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CHAPTER XXIAugust Build-up and September Portents |
The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary PeopleHistory |
| The impact of an army, like the total of mechanical coefficients, isequal to the mass multiplied by the velocity ... when you are about togive battle concentrate all your strength, neglect nothing; a battalionoften decides the day. |
| NAPOLEON |
The Far East Air Forces probably exercised a greater relative influencein August 1950 in determining the outcome of the Korean battles than inany other month of the war. As the number of tactical air control partiesincreased in late July and during August, the standard practice of theFifth Air Force was to place one with each U.S. Army regiment and divisionheadquarters and one with each ROK division and corps headquarters. Fighteraircraft in August normally left their Japanese bases at Itazuke and Ashiyaon a daily schedule of two planes every fifteen minutes. They reportedto the tactical air control center at Taegu where they received specificmissions. After receiving them the planes reported to the proper divisionTACP and then to a regimental TACP for their target assignment. By 23 August,the Fifth Air Force operated twenty-nine T-6 Mosquitoes, all using theTaegu airstrip. The Mosquitoes operated over six stations from dawn todusk, each plane on station for a 2-hour period before being relieved byanother. [1] The pilots of these planes were tactical co-ordinators. Theylocated and controlled close support missions when TACP's did not havevisual control.
At the end of the month, eight fighter squadrons were engaged in combatoperations in Korea. They were about all that could be supported at theKyushu bases. In July, FEAF flew 4,635 sorties in close support of groundtroops in Korea; in August, 7,397 sorties. An average of 40 sorties dailysupported each U.S. division in the August Pusan Perimeter battles. A colorfulpilot from Ohio, Maj. Dean E. Hess, who had a record of 63 combat missionsin Europe in World War II, had been assigned to train South Korean pilots.He was known to many as "the one man Air Force of the South KoreanArmy" and by his call sign "MacIntosh One." Hess was groundedby official order near the end of August after he had flown 95 combat missions in less than two months. [2]
Aviation engineer units available to the Far East Air Forces in Julyhad been badly understrength and deficient in technical training. Thisslowed the construction of six planned airfields in Korea and, togetherwith the ground reverses, prevented a deployment of fighter planes to basesthere. [3]
On 4 August FEAF began B-29 interdiction attacks against all key bridgesnorth of the 37th Parallel in Korea, and on 15 August some light bombersand fighter-bombers joined in the interdiction campaign. This campaignsought the destruction of thirty-two rail and highway bridges on the threemain transportation routes across Korea: (1) the line from Sinanju southto P'yongyang and thence northeast to Wonsan on the east coast; (2) theline just below the 38th Parallel from Munsan-ni through Seoul to Ch'unch'onto Chumunjin-up on the east coast; (3) the line from Seoul south to Choch'iwonand hence east to Wonju to Samch'ok on the east coast. The interdictioncampaign marked nine rail yards, including those at Seoul, P'yongyang,and Wonsan, for attack, and the ports of Inch'on and Wonsan to be mined.This interdiction program, if effectively executed, would slow and perhapscritically disrupt the movement of enemy supplies along the main routessouth to the battlefront. [4]
The Air Force B-29's on 7 August bombed and largely destroyed the P'yongyangArmy Arsenal and the P'yongyang railroad yards. On 7, 9, and 10 Augustthey bombed and completely destroyed the large Chosen petroleum refineryat Wonsan. This plant, with its estimated capacity of 250,000 tons, annuallyproduced approximately 93 percent of the North Korean petroleum products.Throughout the month the Air Force bombed the chemical complex in the Hungnamarea, the largest in Asia, dropping 1,761 tons of bombs there in the periodbetween 30 July and 19 September. It bombed the Najin docks only 17 milessouth of the Siberian border and 10 air miles from Vladivostok. (Najinwas an important port of entry for vessels carrying supplies from Vladivostokand it was also a rail center.) The bombers struck the metal-working industryat Songjin with 326 tons of bombs on 28 August, and three days later theyheavily damaged the aluminum and magnesium plants at Chinnamp'o with 284tons of bombs. [5]
The supremacy of the Fifth Air Force in the skies over Korea forcedthe North Koreans in the first month of the war to resort to night movementof supplies to the battle area. To counter this, General Stratemeyer ordered nightly visual reconnaissance of the enemysupply routes, beginning on 6 August. On the 8th, Stratemeyer ordered Partridgeto increase the night sorties to fifty; by 24 August, Fifth Air Force B-26'salone averaged thirty-five sorties nightly. Late in August the Air Forcebegan flare missions over North Korea. B-29's would release parachute flaresat 10,000 feet that ignited at 6,000 feet, whereupon co-operating B-26bombers attacked any enemy movement discovered in the illuminated area.These M-26 parachute flares from World War II stock functioned poorly,many of them proving to be duds. [6]
Since capturing Seoul, the North Koreans had built two pontoon bridgesover the Han at that point, one north and one south of the rail and highwaybridges. They had also started a new railroad bridge north of the old triplebridge group. The steel cantilever railroad bridge on the west still stood,defying all the efforts of the Far East Air Forces to bring it down. Foralmost four weeks the Air Force bombed this bridge daily with 1-, 2-, and4-thousand-pound general purpose bombs with fuze settings, intended todamage both the superstructure and the abutments. On 19 August, nine B-29'sof the 19th Group dropped 54 tons of 1,000-pound bombs on the bridge, butit still stood. The same day, Navy carrier-based planes attacked the bridge,scoring eight direct hits, and brought it down. The next day when Air Forceplanes returned to the bridge they found that three spans had dropped intothe river.'
Attacks against the Han River pontoon bridges at Seoul do not seem tohave been successful until FEAF on 27 August ordered the Bomber Commandto lay delayed action bombs alongside the bridges, set to detonate at night.This method of attack seems to have caused such heavy casualties amongthe North Korean labor force trying to keep the pontoons in repair thatthe enemy finally abandoned the effort. These bridges remained unfinished when the American forces recaptured Seoul. [8]
While it is clear that air power wrought great destruction of enemyequipment and troops during this period of the war, it is not possibleto state accurately just how great it really was. Pilot claims are thebasis of most estimates of air damage and destruction. Experience has shownthat these are subject to many kinds of error. As an example, pilots oftenmistakenly claimed the destruction of enemy equipment if it remained immobileafter attack. It is often impossible for a pilot of a high-speed aircraftto determine if his target is live or not, and three or four differentpilots may claim as a "kill" a vehicle already knocked out byground action. One study revealed a surprisingly great discrepancy betweenpilot claims and a ground study of destroyed enemy equipment. Pilots claimedto have destroyed ten times as many tanks with rockets as with napalm inthe first three months of the Korean War, but a ground survey of destroyedenemy tanks after the Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter showedthree times as many tanks destroyed with napalm as with rockets. This givesa discrepancy factor of thirty to one in relation to pilot claims. Napalmseldom destroyed a tank by the burst of flame itself. But it did set offchain events that often led to the complete destruction of the tank. Thesplashing napalm on the bogie wheels set the rubber tires on fire, it heatedammunition to the point where it detonated inside the tank, or it set fuelon fire, and sometimes it splashed into the air intake vents and startedfires inside the tank. [9]
The Far East Command's "Operation Rebuild" by August had assumedthe proportions of a gigantic production of ordnance materiel. Before theend of 1950 it had expanded to employ 19,908 people in eight Japanese shops.In August, 1950 2 1/2-ton trucks alone were repaired. During the firstthree months of the Korean War practically all ammunition the U.N. andSouth Korean forces used came from rebuild stocks in Japan.
