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CHAPTER XXIIINorth Korean Break-through in the South |
The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary PeopleHistory |
| Exact knowledge of the terrain regulates the dispositions of the troopsand the order of battle.... Knowledge of the country is to a general whata rifle is to an infantryman and what the rules of arithmetic are to ageometrician. |
| FREDERICK THE GREAT, Instructions for His Generals |
The dog days of August had given way to September. Casualties duringthe next two weeks were to be the greatest of the Korean War. To the menof Eighth Army, these were to be the worst of "the days along theNaktong." And, as if to envelop this deadly clash of arms with a miseryof nature's own making, the elements brought to the battlefield blackenedskies and torrential rains. It was the end of the summer monsoon season.
Aerial reconnaissance in the last week of August had disclosed to EighthArmy exceptional enemy activity behind the lines opposite the U.S. 2d and25th Divisions in the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter. Ominously,the enemy had built three new underwater bridges across the Nam River infront of the 35th Infantry in the 25th Division sector. Aerial bombingonly temporarily and partially destroyed these bridges, for they couldbe repaired overnight.
Eighth Army intelligence credited the North Koreans with having movedone or two new divisions and about twenty tanks to the Hyopch'on area onthe west side of the Naktong River opposite the U.S. 2d Division. On 28August the Eighth Army intelligence officer warned that a general attack"may be expected at any time along the 2d Division and 25th Divisionfront," aimed at severing the Taegu-Pusan railroad and highway andcapturing Masan. [1]
With this tense situation as the setting, the N.K. I Corpsbefore midnight 31 August started its great offensive. As the final hoursof August gave way to the first hours of September, North Korean soldierycrossed the lower Naktong at a number of points in a well-planned attack.From Hyongp'ung southward to the coast, in the zones of the U.S. 2d and25th Divisions, the enemy's greatest effort struck in a single massivecoordinated attack.
In the southern part of its sector, where the U.S. 25th Division heldthe U.N. line, the N.K. I Corps planned a crushing blow,co-ordinating it with an attack against the 2d Division just to the north. The North Korean 6thand 7th Divisions prepared for the breakthrough effort againstthe 25th Division after receiving their attack orders about 20 August.The operation order called for the N.K. I Corps to assaultall along the line at 2200, 31 August. The 6th Division,farthest south on the enemy right flank, was to attack through Haman, Masan,and Chinhae and capture Kumhae. on the west side of the Naktong River deltafifteen miles from Pusan, by 3 September. The division zone of attack wasto be south of the Chinju-Komam-ni (Saga)-Masan highway. The 7thDivision, next in line north of the 6th Division,was to attack north of the Masan highway, wheel left to the Naktong, andwait for the 6th Division on its right and the 9thon its left to join it. Part of the 7th Division was concentratedin the Uiryong area west of the Nam River. This plan pitted the 6thDivision against the 24th Infantry and the 7th Divisionagainst the 35th Infantry. [2]
On 24 August, Maj. Gen. Pang Ho San, commanding general of the N.K.6th Division, much decorated for the exploits of his divisionthus far, issued an order calculated to improve troop morale. He said themission of the division was "to liberate Masan and Pusan within afew days." He demanded stricter discipline and more perseverance thanever before, and stated that tactics must adjust to the changes "thisepoch-making conflict has introduced into the art of warfare." Hesummed up the battle lessons:
Our experience in night combat up to now shows that we can operate onlyfour or five hours in the dark since we start night attacks between 2300and 2400 hours, and, therefore, if the battle continues until dawn, weare likely to suffer losses. From now on, use daylight hours for full combatpreparation, and commence attacks soon after sunset. Concentrate your battleactions mostly at night and capture enemy base positions. From midnighton, engage enemy in close combat by approaching to within 100 to 150 metersof him. Then, even with the break of dawn, the enemy planes will not beable to distinguish friend from foe, which will enable you to prevent greatlosses. This is the most valuable battle experience we have gained fromthe Chinju operation. [3]
On 31 August 1950 the 25th Division held a front of almost thirty miles,beginning in the north at the Namji-ri bridge over the Naktong River andextending westward on the hills south of the river to the Nam's confluencewith it. (Map V) It then bent southwest up the south sideof the Nam to where the Sobuk-san mountain mass tapered down in its northernextremity to the river. There the line turned south along rising groundto 850-foot-high Sibidang-san (Hill 276), crossed the saddle on its southface through which passed the Chinju-Masan railroad and highway, and continuedsouthward, climbing to 2,200-foot-high Battle Mountain (Hill 665) and onto 2,400-foot-high P'il-bong (Hill 743). From P'il-bong the line droppeddown spur ridge lines to the southern coastal road near Chindong-ni.
Colonel Fisher's 35th Infantry held the northern part of the divisionline, approximately 26,000 yards of it from the Namji-ri bridge to theChinju-Masan highway. The regiment was responsible for the highway. ColonelFisher considered his weakest and most vulnerable point to be a 3-milegap along the Naktong River between most of F Company on the west and its1st Platoon to the east. This platoon guarded the Namji-ri cantilever steelbridge on the division extreme right at the boundary with the 2d Divisionacross the Naktong.
