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CHAPTER XXXIThe Capture of Pyongyang |
The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary PeopleHistory |
| To the devil with history and principles! After all, what is the problem? |
| Verdy du Vernois at battle of Nachod, anecdote told by Foch |
The Eighth Army advance into North Korea had begun under great logisticaldifficulties and was supported only on the narrowest margin. On 10 October,the day after the attack began, General Milburn expressed himself as beingdisturbed by the logistical situation of I Corps. He felt that at least3,000 tons of balanced stocks should be in the Kaesong ammunition supplypoints. But Col. Albert K. Stebbins, Jr., Eighth Army G-4, informed himthat this could not be accomplished unless all the truck companies werediverted to that task. The unfavorable supply situation largely grew outof the fact that during the first half of October (1-17 October) unloadingactivities at Inch'on for Eighth Army were negligible. Practically allthe port capabilities at that time were engaged in mounting out the 1stMarine Division for the Wonsan operation. Levels of some supplies for ICorps were at times reduced to one day, and only selective unloading enabledthe supply sections to meet troop requirements. Most combat vehicles, suchas tanks, operated in the forward zone without knowing whether they wouldhave enough fuel at hand to continue the attack the next day.
Because it could not support any more troops north of the Han Riverat this time, Eighth Army had been compelled to undertake the movementnorth of the 38th Parallel with only one corps (I Corps), leaving IX Corpsbelow the river. As rapidly as the logistical situation permitted, GeneralWalker intended to move IX Corps into North Korea to help in the driveto the border. On 23 October, General Walker informed General Coulter thatthe ROK III Corps (5th and 11th Divisions) would relieve IX Corps' in itszone as soon as practicable for this purpose, and not later than 10 November.[1]
On 19 October the army forward distributing point was at Kaesong. Hence,for most units supplies had to be trucked more than a hundred miles-a mostdifficult logistical situation even with good roads, and those in Koreawere far from that. During this time Eighth Army used about 200 trucksdaily to transport food, gasoline, and lubricants to dumps 50 miles north of Seoul.
A pipeline, completed in October, carried aviation gasoline from Inch'onto Kimpo Airfield and helped immensely in supplying the planes with fuel.[2]
The 3d Logistical Command at Inch'on was assigned to Eighth Army on7 October with the primary mission of providing it with logistical supportin North Korea. Eighth Army in turn attached the 3d Logistical Commandto the 2d Logistical Command. From Pusan the 2d Logistical Command continuedof necessity to forward by rail and truck supplies for Eighth Army.
The solution to Eighth Army's logistical problems rested in the lastanalysis on the railroads. Airlift and long-distance trucking were emergencymeasures only; they could not supply the army for an offensive operationseveral hundreds of miles from its railhead.
At the end of September, rail communications for Eighth Army did notextend beyond the old Pusan Perimeter. Yet the army itself was then atthe Han River, 200 miles northward. Because of the resulting logisticalstrain, the repair of the rail line north of Waegwan was of the greatestimportance.
The reconstruction of the railroad bridges over the major rivers northof Taegu constituted the greatest single problem. To rebuild these bridgesEighth Army marshaled all available bridging equipment and materiel. Engineerconstruction troops, aided by great numbers of Korean laborers, workedto the limit of their endurance to restore the rail lines northward. TheKoreans assumed responsibility for repairing minor bridges, I Corps mostof the highway bridges, and Eighth Army the rail bridges and the largesthighway bridges.
The first great task was to repair the 165-foot break in the Waegwanrail bridge over the Naktong. Working fifty feet above the water, the engineers,after some preliminary work, in 7 days completed the major repairs. Railtraffic crossed the bridge on 5 October. At first all effort was concentratedon opening single track communications over the 200 miles of rail fromthe Naktong to the Han River. This was accomplished on 10 October, 17 daysafter reconstruction work started at the Naktong River bridge. It was notuntil 11 days later that a shoofly bridge carried rail traffic across theHan into Seoul. [3]
But even after trains crossed into Seoul they could proceed only asfar as Munsan-ni on the south bank of the Imjin River. This was still 200miles below the Eighth Army front at the Ch'ongch'on River in late October.Thus, at that time the railhead was still as many miles south of the EighthArmy front as it had been a month earlier when the front was in the Seoul areaand the railhead was at Waegwan. At Munsan-ni the supplies were unloaded,trucked across the Imjin, and reloaded on trains on the north side. Meanwhile,Engineer troops were at work repairing the Imjin River rail bridge. Thewater span was 1,600 feet long, with a length of several thousand feetof earth fill required in its approaches. As a generalization, it may besaid that the railhead lagged 200 miles behind the Eighth Army front inOctober 1950.