The daily rail and water Red Ball Express from Yokohama to Sasebo toPusan, beginning on 23 July, operated with increased efficiency in Augustand demonstrated that it could deliver promptly to Korea any supplies availablein Japan. On 5 August, for instance, it delivered 308 measurement tons;on 9 August, 403 tons; on 22 August, 574 tons; and on 25 August, 949 tons.The success of the Red Ball Express cut down the amount of airlift tonnage.This fell from 85 tons on 31 July to 49 tons on 6 August. The express eliminatedthe need for nearly all airlift of supplies to Korea from Japan. It deliveredsupplies to Korea in an average time of 60-70 hours, while the airliftdelivery varied from 12 hours to 5 days. The Red Ball delivery was notonly far cheaper, it was more consistent and reliable. [10]
The drop in air delivery to Korea caused General Partridge, commandingthe Far East Air Forces, to complain on 10 August that the Army was notfully using the airlift's 200-ton daily capacity. That day, Eighth Armyordered curtailment of delivery by the Red Ball Express and increased useof the airlift to its maximum capacity. The reason given for this actionwas a sudden apprehension that the port of Pusan could not process promptlythe flow of water-borne supplies. The absurdity of the logistical situationwas illustrated the next day, 11 August, when, upon General Partridge'ssuggestion, two 2 1/2-ton trucks were airlifted in a C-119 from TachikawaAir Base in Japan to Taegu. The Air Force planned to airlift two trucksdaily in this manner. As a result of this development, Eighth Army on 12August ordered that, effective 15 August, the Red Ball Express be discontinuedexcept on Tuesday and Friday of each week when it would carry cargo difficultfor the planes to handle. Under this arrangement airlift tonnage greatlyincreased. On 16 August, transport planes carried 324 tons of cargo and595 passengers; on 19 August, 160 tons of cargo and 381 passengers; on28 August, 398 tons of cargo and 343 passengers; and, on 29 August, 326tons of cargo and 347 passengers. [11]
After the Russian-built T34 tank appeared on the Korean battlefield,the Department of the Army acted as quickly as possible to correct theimbalance in armor. It alerted three medium tank battalions for immediatemovement to Korea. These battalions were the 6th (M46), the 70th (M26 andM4A3), and the 73d (M26). Two of them were the school troop battalionsof the Armored School at Fort Knox and of the Infantry School at Fort Benning;the third was the organic battalion of the 1st Armored Division. The Departmentof the Army notified General MacArthur on 10 July that it planned to shipthese battalions to the Far East as the quickest way it could devise of getting mediumtanks and trained crews to the battlefield. Ships carrying these threetank battalions sailed from San Francisco on 23 July and arrived at Pusanon 7 August. The tank battalions unloaded the next day. The 6th MediumTank Battalion served as Eighth Army reserve near Taegu in August; the70th joined the 1st Cavalry Division on 12 August; and the 73d on armyorders sent its companies to support various ground operations around thePusan Perimeter-A Company to Ulsan guarding the eastern main supply route,B Company to Task Force Bradley at Kyongju and Kigye, and C Company tothe 27th Infantry in the Bowling Alley north of Taegu. For further reinforcementof Eighth Army, the SS Luxembourg Victory departed San Franciscoon 28 July with eighty medium tanks in its cargo. Still more armor reinforcementsarrived on 16 August, when the 72d Medium Tank Battalion, organic to the2d Infantry Division, landed at Pusan. The 2d Division also had two regimentaltank companies. [12]
During August, therefore, 6 U.S. medium tank battalions landed in Korea,5 of them in the first eight days of the month. There were, in addition,4 regimental tank companies and about 30 light tanks for reconnaissancepurposes. The tanks in the battalions were about equally divided betweenM26 Pershings and M4A3 Shermans, except for 1 battalion which had M46 Pattons.The tank battalions averaged 69 tanks. Through 22 August, Eighth Army hadlost 20 medium tanks in action. [13] By the third week of August therewere more than 500 U.S. medium tanks within the Pusan Perimeter. At thebeginning of September American tanks outnumbered the enemy's on the PusanPerimeter battlefield by at least five to one.
The Korean battle situation in August 1950 caused the Department ofthe Army to decide to increase its strength there by moving the 3d InfantryDivision from the United States. Anticipating future offensive operationsin Korea, General MacArthur on 19 August requested troops for two corpsheadquarters and asked that these two corps be designated I and IX Corps.[14]
Losses in the American divisions fighting in Korea had been so greatin the first two months that special steps had to be taken to obtain replacements.On 19 August to help meet this demand, Eighth Army Rear in Japan orderedwhat it called "Operation Flushout." This required that all unitsin Japan reassign part of their troops as replacements for use in Korea.By 6 September, 229 officers and 2,201 enlisted men had been reassignedto Korea under this plan. Altogether, during August, 11,115 officer andenlisted replacements arrived in Ko rea from Japan and the United States. [15] The United Nations Command had a supported strength in Korea on 1 September 1950 of nearly 180,000 men, according to figures available at the time. The major organizations reported their personnel strengths as follows:
| Total | 179,929 |
| U.S. Eighth Army | 78,762 |
| 2d Infantry Division | 17,498 |
| 24th Infantry Division | 14,739 |
| 25th Infantry Division | 15,007 |
| 1st Cavalry Division | 14,703 |
| ROK Army | 91,696 |
| U.S. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade | 4,290 |
| British 27th Infantry Brigade | 1,578 |
| U.S. Fifth Air Force | 3,603 |
Available for aerial action over Korea and naval action in the waters around it there must be counted an additional 33,651 men in the Far East Air Forces, 330 men of the Royal Australian Air Force, and 36,389 men in the U.S. Naval Forces, Far East. [16]
In early September a distinguished soldier joined the Eighth Army staff.The Department of the Army sent Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen to Korea to serveas General Walker's chief of staff. General Allen in World War II had beenGeneral Omar N. Bradley's army group chief of staff in the European Theaterof Operations. He entered on duty at Eighth Army Headquarters in Taeguon 4 September. Colonel Landrum, highly regarded by General Walker, remainedas deputy chief of staff. [17]
The Korean War was more than two months old before the first UnitedNations troops, other than those of the United States, arrived in Korea.Since the Republic of Korea was not a member of the United Nations, theROK Army was considered an allied force.
