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CHAPTER IIArmed Forces of North and South Korea |
The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary PeopleHistory |
| It was not Lacedaemon alone that gave birth to warriors, ... they wereproduced in all countries where men were found capable of instructing othersin the art of war |
| NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, The Discourses |
The North Korea People's Army had been from the beginning under thesupervision of the Soviets. At first the Peace Preservation Corps had undertakenthe organization and training of a military force. Then, when the Sovietsbegan to withdraw their occupation forces in February 1948, the North KoreanGovernment established a Ministry of Defense and activated the North KoreaPeople's Army. Soviet instruction and supervision of the Army continued,however, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from North Korea. One prisonerstated that every training film he ever saw or used had been made in theUSSR. About three thousand Russians were active in the Army program beforeJune 1950. In some instances as many as fifteen Soviet officers servedas advisers on an N.K. infantry division staff. The adviser to a divisioncommander reportedly was a Soviet colonel. [1]
The Soviet diplomatic mission to North Korea, apparently organized inJanuary 1949, became the post-occupation body for Soviet control of thecountry. By June 1950 every member of the Soviet diplomatic staff in NorthKorea was either an army or an air force officer. Col. Gen. Terenty F.Shtykov, commander of the Soviet occupation forces in North Korea and,after their withdrawal, the Soviet Ambassador there, apparently functionedas the senior Soviet officer in the country. Intelligence reports indicatethat Premier Kim Il Sung received weekly instructions from the USSR throughAmbassador Shtykov. [2]
In June 1950 Kim Il Sung was Commander in Chief of the North Koreanarmed forces. His deputy was Marshal Choe Yong Gun. Both had left Koreain their youth, resided in China for long periods of time, and, ultimately,gone to Moscow for training. Kim Il Sung returned to Korea on 25 September1945 under Soviet sponsorship, landing at Wonsan on that date with a groupof Soviet-trained guerrillas.
For all practical purposes the North Korean ground forces in June 1950comprised two types of units: (1) the Border Constabulary (BC or BoAn Dae) and (2) the North Korea People's Army (NKPA or In Min Gun).The Border Constabulary, an internal security force, was organized,trained, and supervised by Soviet officials. It was uncommonly strong inpolitical indoctrination and supported and promoted the Communist partyline throughout North Korea. All officer training for the Border Constabularywas under the direct supervision of Soviet advisers on the school staffs.[3]
The Border Constabulary had its beginnings as early as September 1945,when anti-Japanese and Communist Koreans, guerrillas who had fled fromKorea and Manchuria to Soviet territory, came back to Korea and formedthe nucleus of what was called the Peace Preservation Corps. It numberedabout 18,000 men and drew its personnel mostly from Communist youth groups.Its officers were usually active Communists. In May 1950 the effectivestrength of the North Korean internal security forces was approximately50,000, divided among the Border Constabulary, the regular police, andthe "thought" police. [4]
The Border Constabulary in June 1950 consisted of five brigades of unevensize and armament-the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 7th. The 1stBrigade numbered 5,000 men; the 3d and 7th each had astrength of 4,000. These three brigades were stationed just north of the38th Parallel. The 7th was in the west, deployed from Haeju to thecoast, just above the Ongjin Peninsula; the 3d was east of the 7th,in the center from Haeju to the vicinity of Chorwon; and the 1stwas at Kansong on the east coast. These three brigades, totaling 13,000men, were armed and equipped to combat-infantry standards. The brigadeseach had six or seven battalions composed of three rifle companies each,together with machine gun and mortar companies, an antitank platoon, andthe usual headquarters and service units.