The daily "must" trains from Pusan at this time were (1) atrain of 9 cars to Taejon for the 25th Division, (2) a ration train of20 cars (200,000 rations) to Yongdungp'o, (3) 2 ammunition trains of 20cars each, (4) 1 hospital train, (5) 1 POL train of 30 cars, and (6) 1train of 20 cars every other day in support of ROK troops based in theSeoul area. [4]
Repair of the major highway bridges presented a problem just as pressingas repair of the rail bridges. In some respects it was an even more immediateproblem because, in general, the highway bridges could be repaired morequickly, and they were the first used to keep supplies moving forward tothe troops. The 207-foot span break in the Naktong River highway bridgeat Waegwan was closed with pile bents and a 100-foot triple single-panelBailey bridge. The first traffic crossed the repaired bridge on 30 September.To provide a vehicular bridge across the Han River at Seoul quickly, theFEAF Combat Cargo Command, using seventy C-119 flights, flew in a pontoonbridge from Japan. This 50-ton floating bridge was 740 feet long. On 30September, 3,034 vehicles crossed it, and thereafter traffic passed overit day and night. A second bridge was completed across the Han on 7 October.The next afternoon two-way traffic resumed across the river.
At every turn in the operations in North Korea during October, EighthArmy's effort was limited by an adverse logistical situation. And it mustbe borne in mind that Eighth Army's troops had almost reached the NorthKorean capital of P'yongyang before it could get any supplies through theport of Inch'on, where facilities were still devoted exclusively to outloadingthe X Corps.
With action in the Kumch'on Pocket ended, in the first phase of EighthArmy's drive into North Korea, the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, marched fromHanp'o-ri on Namch'onjom. (Map 19) Air strikes on that townat 0700, 15 October, preceded the attack. The 2d Battalion then launchedits assault, supported by artillery, against fiercely defending North Koreans.After hard fighting the 2d Battalion overcame the enemy force and enteredNamch'onjom at noon, losing ten men killed and thirty wounded in the battle.North Korean prisoners said that strafing attacks on Namch'onjom duringthe morning had destroyed the 19th Division command postand killed the division chief of staff. [5]
Torrential rains now turned the dusty roads into seas of mud, and maneuversplanned to put the 5th Cavalry in front of the retreating enemy came tonaught.
On 16 October, Colonel Lynch's 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, led the attackout of Namch'onjom, and by noon it had secured Sohung, seventeen milesnorthwest. The 1st Battalion passed through the town, turned north on asecondary road, and prepared to advance on Hwangju the next day. ColonelHarris and the regimental headquarters arrived at Sohung late in the afternoon.
On the right of the 1st Cavalry Division the ROK 1st Division had madespectacular progress. On the 13th it entered Sibyon-ni, a vital crossroadsnortheast of Kaesong. Two days later it engaged a regiment-sized forceof North Koreans, which was supported by six tanks and artillery, in heavybattle in the vicinity of Miu-dong, twelve miles northeast of Namch'onjom.Air strikes helped the ROK's. With his men following the high ground andhis tanks on the road, Paik moved ahead. His division fought another battlethe next day, 16 October, after which its leading elements entered Suan,forty air miles southeast of P'yongyang. General Paik said at this timethat his tactics were "no stop." It began to look as if his division,the infantry afoot and traveling over secondary roads, was going to beatthe American motorized columns to P'yongyang. [6]
On 15 October General Milburn reflected General Walker's impatiencewith what Walker thought was a slow advance. Milburn ordered the 24th Divisionto move into attack position on the left (west) of the 1st Cavalry Divisionand to seize Sariwon from the south, and then attack north toward the NorthKorean capital. On the same day General Gay ordered the 27th British CommonwealthBrigade to assemble behind the 7th Cavalry Regiment and be prepared topass through it and seize Sariwon. Thus the stage was set for a continuationof the I Corps drive for P'yongyang. General Gay has said of that period,"The situation was tense, everybody was tired and nervous." [7]
Colonel Stephen's 21st Infantry of the 24th Division met just enoughopposition as it moved from Paekch'on toward Haeju to prevent the infantryfrom mounting the trucks and rolling along rapidly as a motorized column.Its tank-infantry teams on 17 October overcame 300 North Koreans defendingHaeju and secured the town that afternoon. [8]
The 19th Regiment of the 24th Division, meanwhile, trailed the 5th CavalryRegiment. Both of them turned westward off the main highway at Namch'onjom.The 19th Infantry was to continue westward beyond Nuch'on-ni and then turnnorth toward Sariwon. On the 16th a bad traffic jam developed on the roadup to Namch'onjom where the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, the 5thCavalry, and the 19th Regiment were all on the road. For long periods thevehicles moved slowly, bumper to bumper. From Namch'onjom westward, the19th Infantry, behind the 5th Cavalry Regiment, was powerless to accelerateits pace although General Church had ordered it to do so. Word came at this time that General Milburn had told GeneralsGay and Church that whichever division-the 1st Cavalry or the 24th Infantry-reachedSariwon first would thereby win the right to lead the corps attack on intoP'yongyang. The 24th Division was handicapped in this race for Sariwon,as it had a roundabout, longer route over inferior roads and poorer supplyroutes. [9]
A dominant characteristic of all units in the advance at this time wasthe strong rivalry prevailing between divisions, and even between unitswithin a division, to gain the most ground and be the first to reach theNorth Korean capital. Flare-ups between units were frequent and nerveswere taut.