South of the highway, Colonel Champney's 24th Infantry held the highcountry west of Haman up to and including Battle Mountain and P'il-bong.Colonel Throckmorton's 5th Infantry held the southern spur of Sobuk-santo the coastal road at Chindong-ni. From Chindong-ni some ROK Marine unitscontinued the line to the southern coast. General Kean's 5th Division commandpost was at Masan; Colonel Fisher's 35th Infantry command post was on theeast side of the Chirwon-Chung-ni road about midway between the two towns;Colonel Champney's 24th Infantry command post was at Haman; and ColonelThrockmorton's command post was at Chindong-ni. [4]
In the left center of the 25th Division line, Lt. Col. Paul F. Roberts'2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, held the crest of the second ridge west of Haman,a little more than a mile from the town. From Chungam-ni, in enemy territory,a secondary road zigzagged to Haman along the shoulders of low hills andacross paddy ground, running generally east a mile south of the main Chinju-Masanroad. It came through Colonel Roberts' 2d Battalion position in a passa little more than a mile directly west of Haman.
Late in the afternoon of 31 August, observers with G Company, 24th Infantry,noticed a lot of activity a mile to their front. They called in two airstrikes that hit this enemy area at twilight. Artillery also took it underfire. All line units were alerted for a possible enemy attack. [5]
Shortly before midnight the North Koreans struck, first hitting F Companyon the north side of the pass on the Chungam-ni-Haman road. The ROK troopsin the pass left their positions and fell back on G Company south of thepass. The North Koreans captured a 75-mm. recoilless rifle in the mouthof the pass and turned it on American tanks, knocking out two of them.They then overran a section of 82-mm. mortars at the east end of the pass.South of the pass, at dawn, 1st Lt. Houston M. McMurray found that only15 out of 69 men remained with him, 8 from his own 1st Platoon, G Company,and 7 ROK's of a group he had taken into his position during the night.The enemy attacked his position at first light. They came through an openingin the barbed wire, supposedly covered by a BAR, but the BAR men had fled.Throwing grenades and spraying the area with burp gun fire, the North Koreansquickly overran the position. [6]
Farther up the slope, enemy tank fire hit E Company at midnight. Thecompany commander, 1st Lt. Charles Ellis, an able and courageous officer,ran over to his left flank when he heard a noise there. He found that his3d Platoon was leaving its position. Ellis threatened the platoon leader,saying he would shoot him if he did not get back in position, and fireda shot between his feet to impress him. Ellis then went to his right flankand found that platoon also leaving its position. During the night everyonein E Company ran off the hill except Ellis and eleven men. Several E Companymen in fleeing their position had run through their own mine field andwere killed.
It is worthwhile to anticipate a bit and tell the fate of Ellis andhis small group of men who stood their ground. Enemy fire pinned them downafter daylight. When three or four of the group tried to run for it, enemymachine gun fire killed them. Ellis and the rest stayed in their holeson the hill for two days, repelling several attacks in that time. Elliswas then able to withdraw southward up the mountain to the 3d Battalion'sposition. In his withdrawal, Ellis, discovering a man who had been injuredearlier in a mine explosion, entered the mine field to rescue him. [7]
The fact is that shortly after the enemy attack started most of the2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, fled its positions. The enemy passed throughthe line quickly and overran the 2d Battalion command post, killing manymen there and destroying much equipment. Haman was then open to directattack. As the enemy encircled Haman, Colonel Roberts, the 2d Battalioncommander, ordered an officer to take remnants of the battalion and establisha roadblock at the south edge of the town. Although the officer directeda large group of men to accompany him, only eight did so. The 2d Battalionwas no longer an effective fighting force. [8]
Colonel Champney at 0400, 1 September, moved the 24th Regiment commandpost from Haman two miles northeast to a narrow defile on the New EngineerRoad. At this time, an enemy group attacked C Battery, 159th Field ArtilleryBattalion, a mile north of Haman. Two tanks of the 88th Tank Battalionhelped defend the battery until the artillerymen could pull out the howitzersand escape back through Haman and then eastward over this recently improvedtrail. [9]
The enemy assault did not strike the southern part of the line heldby Corley's 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, and Colonel Throckmorton's 5thInfantry. That part of the line, however, did receive artillery and mortarfire and some diversionary light attacks. About 0200, 1 September, menin an outpost on the right flank of Colonel Corley's battalion watchedan estimated 600 enemy soldiers file past at a distance of 100 yards, goingin the direction of Haman. Viewed during the night from the high groundof the 3d Battalion, Haman seemed to be in flames. At dawn, men in thebattalion saw an estimated 800 enemy troops enter the town. [10]
When the enemy attack broke through the 2d Battalion, Colonel Champneyordered the 1st Battalion, about three miles south of Haman on the Chindong-niroad, to counterattack and restore the line. Colonel Roberts, a superiorbattalion commander, assembled all the men of the disorganized 2d Battalionhe could find-about forty-to join in this counterattack, which got underway at 0730. But it was of short duration. Upon contact with the enemy,the 1st Battalion broke and fled to the rear. Thus, shortly after daylightthe scattered and disorganized men of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the24th Infantry had fled to the high ground two miles east of Haman. Thebetter part of two regiments of the N.K. 6th Division pouredinto and through the 3-mile-wide Haman gap. [11]
Meanwhile, action-packed events were taking place simultaneously tothe north, on the right side of the 25th Division line. Half an hour beforemidnight, 31 August, an enemy self-propelled high-velocity gun from acrossthe Nam fired shells into the position of G Company, 35th Infantry, overlookingthe river.
Within a few minutes, enemy artillery had taken under fire all front-linerifle companies of the regiment from the Namji-ri bridge west. Under coverof this fire a reinforced regiment of the N.K. 7th Divisioncrossed the Nam River and attacked F and G Companies, 35th Infantry. Otherenemy soldiers crossed the Nam on an underwater bridge in front of thepaddy ground north of Komam-ni and near the boundary between the 2d Battalion,led by Lt. Col. John L. Wilkins, Jr., holding the river front and Lt. Col.Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion holding the hill line that stretchedfrom the Nam River to Sibidang-san and the Chinju-Masan highway.