The BC 2d Brigade, with a total strength of only 2,600, was dividedinto seven battalions. It held positions along the Yalu and Tumen Riverboundaries separating North Korea from Manchuria and the USSR. This brigadehad little heavy equipment and few mortars, machine guns, or antitank guns.The BC 5th Brigade, with a strength of about 3,000 men, had headquartersat Pyong-yang, the North Korean capital. It was responsible for railroadsecurity. [5]
The North Korea People's Army
The North Korea People's Army in June 1950 constituted a ground forceof eight infantry divisions at full strength, two more infantry divisionsactivated at an estimated half strength, a separate infantry regiment,a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, and an armored brigade. Five of theinfantry divisions and the armored brigade had well-trained combat personnel.Many of these soldiers were hardened veterans who had fought with the ChineseCommunist and Soviet Armies in World War II.
The North Korea People's Army was officially activated on 8 February1948. Its first full infantry divisions, the 3d and 4th,were established between 1947 and 1949: and its first armored unit, the105th Armored Battalion, was established in October 1948. The latterincreased to regimental strength in May 1949. Conscription for replacementsand build-up of the North Korea People's Army apparently began about July1948. After a meeting of USSR and Communist China officials, reportedlyheld in Peiping early in 1950 to explore the advisability of using theNorth Korea People's Army for an invasion of South Korea, there was a rapidbuild-up of that Army. It increased its training program, transferred ordnancedepots from urban to isolated rural sites, and readied hidden dump areasto receive supplies, weapons, and munitions of war from the USSR. At thebeginning of this build-up there were in Korea about 16,000 repatriatedNorth Koreans from the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). In April 1950 CommunistChina returned 12,000 more veterans of the CCF to Korea where they formedthe N.K. 7th Division (redesignated the 12th about 2 July1950). [6]
The Korean veterans of the Chinese Communist Forces made up about onethird of the North Korea People's Army in June 1950 and gave it a combat-hardenedquality and efficiency that it would not otherwise have had. Five of theeight divisions in the North Korea People's Army-the 1st, 4th, 5th,6th, and 7th (12th) Divisions-had in their ranks substantialnumbers of CCF soldiers of Korean extraction. The 5th, 6th, and7th (12th) Divisions had the largest number of them. Also, manyof the NKPA units that did not have rank and file soldiers from the CCFdid have officers and non-commissioned officers from it. [7]
Special mention needs to be made of the N.K. 5th, 6th, and 7thDivisions. In July 1949 the Chinese Communist Forces transferred allnon-Koreans in the CCF 164th Division, then stationed in Manchuria,to other Chinese divisions and filled the 164th with Korean re-placements.Near the end of the month the division, about 7,500 strong, moved by railto Korea where it reorganized into the 10th, 11th, and 12th RifleRegiments of the N.K. 5th Division. [8]
At the same time, in July 1949, the CCF 166th Division movedto Korea and reorganized into the 13th. 14th, and 15th Regimentsof the N.K. 6th Division. The story of the Koreans in this divisiongoes back to 1942 when the Chinese Communists formed a Korean VolunteerArmy largely with deserters from the Japanese Kwantung Army. Thisdivision had a strength of about 10,000 men when it entered Korea; there800 replacements brought it to full strength. [9]
In February 1950 all Korean units in the Chinese Manchurian Army assembledin Honan Province. They numbered about 12,000 men drawn from the CCF 138th,140th, 141st, and 156th Divisions. Some of them had participatedin the Chinese Communist advance from Manchuria to Peiping, and all wereveteran troops. In the first part of April these troops moved by rail toKorea. In the Wonsan area these CCF veterans re-organized into the 1st,2d, and 3d Regiments of the N.K. 7th Division. [10]
In addition to these three divisions, the N.K. 1st and 4thDivisions each had one regiment of CCF veterans. All the units fromthe CCF Army upon arrival in North Korea received Soviet-type arms andNorth Korean uniforms and were retrained in North Korean tactical doctrine,which closely followed the Russian.