One such flare-up occurred before dawn of 17 October. On the precedingafternoon two battalions and the regimental headquarters of the 7th Cavalryreached Sohung. The 3d Battalion held the town and together with F Companyestablished roadblocks there. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade wasto pass through it the next morning in attack along the main highway toSariwon. Holding a roadblock south of Sohung was Capt. Arthur H. Truxes,Jr., with F Company. Colonel Harris in posting his roadblock forces gavethem orders to shoot at anything moving in front of the perimeter duringthe hours of darkness. He says he had no information that the 5th Cavalrywas making a night approach toward his position. Captain Webel, S-3 ofthe 7th Cavalry Regiment, says that he told the 5th Cavalry liaison officerwith the regiment of the roadblock forces and their orders to shoot, andasked him to return to the 5th Cavalry and inform it of the situation.This officer did not do that, however, but stayed in the 7th Cavalry commandpost overnight. The leading elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th CavalryRegiment, approached the 7th Cavalry outpost one mile south of Sohung at0300 the morning of 17 October, and a fire fight broke out between them,each thinking the other an enemy force. Before the mistake could be corrected,7th Cavalry fire wounded seven men of the 5th Cavalry. [10]
On 17 October, with the 1st Battalion in the lead, the 7th Cavalry Regimentfollowed the secondary "cow path" road north from Sohung in acircuitous route toward Hwangju where it would strike the main P'yongyanghighway north of Sariwon. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade passedthrough the lines of the 7th Cavalry that morning at Sohung and took upthe advance along the main highway toward Sariwon.
Sariwon lay some thirty miles up the highway almost due west from Sohung.At Sariwon the highway and railroad debouched from the mountains, turnednorth and ran through the coastal plain to P'yongyang, thirty-five miles away. Only occasional low hills layacross the road between Sariwon and P'yongyang. It was generally expectedthat the North Koreans would make their stand for the defense of P'yongyang,short of the city itself, on the heights before Sariwon.
A platoon of Maj. David Wilson's A Company of the Argyll 1st Battalion,mounted on American Sherman tanks, formed the point as the Argylls ledthe attack. Brig. Gen. Frank A. Allen, Jr., Assistant Division Commander,1st Cavalry Division, accompanied the Argylls. Groups of haggard and hungryNorth Korean soldiers stood along the roadside waiting for a chance tosurrender, and Russian-made trucks, their gas tanks empty, stood abandoned.Four miles short of Sariwon, on the hills guarding the approach to thetown, it looked for a while as if the anticipated big battle had started.Enemy rifle fire suddenly burst on the column from a hillside apple orchard,200 yards away. The column stopped and the men sought cover.
Behind the lead tanks, General Allen jumped from his jeep, stamped alongthe road, waved a map and shouted, "They're in that orchard, rake'em, blast them out of there!" The general's aide, 1st Lt. John T.Hodes, climbed on one of the tanks and trained his glasses on the orchardto give fire direction. The pilot of a spotter plane above the ridge dippedhis wings to indicate the presence of the enemy in force. A few North Koreansstarted running from the orchard when the tanks began firing into it. Suddenly,a mass of North Koreans broke from the orchard, rushed for the ridge line,and vanished over the top. Wilson's A Company of the Argylls moved on theorchard and swept it clean of remaining enemy troops. They killed about40 and captured others in this brief action. The fleeing North Koreansleft behind ten machine guns and, in the pass, they abandoned a batteryof antitank guns. The British now entered Sariwon, a large town, whichthey found to be badly damaged by bombing. Their loss thus far for theday was 1 man killed and 3 wounded. [11]
About 1700 in the afternoon the Australian 3d Battalion passed throughthe Argylls in the town and advanced five miles north of it toward Hwangju.There the Australians went into a perimeter blocking position in frontof a range of hills strongly held by the enemy, and prepared to attackin the morning.
Now began a succession of weird events in what proved to be a chaoticnight in Sariwon. A British reconnaissance group south of the town encountereda truckload of North Korean soldiers driving north. The North Koreans shottheir way through and continued into the town, but, finding the northernexit closed, they turned back and met the reconnaissance group again. Inthis second encounter, the reconnaissance party killed about twenty ofthe enemy troops.
A little later, Lt. Col. Leslie Nielson, commanding officer of the Argyll1st Battalion, driving in the gloom near the southern end of Sariwon, wassuddenly amazed to see coming toward him on either side of the road a doublefile of North Korean soldiers. The leading soldiers fired at him but missed.Nielson shouted to his driver, "Put your foot on it!" The driverdid, and raced four miles through the marching North Koreans. Clearingthe last of them, Nielson and his driver took to the hills and stayed thereuntil morning. This enemy force, fleeing in front of the 18th Infantry,24th Division, and approaching Sariwon from the south, did not know thetown had already fallen to U.N. units.
There were many times during that wild night in Sariwon when U.N. soldiersthought the North Koreans were South Koreans coming up from the south withthe 24th Division, and the North Koreans thought the British were Russians.There were several instances of mutual congratulations and passing aroundof cigarettes. One group of North Koreans greeted a platoon of Argyllswith shouts of "Comrade!" and, rushing forward in the dim light,slapped the Scots on the back, offered cigarettes, and gave them the redstars from their caps as souvenirs. The ensuing fight was at very closequarters.
Lt. Robin D. Fairrey, the Argylls' mortar officer, walked around a cornerinto a group of North Koreans. Maintaining his composure, he said to them,"Rusky, Rusky," and after receiving several pats on the back,turned another corner and got away.
