through the Chiryearea threatened the division's rear and communications with Taegu. EighthArmy strengthened the 1st Cavalry Division against this threat by attachingto it the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry. This battalion had the mission ofestablishing a roadblock ten miles southwest of Kumch'on near Hawan-nion the Chirye road. [58] This proved to be a timely and wise move, for,on this very day, the enemy 7th Regiment began arriving atChirye, only a few miles farther down the road.

That morning, 29 July, a platoon-sized patrol of the 16th ReconnaissanceCompany under Lt. Lester Lauer drove southwest through Chirye. Later inthe morning, Korean police informed Lauer that an enemy battalion was inChirye. He radioed this information to the Reconnaissance Company and askedfor instructions. The company commander, Capt, Charles V. H. Harvey, decidedto take another platoon to the assistance of the one beyond Chirye. Heset out immediately from Kumch'on with the platoon and fourteen South Koreanpolice. At the outskirts of Chirye this force surprised and killed threeenemy soldiers. Beyond Chirye the little column drew scattered rifle fire.The two platoons joined forces at noon and started back.

In the northern part of Chirye, which Harvey's column entered cautiously,the lead vehicles came upon a partially built roadblock from which an estimatedenemy platoon opened fire on the column, Harvey ordered his little columnto smash through the roadblock. The M39 vehicle pushed aside the wagonand truck that constituted the partially built block, but only one jeepwas able to follow it through. Enemy machine gun fire disabled the nextvehicle in line; thus the northern exit from Chirye was closed. [59] Severalhundred enemy were now in view, moving to surround the patrol.

The patrol pulled back to the south edge of town, set up three 81-mm.mortars, and began firing on the enemy machine gun positions. Cpl. HarryD. Mitchell, although wounded four times and bleeding profusely, stayedwith his mortar and fired it until his ammunition was expended. CaptainHarvey early in the fight had received a bullet through one hand, and nowmachine gun fire struck him again, this time cutting his jugular vein.He did not respond to first aid treatment and died in a few minutes. His last order was for the company to withdraw.

Three officers and forty-one enlisted men, abandoning their vehiclesand heavier equipment, gained the nearest hill. They walked all night-anestimated thirty-five miles-and reached 1st Cavalry Division lines thenext morning. The 16th Reconnaissance Company in this incident lost 2 killed,3 wounded, and 11 missing.

The Chirye action made clear that a strong enemy force was approachingthe rear of, or passing behind, the 1st Cavalry Division positions at Kumch'on.The next day, 30 July, General Gay ordered the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry;the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry; and the 99th Field Artillery Battalionto Chirye. This strong force was able to enter the town, but the enemyheld the hills around it. The next day North Koreans shelled Chirye, forcingthe Americans to withdraw to a position northeast of the town. [60] Theenemy 8th Regiment together with its artillery now joinedthe other North Koreans already at Chirye. This meant that the bulk ofthe division was engaged in the enveloping move.

On 31 July the N.K. 3d Division was closing on Kumch'on.About daylight a squad of North Koreans infiltrated into the command postof the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1,000 yards from the 1st CavalryDivision command post, and killed four men and wounded six others. Amongthe latter was the battalion executive officer who died subsequently ofhis wounds. The 7th Cavalry also came under attack. But in pressing forwardthe North Koreans exposed their tanks. Air and ground fire power reportedlydestroyed thirteen of them and set six more on fire. [61]

During its first ten days of action in Korea the 1st Cavalry Divisionhad 916 battle casualties-78 killed, 419 wounded, and 419 missing. [62]

The N.K. 3d Division in forcing the 1st Cavalry Divisionfrom Yongdong and back on Kumch'on apparently suffered nearly 2,000 casualties,which reduced it to a strength of about 5,000 men. Nevertheless, it hadeffectively and quickly driven the 1st Cavalry Division toward the Naktong.For its operations in the Yongdong-Kumch'on area the N.K. 3d Divisionreceived the honorary title of Guards. [63]

On Wednesday, 26 July, Eighth Army had issued an operational directiveindicating that the army would move to prepared positions, stabilize thefront line, and maintain a position from which it could initiate offensiveaction. The time of the movement was to be announced later. During thewithdrawal, units were to maintain contact with the enemy. [64] Three dayslater, on 29 July, General Walker issued his much discussed "standor die" order and seemingly ruled out the previously announced withdrawal. The actual withdrawal of EighthArmy behind the Naktong River in the first days of August further confusedthe issue.