In the low ground between these two battalions at the river ferry crossingsite, Colonel Fisher had placed about 300 ROK police. He expected themto hold there long enough in case of a major attack to serve as a warningdevice. Guns from the flanking hills there could cover the low ground withfire. Back of Komam-ni he held the 3d Battalion ready for use in counterattackto stop an enemy penetration should it occur.
Unexpectedly, the ROK police companies near the ferry scattered at thefirst enemy fire. Half an hour after midnight enemy troops streamed throughthis hole in the line, some turning left to take G Company in flank andrear, and others turning right to attack C Company, which was on a spurof ground west of the Komam-ni road. The I&R Platoon and elements ofC and D Companies formed a defense line along the dike at the north edgeof Komam-ni where tanks joined them at daybreak. But the enemy did notdrive for the Komam-ni road fork four miles south of the river as ColonelFisher expected him to do; instead, he turned east into the hills behindFisher's 2d Battalion. [12]
The position of B Company, 35th Infantry, on 1,100-foot-high Sibidang-san,flanking the Masan road two miles west of Komam-ni and giving observationover all the surrounding country, was certain to figure prominently inthe enemy's attack. It was a key position in the 25th Division line. Theenemy's preparatory barrage there lasted from 1130 to midnight. Under coverof it two battalions of the N.K. 13th Regiment, 6thDivision, moved up within 150 yards of the American foxholes. Atthe same time, enemy tanks, self-propelled guns, and antitank guns movedtoward Komam-ni on the road at the foot of Sibidang-san. An American Shermantank there destroyed a T34 just after midnight, and a 3.5-inch bazookateam destroyed a self-propelled gun and several 45-mm. antitank guns.
On the crest of Sibidang-san, an antipersonnel mine field stopped thefirst enemy infantry assault. Others followed in quick succession. Theywere met and turned back with the fire of all weapons. By 0230 the B Companyriflemen were stripping machine gun ammunition belts for their rifles.The 1st Platoon of C Company, at the base of the mountain behind B Company,met the emergency by climbing Sibidang-san in forty-five minutes with anammunition resupply for the company. Just before dawn the enemy attacksubsided. Daylight disclosed a great amount of abandoned enemy equipment scattered on theslope just below the crest, including thirty light and three heavy machineguns. Among the enemy dead lay the body of the commanding officer of theN.K. 13th Regiment. [13]
At daybreak, 1 September, a tank-led relief force of C Company headquarterstroops cleared the road to Sibidang-san and resupplied the 2d Platoon,B Company, with ammunition just in time for it to repel a final North Koreanassault, killing seventy-seven and capturing twenty-one of the enemy.
Although Colonel Fisher's 35th Infantry held all its original positions,except that of the forward platoon of G Company, it nevertheless was ina dangerous situation. Approximately 3,000 North Korean soldiers were behindits lines. The farthest eastern penetration reached the high ground justsouth of Chirwon overlooking the north-south road there.
On the 35th Regiment's right flank, in the 9th Infantry, 2d Division,sector across the Naktong, the enemy also made deep penetrations. (MapVI) There, in the southern part of the U.S. 2d Division zone, the9th Infantry Regiment held a sector more than 20,000 yards long, includingthe bulge area of the Naktong where heavy fighting had taken place earlierin August. The rifle companies on the river line here had frontages of3,000 to 4,000 feet, and, like the units to the north and south of them,they held only key hills and observation points.
As August neared its end, men on these hills could see minor enemy activityacross the river, which they interpreted as North Koreans organizing thehigh ground on the west side of the Naktong against a possible Americanattack. There was moderate enemy infiltration into the 9th Infantry forwardpositions, but to the men in the front line this appeared to be only normalpatrol action.
Opposite, on the west side of the Naktong, General Pak Kyo Sam, commandingthe N.K. 9th Division, issued his operational order to thedivision on 28 August. Its mission in the forthcoming attack was statedin part as follows:
To outflank and destroy the enemy by capturing the Miryang and Samnangjinareas, thereby cutting off his [Eighth Army] route of withdrawal betweenTaegu and Pusan, is the mission of this division. [14]
The North Koreans apparently did not know on the eve of their attackthat the U.S. 2d Division had replaced the 24th Division in this sectorof the front, since they named the latter division in the attack orderas being opposite it in the attack zone.
On the left and southern flank of the 9th Infantry river line, justabove the junction of the Nam River with the Naktong, A Company was dugin on a long finger ridge paralleling the Naktong that terminates in Hill94 at the Kihang ferry site. The river road from Namji-ri running westalong the Naktong passes the southern tip of this ridge and crosses to the west side of the river at the ferry. A small villageof a few huts, called Agok, lay at the base of Hill 94 and 300 yards fromthe river. Two medium tanks of A Company, 72d Tank Battalion and two antiaircraftvehicles of D Battery, 82d AAA Battalion, one mounting twin 40-mm. gunsand the other four .50-caliber machine guns, together with two rifle squadsof A Company, 9th Infantry, held a roadblock near the ferry and close toAgok. On the evening of 31 August, A Company, in accordance with ordersjust received, moved from its ridge positions overlooking Agok and theriver to new positions along the river below the ridge line. [15]
That evening Sgt. Ernest R. Kouma took a Pershing tank to Agok to replaceone that had developed gun trouble. Kouma placed his tank on the west sideof Agok about forty yards from the Kihang ferry. At 2000 a heavy fog coveredthe river. An hour later dogs started barking on the far side of the Naktong,and continued to bark in the otherwise unbroken silence until enemy mortarshells began falling on the American-held side of the river at 2200. Fifteenminutes later a heavy enemy mortar preparation struck A Company's positions.American mortars and artillery began firing counterbattery. Some of theA Company men reported they heard noises on the opposite side of the riverand splashes in the water. [16]
Suddenly at 2230 the fog lifted and Kouma saw that an enemy bridge,already two-thirds completed, was being laid across the river directlyin front of him. He ordered his tank gunner to lay the 90-mm. cannon onthe bridge and he himself went to the .50-caliber machine gun mounted behindthe tank cupola. Kouma's gunner opened fire on the bridge and the bridgingparty; the other tank and the two antiaircraft vehicles joined in the action.After about a minute of this heavy fire the bridge collapsed, and afteranother two minutes the ponton boats used to hold the bridge in place brokeloose. Machine gun fire then sank many of them. Except for the barkingof the dogs across the river and an occasional mortar round, silence onceagain reigned as Kouma's guns fell silent after the destruction of thebridge.
