On the Western Front
Since January, after the Fifth Air Force evacuated the airfields at Kimpo, Seoul, and Suwon, a shortage of fields, especially of airstrips near the front, had impeded close air support to the Eighth Army. Early in March General Partridge had approved plans for the construction of all-weather fields, including three forward strips, but only in June would he acquire enough engineer aviation battalions to begin any extensive airfield development. Consequently, at the opening of the Chinese April offensive only three Fifth Air Force groups were based in Korea. All other groups flew from bases in Japan, a situation that raised the related problems of distance and range limitations. Staging through Korean fields, primarily the airfield at Taegu, helped, but the time that aircraft based in Japan could spend at the front was nevertheless reduced. Compensating considerably were the fighter squadrons of the 1st Marine Air Wing, five land based in southeastern Korea, another aboard the escort carrier Bataan with Task Force 95 in the Yellow Sea. To help further, Task Force 77 in the Sea of Japan shifted its fast carrier operations from interdiction to close support beginning on 23 April.1
Though unable to operate at top capacity, the Fifth Air Force alone flew some three hundred forty close support sorties on the 23d, a number that almost equaled the highest flown during a single day so far in the war, and the 1st Marine Air Wing flew over a hundred fifty missions. The bulk of the air strikes supported the I Corps as General Milburn pulled the 24th and 25th Divisions and the rightmost forces of the 3d Division back to line Kansas. He judged that the Fifth Air Force and Marine attacks, in combination with artillery fire, had been instrumental in preventing Chinese forces from following his withdrawal closely.2
Defending the Kansas Line
Chinese following the withdrawal of the 24th and 25th Divisions finally reestablished contact with small, groping attacks near midnight on the 23d. Almost at the same hour, far harder attacks struck the ROK 1st Division and British 29th Brigade along the Imjin, particularly their neighboring interior units, the 12th ROK Regiment and the British brigade's isolated Gloster battalion at Solma-ri. (See Map 32.)
The midnight exploratory probes in the eastern half of the corps sector developed into stout but not overpowering daytime assaults by three divisions against the 24th Infantry on the right of the 25th Division and on the entire front of the 24th Division. The 179th Division seized Hill 664, the highest ground in the 24th Infantry sector, but failed in daylong attacks to dislodge the regiment and two reinforcing battalions of the 27th Infantry from a new line established in the foothills of the high feature. Forces of the 80th and 59th Divisions kept the 24th Division's front under pressure all day, but only the 80th attacking the 19th Infantry made any penetrations, all shallow. Counterattacks by regimental reserve forces eliminated all of them. Of more concern was a visible enemy buildup in front of the division, particularly ahead of the 21st Infantry on the right flank.3
At the Gloster battalion's Solma-ri position along the Imjin, the 187th Division reopened its attack on the British by sending its 559th Regiment up the slopes east of Route 5Y toward Company C near the road and Company B on the battalion's right flank. Unaware of exactly where or how the two companies were deployed, the enemy regiment attacked obliquely across the Gloster front, wasting the force of repeated assaults and taking heavy casualties from Gloster fire partially enfilading the skirmish lines. Finally correcting the direction of attack, the Chinese shoved their way onto the highest ground inside Company C's position to command the remainder of the company's hill and the valley behind, where the mortars and battalion headquarters were located. Expecting that the Chinese would quickly exploit their advantage, Colonel Carne ordered the troops in the valley and Company C to withdraw west across Route 5Y to positions between Companies A and D in the Hill 235 area. The withdrawal would leave Company B isolated on the east flank, but Carne doubted that the unit could make the long trek to Hill 235 from its distant position without becoming scattered and lost in the darkness; he decided to wait until daylight to pull it in.4
While Carne had few alternatives, he had to a degree played into Chinese hands. Making no move to follow Company C when it broke away or to move into the valley, where much of the battalion's ammunition, food, and other supplies lay abandoned after the hasty evacuation of the headquarters site, the attack force turned its weight against Company B, surrounding and squeezing the unit with assaults from all directions. Though steadily weakened by casualties, the isolated company turned back the repeated rushes until dawn. Then the Chinese changed tactics, keeping the company encircled and engaged all around but concentrating forces on the north for an assault on one platoon. Penetrated by the focused attack, the Gloster company had no choice but to try to disengage. Colonel Carne covered the attempt with every weapon he could bring to bear on the Chinese who had hemmed in the company and had left only a path down wooded slopes to the south, where the Glosters, breaking away in groups, tried to get through the smaller ranks of Chinese who had circled behind them. The attempt, if unavoidable, was disastrous. Only twenty men reached the main body of the battalion at Hill 235.