What prompted General Walker to issue his 29 July "stand or die"order?

For several days both the 25th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry Divisionshad been withdrawing steadily in the face of North Korean attacks, oftenin circumstances that seemed not to justify it, and with troops in panicand out of control. General Walker was disappointed and upset over theperformance of the 25th Division in the Sangju area and he made this feelingknown to General Kean, the division commander. [65]

General Walker was also disappointed over the inability of the 1st CavalryDivision to check the advance of the enemy on the Taejon-Taegu axis. Thiswas apparent on the afternoon on 29 July when he visited the division commandpost in a little schoolhouse at Kumch'on. He questioned the withdrawalsand ordered that there be no more. General Gay replied that he himselfdid not know whether the withdrawals had been sound, but that he had fearedhis communications to the rear would be cut. General Gay had served asChief of Staff for General Patton's Third Army in Europe in World War II.This, his initial experience in Korea, was a defensive operation and, ashe has since said, "he didn't know what to do about it." Andalways General Walker's earlier admonition to him in Taegu rang in hisears. [66]

General Walker himself was a most determined commander. His bulldogtenacity became a byword in Korea and it was one of the decisive factorsin the summer battles of 1950. These characteristics caused him to smartall the more under the poor showing of many of the American units. He understoodwell the great problem of maintaining morale in his command at a time whenEighth Army was retreating rapidly toward its base of supply and, unlesschecked, would soon have its back to the sea.

On 26 July, the day Eighth Army issued its warning order for a plannedwithdrawal to a defensive position, General Walker telephoned General MacArthur'sheadquarters in Tokyo. General Almond, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, tookthe call. General Walker asked for authority to move Eighth Army headquartersfrom Taegu to Pusan immediately for security of the army communicationsequipment which was virtually irreplaceable if destroyed or lost. He saidthe enemy was approaching too close to Taegu for its safety there. Therewas no indication in this conversation that General Walker contemplatedhaving the army's tactical units themselves fall back on Pusan. The withdrawalsto a planned position Walker then had in mind would bring the enemy tothe Naktong River. General Almond told Walker over the telephone that hewould transmit the request to General MacArthur, but that he personallythought such a move at that time would have a very bad effect on EighthArmy units and

[65] Interv, author with Lt Col Paul F. Smith 1 Oct 52; Ltr, Landrumto

author, recd 23 Nov 53; Collier, MS review comments, Mar 58.

[66] Ltr. Gay to author, 24 Aug 53.

also on the ROK troops. It might lead to the belief that Eighth Armycould not stay in Korea and might be the forerunner of a general debacle.[67]

At the conclusion of the telephone conversation with Walker, GeneralAlmond related the substance of it to General MacArthur, strongly recommendingthat the latter fly to Korea at once-the next day-to talk with Walker.Almond said he felt the situation in Korea was critical and demanded thepersonal attention of the Far East commander. MacArthur said he would thinkabout it. Half an hour later he directed Almond to arrange for the flightto Korea the next morning. Almond notified Walker that evening of the projectedtrip.

Thursday morning early, 27 July, the Bataan departed Haneda Airfieldand landed at Taegu about 1000. A small group of officers, including GeneralAlmond, accompanied MacArthur. Met by Generals Walker and Partridge andColonel Landrum, the party went directly to Eighth Army headquarters.