At 2300 this quiet suddenly gave way to a small arms fight which flaredaround the left side of A Company north of the tanks. This gunfire hadlasted only two or three minutes when the A Company roadblock squads nearthe tanks received word by field telephone that the company was withdrawingto the original ridge positions and that they should do likewise. Someonein the outpost shouted, "We are moving out, tankers!" [17] Then,as Kouma tells it:
The infantry outpost had hardly left when I spotted seven men runningtowards me from the direction of where Able Company's CP formerly was located.I halted them and noticed that they were wearing the division patch. [TheIndianhead of 2d Division, which the newly augmented Koreans wore on theirherringbone twill as did regular members of the division. Company A had some of these South Koreans.] One of them spoke excellentEnglish. All seven came next to my tank ... three of them crawled on thedeck of the tank and informed me that a large force had crossed the riverfarther down approaching my position and that most of Able Company werekilled or captured. At the time I had the idea that they were part of the9th Infantry. During this time I was on top of the turret checking my 50cal. machine gun. At a given signal they leaped from the tank and beganthrowing grenades on the tank and about the same time a steady spray ofmachine gun and rifle fire began hitting the tanks and AA guns from thecrest of the high bluff about 150 yards to my right. My gunner at oncetook them under fire as well as SFC Berry's and the AA guns. I got backin the turret and threw about 7 or 8 grenades over the house as well asinside the house through the door which faced us. [18]
In this exchange, enemy grenades and fire wounded Kouma twice. Enemysoldiers now attacked the tanks and the antiaircraft vehicles from therear. The group approaching the quad-50 knew the password and overran thevehicle, killing all crew members except one who escaped. Several men inthe second, the dual 40-mm. gun vehicle (M 19), were wounded but this trackedvehicle escaped to the rear. The two tanks were alone. They quickly changedtheir positions, driving out from under the cliffs and near the villageto open ground with clear fields of fire for 200 yards in every direction.There they repelled repeated attacks, some enemy soldiers reaching withintwenty yards of the tanks before they turned back leaving their dead andwounded. About 0130, SFC Oscar V. Berry informed Kouma his tank enginewas overheating and that he was going to withdraw. A mile to the rear Berry'stank engine caught fire and he abandoned the tank. Kouma maintained hisposition throughout the night. With the coming of daylight the enemy attemptsto destroy the tank by infantry attack ceased. At 0730 Kouma started backtoward friendly lines and got through safely, firing into enemy positionson the way. [19]
In the attack against A Company, the North Koreans happened to strikethe 1st Platoon, which was near Agok, but they did not find the 2d Platoonnorthward, commanded by 2d Lt. Albert J. Fern, Jr. Fern could tell by thesound of combat that C Company on his right and that part of A Companyon his left were under heavy attack. Two stragglers from C Company soontold him the North Koreans had overrun that company. The A Company commander,1st Lt. Adam B. Rodriguez, quickly found it necessary to abandon his commandpost in Agok and withdraw up the ridge to his original positions, orderinghis subordinate units to do likewise. Fern's 2d Platoon had a skirmishwith a small group of North Koreans in the dark in going up the slope.On top, the company reassembled and went into perimeter defense positions.For them the rest of the night passed quietly.
The N.K. 9th Division's infantry crossing of the Naktongand attack on its east side near midnight quickly overran the positionsof C Company, north of A Company. There the North Koreans assaulted with unusual force, to the accompaniment of green flares andblowing of whistles. The company held its positions only a short time andthen attempted to escape. Many of the men moved southward, a few of themcoming into A Company's ridge line positions near Agok during the night.Most of C Company moved all the way to the 25th Division positions southof the Naktong. On 1 September that division reported that 110 men of CCompany had come into its lines. [20]
Five miles north of Agok and A Company's position, B Company, 9th Infantry,held a similar position on Hill 209 overlooking the Paekchin ferry crossingof the river. This ferry was located at the middle of the Naktong Bulgewhere the Yongsan road came down to the Naktong and crossed it. The U.S.2d Division, as it chanced, had planned an important reconnaissance actionto start from there the night of 31 August, the very night that the N.K.I Corps offensive rolled across the river.