Along Route 11 northeast of the Glosters, forces of the 188th Division meanwhile had followed the late night withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, out of the Hill 257 mass and engaged the Northumberland Fusiliers and Royal Ulster Rifles standing across the road about two miles to the south. Handling the Chinese frontal pressure fully occupied the two battalions and left them vulnerable to a flanking or enveloping attack out of the gap between the fusiliers and Glosters, a gap that as a result of the Glosters' withdrawals to the Hill 235 area had widened to four miles.5
In a move to fill the gap at least partially and at the same time to restore the deteriorating Gloster position, the 3d Division commander, General Soule, early in the morning of the 24th directed Brigadier Brodie to move a reserve battalion into the gap and also to send a tank-infantry force up Route 5Y to clear the road and reinforce the Gloster battalion. For the latter effort Brodie added six Centurions from C Squadron, 8th Hussars, to the three rifle companies and four light tanks of the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team and sent the force toward the Glosters about 0730. Word that reinforcements were on the way reached Colonel Carne as the few survivors of Company B began to trickle in at Hill 235. By midmorning, however, perhaps because the Glosters had reported a large enemy buildup in their area, Brodie changed the concept of the operation. The 10th Battalion Combat Team now was to set up a blocking position at a pass about two miles below Hill 235, and from there only tanks were to move on to join the Gloster battalion. Brodie may not have been aware that the big Centurions, leading the way up Route 5Y at the moment, would be unable to proceed much farther than the blocking position. As the hussars had learned during earlier reconnaissance, the road beyond became too narrow at defiles to allow the nearly twelve-foot-wide tanks to pass. The attempt to reach the Glosters, in any case, could be made only by the 10th Battalion Combat Team's four light tanks. Brodie also gave the Glosters the choice of fighting their way to safety, apparently visualizing a linkup of Glosters and Filipinos at the latter's blocking position. But Colonel Carne, doubting that his weakened battalion could make it and remaining under the impression that the full tankinfantry force would attempt to reach him, elected to stay in position in the hope that the approaching column would succeed.6
The Belgian battalion, which Brodie intended to place in the gap between the Glosters and Northumberland Fusiliers, had made a second march during the night after withdrawing out of the Imjin angle, moving from its initial assembly along Route 33 to an area near the 29th Brigade's command post. Tired and somewhat disorganized by the Imjin angle battle and disengagement, the Belgians needed rest and time to straighten their ranks before moving into the gap. The commander, Colonel Albert Crahay, informed Brodie that the battalion would be ready by the start of the afternoon.7
General Soule, however, had second thoughts about committing the Belgians. Nine Glosters who had been captured during the Chinese attack on the battalion's supply point the day before and who had been taken off to Hill 675 in the gap escaped their captors during an early morning air strike (Mustangs dropping napalm) and reached the 29th Brigade command post. They reported at least a thousand Chinese to be on Hill 675, an estimate tending to confirm other reports that the Chinese in the 675 area had reached regimental strength. Reluctant to pit the Belgians against that possible enemy strength, Soule about noon informed Brodie that the Belgian battalion was not to be committed to action without division approval.8
Soule did not question Brodie's decision to stop the 10th Battalion Combat Team short of the Gloster battalion. Because of the growing enemy strength in the Gloster and gap areas, Soule now planned to attack with two battalions of the 65th Infantry, the bulk of the 64th Tank Battalion, and the 10th Field Artillery Battalion to relieve the Glosters and clear the Chinese from Hill 675. The 10th Battalion Combat Team, as an attachment to the 65th Infantry, was to remain in its blocking position until the attack force passed through, then was to follow the force to its objectives. Soule set the attack for 0630 on the 25th after checking with Brodie to ask if that timing was satisfactory in light of the Gloster battalion's overnight reverses and present condition. Brodie assured him that the Glosters could hold out until relieved by the 65th Infantry.9
In a midafternoon conference at the 3d Division airstrip, Soule briefed General Milburn, General Van Fleet, and General Ridgway (who had arrived in Korea at noon) on the attack plan. They questioned waiting until morning to attack. But Soule told them that the attack could not be made in what remained of the afternoon: the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 65th Infantry were then only beginning to assemble for the attack a mile west of the 29th Brigade's command post and two miles southeast of Hill 675 and would not complete their move until 1730. Soule, in any case, had no reason to believe that the Gloster battalion could not hold its position; he had Brigadier Brodie's assurance. According to a noontime report from the 29th Brigade, the battalion's only critical supply need was radio batteries, which, along with a resupply of other items, were to be airdropped before dark. The 10th Battalion Combat Team meanwhile had broken through a spot of resistance about three miles south of Hill 235 and, with its light tanks now leading, the Centurions next in column, and foot troops bringing up the rear, was grin on the move toward the Glosters.10