During a ninety-minute conference between General MacArthur and GeneralWalker only one other person was present-General Almond. In this lengthyconversation General MacArthur never mentioned Walker's request of theday before, nor did he in any way criticize Walker. But he did emphasizethe necessity of Eighth Army standing its ground. He said withdrawals mustcease. Later, after lunch and in the presence of several members of thearmy staff, MacArthur said there would be no evacuation from Korea-thatthere would be no Korean Dunkerque. He praised the 24th Division and theROK Capital Division. [68]

Two days later, on Saturday, 29 July, General Walker visited the 25thDivision command post at Sangju. There he conferred with General Kean andafterward spoke to the division staff and issued his order to hold theline. The press widely reported this as a "stand or die" orderto Eighth Army. A paraphrase of Walker's talk, recorded in notes takenat the time, gives a clear version of what he said:

General Walker said much the same thing to his other division commandersat this time, but he did not repeat it to the other division staffs.

General Walker's words reached down quickly to every soldier, with varyingresults. Many criticized the order because they thought it impossible toexecute. One responsible officer with troops at the time seems to haveexpressed this viewpoint, saying that the troops interpreted it as meaning,"Stay and die where you are." They neither understood nor acceptedthis dictum in a battle situation where the enemy seldom directed his maineffort at their front but moved around the flanks to the rear when, generally,there were no friendly units on their immediate flanks. [70]

A contrary viewpoint about the order was expressed by a regimental commanderwho said he and the men in his command had a great sense of relief whenthe order reached them. They felt the day of withdrawals was over, and"a greater amount of earth came out with each shovelful" whenthe troops dug in. [71]

Whatever the individual viewpoint about the order might have been, GeneralWalker was faced with the fact that soon there would be no place to goin the next withdrawal except into the sea. And it must be said, too, thatthe troops very often were not fighting in position until they were threatenedwith encirclement-they left their positions long before that time had arrived.It was actually this condition to which General Walker had addressed hisstrong words. But they did not immediately change the course of events.

Two days after Walker had spoken at Sangju, the 25th Division orderedits troops to withdraw to positions three miles east of the town-anotherwithdrawal. On the Kumch'on front an observer saw elements of the 1st CavalryDivision come off their positions-leaving behind heavy equipment-load intotrucks, and once again move to the rear. [72]

A New York Times article on General Walker's talk to the 25thDivision staff commented that it apparently ruled out the possibility ofa strategic withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter. William H. Lawrence of theNew York Times asked General Walker if he thought the battle hadreached a critical point. General Walker replied, "very certainly,very definitely." The next day the Times ran an editorial headed, "Crisis in Korea." It said the "criticalpoint in the defense of Korea has already been reached or will shortlybe upon us. For five weeks we have been trading space for time. The spaceis running out for us. The time is running out for our enemies." [73]

On 30 July General Walker softened somewhat the impact of his recentorder and statements by expressing confidence that the United States wouldhold "until reinforcements arrive" and that "ultimate victorywill be ours." But, he added, the simple truth was that the "warhad reached its critical stage." [74]

A few days later, Hanson W. Baldwin, the military critic of the NewYork Times, referred to Walker's "stand or die" orderas a "well merited rebuke to the Pentagon, which has too often disseminateda soothing syrup of cheer and sweetness and light since the fighting began."[75] It is clear that by the end of July the reading public in the UnitedStates should have realized that the country was in a real war, that theoutcome was in doubt, and that many uncertainties lay ahead.

The optimistic forecasts of the first days of the war as to the Americanmilitary strength needed to drive the invaders northward had now givenway to more realistic planning. By 22 July, some Eighth Army staff officershad even suggested that it might be necessary to deploy ground troops inKorea until the spring of 1951, to accomplish the objectives stated inthe U.N. Security Council resolutions. [76]

Notes

[1] Col Rollins S. Emmerich, MS review comments, 30 Nov 57; Interv, author with Darrigo (KMAG adviser to ROK 17th Regt, Jul-Aug 50), 5 Aug 53.

[2] Emmerich, MS review comments, 30 Nov 57.

[3] 159th FA Bn WD (25th Div), 17 Jul 50.

[4] Emmerich, MS review comments, 30 Nov 57.

[6] EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 20-24 Jul 50; EUSAK POR 26, 21 Jul 50; GHQ FEC Sitrep, 21 Jul 50; 35th Inf Regt WD, Unit Rpt, 1st Bn, 22 Jul 50; 159th FA Bn WD. 23-24 Jul 50; Emmerich, MS review comments, 30 Nov 57; Karig, et al., Battle Report: The War in Korea, p. 101.