The British War Office on 20 August announced that it was dispatchingto Korea at once from Hong Kong an infantry force of two battalions. Thesewere regular troops and comprised the 27th Infantry Brigade headquarters,the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of theArgyll and Sutherland Highlanders Regiment. Both regimental organizationsdated from the American Revolution-the Middlesex Battalion from 1775, theArgylls from 1776. Since that time they had seen service in many partsof the world, including Wellington's Peninsular Campaign, India, and SouthAfrica. Brigadier Basil A. Coad commanded the force. The British troopssailed from Hong Kong for Pusan, 1,300 miles to the north, on 25 Augustwith bagpipes playing "Auld Lang Syne" and "The CampbellsAre Coming." Five ships, including the cruiser Ceylon and thecarrier Unicorn, carried the British to Pusan where they dockedon 29 August. En route at sea, the rumor had spread among the troops thatthe North Koreans were only five miles from Pusan. Instead of the anticipatedsound of gunfire the British soldiers found relative quiet in the portcity. Debarking at once, the 27th Infantry Brigade, on Eighth Army orders, moved by train that night toan assembly area near Kyongsan, ten miles southeast of Taegu. [18]
On 24 August, General MacArthur established the Japan Logistical Command(JLC) as a major organization of the Far East Command. It relieved EighthArmy Rear of all responsibilities concerning posts, camps, and stationsin Japan and assumed responsibility as well for the logistical supportof all U.N. forces in Korea, except those specifically delegated to othercommands. Other organizational changes came on 27 August when General MacArthurdesignated the Far East Air Forces and the U.S. Naval Forces, Far East,officially as part of the United Nations Command, thus clarifying his relationshipto them as Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. This actionserved as a precedent for subsequent attachments of other U.N. air andnaval forces to the United Nations Command. [19]
The movement of refugees through the front lines and their removal fromthe battle area was a constant source of worry to the military authoritiesin August. Between 12 and 19 August, the 25th Division helped the ROK policescreen and remove more than 50,000 refugees from its battlefront area betweenChindong-ni and the Nam River. Altogether, the 25th Division evacuated120,335 refugees from its sector during August. In mid-August, the 24thDivision estimated there were 100,000 refugees in its southern sector seekingan opportunity to cross the Naktong River. On 24 August, about 300,000refugees assembled in collecting points near Yongsan and Changnyong, beganmoving under ROK police control to areas away from the front lines. Theywere warned not to stray from their assigned routes of travel lest theybe mistaken for guerrillas and shot. The 1st Cavalry Division and the ROKdivisions eastward had similar experiences with refugees. In all cases,the ROK police, working in collaboration with the local army commanders,screened the refugees and moved them away from the combat area as quicklyas possible. [20]
Occasionally, guerrillas would attack trains in rear areas of the PusanPerimeter, usually in the Yongch'on-Kyongju area in the east or along thelower Naktong in the Samnangjin area. These attacks generally resultedin only a few persons wounded and minor damage to rail equipment. The mostsuccessful guerrilla attack behind the lines of the Pusan Perimeter occurredon 11 August against a VHF radio relay station on Hill 915, eight milessouth of Taegu. A guerrilla force, estimated at 100 men, at 0515 attackedthe 70 ROK police guarding the station and its American operators. Theydrove off the ROK police and set fire to the buildings. American casualtieswere 2 killed, 2 wounded, and 3 missing. When a ROK police force reoccupied the area later in the day the guerrillas had disappeared. [21]
How to use South Korean manpower to the greatest advantage became oneof the most important problems early in the conduct of the war. An immediateneed was for more troops to oppose and stop the advancing North Koreans.A longer range need was to build up the manpower of the allied forces tothe point where they could drive the enemy back across the 38th Parallel.The program adopted was threefold: (1) fill the five ROK divisions to fullstrength with replacements; (2) activate new ROK divisions; and (3) attachlarge numbers of South Korean recruits to American units (a novel expedient).
As part of its projected expansion program the ROK Army opened trainingschools and centers for officers and replacements. On 14 July it openedthe 1st Replacement Training Center at Taegu. This center at first operatedon a 10-day schedule to receive and send out 1,000 men daily. The 2d ReplacementTraining Center at Pusan opened on 20 August. Its capacity was 500 daily,half that of the Taegu center. On 15 August, the ROK Army activated theGround General School at Tongnae, near Pusan, which received its firstclass on 23 August. This school was principally a center for training infantrysecond lieutenant replacements. Its normal capacity was 250 candidatesa week. After the pressing needs of the Pusan Perimeter battles had passed,all these schools lengthened their courses of training. [22]
On 10 August, General MacArthur, having received the necessary authority from the Department of the Army, authorized General Walker to increase the strength of the ROK Army to any practicable number. [23] Walker on 18 August requested authority to activate and equip five new ROK divisions at the rate of one a month beginning in September. The divisions were to have a strength of 10,500 men. General MacArthur denied General Walker this authority because of other needs for the available equipment, but he did concur in the recommendation to activate new divisions and service units and so reported to the Department of the Army. On 19 August the strength of the ROK tactical troops was 61,152; service troops, 23,672; total strength of the ROK Army, 84,824 men. The reported strength of ROK tactical organizations was as follows: [24]
| Total | 76,842 |
| I ROK Corps Headquarters | 1,275 |
| Capital Division | 16,376 |
| 8th Division | 9,106 |
| II ROK Corps Headquarters | 499 |
| 1st Division | 10,482 |
| 6th Division | 9,300 |
| ROK's Headquarters | 2,159 |
| 3d Division | 7,154 |
| P'ohang Task Force | 575 |
| Task Force Kim | 4,025 |
| Special type troops | 14,641 |
| Training Center and Headquarters Company | 1,250 |
The pay scale of the ROK Army in won per month was as follows, with the exchange rate of 4,000 won to one U.S. dollar:
| Pvt | 3,000 |
| Pfc | 3,600 |
| Cpl | 4,500 |
| Sgt | 5,400 |
| SSgt | 6,000 |
| MSgt | 24,900 |
| WO | 29,700 |
| 2d Lt | 30,900 |
| 1st Lt | 33,300 |
| Capt | 35,700 |
| Maj | 41,700 |
| Lt Col | 46,500 |
| Col | 51,300 |
| Gen | 60,000 |
Of the five planned new divisions, the ROK Army intended to reactivatefirst the ROK 7th Division and second the ROK 11th Division. General MacArthurwarned that the new divisions could be equipped only from stocks deliveredfrom the United States. The ROK Army did not wait upon the planned schedule,but was in the process of reactivating the ROK 7th Division at the endof August, forming at least one battalion in each of the 3d, 5th, and 8thRegiments. Task Force Min as an organization disappeared from the ROK ArmyOrder of Battle and became instead the 71st and 2d Battalions of the 5thRegiment, ROK 7th Division. [25]
The attachment by 10 September of a U.S. battalion of 105-mm. howitzersto each of the six ROK divisions then in action considerably increasedtheir combat effectiveness. But even with this new artillery, it must benoted that the ROK divisions had only approximately one-fourth the artillerysupport of that of the American divisions in Eighth Army. [20] It shouldnot have been surprising that sometimes the ROK divisions did not performas satisfactorily as the U.S. divisions.