Near the end of the month two reconnaissance patrols from the 9th Infantryhad crossed to the west side of the Naktong and from a hill position watchedenemy tank and troop activity at a place approximately two miles west ofthe river, which they suspected was a division command post. Informationobtained later indicated it was in fact the command post of the N.K. 9thDivision. On 25 August, Col. John G. Hill outlined projected "OperationManchu," which was to be a company-sized combat patrol to cross theriver, advance to the suspected enemy command post and communications center,destroy it, capture prisoners, and gain information of enemy plans. [21]
The 9th Infantry Regiment had planned Task Force Manchu on orders fromthe 2d Division, which in turn had received instructions from Eighth Armyfor aggressive patrolling. Colonel Hill selected three possible crossingsites for the operation. General Keiser decided on the one at the Paekchinferry. The 9th Infantry reserve, E Company, reinforced with one sectionof light machine guns from H Company, was to be the attack force. The 1stPlatoon, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, was to transport it across the riverin assault boats the night of 31 August. Two heavy weapons companies, Dand H, were each to furnish one section of heavy machine guns, one sectionof 81-mm. mortars, and one section of 75-mm. recoilless rifles for supportingfires. A platoon of 4.2-inch mortars was also to give support. [22]
After dark on the evening of 31 August, 1st Lt. Charles I. Caldwellof D Company and 1st Lt. Edward Schmitt of H Company, 9th Infantry, movedtheir men and weapons to the base of Hill 209, which was within B Company'sdefense sector and overlooked the Paekchin ferry crossing of the NaktongRiver. The raiding force, E Company, was still in its regimental reserve position abouttwo miles west of Yongsan, getting ready with the engineer platoon to moveto the crossing site. Colonel Hill, the regimental commander, went forwardin the evening with the 4.2-inch mortar platoon to its position at thebase of Hill 209 where the mortarmen prepared to set up their weapons.
Schmitt and Caldwell took their section leaders up the hill and showedthem where they wanted the weapons set up. The first of the carrying partiessoon followed them. It was now a little after 2100, and dark.
The closest front line unit was B Company on top of Hill 209, approximatelya mile north of the river road which curved around the hill's southernbase. The regimental chaplain, Capt. Lewis B. Sheen, had gone forward inthe afternoon to B Company to hold services. [23] On top of Hill 209, ChaplainSheen and men in B Company after dark thought they could hear a swishingsound in the water below them. By straining their eyes and staring throughfield glasses for a long time into the near darkness, they made out a longline of North Korean soldiers wading the river.
The first enemy crossing at the Paekchin ferry caught the Heavy MortarPlatoon wholly unaware in the act of setting up its weapons. It also caughtmost of the D and H Company men at the base of Hill 209, only a littlemore than half a mile from the crossing site. The North Koreans killedor captured many of them. Colonel Hill was there, but escaped to the rearjust before midnight, together with several others, when the division canceledOperation Manchu. His S-3, who was with him, delayed a bit and never gotout. The first heavy weapons carrying party was on its way up the hillwhen the enemy engulfed the men below. It hurried on to the top where theadvance group waited and there all hastily dug in on a small perimeter.This group was unmolested during the night.
Word of the enemy crossing that had caught the support elements of TaskForce Manchu flat-footed had been received at the 2d Division headquarters.This news, together with the heavy enemy barrages that had developed allalong the river, caused the division to cancel Operation Manchu five minutesbefore midnight.
From approximately 2130 until shortly after midnight the N.K. 9thDivision crossed the Naktong at a number of places and climbed thehills quietly toward the 9th Infantry river line positions. Then, whenthe artillery barrage preparation lifted, the North Korean infantry werein position to launch their assaults. These began in the northern partof the regimental sector and quickly spread southward. Chaplain Sheen inthe B Company perimeter heard cries of "Manzai!" northward andsaw many flares light the sky in that direction. At the river crossingbelow him he could hear enemy troops working on a bridge. By this timethe sounds of enemy tanks and trucks and shouting men came up from theriver. And from the hills up stream the men in B Company heard, ever sooften, after a flurry of small arms fire, a massed shout which they interpreted as the North Korean captureof another position. [24]
At 0200, B Company's turn came. A truck stopped at the bottom of thehill, a whistle sounded, then came a shouted order, and enemy soldiersstarted climbing the slope. The hills on both sides of B Company were alreadyunder attack as was also Hill 311, a rugged terrain feature a mile anda half back from the river and apparently the enemy's principal immediateobjective. The North Koreans apparently were not aware of the Task ForceManchu group lower down on the hill for it remained unmolested during thenight. But higher up on Hill 209 the enemy drove B Company from its position,inflicting very heavy casualties on it. Chaplain Sheen led one group ofsoldiers back to friendly lines on 4 September. [25]
Approximately at 0300, 1 September, the 9th Infantry Regiment orderedits only reserve, E Company, which was to have been the striking forceof Task Force Manchu, to move west along the Yongsan-Naktong River roadand take a blocking position at the pass between Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-niRidge, about three miles from the river and six miles from Yongsan. Thiswas the critical terrain where so much heavy fighting had taken place inthe first battle of the Naktong Bulge. Fighting began at the pass at 0230when an American medium tank of A Company, 72d Tank Battalion, knockedout a T34 at Tugok (Morisil). E Company never reached its blocking position.A strong enemy force surprised and delivered heavy automatic fire on itat 0330 from positions astride the road east of the pass. The company sufferedheavy casualties, the killed including the company commander and GeneralKeiser's aide who had accompanied the force. With the critical parts ofCloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge in enemy hands before dawn of 1 September,the best defensive terrain between Yongsan and the river was lost. The2d Division now had to base its defense of Yongsan on relatively poor defensiveterrain, the low jumbled hills at the western edge of the town. [26]
North of the 9th Infantry sector of the 2d Division front along theNaktong, the 23d Regiment on 29 August had just relieved the 3d Battalionof the 38th Infantry Regiment, which in turn had only a few days beforerelieved the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division. On 1 August,therefore, the 23d Regiment was in a new sector of which it had only alimited knowledge. It took over a 16,000-yard Naktong River front withoutits 3d Battalion which had been attached to the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division.Colonel Freeman, the regimental commander, deployed the 1st Battalion onthe high ground along the river with the three companies abreast. Actually, the 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. Claire E. Hutchin, Jr., little morethan outposted the hills with platoons and squads. He placed the 2d Battalionin a reserve position approximately eight miles in the rear of the 1stBattalion and in a position where it commanded the road net in the regimentalsector. On the last day of the month the 2d Division moved E Company southto a reserve position in the 9th Infantry sector. [27]
Two roads ran through the regimental sector from the Naktong River toChangnyong. The main road bent south along the east bank of the river toPugong-ni and then turned northeast to Changnyong. A northern secondaryroad curved around marshland and lakes, the largest of which was Lake U-p'o,to Changnyong. In effect, the 1st Battalion of the 23d Regiment guardedthese two approach routes to Changnyong.