[7] EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 24 Jul 50; GHQ FEC G-3 Opn Rpt 30, 24 Jul 50 and 31, 25 Jul 50

[8] EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 16-22 Jul 50; Ibid., Summ, 13-31 Jul 50; Clainos, Notes for author, May 1954; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 1533, 230935 Jul 50.

[9] Emmerich, MS review comments, 30 Nov 57.

[10] EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 27 Jul 50 and 3 Aug 50; 159th FA Bn (25th Div) WD, 27 Jul 50; GHQ UNC G-3 Opn Rpts 36 and 37, 30-31 Jul, and 40, 3 Aug 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 42; Emmerich, MS review comments, 30 Nov 57.

[11] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), p. 45 G-2 PW Interrog file, interrog of Col Lee Hak Ku; FEC, telecon TT3559, 21 Jul 50.

[12] New York Times, August 4, 1950.

[13] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), pp. 45-46; GHQ UNC G-3 Opn Rpt 37, 31 Jul 50; FEC telecon to DA TT3597, 30 Jul 50; TT3600, 31 Jul 50; TT3605, 1 Aug 50.

[14] 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, 16-20 Jul 50, entry 148, Rpt of Opns with I Corps, ROK Army.

[15] GHQ FEC G-3 Opn Rpt 22, 16 Jul 50.

[16] GHQ UNC Sitrep, 27 Jul 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Rpt, 24 Jul 50, and G-3 Jnl, 25 Jul 50. The reorganization wag effective 241800 Jul 50.

[17] 24th Inf Regt WD, 17-20 Jul 50: 35th Inf Regt WD, Narr, 19-20 Jul 50.

[18] Interv, author with Capt Johnson, 11 Jul 52.

[19] Fisher, MS review comments, 27 Oct 57; 35th Inf WD and 24th Inf WD, 20-21 Jul 50.

[20] 35th Inf Regt WD, 22 Jul 50; Fisher, MS review comments, 27 Oct 57.

[21] 35th Inf Regt WD, 23-31 Jul 50; 25th Div POR 28, 23 Jul 50; 25th Div WD, Narr Rpt, 8-31 Jul 50; 35th Inf Opn Instr, 25 Jul 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 104 (N.K. 13th Div), p. 60.

[22] FEC telecons with DA, TT3566, 23 Jul 50; TT3567, 24 Jul 50; TT3577, 25 Jul 50: TT3579, 26 Jul 50; ATIS Supp, Enemy Docs, Issue 1, pp. 42-48, Battle Rpts 23 Jun-3 Aug 50, by NA unit, Ok Chae Min and Kim Myung Kap; 34th Div WD, G-2 Sec, entry 1616, 271900 Jul 50.

[23] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 3 (N.K. 1st Div), pp. 32-33; Ibid., Issue 104 (N.K. 13th Div), p. 60.

[24] 4th Inf Regt WD, 22 Jul 50; 25th Div WD, Incl 3, 22 Jul 50; EUSAK IG Rept on 24th Inf Regt, 1950. testimony of bn and regtl off, 2d Bn and 24th Inf Regt.

[25] EUSAK IG Rpt, 24th Inf Regt, 1950.

[26] 24th Inf Regt WD, 23-26 Jul 50; 159th FA Bn WD, Jul 50.

[27] EUSAK IG Rpt, 24th Inf Regt, 1950; 24th Inf WD, 29 Jul 50; 159th FA Bn WD, 29-30 Jul 50.

[28] 24th Inf WD, 30-31 Jul 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, Msg 301355 Jul 50; JAG CM-343472, U.S. vs. 1st Lt Leon A. Gilbert, O-1304518, (includes all legal action taken in the case up to commutation of sentence on 27 Nov 50); Washington Post, September 20, 1952.

[29] 24th Inf Regt WD, 31 Jul 50 and app. V.