A proper ration for the ROK soldier finally evolved after experimentationand testing, and was adopted in September. It provided 3,165 calories aday for an active 130-pound man. The ration included canned fish, fieldbiscuit, barley, rice, kelp, and tea. Supplemental items were furnishedfrom American stocks. This diet gave promise of improving the physicalstamina of the ROK soldier. [27]
Concurrent with the steps taken in August to rebuild the ROK Army, theFar East Command planned to incorporate 30,000 to 40,000 ROK recruits inthe four American divisions in Korea and the one still in Japan but scheduledto go to Korea. This was admittedly a drastic expedient to meet the replacementrequirement in the depleted American ground forces. As early as 10 August,Eighth Army began planning for the Korean augmentation, but it was notuntil 15 August that General MacArthur ordered it-General Walker was toincrease the strength of each company and battery of United States troopsby 100 Koreans. The Koreans legally would be part of the ROK Army and wouldbe paid and administered by the South Korean Government. They would receiveU.S. rations and special service items. The Far East Command initiallyexpected that each ROK recruit would pair with a United States soldier.[28]
Before the augmentation program began there had been a few cases inwhich American unit commanders had used volunteer South Koreans unofficiallyto strengthen their forces. One of the first of these officers, if notthe first, was Colonel Clainos, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion,7th Cavalry Regiment. About the first of August, just after Eighth Armyhad retired behind the Naktong River, four Korean officers and 133 menfrom the South Korean police at Taegu voluntarily joined Clainos' battalionon the unofficial basis that they would receive arms and food to the bestof Colonel Clainos' ability. A Lieutenant Chung, a Tokyo-trained Koreanwearing a Japanese samurai sword, marched his unit to the 1st Battalion.Colonel Clainos attached Lieutenant Chung to his staff and the other threeofficers to A, B and C Companies, respectively. He then attached two Koreanpolicemen to each rifle squad in the companies. Nine days after these Koreansjoined the 1st Battalion they took part in the battle at TriangulationHill, after the North Korean crossing of the Naktong in the 1st CavalryDivision sector. Two of them were killed in this action, and seven wounded.Of the wounded, all refused evacuation except one who could not walk. [29]
The U.S. 7th Infantry Division in Japan was far understrength, havingcontributed key personnel to the 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry Divisionsin succession when they mounted out for Korea. In an effort to rebuildthis division, the first Korean augmentation recruits were assigned toit rather than to the divisions in Korea. The first three platoons of 313recruits left Pusan by ship the morning of 16 August and arrived in Japanthe afternoon of the 18th. Once started, the shipments of recruits leftPusan at the rate of nearly 2,000 daily. The final shipment arrived atYokohama on the 24th and debarked the next day, making a total of 8,625Korean officers and men for the division. The South Korean Government atfirst obtained many of these recruits directly from the streets of Pusanand Taegu. In the contingents shipped to Japan, schoolboys still had theirschoolbooks; one recruit who had left home to obtain medicine for his sickwife still had the medicine with him. [30]
On 20 August, the American divisions in Korea received their first augmentationrecruits-the 24th and 25th Divisions, 250 each; the 2d and 1st CavalryDivisions, 249 each. For the next week each of the divisions received adaily average of 250 Korean recruits. On the 29th and 30th, the 1st CavalryDivision got an average of 740, and the 24th Division, 950 recruits daily.Near the end of August the plan changed so that every fourth day each divisionwould receive 500 men until it had a total of 8,300 Korean recruits. Exceptfor the first
[Caption] SOUTH KOREAN RECRUIT with an Americansoldier.
groups, the recruits received five days' training at the Kup'o-ri TrainingCenter near Pusan, which was opened 20 August. [31]
Even though it initially had been the intention of the Far East Commandto pair Korean augmentation recruits with American soldiers in a "buddysystem," this did not work out uniformly in practice in the EighthArmy. The 1st Cavalry and the 2d Infantry Divisions used the buddy system,with the American responsible for the training of the recruit in use ofweapons, drill, personal hygiene, and personal conduct. Two regiments ofthe 25th Division used the system, while the third placed the recruitsin separate platoons commanded by American officers and noncommissionedofficers. General Church directed the 24th Division to place all its augmentationrecruits in separate squads and platoons commanded by selected Korean officersand noncommissioned officers. These Korean squads and platoons were attachedto American units. [32]
Capt. Robert K. Sawyer who, as a 2d lieutenant, commanded a platoonof these new augmentation recruits in the Reconnaissance Company, 25thDivision, has given a fair appraisal of the typical Korean recruit in theUnited States Army in August and September 1950:
When a fresh batch arrived our First Sergeant ran them through a briefschooling on methods of attack, and they were ready for us. Recon Company'sROK contingent ate with us (our menu plus a huge, steaming plate of rice),but otherwise was a force apart.
About sixty ROK's were assigned to each Recon platoon, under the commandof an American Lieutenant, as support for the Recon platoon leader. Inother words, each Recon platoon had two U.S. officers; one for the Americans,the other for the ROK's. I had the latter job for a few weeks. On someoccasions I controlled forces consisting of nearly one hundred ROK's, plusten or twelve GI's scattered throughout for control. At other times I hada fifty-fifty combination. Sometimes the Americans predominated.
It is difficult for me to evaluate the Koreans who augmented our ranks.All in all, however, I was not impressed by my charges and was happy tosee the last of them. Mere recruits, they simply had not had time to becomesoldiers, and I used them for little more than carrying ammunition andrations. On the occasions I had to use them for fighting I spread my GI'saround and prayed that nothing of consequence would happen.
My ROK's were always hungry, and never did understand that the cardboardbox of C rations was meant for one day's subsistence. Often, an hour afterdoling out the one-box-per-man I have heard my interpreter ask me for more'chop-chop.' The Koreans had already eaten their entire day's supply! Invariablythey fell asleep when on guard, requiring constant checking by the Americans.And to make matters worse, most Koreans I have observed love to greet themorning sun with a song. This habit did not always fit into our securityplan.
In one action I had spread my ROK's in a half circle position, withGI's posted here and there along the line for control. Late in the morningone lone sniper fired at us, and immediately my ROK's went to pieces. Hysterical,they lay on the ground with faces pressed into the earth, weapons pointedin the general direction of the enemy, firing madly, wasting ammunition,completely out of hand. There was only one way to straighten out the situation,so my GI's and I went from ROK to ROK, kicking them and dragging them bodilyto where they could see. We eventually succeeded in quieting them down,and when the enemy attacked us later in the day my ROK's held pretty well.[33]
The buddy system of using the Korean augmentation recruits graduallybroke down and was abandoned. Most American soldiers did not like the system.Most units found they could employ the recruits, organized in ROK squadsand platoons with American officers and noncommissioned officers in charge,to best advantage as security guards, in scouting and patrolling, and inperforming various labor details. They were particularly useful in heavyweapons companies where the hand-carrying of machine guns, mortars, andrecoilless rifles and their ammunition over the rugged terrain was a gruelingjob. They also performed valuable work in digging and camouflaging defensivepositions. [34]
There also began in August the extensive use of Korean civilians withA-frames as cargo carriers up the mountains to the front lines. This methodof transport proved both cheaper and more efficient than using pack animals.American units obtained the civilian carriers through arrangements withthe ROK Army. Soon the American divisions were using Korean labor for nearlyall unskilled work, at an average of about 500 laborers and carriers toa division.
The U.S. divisions in Korea never received the number of Korean augmentationrecruits planned for them. In September the divisions began to take stepsto halt further assignments. In the middle of the month, the 24th Divisionrequested Eighth Army not to assign to it any more such troops until thedivision asked for them. As one observer wrote, "The Koreans haven'thad time to learn our Army technique. An American doughboy hated to havehis life dependent on whether his Oriental buddy knew enough to give himcovering fire at the right moment." [35] The language barrier, thedifference in loyalties, the lack of training in the recruits, and their relative combat ineffectivenessall put great strain on the attempt to integrate the Koreans. It was notstrange that as fast as American units obtained American replacements theydispensed with their Korean replacements. By winter, the buddy system hadbeen quietly dropped.
The last of the 2d Division's regiments, the 38th, known as "TheRock of the Marne" and commanded by Col. George B. Peploe, landedat Pusan on 19 August. The next day, 20 August, Eighth Army issued an operationaldirective ordering the 2d Infantry Division to relieve the 24th Divisionas soon as the 38th Regiment closed on Miryang. The 2d Division completedrelief of the 24th Division in its Naktong River positions on 24 Augustand Keiser, 2d Division commander, assumed responsibility for the sectorat 1800 that date.