The forty-two men of the 2d Platoon, B Company, 23d Infantry, led by1st Lt. William M. Glasgow held outpost positions on seven hills coveringa 2,600-yard front along the east bank of the Naktong north of Pugong-ni.Across the river in the rice paddies they could see, in the afternoon of31 August, two large groups of enemy soldiers. Occasionally artillery firedispersed them.
Just before dusk turned to darkness, Glasgow and the men in his 1stSquad saw "a large and bizarre torchlight parade" come out ofthe hills and proceed toward the river. Glasgow immediately reported thespectacle to the battalion command post. The artillery forward observer,who estimated the crowd to number 2,000 people, thought they were refugees.When the matter was referred to Colonel Freeman, he immediately orderedthe artillery to fire on the torchbearers. With each bursting shell someof the torches disappeared but others took their places and the processioncontinued unchecked toward the river bank. [28]
At 2100 the first shells of what proved to be a two-hour enemy artilleryand mortar preparation against the American river positions jarred thefascinated Glasgow and his companions from their absorbed contemplationof the torchlight scene. As the enemy barrage rolled on, North Korean infantrycrossed the river and climbed the hills in the darkness under cover ofits fire. At 2300 the barrage lifted. A green flare signaled the NorthKorean assault. A few minutes later enemy grenades showered into Glasgow'sposition. After a short fight at close quarters, Glasgow and his men ranoff the hill toward the rear. Similar assaults took place elsewhere alongthe battalion outpost line.
On the regimental left along the main Pugong-ni-Changnyong road enemysoldiers completely overran C Company by 0300, 1 September. Capt. CyrilS. Bartholdi, the company commander, and most of his men were lost. Onlyseven men of C Company could be accounted for, and three days later, after all the stragglers and those cut off behindenemy lines had come in, there were fewer than twenty men in the company.[28]
As the enemy attack developed during the night, Colonel Hutchin succeededin withdrawing a large part of the battalion, less C Company, to his commandpost just north of Lake U-p'o and the hills there covering the northernroad into Changnyong, three miles east of the river and five air mileswest of the town. B Company lost heavily in this action.
When word of Colonel Hutchin's plight and of the disaster that had overtakenC Company reached regimental headquarters, Colonel Freeman obtained therelease of G and F Companies from 2d Division reserve and sent the formerto help Hutchin and the latter on the southern road toward Pugong-ni andC Company. Maj. Lloyd K. Jensen, executive officer of the 2d Battalion,accompanied F Company down the Pugong-ni road. This force was unable toreach C Company, but Major Jensen collected stragglers from it and seizedhigh ground astride this main approach to Changnyong near Ponch'o-ri aboveLake Sanorho, and went into a defensive position there. The 2d Divisionreleased E Company to the regiment and the next day it joined F Companyto build up what became the main defensive position of the 23d Regimentin front of Changnyong. Lt. Col. James W. Edwards took command of this2d Battalion position. [30] Enemy troops during the night passed aroundthe right flank of Colonel Hutchin's northern blocking position and reachedthe road three miles behind him near the division artillery positions.The 23d Infantry Headquarters and Service Companies and other miscellaneousregimental units finally stopped this enemy penetration near the regimentalcommand post five miles northwest of Changnyong.
Before the morning of 1 September had passed, reports coming in to 2dDivision headquarters made it clear that North Koreans had penetrated tothe north-south Changnyong-Yongsan road and cut the division in two; the38th and 23d Infantry Regiments with the bulk of the division artilleryin the north were separated from the division headquarters and the 9thInfantry Regiment in the south. General Keiser decided that this situationmade it advisable to control and direct the divided division as two specialforces. Accordingly, he placed the division artillery commander, Brig.Gen. Loyal M. Haynes, in command of the northern group. Haynes' commandpost was seven miles north of Changnyong. Task Force Haynes became operationalat 1020, 1 September. [31] Southward, in the Yongsan area, General Keiserplaced Brig. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley, Assistant Division Commander, in charge of the 9th Infantry Regiment, the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion,most of the 72d Tank Battalion, and other miscellaneous units of the division.This southern grouping was known as Task Force Bradley.
All three regiments of the enemy 2d Division-the 4th,17th, and 6th, in line from north to south-crossed duringthe night to the east side of the Naktong River into the 23d Regiment sector.The enemy 2d Division, concentrated in the Sinban-ni areawest of the river, had, in effect, attacked straight east across the riverand was trying to seize the two avenues of advance into Changnyong aboveand below Lake U-p'o. The water area of this lake and the surrounding marshlandvaried according to the season and the amount of rainfall. On 31 August1950, Lake U-p'o was a large body of water although in most places onlya few feet deep. [32]
At daybreak of 1 September, General Keiser at 2d Division headquartersin Muan-ni, seven air miles east of Yongsan on the Miryang road, knew thathis division was in the midst of a crisis. A massive enemy attack was inprogress and had made deep penetrations everywhere in his sector exceptin the north in the zone of the 38th Infantry. The N.K. 9th Divisionhad effected major crossings of the Naktong at two principal points against the 9th Infantry; the 2d Division, three major crossingsagainst the 23d Infantry; and the 10th Division had crossedmore troops in the Hill 409 area near Hyongp'ung in the 38th Infantry sector.At 081o General Keiser telephoned Eighth Army headquarters and reportedthe situation as he then understood it, indicating that the heaviest anddeepest enemy penetrations were in the 9th Infantry sector.