[30] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 3 (N.K. 1st Div), pp. 32-33; Ibid., Issue 104 (N.K. 13th Div), p. 61; and p. 42 (N.K. 15th Div); Ibid., Issue 4 (105th Armored Div), p. 38; EUSAK WD, G-2 Sec, 2 Aug 50, ATIS Interrog Rpt 339.

[31] Ltr and Comments, Gen Gay to author, 24 Aug 58.

[32] Comdr, Amphibious Group One, Task Force 90, Attack Force Opn Order 10-50, 131200 Jul 50, Tokyo; Notes, Harris for author, 18 May 54.

[33] 1st Cav Div WD, 12-22 Jul 50, and Summ, 25 Jun-Jul 50.

[34] Ibid., 21-22 Jul 50; Ibid., G-3 Sec, 20 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-4 Daily Summ, 22 Jul 50; EUSAK WD, Summ, 13-31 Jul 50; 8th Cav Regt Opn Jnl, 21 Jul 50.

[35] Comments, Gen Gay to author, 24 Aug 53.

[37] The strength of the major units in USAFIK is shown in the following:

Total	39,439
EUSAK	2,184
KMAG	473
1st CAV Div (Inf)	10,027
24th Inf Div	10,463
25th Inf Div	13,059
Pusan Base	2,979
ADCOM	163
Misc Personnel	91

Source: GHQ FEC G-3 Opn Rpt 34, 19 Jul 50; Ibid., Sitrep, 19 Jul 50.

[38] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 32; EUSAK WD, 23 Jul 50; 8th Cav Regt Opn Jnl. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, had enemy contact at 222100.

[39] 1st Cav Div WD, 23-24 Jul 50; 8th Cav Regt Opn Jnl, 24 Jul 50. Overlay 36 to 8th Cav Opn Jnl shows location of enemy roadblock.

[40] 8th Cav Regt Opn Jnl, 24 Jul 50: 1st Cav Div WD, G-3 Sec, serial 80, 26 Jul 50.

[41] 1st Cav Div WD, 25 Jul 50: Interv, author with Maj Rene J. Giuraud, 21 Apr 54 (Giuraud commanded the mortar company at Yongdong) Interv, author with Harris, 30 Apr 54 Notes, Harris for author, 18 May 54.

[42] 1st Cav Div WD, 25-27 Jul 50; Ltr, Gay to author, 24 Aug 53 8th Cav Regt Opn Jnl, 25 Jul 50: Capt Charles A. Rogers, History of the 16th Reconnaissance Company in Korea, 18 July 1950-April 1951, typescript MS, May 51, copy in OCMH: New York Times, July 29, 1950, dispatch by WilliamH. Lawrence from 1st Cavalry Division.

[43] 1st Cav Div WD, 25 Jul 50.

[44] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), pp. 38-33; Ibid., Enemy Docs, Issue 2, pp. 66-67 (Choe Song Hwan diary, 21 Jul-10 Aug 50).

[45] 27th Inf WD, an. 2, 13 Jul, and Opn sec, 6-31 Jul 50; Ibid., Summ of Activities, 2d Bn, Opn Rpt, 1st Bn, and an. 2, 21-22 Jul 50.

[46] EUSAK WD, G-3, Sec, 22 Jul 50; 27th Inf WD, Opn Rpt, 1st Bn, 23 Jul-3 Aug 50.

[47] 27th Inf WD, Opn Rpt, 1st Bn, 23 Jul-3 Aug 50 25th Div WD. G-3 Sec, 24 Jul 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 2d Div) p. 36.

[48] EUSAK WD, C-3 Jnl, 24 Jul 50: 27th Inf WD, Opn Rpt, 1st Bn 24 Jul 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 9d Div.), p. 36; Col Gilbert J. Check, MS review comments, 25 Nov 57.

[49] 27th Inf WD, 25 Jul 50; Lt Col Gordon E. Murch, Notes for author, 7 Apr 54.

[50] Murch, Notes for author, 7 Apr 54; 27th Inf WD, Summ of Activities, 2d Bn, 25 Jul 50.

[51] EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 26 Jul 50; 27th Inf WD, Opn Rpt, 1st Bn, 27 Jul 50; 27th Inf WD, Hist Rpt, 27-28 Jul 50.