The strength of the 24th Division on 25 August was approximately 10,600men. It needed about 8,000 replacements as well as quantities of arms,equipment, and vehicles to bring it up to war strength. The 19th Infantryand the 11th Field Artillery Battalion were attached to the 2d Divisionas a reserve force; the 21st Infantry became Eighth Army reserve; the restof the division assembled in the vicinity of Kyongsan, twelve miles southeastof Taegu. [36]
General Walker, after discussing the matter with General Church on 26August, ordered the 34th Infantry reduced to paper status and its personneland remaining equipment transferred to the 19th and 21st Regiments. Atthe same time, Eighth Army also reduced to paper status the 63d Field ArtilleryBattalion, which had been in support of the 34th Infantry, and transferredits troops and equipment to the newly activated C Batteries of the 11th,13th, and 52d Field Artillery Battalions. The effective dates for the transferwere 26 August for the artillery and 31 August for the infantry. The troopsof the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, were transferred to the 19th Infantryas its newly activated 3d Battalion and the men of the 3d Battalion, 34thInfantry, were transferred to the 21st Infantry as its newly activated2d Battalion. Out of the nearly 2,000 men who originally entered Koreawith the 34th Infantry on 3 July, there were 184 left in the regiment atthe end of August-the rest either had been killed, wounded, or were missingin action. Colonel Beauchamp was reassigned to the command of his old regiment,the 32d Infantry of the 7th Division. [37]
Simultaneously with this action, General Walker transferred the 5thRegimental Combat Team to the 24th Division as its third regiment. The5th Regimental Combat Team at this time numbered about 3,500 men. The 6thMedium Tank Battalion with about 650 men also was to be attached to the24th Division. The division still needed approximately 4,000 replacements.[38]
The 27th and 35th Regiments of the 25th Division had received theirthird battalions early in August with the transfer to them of the two battalionsof the 29th Infantry. The 1st Cavalry Division on 26 August received thethird battalions for its regiments in organizations sent from the UnitedStates. It also received 3 provisional artillery batteries to provide thethird firing battery for 3 battalions of artillery. At the end of August,therefore, the 4 U.S. divisions in Korea had finally built up their regimentsto the normal 3 battalions. [39]
In Eighth Army a confused order of battle had prevailed generally throughoutAugust. Battle conditions frequently had compelled the army to separatebattalions and regiments from their parent organizations and send themposthaste to distant points of the Pusan Perimeter to bolster a threatenedsector. All divisions except the 1st Cavalry at various times were brokenup by this process. At the end of August, Eighth Army made an effort tounscramble the disorder. It ordered the 23d Infantry on 28 August to leavethe Taegu front and return to 2d Division control at Miryang; it orderedthe 27th Infantry on 30 August to rejoin the 25th Division at Masan; andit ordered the 5th Regimental Combat Team north from the Masan area tojoin the 24th Division. [40]
The course of battle in the ROK eastern sector of the Perimeter andthe enemy advance down the Sangju-Taegu road during August caused GeneralWalker near the end of the month to decide on a shift of the boundary eastwardbetween the American and ROK troops. He considered the existing boundarynear the Sangju-Taegu road a source of military weakness. On 26; Augusthe ordered a new boundary line slanting southeast from a point two milesnorth of the Walled City of Ka-san to a point east of and below Taegu.This placed the Sangju-Taegu road and the former zone of the ROK 1st Divisionin the American zone. The 1st Cavalry Division was to move eastward intothe ROK 1st Division zone, and the U.S. 2d Division at the same time wasto extend its zone northward into the 1st Cavalry zone. The shift of unitswas to take place as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 August.[41]
Pursuant to the army directive, General Gay on 28 August ordered the7th Cavalry Regiment to occupy the left (west) part of the ROK 1st Divisionsector and the 8th Cavalry Regiment to occupy the right (east) part. Thisshift placed the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments in mountainous terrain northof Taegu. The supply of these units now became much more difficult thanit had been along the Naktong. On 29 August, the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry,relieved the 7th Cavalry Regiment in the southern part of the division sector,and the 7th Cavalry in turn relieved the ROK 13th Regiment and part ofthe 12th. When the newly arrived 3d Battalion of the 5th Cavalry assumedresponsibility on 30 August for the generally quiet 14,000-yard sectorof the 8th Cavalry Regiment, the result was a 32,000-yard front for the5th Cavalry. The 8th Cavalry Regiment then moved to the sectors of theROK 11th and part of the 12th Regiments. The 1st Cavalry Division completedthe relief of the ROK 1st Division at 1300 on 30 August, whereupon theROK division moved to its new sector just eastward of the new boundary.The contemplated shift of the 2d Division zone of responsibility northwardproved impracticable because the area could be supplied only over the roadnet from Taegu, and Eighth Army reestablished the old boundary betweenthe two divisions, effective 30 August. To defend this old 7th Cavalrysector, Eighth Army attached the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, to the 1stCavalry Division. [42]
On 30 August the 714th Transportation Railway Operating Battalion arrivedin Korea and became responsible for operating the approximately 500 milesof rail lines within the Pusan Perimeter. [43] The rail lines usually carriedsupplies from Pusan to a division railhead. From there they were truckedforward to regiment and battalion.
August was a month of heavy casualties for Eighth Army. Battle casualtiesin its four divisions were for the 24th Division, 1,941; 25th Division,1,800; 1st Cavalry Division, 1,503; and the 9th Regiment of the 2d Division,827. Nonbattle casualties were high in all units, many of them caused byheat exhaustion; the 9th Regiment alone had 419 nonbattle casualties. Lossamong officers was very heavy. [44]
During the same period, battle losses had been far greater in the ROKArmy than in United States forces, but nonbattle casualties were fewer.On some days ROK battle losses were wholly disproportionate to American.As extreme examples, on 6 August American battle losses were 74, the ROK1,328; on 21 August the American battle losses were 49, the ROK, 2,229.[45]
As is customary in most army and theater zones of military action, EighthArmy had prepared plans to meet all eventualities anticipated as probable.In early August, General MacArthur outlined to General Walker a defenseline closer to Pusan than the Naktong River line. He wanted this line preparedfor occupancy in the event Eighth Army could not stop the North Koreansat the Naktong. On 11 August, General Walker verbally instructed Brig.Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, an Engineer officer, to lay out this secondarydefense line. Davidson, after looking over the ground, recommended to GeneralWalker that because of better defensive terrain the line should be somewhatfarther back toward Pusan than General MacArthur had indicated. GeneralWalker replied that the line would be constructed where General MacArthur had indicated it shouldgo. General Davidson began laying out the line with very few resources.He received some help from Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin and the 2d LogisticalCommand at Pusan and from the 2d and 25th Divisions. This line, known asthe Davidson Line, began on the east coast at Sodong-ni, approximatelyeight miles north of Ulsan, and extended generally west along high groundto a point northeast of Miryang, then curved down the ridge east of Muan-ni,turned south across the Naktong River and anchored on the high ground northeastof Masan. General Walker would not approve Davidson's recommendation toremove all houses from in front of the line to clear a field of fire. Davidsonsucceeded in laying a trace of the line on the ground, cleared fields offire except for houses, ordered material for fortifications, and was ableto have a few positions dug before he reported to the 24th Division asassistant division commander on the first of September. [46 ]
While General Walker had many capable staff officers at his Eighth Armyheadquarters at this time, perhaps none was more valuable to him than Col.John A. Dabney, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, who had joined the Armyin Korea during July. Dabney was quiet and unassuming, possessed of a goodmind, sound professional knowledge, persistent in his search of facts,and blessed with a fine judgment in evaluating combat information. He showedcommon sense throughout the critical Naktong battles of the Perimeter,and was a trusted and valued adviser to General Walker and his chief ofstaff.