During this scrambled night at Sariwon about 150 North Koreans werekilled; strangely enough, the British lost only one soldier. Most of theNorth Koreans passed through the town. North of it the Australian 3d Battalionreaped a harvest, capturing 1,982 North Korean soldiers at its roadblock.Maj. I. B. Ferguson played a leading role in capturing this large numberof enemy troops. When the first of them came up to the Australian outposta night battle seemed imminent. Ferguson mounted a tank and called outin the gloom for the North Koreans to surrender, telling them they weresurrounded. After some hesitation, the leading enemy unit dropped its armsand surrendered, and most of the others followed its example. [12]
During the day, while the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade advancedon Sariwon along the main highway, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, with ColonelClainos' 1st Battalion in the lead, hurried along the poor secondary roadsthrough the hills north of it. This column was about three miles from Hwangjuand the main highway above Sariwon when at 1600 in the afternoon it receiveda message General Gay dropped from a light plane. The message said thatthe roads out of Sariwon were crowded with hundreds of North Korean soldiers,and it directed Colonel Clainos to have one battalion of the 7th Cavalryturn south at Hwangju on the main highway to meet the British and helptrap the large numbers of enemy soldiers in the Sariwon area, while anotherbattalion turned right and held the town of Hwangju. Clinos and the twobattalion commanders agreed that the 1st Battalion would turn to meet theBritish and the 2d Battalion would hold Hwangju. [13]
Soon after turning south on the Sariwon-P'yongyang highway the leading elements of the 1st Battalion captured an enemy cavalry detachment and thirty-seven horses.
A little later the battalion came under fire from the enemy on the hillbarrier ahead and separating it from the Australians. The battalion's motorizedpoint had a short skirmish with an enemy group during which its South Koreaninterpreter, although wounded, tried and indeed succeeded in reaching theNorth Korean forward position. He told the North Koreans that the columnthey were fighting was Russian. The enemy platoon thereupon came up tothe 7th Cavalry's point, which Colonel Clainos had just joined. Clainosturned the enemy group over to a squad leader who proceeded to disarm it.Finding that they had been tricked, some of the enemy tried to resist.This ended when the squad leader knocked one of the North Koreans intoa ditch.
The enemy platoon's surrender took place in clear daylight and was observedby hundreds of North Korean soldiers in the nearby hills. Almost immediately,enemy soldiers from the eastern side of the position began pouring in tosurrender. On the western side, however, small arms fire continued untildark when many there also came out to surrender. Altogether, more than1,700 North Korean soldiers and thirteen female nurses surrendered to the1st Battalion that evening.
Colonel Clainos had established radio communication with the Australiansabout 1800. At 2230, he radioed Colonel Green of the Australian battalionthat, with vehicle lights on, he was coming through the pass with his battalionand prisoners. An hour before midnight the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry,reached the Australian perimeter. There, Colonel Clainos overheard oneAustralian soldier saying to another, "Now what do you make of this?Here we are all set for a coordinated attack in the morning, and the bloodyYanks come in at midnight from the north, with their lights burning, andbringing the whole damned North Korean Army as prisoners." [14]
It had become clear by the time the U.N. troops reached Sariwon thatthe remaining North Korean forces could not attempt a strong defense ofP'yongyang without incurring total destruction or capture. The North Koreansby this time not only had to contend with the U.S. I Corps, approachingthe capital city along the main Seoul axis from the south, but also theenveloping movements of the ROK Army forces from the southeast and east.Some of these forces, if they continued their rapid advance for a few daysmore, would almost certainly cut on the north the highways and exits fromthe doomed city. P'yongyang would then be surrounded and any forces retainedin and around the city for its defense would face either destruction orsurrender.
The flanking operation originally conceived by General MacArthur forthe X Corps after it had landed on the east coast at Wonsan had, in fact,been carried out by ROK Army units under Eighth Army control before a singlesoldier of X Corps landed in the east. By evening of 17 October four ROK divisions were racing each other, aswell as the American and British units of the U.S. I Corps, to be firstin reaching P'yongyang. The ROK 1st Division, only fifteen miles away tothe southeast, was closest of all U.N. units to the city. On its rightflank, the ROK 7th Division was swinging toward P'yongyang from the east.Still farther east the ROK 8th Division had almost reached Yangdok in thecentral mountains where it would turn west on the P'yongyang-Wonsan lateralroad. And, finally, the ROK 6th Division was just short of Yangdok on thisroad, fifty air miles east of P'yongyang, after having turned west on 15October from Wonsan on the coast, which it had reached by the road fromHwach'on. Thus, the U.S. I Corps was nearing P'yongyang from the southand southeast, the ROK 7th Division from the southeast, and the ROK 8thand 6th Divisions from the northeast. With approximately seven U.N. divisionsconverging on P'yongyang, obviously the North Korean Army in its stateof depletion, disorganization, and demoralization could not hold the city.[15]
The Eighth Army G-2 estimated on 17 October that less than 8,000 effectivesof the N.K. 32d and 17th Divisions were availablefor defense of P'yongyang. The estimate concluded that the enemy wouldundertake a token defense of the city while the main force withdrew northwardacross the Ch'ongch'on River for further operations. [16]
The 1st Cavalry Division had won the honor of leading the attack intoP'yongyang when the British 27th Brigade, attached to it, beat the 24thDivision into Sariwon. Leading elements of the 18th Infantry Regiment,24th Division, were still several miles south of Sariwon when orders cameat 1700 on 17 October to stop and hold up the attack because U.N. troopswere already in the town. Morale in the 1st Cavalry Division was high.Most of the soldiers heard and passed on a rumor that the city was theirfinal objective in the war, and once it was taken the American troops wouldleave Korea. Most of them expected to eat Thanksgiving Day dinner in Japan.[17]
Since the 7th Cavalry Regiment was the unit farthest north, GeneralGay ordered it to resume the advance on P'yongyang at daylight 18 October.The 3d Battalion at Hwangju became the assault battalion even though itsmen were tired from their long night movement to the town. At daylighton the 18th the battalion crossed the ford in Hwangju and began the advance.Resistance was light until the leading elements of the battalion arrivedin front of the high ground south of Hukkyo-ri, halfway to P'yongyang.There enemy high velocity gun and heavy 120-mm. mortar fire struck thecolumn. Captain Webel, the regimental S-3, estimated that a reinforcedbattalion of about 800 men held the prepared enemy defensive positions.