In March 1950 North Korea activated two new divisions: the 10th,around Manchurian-trained units, and the 15th, with men fromthree youth-training schools and veteran Communist officers and noncommissionedofficers. Although activated in March, the 15th Division receivedmost of its troops near the end of June-after the invasion had started.In early June the 13th Division was activated; the last one to beactivated before the invasion of South Korea. [11]
By June 1950, the 105th Armored Regiment had become the 105thArmored Brigade with a strength of 6,000 men and 120 T34 tanks. Itsequipment-tanks, weapons, and vehicles-was Russian-made. The brigade hadthree tank regiments-the 107th, 109th, and 203d-each with40 tanks, and a mechanized infantry regiment, the 206th, with astrength of about 2,500 men. A tank regiment had three medium tank battalions,each having 13 tanks. The battalions each had three tank companies with4 tanks to a company. Tank crews consisted of five men. Battalion, regimental,and division tank commanders each had a personal tank. The 105th ArmoredBrigade was raised to division status in Seoul at the end of June 1950before it crossed the Han River to continue the attack southward. [12]
In addition to the 120 tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade, thebetter part of another tank regiment appears to have been available toNorth Korea in late June. Thirty tanks reportedly joined the N.K. 7th(12th) Division at Inje in east central Korea just before it crossedthe Parallel. [13] This gave North Korea a total of 150 Russian-built T34tanks in June 1950.
In the six months before the invasion, a defensive-type army of 4 divisionsand an armored regiment had doubled in strength to form 7 combat-readydivisions and an armored brigade. And there were in addition 3 other newlyactivated and trained divisions, and 2 independent regiments.
The North Korean ground forces-the NKPA and the Border Constabulary-inJune 1950 numbered about 135,000 men. This estimated total included 77,838men in seven assault infantry divisions, 6,000 in the tank brigade, 3,000 in an independent infantry regiment,2,000 in a motorcycle regiment, 23,000 in three reserve divisions, 18,600in the Border Constabulary, and 5,000 in Army and I and IICorps Headquarters. [15]
The North Korean infantry division at full strength numbered 11,000men. It was a triangular division composed of three rifle regiments, eachregiment having three battalions. [16] The division had as integral partsan artillery regiment and a self-propelled gun battalion.
There were also medical, signal, anti-tank, engineer, and training battalions,and reconnaissance and transport companies.
The artillery support of the North Korean division in 1950 closely resembledthat of the older type of Soviet division in World War II. A division had12 122-mm. howitzers, 24 76-mm. guns, 12 Su-76 self-propelled guns, 1245-mm. antitank guns, and 36 14.5-mm. antitank rifles. In addition, theregiments and battalions had their own supporting weapons. Each regiment,for instance, had 6 120-mm. mortars, 4 76-mm. howitzers, and 6 45-mm. antitankguns. Each battalion had 9 82-mm. mortars, 2 45-mm. antitank guns, and9 14.5-mm. antitank rifles. The companies had their own 61-mm. mortars.A North Korean rifle regiment at full strength numbered 2,794 men-204 officers,711 noncommissioned officers, and 1,879 privates. [17]
From the beginning the Soviet Union had been the sponsor for the NKPAand had provided it with the sinews of war. Most important at first werethe Russian-built T34 tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade. The T34was a standard medium tank in the Soviet Army at the end of World War II.The Russians first used this tank against the Germans in July 1941. Guderiangives it the credit for stopping his drive on Tula and Moscow. [18] TheT34 weighed 32 tons, was of low silhouette, had a broad tread, and was protected by heavy armor plate. It mounted an 85-mm.gun and carried two 7.62-mm. machine guns, one mounted on the bow and theother coaxially with the gun. [19]
Other ordnance items supplied to the NKPA by the Soviets included 76-mm.and 122-mm. howitzers; 45-mm. guns; 76-mm. self-propelled guns; 45-mm.antitank guns; 61-mm., 82-mm., and 120-mm. mortars; small arms; ammunitionfor these weapons; and grenades. From the Soviet Union North Korea alsoreceived trucks, jeeps, radios, and fire control, signal, and medical equipment.[20]
In the spring of 1950 the Soviet Union made particularly large shipmentsof arms and military supplies to North Korea. One captured North Koreansupply officer stated that in May 1950, when he went to Ch'ongjin to getsupplies for the N.K. 5th Division, Soviet merchant ships were unloadingweapons and ammunition, and that trucks crowded the harbor waterfront area.Korean-speaking crew members told him the ships had come from Vladivostok.Markings on some of the North Korean equipment captured in the first fewmonths of the Korean War show that it was manufactured in the Soviet Unionin 1949-50 and, accordingly, could not have been materiel left behind in1948 when the occupation forces withdrew from North Korea, as the Sovietshave claimed. [21]
North Korea began the war with about 180 aircraft, all supplied by Russia.Of these about 60 were YAK trainers; 40, YAK fighters; 70, attack bombers;and 10, reconnaissance planes. The North Korean Navy had approximately16 patrol craft of various types and a few coastwise steamers reportedlyequipped with light deck guns. [22]
The Republic of Korea Armed Forces
In June 1950 President Syngman Rhee was Commander in Chief of the SouthKorean Army. Under him was Sihn Sung Mo, the Minister of National Defense.The Deputy Commander in Chief actually in command of the Army was Maj.Gen. Chae Byong Duk.