At the beginning of September the United Nations had a large numericalsuperiority of men in the line divisions and in army reserve. In the skiesover the battlefield and in the coastal waters guarding the Perimeter flanks,United Nations aerial and naval might was virtually uncontested. Approximately600 American medium tanks mounting 90-mm. and 76-mm. guns were in the battlearea on 1 September, as contrasted with probably not more than 100 NorthKorean Russian-built medium T34 tanks mounting 85-mm. guns. Eighth Armyalso had overwhelming superiority in artillery and mortar fire.
The Eighth Army intelligence officer on 30 August estimated that thetwelve known enemy rifle divisions had an effective strength of 82,590men, with combat effectiveness varying between 27 percent for the 13thand 15th Divisions to 96 percent for the 7th and 100 percentfor the 2d Division. His estimate gave the North Korean divisionsa loss of 26,820 men in August against a gain of only .1,800 replacements.[47] This estimate, as noted below, was not entirely correct.
In their action against the Perimeter in August the plan and tacticsof the North Koreans showed no departure from those that had characterizedtheir advance south of the Han River in July. Their divisions simply followedthe American and ROK forces on all avenues leading south and closed withthem as soon as possible. Enemy action followed the familiar pattern offrontal holding attack, envelopment of the flank, and infiltration to therear. These tactics had paid high dividends during July when the NorthKoreans were numerically superior to the forces opposing them and whenthere was no continuous and connected defense line across the width ofKorea. When Eighth Army and the ROK Army withdrew into the Pusan Perimeterin early August and there stabilized a line in relatively connected althoughthinly held defense positions, these tactics failed for the first timein the war to accomplish their desired result.
The battle line on both flanks rested on the sea. U.N. naval forcessecured these flanks. Flanking operations and a tactical decision by grandmaneuver were now impossible. Success could come to the North Korean commandnow in only one way-by frontal attack and penetration of the Perimeterdefense followed by immediate exploitation.
Generals MacArthur and Walker applied classical principles of defensein the Pusan Perimeter battles-interior lines of communications for movementof supplies and reinforcements, superior artillery fire power to breakthe offensive spirit of enemy soldiers and reduce their numbers, and astrong air force which is ideally suited for operational defense becauseit can intervene quickly in adding its fire power to turn the tide of battle.
The North Korean Army strength during August fell below the combinedstrength of the U.S. Eighth and the
ROK Armies. It is certain also that its combat effectiveness at thefirst of September was considerably below what it had been a month earlier.While its numbers may have been as large, its trained troops, tanks, andheavy weapons were fewer. Many of the recruits that filled the North Koreandivisions in September had no small arms.
The North Korea People's Army had shown a remarkable ability to maintaintransport to its front lines over long lines of communications despiteheavy and constant air attacks. This accomplishment is one of the outstandingfeats of the North Korean war effort in the Pusan Perimeter period. TheUnited Nations air effort failed to halt military rail transport. Ammunitionand motor fuel, which took precedence over all other types of supply, continuedto arrive at the front, though in diminished quantity. There was stilla considerable resupply of heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, andmortars, at the front in early September, although a steady decline inartillery can be traced from the middle of August. There was a sufficientsupply of small arms ammunition, but a shortage of small arms themselvesbecame apparent by mid-August and continued to worsen with each passingweek. Rear areas were able to fill only about one third of the requisitionsfrom the front for small arms in mid-August and resupply ceased entirelyabout the middle of September. New trucks were almost impossible to obtain.There was no resupply of clothing. At best there were rations for onlyone or two meals a day. Most units had to live at least partially off thecountry. By 1 September the food situation was so bad in the North KoreanArmy at the front that most of the soldiers showed a loss of stamina with resulting impairedcombat effectiveness. [48]
The North Koreans directed the Pusan Perimeter battles from their FrontHeadquarters in Kumch'on. Marshal Choe Yong Gun, the North KoreanMinister of Defense, was Deputy Commander of the North Korean Armed Forces.He had formerly been associated with the Chinese Communist 8th RouteArmy. In command of the Front Headquarters duringAugust and September was General Kim Chaek. His chief of staff was Lt.Gen. Kang Kon until the latter was killed near Andong by a land mine explosionon 8 September.
The II Corps from its headquarters at Mun'gyong directedthe action from north of Taegu eastward to the coast. Lt. Gen. Kim Mu Chong,a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy under Chiang Kai-shek and aCommunist veteran of the Chinese wars, commanded the II Corps.He had accompanied Mao Tse Tung on the "Long March" and reportedlywas the only one of thirty Koreans to survive that march.
The I Corps, which had captured Seoul in the early daysof the war, had direct charge under the Front Headquartersfor the western half of the enemy arc around the Perimeter, from Waegwansouth to the Korea Strait. Lt. Gen. Kim Ung, a spectacular soldier, commandedthe I Corps. Kim had gone from Korea to the Whampoa MilitaryAcademy and eventually served with the Communist 8th RouteArmy in North China where reportedly he became a brigade or divisioncommander. He was generally considered the ablest of the North Korean fieldcommanders. He was energetic and harsh, feared rather than loved by hissubordinates. His I Corps headquarters was at Chon-ju. [49]
With time running against it, the North Korean High Command prepareda massive co-ordinated offensive all around the Pusan Perimeter for thefirst of September. As the North Korea People's Army prepared for its greateffort, it brought 13 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 2 armoredbrigades, and miscellaneous security forces into the line. On the ICorps front, reaching from opposite Taegu southward along the NaktongRiver, in line from north to south, were the 10th, 2d, 4th,9th, 7th, and 6th Infantry Divisions.Elements of the 105th Armored Division and the newlyarrived 16th Armored Brigade supported these troops.The 16th Armored Brigade, really a regiment, had forty-threenew T34 tanks when it left P'yongyang in August to take part in the Septemberoffensive. Back of the 6th Division was the 104thSecurity Brigade. Deployed along the II Corpsfront from northwest of Taegu eastward to the coast and in line from westto east were the 3d, 13th, 1st, 8th, 15th,12th, and 5th Infantry Divisions. Elementsof the 105th Armored Division and the newly arrived17th Armored Brigade supported this corps. The 17thArmored Brigade, also actually a regiment, had forty new tanks when it left P'yongyang. Most, if notall, of the tanks in the two brigades apparently arrived in P'yongyangon or about 23 August, coming from the Russians by way of Manchuria. Trainedcrews were immediately assigned to the tanks. The two armored brigadeseach had two battalions; each battalion was composed of four tank companies.The two new armored brigades moved to the front by rail at night. [50]
Other than the 17th Armored Brigade, the IICorps had no new units along the northern and eastern front forthe September offensive. In the I Corps sector were two newand previously uncommitted infantry formations to strengthen the assaultforces there. The 9th Infantry Division, formed aroundthe old 3d Border Constabulary, arrived in the Hyopch'onarea from Seoul (less its 3d Regiment which remained at Inch'on)on or about 25 August. The 7th Infantry Division,in the Chinju-Masan area, had not been committed except for two battalionsthat fought briefly against ROK marines at T'ongyong. [51]
The North Korean force assembled at the front on 1 September for the assault against the Pusan Perimeter numbered about 98,000 men. Perhaps a third were raw recruits, most of them forcibly conscripted in South Korea and hastened to the front with little or no training and with few weapons. It is believed that the major organizations had personnel strength approximately as follows: [52]
| Total | 97,850 |
| 1st Infantry Division | 5,000 |
| 2d Infantry Division | 6,000 |
| 3d Infantry Division | 7,000 |
| 4th Infantry Division | 5,500 |
| 5th Infantry Division | 7,000 |
| 6th Infantry Division | 10,000 |
| 7th Infantry Division | 9,000 |
| 8th Infantry Division | 6,500 |
| 9th Infantry Division | 9,350 |
| 10th Infantry Division | 7,500 |
| 12th Infantry Division | 5,000 |
| 13th Infantry Division | 9,000 |
| 15th Infantry Division | 7,000 |
| 104th Security Brigade | 2,000 |
| 105th Armored Division | 1,000 |
| 16th Armored Brigade | 500 |
| 17th Armored Brigade | 500 |
Planning for the massive attack was under way for at least the lastten days of August since the N.K. Army operational order for the ICorps attack was issued on or about 20 August. The enemy plan indicatedfive major groupings of assault units and objectives:
1. 6th and 7th Divisions to break through the U.S.25th Division to Masan in the south.