Twenty tanks of C Company, 70th Tank Battalion supported the battalion,but they had to contend with fire from three or four dug-in enemy tanksand a mined roadway. In the midst of the fighting, enemy small arms fireshot down an F-51 fighter plane. General Milburn, the corps commander,watched the action from an apple orchard at the side of the road, and about midafternoonGeneral Gay came up and joined him. Dissatisfied with the progress of theattack, Gay ordered the regimental commander, Col. James K. Woolnough,who had temporarily replaced Colonel Harris, to start the other two battalionson flank movements against the enemy-held ridge. Captain Webel protestedto General Gay that the enemy position was all but taken and that commitmentof the other two battalions was unnecessary. But Gay let the order standwhen he learned from Woolnough that the latter had already started to implementit. The two battalions upon coming up moved off toward the enemy flanksin what proved to be a night-long movement. The next morning they foundthe enemy positions abandoned.
After giving the order on the 18th for a full regimental attack on theHukkyo-ri position, General Gay informed Colonel Woolnough that the 5thCavalry Regiment would pass through the 7th Cavalry the next morning andtake up the attack on P'yongyang. He then went back and found Colonel Crombezand gave him the order. The 5th Cavalry Regiment was still strung out onthe mountainous secondary road it had been traveling behind the 7th Cavalryfrom Sohung to Hwangju. Crombez did not have the last battalion in bivouacuntil 2300 that night. [18]
At 0500 on 19 October Lt. Col. Paul Clifford's 2d Battalion, 5th CavalryRegiment, led north out of Hwangju. When it arrived at the 7th Cavalrylines at Hukkyo-ri those troops had just repulsed an enemy counterattack.At this point three enemy tanks rumbled up. A 5th Cavalry bazooka teamled by a young Italo-American boy knocked out these tanks. Questioned aboutthe exploit a little later, the boy explained, "Me and my two buddieswere sitting over there behind that rock. These tanks came up toward usand stopped right out there on the road. They raised their turrets andstarted talking to each other. One of my buddies said, 'Christ, them ain'tGI's, them are Gooks,' and I said, 'Let's shoot the S.O.B.'s' and thatis what we did." [19] F Company, led by 1st Lt. James H. Bell, reinforced with five tanks,a platoon of engineers, and a section of heavy machine guns, now passedthrough the 7th Cavalry and led the 5th Cavalry Regiment toward P'yongyang.Just as Bell was passing the first of the burning enemy tanks a friendlyplane swooped down and rocketed it. The concussion almost made him a casualty.
[Caption] BURNING ENEMY TANK knocked out by 5thCavalry bazooka team at Hukkyo-ri 19October.
Flights of jet planes coursed overhead in advance of F Company and,on at least two occasions, they helped supporting artillery reduce enemyforces that threatened to delay its advance. The regimental commander,Colonel Crombez, and a small command group followed immediately behindF Company most of the morning and pushed it hard.
At 1102, Lieutenant Bell's F Company reached the 20-yard-wide Mujin-ch'onRiver, a tributary of the Taedong at the southern edge of P'yongyang. NorthKorean troops from behind a 20-foot embankment on the north side defendedthe highway bridge over it with three antitank guns. Bell's troops weredelayed there for about half an hour until their mortar fire caused theNorth Korean gun crews to abandon the antitank guns. Bell's F Company thencrossed the Mujin-ch'on and entered the southwestern edge of P'yongyangjust after 1100. [20]
P'yongyang is the oldest city in Korea, and for a long time was itscapital.
Its population at the outbreak of the war was approximately 500,000.The city is situated astride the Taedong River, one of the larger streamsof Korea, forty miles from where it empties into the Yellow Sea. The mainpart of the city with the important public buildings lay on the north sideof the river. A large, relatively new industrial suburb sprawled oppositeon the south side. Two railroad bridges of the Pusan-Seoul-Mukden railroadcross the Taedong River here. Upstream from them about two miles was themain highway bridge. The Taedong at P'yongyang averages about 400-500 yardsin width. As the current is swift, it constitutes a major military obstacleto north-south movement.