The origins and development of an armed force in South Korea had their roots, as in North Korea, in theoccupation period after World War II. At first the principal objects ofthe U.S. occupation were to secure the surrender of the Japanese troopssouth of the 38th Parallel, return them to Japan, and preserve law andorder until such time as the Koreans could do this for themselves.
In January 1946 a Korean constabulary was authorized and established.This organization took form so slowly that a year later it numbered only5,000 men. By April 1947, however, it had doubled in strength and by Julyof that year it had reached 15,000. The constabulary became the Republicof Korea (ROK) Army in August 1948 and grew so rapidly in the next fewmonths that by January 1949 it numbered more than 60,000 men. [23] In March1949 the Republic of Korea had an Army of 65,000, a Coast Guard of 4,000,and a police force of 45,000-a total security force of about 114,000 men.The United States had equipped about 50,000 men in the Army with standardinfantry-type weapons and materiel, including the M1 rifle and 60-mm. and81-mm. mortars. [24]
Upon withdrawal of the last of the U.S. occupation force at the endof June 1949 a group of 482 United States military advisers began workingwith the South Korean Army. This small group of U.S. Army officers andenlisted men, established on 1 July 1949 with an authorized strength of500 men, was called the United States Korean Military Advisory Group tothe Republic of Korea (KMAG). Its mission was "to advise the governmentof the Republic of Korea in the continued development of the Security Forcesof that government." [25] KMAG was an integral part of the AmericanMission in Korea (AMIK) and, as such, came under the control of AmbassadorMuccio. In matters purely military, however, it was authorized to reportdirectly to the Department of the Army and, after co-ordinating with AmbassadorMuccio, to inform General MacArthur, the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE),of military matters.
In April 1950 the South Korean Government began the formation of combatpolice battalions to relieve the Army of internal security missions, butof twenty-one battalions planned only one, that activated at Yongwol on10 April 1950 to provide protection for the power plant, coal mines, andother vital resources in that vicinity, was in existence when the war started.
By June 1950 the Republic of Korea armed forces consisted of the following:Army, 94,808; Coast Guard, 6,145; Air Force, 1,865; National Police, 48,273. When the war began nearly a monthlater the Army had a strength of about 98,000, composed of approximately65,000 combat troops and 33,000 headquarters and service troops. [26]
In June 1950 the combat troops of the ROK Army were organized into eightdivisions: the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions.Five of them, the 1st, 2d, 6th, 7th, and Capital, had 3 regiments; twodivisions, the 3d and 8th, had 2 regiments; and one division, the 5th,had 2 regiments and 1 battalion. Only four divisions, the 1st, 6th, 7th,and Capital, were near full strength of 10,000 men.