2. 9th, 4th, 2d, and 10th Divisionsto break through the U.S. 2d Division to Miryang and the Pusan-Taegu railroadand highway by way of Changnyong and Yongsan.
3. 3d, 13th, and 1st Divisions to breakthrough the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the ROK 1st Division to Taegu.
4. 8th and 15th Divisions to break through theROK 8th and 6th Divisions to Hayang and Yongch'on in the lateral corridoreast of Taegu.
5. 12th and 5th Divisions to break through theROK Capital and 3d Divisions to P'ohang-dong, Yonil Airfield, and the Kyongjucorridor to Pusan.
Assault groupings 1 and 2 of I Corps were to begin theirco-ordinated attacks at 2330, 31 August; assault groupings 3, 4, and 5of II Corps were to attack at 1800, 2 September. [53]
[1] Hq, X Corps, Analysis of the Air-Ground Operation. System, 28 Jun-8 Sep 50. A tactical air control party is described above, p. 95.
[2] USAF Hist Study 71, pp. 14, 46; 25th Div WD, 21 Aug 50; New York Times, August 29, 1950. Hess was an ordained minister in the Campbellite Church of the Disciples of Christ. See Newsweek, August 1, 1955, p. 28, for Hess' subsequent service in Korea.
[3] USAF Hist Study 71, pp. 18, 20.
[4] "Air War in Korea," op. cit., IV, No. 2, 19-39; Col Raymond S. Sleeper, "Korean Targets for Medium Bombardment," Air University Quarterly Review, IV, No. 3 (Spring, 1951), 21-22.
[5] Sleeper, "Korean Targets for Medium Bombardment," op. cit., pp. 24-26; Air Intelligence Digest, September 1950; Hq X Corps, A General Review of U.S. Tactical Air Support in Korea, 28 Jun-8 Sep 50, p. 61; New York Times, August 16, 1950.
[6] Sleeper, "Korean Targets for Medium Bombardment," op. cit., p. 66; USAF Hist Study 71, p. 45.
[7] GHQ FEC G-3, Opn Rpts 57, 20 Aug, and 62, 25 Aug 50; Ibid., Sitrep, 25 Aug 50; USAF Hist Study 71, pp. 41-44; Sleeper, "Korean Targets for Medium Bombardment," op. cit., p. 65. The Bomber Command made eighty-six sorties with 64, tons of demolition bombs against this bridge.
[8] USAF Hist Study 7,, pp. 44-45; Operations Research Office, The Employment of Armor in Korea, ORO-R-1 (FEC), vol. 1, pp. 212-13.
[9] ORO, Close Air Support Operation in Korea, ORO-R-3 (FEC), pp. 37-38, 59, 344-45. Experiments by Eighth Army disclosed that in a napalm burst of two 110-gallon tanks, the intense flame lasted for only approximately twelve seconds and was entirely burned out in twenty seconds. The burst covered an area of about 15,000 square feet; it was considered effective in an area fifty yards square.
[10] GHQ FEC Sitreps, 8, 11, 23, 27 Aug 50; EUSAK WD, 8 Aug 50.
[11] EUSAK WD, G-4 Jnl, 10 Aug 50 (Rear, Yokohama); Ibid., G-4 Sec, 11-12 Aug 50; GHQ FEC Sitrep, 18 Aug 50; GHQ FEC G-3, Opn Rpts 57, 20 Aug, 66, 29 Aug, and 67, 30 Aug 50.
[12] Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch. III, p. 29; 6th Med Tk Bn Opn Jnl, 23 Jul, 7-8 Aug 50: GHQ FEC Sitrep, Jul 50.
[13] Arty School, Ft. Sill, Employment of Armor in Korea, The First Year, vol. 1, pp. 51-52; GHQ FEC G-3, Opn Rpt 64, 27 Aug 50; ORO, The Employment of Armor in Korea, ORO-R-I (FEC), vol. I, p. 167. The tank units in Korea in August were: 1st Marine Tank Battalion; U.S. Army 6th, 70th, 72d, 73d, and 88th Tank Battalions; Regimental tank company with the 5th RCT, three regimental tank companies with the 2d Infantry Division; and the light tanks of the reconnaissance companies of the 2d, 24th, and 25th Infantry, and the 1st Cavalry Divisions.
[14] Schnabel FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch. III, pp. 24, 33.
[15] Japan Logistical Comd, Hist Sec, Logistical Problems and Their Solutions, 25 Aug-31 Aug 50, p. 6 (15 Feb 52); GHQ FEC, Ann Narr Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, p. 32.
[16] EUSAK WD and PIR 50, 31 Aug 50: Ibid., Sep 50 Summ; GHQ FEC Sitrep, 1 Sep 50. A postwar tabulation, ROK and UN Ground Forces Strength in Korea, 31 July 1950-31 July 1953, prepared by COA, 7 Oct 54 (copy in OCMH), shows a strength of 90,092 for Eighth Army, 126,580 for the ROK Army, and 4,468 for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.
[17] EUSAK WD, 4 Sep 50, sec 23, GO 52.
[18] EUSAK WD, 29 Aug 50; Ibid., G-3 Sec, Troop Control, 29 Aug 50: Ibid., POR 139, 28 Aug 50; Maj Gen B. A. Coad, "The Land Campaign in Korea," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (February, 1952), vol. XCVII, No. 585 (lecture given 29 Oct 51); New York Times, August 26, 1950; New York Herald Tribune, August 30, 1950, Bigart dispatch from Pusan.
[19] GHQ FEC, Ann Narr Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-21 Oct 50, ch. II.
[20] 25th Div WD, 11-19, 31 Aug 50; 2d Div Public Info Off file, Aug 50.
[21] EUSAK WD, Aug 50, 25 Aug; Ibid., Sig Sec and G-3 Sec, 11 Aug 50; Ibid., Aug 50, 11 Aug, p. 59.
[22] 0RO, Close Air Support Operations in Korea, ORO-R-3 (FEC), pp. 27-28, 42.