[Caption] 5TH CAVALRY TROOPS at the southern edgeof P'yongyang, 19 October.
Bell received orders to turn west and seize certain factory buildings,the railroad bridges, and a bridgehead on the north bank of the Taedong.In about half an hour he reached the river's southern bank and found that onlyone span of each of the two railroad bridges (each 3-span) was intact.After a hasty examination of the eastern bridge, Bell decided that infantrycould cross on one of its spans to an island in the river. Leaving someriflemen and the Engineer platoon at its southern end to guard the tankswhich gave supporting fire, he led the rest of F Company across to theisland and secured it by midafternoon. While F Company was crossing tothe island, enemy on the north bank destroyed a section of the bridge stillintact there. During the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, crossedto the island and relieved F Company, which then moved back to the airfieldon the south bank.
While F Company was trying to seize the railroad bridges over the Taedong,the rest of the 2d Battalion crossed the Mujin-ch'on and turned right towardthe main highway bridge which crossed the Taedong River about midway onthe city waterfront. This was the only bridge still intact on 19 Octoberwhen U.N. troops entered P'yongyang. When the leading elements of E andG Companies neared the bridge the North Koreans blew up the center span.
Almost simultaneously with the 1st Cavalry Division's arrival at P'yongyangthe ROK 1st Division entered the city on the Sibyon-ni-P'yongyang roadat a point northeast of the 1st Cavalry Division. On the night of 18 Octoberthe chances had appeared excellent for the ROK 1st Division to be firstinto P'yongyang. After a day of very heavy fighting in which itgained two miles, it was only eight miles away. The leading elements ofthe 1st Cavalry Division were about 30 miles away. But the North Koreansmade a stronger fight against the ROK 1st Division than against the 1stCavalry Division, possibly because it was closer to the city and the moreimmediate threat. Also, the road on which the ROK's approached P'yongyangwas heavily mined with both antipersonnel and antitank mines. Paik's divisionfought throughout the rainy night and finally overcame an enemy strongpointan hour or two after daybreak. Enemy emplacements and automatic fire stoppedthe ROK infantry again about six miles from the city near Kojo-dong. Tanksof C Company, 6th Tank Battalion, in the ensuing ROK attack enveloped theenemy positions from both flanks, destroyed self-propelled guns, and overranthe North Korean entrenchments, physically crushing machine guns and enemysoldiers. It was estimated that the tanks in this action killed nearly 300 North Koreans.
[Caption] CAPITOL BUILDING IN P'YONGYANG. The men having coffee are members of Task Force Indianhead.
According to General Paik, extensive mine fields in the street behindthe overrun enemy positions delayed the tanks, but the infantry of theROK 2d Battalion, 12th Regiment, kept moving and General Paik affirms thatthey arrived at the edge of the Taedong River just before 1100 and deployedalong the south bank northeast of the highway bridge. Leading elementsof the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, arrived at the traffic circle100 yards east of the highway bridge almost at the same time. The leadingtanks of C Company, 6th Tank Battalion, were in the southern edge of thecity, according to their own records, at 1245. Tanks of D Company, 6thMedium Tank Battalion, entered the city along the same approach a littlelater, turned north, and together with troops of the ROK 11th Regimentsecured the airfield at 1440. Other ROK units earlier had secured a smallerairfield a few miles to the east. [21]
After the North Koreans blew the highway bridge across the Taedong,elements of the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, continued northeast along theriver searching for a ford reported to be located there. When they foundit a few miles east of the city they discovered that elements of the 15thRegiment, ROK 1st Division, already had crossed the river there, and otherswere then in the act of crossing into the main part of the city. Later,Colonel Crombez asked General Paik how his troops found the ford so quickly.Paik answered, "I am a native of P'yongyang. I know the fords."[22]
By dark most of the ROK 1st Division was in the main part of P'yongyangnorth of the Taedong River. Nor was that all. The 8th Regiment of the ROK7th Division swung into north P'yongyang from the east and was in possessionof Kim Il Sung University in the northern part of the city by 1700. [23]
The next day, 20 October, the ROK 1st Division advanced into the heart of the city and took the stronglyfortified administrative center with ease. The enemy troops posted therewere too demoralized to fight and they abandoned both guns and entrenchments.At 1000 the ROK 1st Division reported the entire city had been secured,including the City Hall, the Provincial Government offices, and the N.K.People's Committee offices. The ROK 8th Regiment aided the 1st Divisionby sweeping through the northwest section of the city and clearing it ofthe enemy. As soon as Engineer assault boats could be brought up, the 3dBattalion, 5th Cavalry, began crossing to the north side of the Taedong,and by noon that regiment, with the 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, attachedto it, was across the river. Bells in Christian churches pealed a welcome.The people appeared friendly and there were no disturbances. [24]
When the operations of Eighth Army had progressed to the point whereit appeared probable that P'yongyang would fall in the near future, thearmy on 16 October had organized a special task force known as Task ForceIndianhead. Its name derived from the shoulder patch of the 2d InfantryDivision. This task force was to enter the North Korean capital with theadvance units of the 1st Cavalry Division. Its mission was to secure andprotect specially selected government buildings and foreign compounds untilthey could be searched for enemy intelligence materials. Lt. Col. RalphL. Foster, Assistant Chief of Staff for G-2, 2d Division, commanded thetask force, which was built around K Company, 38th Infantry Regiment, andsix tanks of C Company, 72d Medium Tank Battalion, and included Engineerdemolition troops, automatic weapons vehicles of the 82d AAA Battalion,and counterintelligence troops. The task force secured most of its assignedobjectives in P'yongyang on 20 October. It obtained a considerable amountof intelligence material, both military and political, which was turnedover to a special team from GHQ, Far East Command, and transported by airto Tokyo. [25]
Twenty American prisoners escaped or were rescued from the North Koreansin the capture of P'yongyang. Most of the large number of prisoners heldthere, however, had been taken northward several days before the U.N. forcesentered the city.