The picture of the situation darkened as the morning hours passed. Liaisonplanes rose from the division strip every hour to observe the enemy's progressand to locate 2d Division front-line units. Communication from divisionand regimental headquarters to nearly all the forward units was broken.Beginning at 0930 and continuing throughout the rest of the day, the lightaviation section of the division artillery located front-line units cutoff by the enemy, and made fourteen drops of ammunition, food, water, andmedical supplies. As information slowly built up at division headquartersit became apparent that the North Koreans had punched a hole six mileswide and eight miles deep in the middle of the division line and made lesserpenetrations elsewhere. The front-line battalions of the 9th and 23d Regimentswere in various states of disorganization and some companies had virtuallydisappeared. General Keiser hoped he could organize a defense along theChangnyong-Yongsan road, five to eight miles east of the Naktong River,and prevent enemy access to the passes eastward leading to Miryang andCh'ongdo. [33]
On its part, the Eighth Army staff had sufficient information soon afterdaybreak of 1 September to realize that a big enemy attack was under wayin the south. At 0900 General Walker requested the Air Force to make amaximum effort along the Naktong River from Toksong-dong, just above the2d Division boundary, southward and to a depth of ten to fifteen mileswest of the river. He wanted the Air Force to isolate the battlefield andprevent enemy reinforcements and supplies from moving across the riverin support of the North Korean spearhead units. The Far East Command requestedthe Navy to join in the air effort, and the Seventh Fleet, pursuant toNAVFE orders, turned back from its strikes in the Inch'on-Seoul area andsped southward at full steam toward the southern battle front. GeneralWalker came to the 2d Division front at noon and ordered a "standor die" defense. He had already ordered ground reinforcements to theYongsan area. [34]
For a few hours during the morning of 1 September, General Walker weighedthe news coming in from his southern front, wavering in a decision as towhich part of the front most needed his Pusan Perimeter reserves. Sincemidnight the N.K. I Corps had broken his Pusan Perimeterin two places-the N.K. ad and 9th Divisions in the U.S. 2dDivision sector, and the 7th and 6th Divisions inthe U.S. 25th Division sector, below the junction of the Nam and NaktongRivers. In the 2d Division sector enemy troops were at the edge of Yongsan,the gateway to the corridor leading twelve air miles eastward to Miryangand the main Pusan-Mukden railroad and highway.
Walker had a critical decision to make. He had in reserve three understrengthinfantry regiments and the 2-battalion British 27th Infantry Brigade whichwas not yet completely equipped and ready to be placed in line. Even so,this was an unusually large reserve for Eighth Army in the summer of 1950.The three U.S. regiments available to Walker were the 5th Marines at Changwon,six miles northeast of Masan, preparing for movement to the port of Pusan;the 27th Regiment of the 25th Division which had arrived at Masan onlythe night before at 2030 to relieve the 5th Regimental Combat Team, whichwas then to join the 24th Division in the Taegu area; and the 19th InfantryRegiment of the 24th Division, then with that division's headquarters atKyongsan southeast of Taegu. Walker alerted both the 24th Division headquarters,together with its 19th Regiment, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigadeto move at a moment's notice; the 24th Division either to the 2d or 25thDivision fronts, and the marines to an unannounced destination.
As the morning passed, General Walker decided that the situation wasmost critical in the Naktong Bulge area of the 2d Division sector. Therethe North Koreans threatened Miryang and with it the lifeline of the entireEighth Army position. There, for the moment at least, was the most criticalspot of the far-flung battlefield. An hour before noon General Walker orderedGeneral Craig to prepare the marines to move at once. Just after noon theaction order came and the marines made ready to depart at 1330. They weregoing back to the bulge area. [35]
[1] GHQ FEC Sitrep, 1 Sep 50; EUSAK PIR's 46-50, 27 Aug-1 Sep 50; EUSAK WD, entry for 30 Aug 50, and Aug 50 Summ; 25th Div WD, 28 Aug 50.
[2] GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 63 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), pp. 39-40; Ibid., Issue 99 (N. K. 7th Div), p. 35.
[3] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), pp. 41-42; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 97.
[4] 25th Div, 35th, 24th, and 5th Inf WD's, 31 Aug 50; Interv, author with Fisher, 5 Jan 52; Interv, author with Champney, 22 Jul 51; Interv, author with Throckmorton, 20 Aug 52.
[5] 24th Inf WD, 31 Aug 50; Interv, author with Corley, 6 Nov 51; Fisher, MS review comments, Jan 58.
[6] 24th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; EUSAK IG Rpt, 24th Inf Regt, Sep 50, testimony of Lt McMurray; Col John T. Corley, MS review comments, 22 Jul 53.
[7] Interv, author with Champney, 22 Jul 51; Interv, author with Corley, 6 Nov 51; EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of Capt Charles Ellis, E Co, 24th Inf.
[8] Inter, author with Corley, 6 Nov 51; Corley, MS review comments, 22 Jul 53; EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of 1st Lt John L. Herren.
[9] 24th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; 159th FA Bn WD, Sep 50: Barth MS, p. 16; Interv, author with Champney, 22 Jul 51.
[10] 3d Bn, 24th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; Corley, MS review comments. 22 Jul 53.