[52] Comments, Gay for author, 24 Aug 53; Collier, MS review comments, 10 Mar 58.

[53 27th Inf WD: Hist Rpt 28-29 Jul 50; Opn Rpt, 1st Bn, 27-29 Jul 50; an. 2, 29-31 Jul 50; Opn Sec, 6-31 Jul 50; S-1 Sec, Cumulative Casualties: S-2 Sec, Act Rpt, Jul 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 28-29 Jul 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94, p. 36.

[54] 7th Cav Regt WD, 26 Jul 50 1st Cav Div WD, 26 Jul 50; Ltr, Gay to author, 24 Aug 53.

[55] 7th Cav Regt WD, 26 Jul 50.

[56] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 33; 1st Cav Div WD, 26-27 Jul 50: Ltr, Gay to author, 24 Aug 53; New York Times, July 27, 1950.

[57] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 33; 1st Cav Div WD, 26-27 Jul 50: Ltr, Gay to author, 24 Aug 53.

[58] 1st Cav Div WD, 28-29 Jul 50; Ltr, Gay to author, 24 Aug 53.

[59] 1st Cav Div WD, 28-29 Jul 50; Rogers, History of the 16th Reconnaissance Company in Korea.

[60] 1st Cav Div WD, 30-31 Jul 50: ATIS Supp, Enemy Docs, Issue 4, p. 69 (Battle Rpt of Arty Opns, N.K. 8th Regt, 3d Div, 3: Aug 50); Ibid., Issue 2, pp. 66-67 (Choe Song Hwan diary, 21 Jul-10 Aug 50).

[61] 1st Cav Div WD, 31 Jul 50; Ibid., G-2 Narr Rpt, 31 Jul 50.

[62] Ibid., Summ, Jul 50.

[63] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpt, Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 33; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army. p. 57.

[64] EUSAK WD, G-3 Stf Sec Rpt, 26 Jul 50.

[65] Interv, author with Lt. Col. Paul F. Smith 1 Oct 52; Ltr. Landrum to author, recd 23 Nov 53; Collier, MS review comments, Mar 58.

[66] Ltr. Gay to author, 24 Aug 53.

[67] Interv, author with Almond, 13 Dec 51. Even the principal members of General Walker's Eighth Army staff knew nothing of this matter. General Landrum and Colonel Collier, on intimate personal terms with General Walker, indicate that there was no plan in the Eighth Army staff or in the Signal Section for such a move to Pusan at that time; that, in the long-range planning initiated some days later, the proposed site of a rear command post was Ulsan on the east coast and not Pusan; that General Walker would not discuss a removal of the command post from Taegu with his staff until late August, when considerable danger existed that the signal equipment might be destroyed; and that no responsible member of the Army staff had at that time proposed a move of the command post to Pusan. See Ltr, Landrum to author, recd 23 Nov 53; Collier, MS review comments, Mar 58; Interv, author with Col Albert K. Stebbins(EUSAK G-4 at the time), 4 Dec 53.

[68] Interv, author with Almond, 13 Dec 51; Ltr, Landrum to author, reed 23 Nov 53; EUSAK WD, G-3 Stf Sec Rpt, 27 Jul 50; New York Times, July 27, 1950. General MacArthur read this passage in MS form and offered no comment on it.

[69] 25th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, 29 Jul 50, Div Historian's Notes; Barth MS, p. 9.

[70] Interv, author with Maj Leon B. Cheek, 7 Aug 51. The author has listened to many similar comments among officers and men of the Eighth Army with respect to this order.

[71] Fisher, MS review comments, 27 Oct 57.

[72] 25th Div WD, 31 Jul 50; Charles and Eugene Jones, The Face of War (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1951), p. 22.

[73] New York Times, July 29, 30 (Lawrence dispatch), and 31, 1950.

[74] New York Times, July 31, 1950.

[75] New York Times, August 2, 1950.

[76] EUSAK WD, G-4 Sec 22 Jul 50, Basis for Planning Supply Requisitions and Service Support for Military Operations in Korea to 1 July 1951.

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