General Gay established his 1st Cavalry Division headquarters in thegranite buildings of the North Korean Military Academy ten miles southwestof P'yongyang on the Chinnamp'o road. He was responsible for the internalsecurity and order of P'yongyang after its capture. On 23 October he appointedColonel Crombez civil assistance officer in the city because of the latter'sspecial knowledge of the country and its people. Colonel Johnson, a veteranof Bataan, replaced Crombez in command of the 5th Cavalry Regiment until14 December.
[Caption] KIM IL SUNG'S DESK. Colonel Foster occupies the North Korean Premier's office in P'yongyang. Note portrait of Stalin.
The 5th Cavalry Regiment was disposed in the southern outskirts of P'yongyang,the 8th Cavalry Regiment in the northern outskirts, and the 7th CavalryRegiment at Chinnamp'o, P'yongyang's port. After the fall of P'yongyang,Colonel Harris had led the 7th Cavalry Regiment in a forced night movementfrom the city thirty-five miles southwest to Chinnamp'o. The regiment enteredthe port city in the dead of night, 22 October.
On 24 October, General Walker took personal command of his advance EighthArmy headquarters, established two days earlier by Colonel Collier of hisstaff, in the attractive and undamaged gray brick building in P'yongyangwhich had been the headquarters of Premier Kim Il Sung. [26]
On 21 October a touching and revealing ceremony occurred on the P'yongyangairfield. General MacArthur had flown in from Tokyo to confer briefly withGenerals Walker and Stratemeyer after the fall of the North Korean capital.In the course of his brief visit he reviewed F Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment,which had been the first American unit to enter P'yongyang. He asked allmen in the company who had landed with it in Korea ninety-six days earlier,when it numbered nearly 200 men, to step forward. Only five men steppedforward; three of them had been wounded. [27]
[1]IX Corps WD, bk. I, sec. II, Oct 50. EUSAK WD, 23 Oct 50: Ltr of Instr, CofS to CG IX Corps. 23 Oct 50.
[2] 3d Log Comd Hist Rpt, Oct 50; 2d Log Comd Rpt, G-4 Sec, Oct 50, pp. 3-6; EUSAK WD, G-4 Sec Rpt, 10 Oct 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl. 15 Oct 50; Interv, author with Eberle (FEC UNC G-4, 1950), 12 Jan 54; Interv, author with Maj Gen Leven C. Allen, 15 Dec 53; ORO, An Evaluation of Service Support in the Korean Campaign, ORO-T-6 (FEC), 1 Mar 51, p. 8.
[3] EUSAK WD, Engr Off Rpt, 30 Sep and 15 Oct 50; Ibid., Trans Sec, 26 Oct, G-4 Staff Sec, 12 Nov, and G-1 Daily Hist Rpt, 20 Nov 50; Dept of State Pub 4051, United Nations Command Eighth Report to the Security Council, United Nations, 16-31 October 1950, p. 6; Col. Paschal N. Strong, "Army Engineers in Korea," Military Engineer, vol. 44, No. 302(November-December, 1952), 404-10, and "Engineers in Korea-Operation Shoestring," vol. 4,, No. 291 (January-February, 1951); Interv, author with Strong (Eighth Army Engr Off), 17 Sep 51.
[4] EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 15 Oct 50 and Surgeon's Rpt, 12-13 Oct 50.
[5] 7th Cav Regt Opn Ord 28, 141015 Oct 50; 5th Cav Regt WD, 15 Oct 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 14-16 Oct 50; 7th Cav Regt WD, 15-16 Oct 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 1130 15 Oct 50; Webel, MS review comments, 13 Apr 54; Ltr, Harris to author, 7 Apr 54; Crombez, MS review comments, 12 Jan 56; Interv, author with Crombez, 12 Jan 56.
[6] EUSAK WD, POR 279, 13 Oct and POR 289, 6 Oct 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, 1130 15 Oct 50.
[7] Ltr, Gay to author, 23 Jan 54; I Corps Opn Dir 12, 151000 Oct 50; 24th Div WD, 15 Oct 50; Linklater, Our Men in Korea, p. 22.
[8] 24th Div WD, 16-79 Oct 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 17 Oct 50.
[9] 24th Div WD, 16 Oct 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 16 Oct 50; 7th Cav Regt WD, 16 Oct 50; Crombez, MS review comments, 12 Jan 56; Ltr, Crombez to author, 12 Oct 54; Interv, author with Crombez, 12 Jan 56.