The organization of the combat divisions and their present-for-dutystrength are shown in Table 1. For some unknown reason the ROK Army headquartersreport, on which Table 1 is based, does not include the 17th Regiment.It numbered about w,500 men and was part of the Capital Division in the paper organization of the Army.[27]
TABLE 1-ROK COMBAT DIVISIONS, 1 JUNE 1950
| Unit | Present | Division Total |
|---|---|---|
| Total | 64,697 | |
| 1st Infantry Division Col. Paik Sun Yup, CO | 1,882 | 9,715 |
| 11th Regiment | 2,527 | |
| 12th Regiment | 2,728 | |
| 13th Regiment | 2,578 | |
| 2d Infantry Division Brig. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, CO | 1,397 | 7,910 |
| 5th Regiment | 1,895 | |
| 16th Regiment | 2,408 | |
| 25th Regiment | 2,210 | |
| 3d Infantry Division Col. Yu Sung Yul, CO (Brig. Gen. Lee Joon Shik took command of 3d Div on 10 Jul 50). | 1,826 | 7,059 |
| 22d Regiment | 2,646 | |
| 23d Regiment | 2,587 | |
| 5th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Lee Ung Joon, CO | 2,274 | 7,276 |
| 15th Regiment | 2,119 | |
| 20th Regiment | 2,185 | |
| 1st Separate Battalion | 698 | |
| 6th Infantry Division Col. Kim Chong O, CO | 2,245 | 9,112 |
| 7th Regiment | 2,411 | |
| 8th Regiment | 2,288 | |
| 19th Regiment | 2,168 | |
| 7th Infantry Division Brig. Gen. Yu Jae Hung, CO | 2,278 | 9,698 |
| 1st Regiment | 2,514 | |
| 3d Regiment | 2,487 | |
| 9th Regiment | 2,419 | |
| 8th Infantry Division Col. Lee Jung Il, CO | 1,923 | 6,866 |
| 10th Regiment | 2,476 | |
| 21st Regiment | 2,467 | |
| Capital Infantry Division Col. Lee Chong Chan, CO | 1,668 | 7,061 |
| 2d Regiment | 2,615 | |
| 18th Regiment | 2,778 | |
| 17th Regiment Col. Paik In Yup, CO | (2,500) |
Source: ROK Army Hq, Consolidated Morning Rpt, 1 Jun 50.
In the early summer of 1950 the 1st, 7th, 6th, and 8th Divisions, consideredthe best in the ROK Army, held positions along the Parallel in the ordernamed, from west to east. Beyond the 1st Division at the extreme westernend of the line was the 17th Regiment of the Capital Division on the OngjinPeninsula. The other four divisions were scattered about the interior andsouthern parts of the country, three of them engaged in antiguerrilla activityand training in small unit tactics. The Capital Division's headquarterswas at Seoul, the 2d's at Ch'ongju near Taejon, the 3d's at Taegu, andthe 5th's at Kwangju in southwest Korea. [28]
The South Korean divisions along the Parallel were equipped mostly withthe United States M1 rifle, .30-caliber carbine, 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars,2.36-in. rocket launchers, 37-mm. antitank guns, and 105-mm. howitzersM3. The howitzers had been used in the U.S. infantry cannon companies inWorld War II. They had a shorter barrel than the regular 105-mm. howitzerM2, possessed no armor shield, and had an effective range of only 7,250yards (8,200 yards maximum range) as compared to 12,500 yards for the 105-mm.howitzer M2. There were five battalions of these howitzers organized intothe usual headquarters and service companies and three firing batteriesof five howitzers each. The 1st, 2d, 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions each hada battalion of the howitzers. A sixth battalion was being formed when thewar started. [29] Of 91 howitzers on hand 15 June 1950, 89 were serviceable.The South Korean armed forces had no tanks, no medium artillery, no 4.2-in.mortars, no recoilless rifles, and no fighter aircraft or bombers. Thedivisions engaged in fighting guerrillas in the eastern and southern mountainshad a miscellany of small arms, including many Japanese Model 99 WorldWar II rifles.