[11] 25th Div WD, 1 Sep 50; Interv, author with Corley, 6 Nov 51; EUSAKIG Rpt, testimony of Col Roberts.
[12] The Distinguished Unit Citation was awarded the 35th Infantry Regiment for action on 11 September 1950. Supporting Docs, AG files. 25th Div WD. 1 Sep 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 0120 1 Sep 50; 2d Bn, 35th Inf, Narr of Act, 31 Aug-1 Sep 50; 35th Inf WD, 31 Aug 50; I&R Plat Unit Hist, 1 Sep 50; Interv, author with Fisher, 5 Jan 52.
[13] 35th Inf WD, 31 Aug 50; 35th Inf DUC award supporting does, AG files.
[14] ATIS Enemy Documents, Issue 4, pp. 16-20, 9th Inf Div Opn Ord concerning Naktong River crossing, signed by CG Pak Kyo Sam.
[15] Ltr, Capt Albert J. Fern, Jr. (Plat Ldr, 2d Plat, A Co, 9th Inf, 31Aug 50) to author, 1 Apr 56; Ltr, Maj Robert L. Cody (S-3, 1st Bn, 9th Inf, Aug-Sep 50) to author, 18 Nov 55.
[16] Ltr, MSgt Ernest R. Kouma to author, 1 May 53; Ltr, SFC Oscar V. Berry to author with location sketch map, 24 Apr 53 (Berry commanded the second tank at the Kihang ferry); Ltr, Fern to author, 1 Apr 56.
[17] Ltr, Kouma to author, 1 May 53; Ltr, Fern to author, 1 Apr 56.
[18] Ltr, Kouma to author, 1 May 53.
[19] Ltrs. Kouma and Berry, 1 May 53 and 24 Apr 53. Department of the Army General Order 38, 4 June 1951, awarded the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Kouma.
[20] 9th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; Ltr, Fern to author, 1 Apr 56.
[21] Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53; Cody, Operation Manchu, student MS, Advanced Inf Off Course, Class 2, Inf School, Ft. Benning, 1952-53.
[22] Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 50; Cody, Operation Manchu; Ltr, Capt Lee E. Beahler (CO D Co, 2d Engr C Bn, Aug-Sep 50) to author. 10Jun 53.
[23] Interv, author with Hill, 15 Apr 53; Ltr, Capt Charles I. Caldwell to author, 29 May 53, together with sketch map of positions of D and H Co units of TF Manchu, 31 Aug-4 Sep 50. Hill 209 is Hill 210 on the revised map of Korea, AMS 4, 1950.
[24] Cody, Operation Manchu; 9th Inf WD, Sep 50, Sheen MS, From Encirclement to Safety; 9th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50, Rpt at 0040 to 9th Regt.
[25] Sheen, From Encirclement to Safety; Ltr, Caldwell to author, 29 May 53; Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53.
[26] Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53; 72d Tk Bn WD, 1 Sep 50; 9th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 0343 1 Sep 50; Cody, Operation Manchu.
[27] 23d Inf WD, Aug 50 Summ: Freeman, Highlights of the Combat Activities of the 23d Infantry Regiment from 5 August to 30 September 1950, MS, copy in OCMH: Maj Gen Paul L. Freeman, Jr., MS review comments, 30 Oct 57.
[28] Glasgow, Platoon Leader in Korea, pp. 100ff; Glasgow, "Through Hell and Out," Bluebook Magazine (August, 1951), pp. 71-77 (reproduces that part of above MS covering experiences of 1-7 September 1950): 23d Inf WD, Aug 50 Summ; Interv, author with Lt Col Frank Meszar (S-3, 23d Inf, Sep 50), 15 May 53; Freeman, MS review comments, 30 Oct 57.
[29] 2d Div WD, JA Stf Sec Hist Rpt, 1 Sep-31 Oct 50, p. 5; 23(1 Inf WD, Narr Summ, Sep 50; Interv, author with Meszar, 15 May 53; EUSAK WD, 21 Sep 50, ADVATIS Interrog Rpts, Sr Lt Lee Kwan Hyon, Med Off, 17th Regt, 2d Div; Glasgow, Platoon Leader in Korea.
[30] Interv, author with Meszar, 15 May 53; Freeman MS; Freeman, MS review comments, 30 Oct 57.
[31] 2d Div Arty WD, Narr Summ, Sep 50. Task Force Haynes remained operational until 1300, 15 September 1950. Units forming the task force were the following: 23d Inf; 38th Inf; 37th FA Bn; C Btry, 503d FA Bn; Btrys A, B, C, 82d AAA AW Bn (SP); and C Co, 72d Tk Bn.
[32] Interv, author with Meszar, 15 May 53; 2d Div WD, Aug 50 (G-3 Stf Sec Rpt is incorporated with Div Narr Summ-all G-3 supporting documents were destroyed or lost through enemy action at Kunu-ri in November 1950); 23d Inf WD, Narr Summ, Sep 50.
[33] EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 1 Sep 50: Ibid., PIR 51, 1 Sep 50; 2d Div WD, Hq Co, Aviation Sec, 1 Sep 50; Ibid., vol. II, Summ, 1 Sep-31 Oct 50, p. 6.
[34] EUSAK WD. G-3 Jnl, 1 Sep 50; 2d Div WD. vol. II, Summ, 1 Sep-3 Oct 50, pp. 61; Memo for Dept of Navy, Hist Sec, 1950, in OCMH.
[35] EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 1 Sep 50; Rd Div WD, 1 Sep 50; Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53; Transcription and Summ of fonecon, Walker with Hickey, Deputy CofS, FEC, 020935 Sep 50, CofS files FEC.
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