[23] Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch. IV, pp. 29. 33; GHQ FEC Sitrep, 10 Aug 50.
[24] EUSAK WD, G-4, 19 Aug 50; Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch. IV, pp. 31-33; ORO, Utilization of Indigenous Manpower in Korea, ORO-R-4 (FEC), Table XXII, p. 65.
[25] GHQ FEC G-3, Opn Rpts 61, 24 Aug, and 65, 28 Aug 50; Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch. IV, pp. 32-33.
[26] EUSAK WD, 11 Sep 50, Arty Rpt, sec 5. Artillery was assigned to the ROK divisions as follows: 10th FA Bn to Capital Div; 17th FA Bn to 1st Div; 11th FA Bn to 3d Div; 16th FA Bn to 6th Div; 18th FA Bn to 7th Div; 50th FA Bn to 8th Div.
[27] EUSAK WD, sec 17, Quartermaster Rpt, 13 Sep 50.
[28] EUSAK WD, 10 and 20 Aug 50: Ibid., Off Asst CofS, G-1, 15 Aug 50; GHQ FEC Sitreps, 10 and 19 Aug 50.
[29] Ltr, Clainos to author, n.d., but recd May 54.
[30] EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 19 Aug 50: Ibid., 20 Aug 50; Ibid., G-1 Sec Rpt, 24 Aug 50; ORO, Close Air Support Operations in Korea, ORO-R-4 (FEC), p. 54.
[31] 25th Div WD, 20 Aug 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 20 Aug 50; GHQ FEC Sitrep, 21 Aug 50; ORO, Close Air Support Operations in Korea, ORO-R-4 (FEC), Table XVII, pt. 1, pp. 52, 54-56, 60-62; Lt Ed. E. Balforth, "Getting Our ROK's," U.S. Combat Forces Journal (February, 1951), p. 23.
[32] EUSAK WD, Memo from Asst CofS G-1, 5 Sep 50, sub: Korean Augmentation; 19th Inf WD, 29 Aug 50; 35th Inf WD, 20 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, G-1 Hist Rpt, 3-4 Sep 50; 25th Div WD, 4 Sep 50.
[33] Sawyer, Notes on Korea, Aug-Nov 50, prepared for author in 1952.
[34] 25th Div WD, 31 Aug 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 29 Aug 50 Maj Norman F. J. Allen, Korean Army Troops, U.S.A. (KATUSA), student MS, Advanced Inf Course. Class 2, Inf School, Ft. Benning, Gal, 1952-53. This is an interesting case study of augmentation in one rifle company. The Korean carrier received a wage of 500 won daily (12 1/2 cents) and a rice ration.
[35] Hal Boyle, "The AP Reports on the Buddy System," U.S. Combat Forces Journal (February, 1951), p. 23; 24th Div WD, G-1 Stf Sec Summ, 26 Aug -28 Sep 50.
[36] 24th Div WD, 20-26 Aug 50; 2d Div POR 64. 24 Aug 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 24 Aug 50.
[37] EUSAK WD, GO 37, 26 Aug 50; Ibid., GO 37, 28 Aug 50; 34th Inf WD, 26 Aug 50; 24th Div WD. G-4 Opn Highlights, 26 Aug-29 Sep 50; 24th Div WD, 31 Aug 50; 19th Inf WD, Pers Summ 26 Aug-28 Sep 50; 34th Inf WD, Summ, 22 Jul-26 Aug 50; Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52. The 34th Infantry from 5 July to 23 August had suffered 1,714 casualties-98 KIA, 569 WIA, 773 MIA, and 274 nonbattle casualties.
[38] 24th Div WD, 29 Aug 50; Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52. Given his choice, General Church chose to have the 5th RCT as his third regiment rather than rebuild the 34th Infantry with replacements.
[39] EUSAK WD, 26 Aug 50; 5th and 8th Cav Regts WD, 26 Aug 50; 7th Cav WD, 27 Aug 50; EUSAK GO 182, 29 Aug 50. The 3d Bn, 7th Regt, 3d Inf Div, from Fort Devens, Mass., became the 3d Bn, 8th Cav; the 2d Bn, 30th Inf Regt, 3d Div, from Fort Benning became the 3d Bn, 7th Cav, and a battalion from Camp Carson became the 3d Bn, 5th Cav Regt.
[40] EUSAK WD, 30 Aug 50: GHQ FEC G-3 Opn Rpt 65, 28 Aug 50.
[41] EUSAK WD, Opn Dir, 26 Aug 50. For a description of the Walled City of Ka-san, see pages 422-23, below.
[42] 1st Cav Div WD, 28-29 Aug 50; EUSAK POR 144, 29 Aug and POR 147, 30 Aug 50; 5th Cav WD, 27 Aug 50.
[43] Mossman and Middleton, Logistical Problems and Their Solutions, p. 53.
[44] 25th Div WD, 26 and 31 Aug 50; 1st Cav Div WD, Aug 50 Summ; 2d Div WD, G-1 Sec, 9 Jul-Aug 50; Ltr, Asst CofS to CG 2d Div; 24th Div WD, AG Sec, 1-26 Aug 50, 23 Aug.
[45] GHQ FEC G-3 Opn Rpts 39-67, 2-30 Aug 50.
[46] Interv, author with Maj Gen Garrison H. Davidson. 28 Jan 54; Ltr, Dabney to author, 19 Jan 54.
[47] EUSAK WD and PIR 49, 30 Aug 50; Ibid., Sep 50 Summ. On 1 September the United Nations held 1,753 North Korean prisoners-1,372 captured by ROK forces, 381 by Eighth Army.
[48] DA Intel Rev, Dec 50, 175, pp. 36-38, ATIS Interrog Rpts, Issue 3, Rpt 895, p. 214, Maj Kim Song Won, CO 19th Regt, 13th Div.
[49] GHQ FEC, History of the North Korean Army, pp. 41, 84, 91-94 98; ATIS Enemy Docs, Issue 9, p. 66, ltr, Kim Man Hwa to Col Lee Hak Ku, CofS N.K. 13th Div, 8 Sep 50; New York Times, August 25 and September 11, 1950.
[50] GHQ FEC, History of the North Korean Army; ATIS Res Supp InterrogRpts, issues for the N.K. divisions previously cited; ORO, EmploymentofArmor in Korea, ORO-R-1 (FEC), vol. 1, p. 165, app. F (Apr 51); EUSAK WD, 9 Sep 50, PW Rpts, ad Lt Won Hong Ki and Sgt Choi Soong Moon; Ibid.,PIR 55, 5 Sep 50.
[51] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 8th Div), p. 49;Ibid., Issue 99 (N. K. 7th Div), p. 35. [52] These figures are based on information derived from enemy material: ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issues 3, 4, 94, 96, 99, 100, 104 (N.K. 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th Divs); GHQ FEC, History of the North Korean Army.
[53] GHQ FEC, History of the North Korean Army, pp. 57, 65, 73; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div) pp. 40-42; Ibid., Issue 3 (N.K. 15th Div), p. 44; ATIS Enemy Docs, Issue 9, p. 65, notebooks belonging to Col Lee Hak Ku, CofS 13th Div, gives summary of order from Mu Chong, CG N.K. II Corps; Ibid., p. 69, ltr from Choe Fam, CO 21st Regt, 13th Div, to Col Lee Hak Ku, 2 Sep 50.
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