In October of 1949 the ROK Minister of Defense had requested 189 M26tanks but the acting chief of KMAG told him the KMAG staff held the viewthat the Korean terrain and the condition of roads and bridges would notlend themselves to efficient tank operations. About the same time a KMAGofficer pointed out to Ambassador Muccio that the equipment provided the
ROK's was not adequate to maintain the border, and he cited the factthat North Korean artillery out-ranged by several thousand yards the ROK105-mm. howitzer M3 and shelled ROK positions at will while being out ofrange of retaliatory fire.
The ROK Army in June 1950 had among its heavier weapons 27 armored cars;something more than 700 artillery pieces and mortars, including 105-mm.howitzers and 81-mm. and 60-mm. mortars; about 140 antitank guns; and approximately1,900 2.36-in. bazookas. In June 1950 it had about 2,100 serviceable U.S.Army motor vehicles for transportation, divided between about 830 2 1/2-tontrucks and 1,300 1/4-ton trucks (jeeps). Motor maintenance was of a loworder. [30]
The South Korean Air Force in June 1950 consisted of a single flightgroup of 12 liaison-type aircraft and 10 advance trainers (AT6). Maj. DeanE. Hess, KMAG adviser to the South Korean Air Force, had a few (approximately10) old F-51 (Mustang) planes under his control but no South Korean pilotshad yet qualified to fly combat missions. These planes were given to theROK Air Force on 26 June 1950.
On 25 June the South Korean Navy consisted of a patrol craft (PC701)recently purchased in the United States from surplus vessels, 3 other similarpatrol craft at Hawaii en route to Korea, 1 LST, 15 former U.S. mine sweepers,10 former Japanese mine layers, and various other small craft. [31]
In June 1950 the ROK Army supply of artillery and mortar ammunitionon hand was small and would be exhausted by a few days of combat. An estimated15 percent of the weapons and 35 percent of the vehicles in the ROK Armywere unserviceable. The six months' supply of spare parts originally providedby the United States was exhausted. [32]
The state of training of the ROK Army is reflected in the Chief of KMAG'sreport that a majority of the units of the South Korean Army had completedsmall unit training at company level and were engaged in battalion training.In summary, the North Korean Army in June 1950 was clearly superior tothe South Korean in several respects: the North Koreans had 150 excellentmedium tanks mounting 85-mm. guns, the South Koreans had no tanks; theNorth Koreans had three types of artillery-the 122-mm. howitzer, the 76-mm.self-propelled gun, and the 76-mm. divisional gun with a maximum rangeof more than 14,000 yards which greatly out-ranged the 105-mm. howitzerM3 of the ROK Army with its maximum range of about 8,200 yards. In numberof divisional artillery pieces, the North Koreans exceeded the South Koreanon an average of three to one. [33] The North Koreans had a small tacticalair force, the South Koreans had none. In the North Korean assault formationsthere were 89,000 combat troops as against approximately 65,000 in theSouth Korean divisions. Also, North Korea had an additional 18,600 trainedtroops in its Border Constabulary and 23,000 partially trained troops inthree reserve divisions. In comparison, South Korea had about 45,000 nationalpolice, but they were not trained or armed for tactical use. The smallcoast guard or navy of each side just about canceled each other and wererelatively unimportant.
The superiority of the North Korean Army over the South Korean in theseseveral respects was not generally recognized, however, by United Statesmilitary authorities before the invasion. In fact, there was the generalfeeling, apparently shared by Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, Chief of KMAG,on the eve of invasion that if attacked from North Korea the ROK Army wouldhave no trouble in repelling the invaders.
[1] DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr 178, p. 32; Ibid., Aug 50, Nr 171, pp. 16-17; Ibid., Mar 51, Nr 178, p. 36; 24th Div G-2 PW Interrog File, 6-22 Jul 50; GHQ FEC MIS GS, History of the North Korean Army, 31 July 1952 (hereafter cited as GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army), pp. 8-24.
[2] DA Intel Rev, Apr 51, Nr 179, p. 32; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army.