[10] 5th Cav Regt Unit Jnl, msg 181, 0630 17 Oct 50; 5th Cav Regt WD, 16-17 Oct 50; Ltrs, Harris to author, 23 Dec 53 and 7 Apr 54; Gay, MS review comments for author, 13 Mar 54; Ltr, Crombez to author, 12 Oct 54; Interv, author with Crombez, 12 Jan 56; Crombez, MS review comments, 12 Jan 56; Interv, author with Maj Geo Frank A. Allen, Jr., 28 Jan 54; Webel, MS review comments, 15 Nov 57. This episode is confused and the principals do not agree on all details. Captain Truxes' account of this incident was unobtainable as he was killed in action when the Chinese entered the war.
[11] Maj Gen B. A. Coad, "The Land Campaign in Korea," op. cit.; Linklater, Our Men in Korea, pp. 22-23; Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 27-28; Ltr, Gay to author, 23 Jan 54; 1st Cav Div WD, 17 Oct 50; Charles and Eugene Jones, The Face of War, pp. 150-51; New York Herald Tribune, October 17, 1950.
[12] Coad, "The Land Campaign in Korea," op. cit.; Linklater, Our Men in Korea, 1st Cav Div WD, 17-18 Oct 50; Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 9; New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1950.
[13] Ltrs, Gay to author, 23 Jan and 13 Mar 54; Clainos, MS review comments, 24 May 54.
[14] Clainos, MS review comments for author, 24 May 54; Coad, "The Land Campaign in Korea," op. cit.; Linklater, Our Men in Korea, 7th Cav Regt WD, 17 Oct 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 17 Oct 50; Ltrs, Gay to author, 23 Jan and 13 Mar 54.
[15] See EUSAK WD and POR's, 12-17 Oct 50, for movements and positions of ROK units.
[16] EUSAK PIR's 95, 15 Oct, and 97, 17 Oct 50.
[17] 1st Cav Div WD. 18 Oct 50; Interv. author with Crombez. 12 Jan 56; 24th Division WD, 17 Oct 50.
[18] Webel, MS review comments, 13 Apr 54; Interv, author with Lynch, 9 Jun 54 (Lynch commanded the 3d Bn at Hukkyo-ri); Interv, author with Crombez, 28 Jun 55; Ltr, Harris to author, 8 Dec 53; Ltrs, Gay to author, 23 Jan and 19 Apr 54; Interv, author with Clainos, 30 Apr 54; 1st Cav Div WD, 17- 8 Oct 50.
[19] Ltr, Gay to author, 23 Jan 54; Ltr, Capt James H. Bell (CO F Co, 5th Cav Regt Oct 50) to author, 11 Apr 56; Interv, author with Crombez, 28 Jun 55; 5th Cav Div Regt WD, 19 Oct 50.
The author has been unable to identify this boy, who reportedly was killed later.
[20] Ltr, Bell to author, 8 Mar 54; Ltr, Crombez to author, 12 Oct 54; Interv, author with Crombez, 28 Jun 55; 5th Cav Regt WD, 19 Oct 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 19 Oct 50; EUSAK WD, Br for CG, 19-20 Oct 50.
Bell estimates the time he entered the south edge of P'yongyang as 1330. The official records, based on an aerial observer's report, give it as 1102.
[21] 6th Med Tk Bn WD, 19 Oct 50; EUSAK PIR 99, 19 Oct 50; EUSAK WD, 19Oct 50, and G-3 Jnl, 1300-1600 19 Oct 50; 5th Cav Regt WD, 19 Oct 50; 10th AAA Group WD, 19-20 Oct 50; 1st Cav Div WD, 19 Oct 50; I Corps WD, Oct 50, p. 18; Gen Paik Sun Yup (CofS ROKA), MS review comments, 11 Jul 58.
[22] Ltr, Bell to author, 11 Apr 56; Interv, author with Crombez, 12 Jan 56.
[23] Interv. author with Schwarze (KMAG adviser with ROK 7th Div Oct 50), 3 Feb 54; 5th Cav Regt WD, 19-20 Oct 50; EUSAK WD, Br for CG, 190001-200800 Oct 50; EUSAK POR 299, to Oct 50.
[24] EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 1200 20 Oct 50; Ibid., Br for CG, 20-21 Oct 50; I Corps WD, 20 Oct 50; Ltr, Crombez to author, 12 Oct 54.
[25] Ltrs, Foster to author, 11 and 21 May 54; Ltr, Gay to author, 13 Feb 54; EUSAK POR 292, 17 Oct 50; EUSAK WD, Br for CG, 190001-200800 Oct 50; 2d Div WD, Summ, 1 Sep-31 Oct 50, vol. II, pp. 47-49
[26] 5th Cav Regt WD, 22-23 Oct 50; GHQ UNC press release, 25 Oct 50. Ltr, Harris to author, 7 Apr 54; EUSAK WD, Br for CG, 22 Oct 50; 7th Cav Regt WD, 22-23 Oct 50.
[27] Ltr, Gay to author, 23 Jan 54; Crombez, MS review comments, 28 Jun 55.
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