[3] DA Intel Rev, Jun 50, Nr 169, pp. 20-23.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Future reference to the two opposed Korean forces generally will be North Korean or N.K. and South Korean or ROK. The abbreviation N.K. will precede a numbered NKPA unit: ROK will precede a numbered South Korean unit.
[6] GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, pp. 3, 8-24; DA Intel Rev, Sep 51, Nr 184, p. 18; Ibid., Mar 51, Nr 178, p. 36; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 99 (N.K, 12th Div), p. 41. PW Interrog estimates of number of CCF veterans in the N.K. 1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issues 94, 95, 100
[7] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), p. 29: Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 41; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, pp. 23-24.
[8] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 37: GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p 23.
[9] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), pp. 27-29 GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 23.
[10] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), pp. 41-44; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 23.
[11] GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 24; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 104 (N.K. 10th and 13th Divs), pp. 43, 57. [12] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 4 (N.K. 105th Armd Div), pp.27-37.
[13] Ibid., Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), p. 42.
[14] DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr 178, p. 38.
[15] The estimate of 135,000 is based on the following tabulation, drawn principally from N.K. PW interrogation reports:
| Total | 135,438 |
| 1st Div | 11,000 |
| 2d Div | 10,838 |
| 3d Div | 11,000 |
| 4th Div | 11,000 |
| 5th Div | 11,000 |
| 6th Div | 11,000 |
| 7th (12th) Div | 12,000 |
| 10th Div | 6,000 |
| 13th Div | 6,000 |
| 15th Div | 11,000 |
| 776th Ind Inf Unit | 3,000 |
| 12th MTsP (Motorcycle Regt) | 2,000[a] |
| 105th Armored Brig | 6,000 |
| B.C. 1st Brig | 5,000 |
| B.C. 2d Brig | 2,600[a] |
| B.C. 3d Brig | 4,000[a] |
| B.C. 5th Brig | 3,000[a] |
| B.C. 7th Brig | 4,000[a] |
| Army, I and II Corps Hq | 5,000[a] |
[a] Indicates the figure is based on U.S. military intelligence or strong inferential data but not on extensive PW reports or order of battle documents. No figure for the strength of II Corps, organized about 12 June 1950 has been found. The strength for Army, I, and II Corps Headquarters possibly should be increased to 6,000-7,000. N.K. I Corps was activated about 10 June 1950. See GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army pp. 41-43. According to some PW reports, there was a 17th Motorcycle Regiment in the enemy's order of battle at the beginning of the invasion.
The KMAG report for the semiannual period ending 15 June 1950 gives, a total North Korean ground force estimate of 117,357 men, including 64,372 for the North Korea People's Army and 27,600 for the Border Constabulary. The ROK Army G-2 estimate of North Korean strength, according to Capt. Frederick C. Schwarze (Asst G-2 Adviser to ROK Army in Seoul when the invasion occurred) was 175,000. Schwarze, Notes for author.
[16] The 12th Division had a strength of 12,000.
[17] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 106 (N.K. Arty), Chart, p. 32: Issue 100 (N.K. 9th Div), p. 49; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, Charts 3b,-8.
[18] General Heinz Guderian. Panzer Leader (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952), pp. 162, 233-38.
[19] Not until the end of the third week of the war did American intelligence settle on the identification of the T34 tank.Characteristics of the Russian-built T34 medium tank used by the North Koreans:
Weight (combat-loaded) ............................... 35 short tons
Length (not including gun) ........................... 19.7 feet
Width (over-all) ..................................... 9.8 feet
Width (between track centers) ........................ 8.0 feet
Height (to top of turret) ............................ 7.9 feet
Ground clearance ..................................... 1.3 feet
Turret traverse ............................. 360° hand and electric
Rate of fire (85-mm. gun) ................... 7-8 rounds per minute
Ammunition carried .......................... 85-mm. 55 rounds
7.62-mm. 2,745 rounds
Engine
Type ...................................... 12 cylinder, Diesel
Horsepower ................................ 493
Fuel
Type ...................................... Diesel
Capacity (main tanks) ..................... 143 gallons
Performance
Maximum speed ............................. 30-34 miles per hour
Source: EUSAK WD, 8 Sep 50, an. 1, to G-2 PIR 58.
[20] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 106 (N.K. Arty), pp. 1-40; DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr 178, pp. 54, 56; Ibid., Jun 51, Nr 181, pp. 26-27; Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50, sec. III, p. 6.
[21] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 38; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 24; DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr 178, pp. 54-56.
[22] Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50, sec. III, p. 6; Capt Walter Karig, Comdr Malcolm W. Cagle, and Lt. Comdr Frank A. Manson, "Battle Report Series," vol. VI, Battle Report, The War in Korea(New York and Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart, 1952), p. 67.
[23] Sawyer, KMAG MS, pts. I and II. This is the best available study on KMAG policies and operations in Korea.
[24] The Conflict in Korea, p. 9.
[25] Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50, Annex 1. The Department of the Army in a message to General MacArthur dated 10 June 1949 established KMAG. It became operational in Korea on 1 July 1949. Msg, G-3 Plans and Opns to CINCFE WARX90049, 10 Jun 49. The KMAG personnel present for duty 1 July 1949 numbered 482: 165 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 313 enlisted men. Sawyer, KMAG MS; Msg, WX90992, DA to CG USAFIK, 2 Jul 49, cited in General Headquarters Support and Participation, 25 June 1950-30 April 1951, by Maj. James F. Schnabel (hereafter cited as Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War), ch. I, pp. 4.-5. This is Volume I of Far East Command, United Nations Command, History of the Korean War, in OCMH
[27] Interv, author with Maj Gen Chang Chang Kuk (Military Attaché, Korean Embassy, Washington), 14 Oct 53. General Chang was G-3 of the ROK Army in June 1950. Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-Jun 50, Annex IX.Major Hausman says he always considered 10,000 as the table of organization strength of a South Korean division. Some references give the figure as 9,500. General Chang said the ROK Army considered 9,000-9,500 as T/O strength of a division in June 1950. Spelling of names and rank as of June 1950 checked and corrected by General Chang and by General Paik Sun Yup, ROK Chief of Staff, in MS review comments, 11 July 1958. In accordance with Korean usage, the surnames come first, the name Syngman Rhee is one of the rare exceptions to this rule. Korean personal names ordinarily consist of three monosyllables.
[28] Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50; EUSAK WD, Prologue, 25 Jun-12 Jul 50; Interv, author with Col Rollins S. Emmerich, 5 Dec 51 (Emmerich was KMAG senior adviser to the ROK 3d Division in 1950).
[29] Rpt, USMAG to ROK. 1 Jan-30 Jun 50, Annex X; Interv, author with Maj Hausman; Col William H. S. Wright, Notes for author, 1952 (Wright was CofS and Acting CO of KMAG at the time of the invasion).
[30] The original U.S. commitment in July 1949 was to supply the Korean Army with an issue of equipment and a six months' supply of spare parts for a force of 50,000. See Memo, Gen Roberts to All Advisers, KMAG, 5 May 50, sub: Korean Army Logistical Situation. The Department of State gives $57,000,000 as the value of military equipment given to South Korea before its invasion by North Korea, with a replacement cost at time of delivery to South Korea of $110,000,000. See The Conflict in Korea, p. 10.
[31] Karig, et al., Battle Report, The War in Korea p. 68.
[32] Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50, sec. VI, pp. 18-22.
[33] The maximum range off the Soviet artillery used by the N.K. Army in June 1950 was as follows: 122-mm. howitzer, 12,904 yards; 76-mm. SP gun, 12,400 yards; 76-mm. divisional gun, 14,545 yards. The average North Korean division had 48 122-mm. howitzers, 76-mm. SP and non-SP guns; the ROK division had 15 105-mm. howitzers M3.
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