By 1530 the tanks leading the 10th Battalion Combat Team were climbing into the pass where the Filipino force was to set up the blocking position. Encouraged by the column's progress, Brigadier Brodie reverted to his original plan and instructed the entire force to go on to the Glosters. He had scarcely issued the order when the point tank lost a track to a mine or mortar round in an extremely narrow, steep-sided defile. Chinese strung out atop the hills bordering both sides of the defile swept the road with fire while others armed with charges worked down the steep banks toward the disabled tank. The M24 crews to the rear, evidently believing the road ahead of them to be mined, made no attempt to pull or push the damaged tank out of the defile or to rescue the stranded crew. Two less cautious Centurion crewssqueezed their huge tanks past the Filipino armor and went as far forward as the narrowing road allowed. Though they stopped short of the disabled M24, their covering fire allowed its crew to escape. Meanwhile, the Filipino infantry became involved in a fire fight with Chinese occupying two hills abutting the road some two hundred yards to the rear.11
When Maj. Henry Huth, in command of the Centurions, radioed brigade headquarters that the road was blocked and that the wide Centurions in any case could not get through the defile, he was given authority to withdraw. Major Huth understood the clearance to withdraw to apply to the 10th Battalion Combat Team as well as his group of tanks, and he gave the Filipinos the word to return to their assembly area after the combat team commander, Lt. Col. Dionisio Ojeda, told him that he did not believe his three rifle companies could move forward through what appeared to be a battalion of Chinese. If someone at brigade headquarters had allowed the 10th Battalion Combat Team to withdraw, it was only afterward that Brigadier Brodie sought General Soule's approval of the move.12 At the same time, apparently after discussing a breakout with Colonel Carne, who began to prepare plans, Brodie requested permission to pull the Gloster battalion out after dark. Soule, however, was certain the Glosters would suffer high losses in a nighttime withdrawal and instructed Brodie to hold both battalions in their present locations until the 65th Infantry reached them the next day. Brodie nevertheless permitted the 10th Battalion Combat Team, already en route to the rear, to continue its withdrawal. Leapfrogging rear guards, alternately tanks and infantry, held off Chinese who followed part of the way back and allowed the force to reach its starting point about 1900. General Soule, who had gone to the 7th Infantry front after his conference with Brodie, was unaware of the 10th Battalion Combat Team's withdrawal until he returned to headquarters about 2100. At that late hour he could only accept Brodie's handling of the matter. A late evening report on the Glosters from Brodie's headquarters reassured him, however, that the isolated battalion could hold its ground without reinforcement until relieved by the 65th Infantry. The position, according to the report, was "fairly safe," and although the battalion had had some weapons and equipment shot up, its casualties did not appear to be heavy.13
If the Gloster position could be called "fairly safe," it was only because the Chinese swarming around Hill 235 had attempted no further daylight assaults after destroying Company B. The ablebodied strength of the battalion was down to around three hundred fifty men. Supplies were so critically short that Colonel Carne had had to risk sending a carrying party to the former headquarters site in the valley. Under the concealment of smoke, the group retrieved a small quantity of food, water, ammunition, and radio batteries. Carne pounded the remaining supplies and several vehicles in the valley with artillery fire to prevent them from falling into Chinese hands. The arrangements for resupply by airdrop, under way since midmorning, meanwhile bogged down in the mix of 29th Brigade, 3d Division, and I Corps channels for lack of an order to execute, and the drop finally was postponed to 0700 on the 25th. A last-minute effort to free-drop a few supplies from two 3d Division light aircraft was only partially successful, much of the material landing outside the Gloster position. Together, the sortie to the valley and the free-drop gave the Glosters scarcely enough for another night of modest battle.14
Colonel Carne had given Brigadier Brodie a correct appraisal of the battalion's condition after the brigade commander informed him of the 10th Battalion Combat Team's unsuccessful attack and relayed General Soule's order that the battalion was to stay in position. While not asking to withdraw, Carne warned that his reduced battalion would not be able to handle the Chinese much longer. Less lenient than he had been with the 10th Battalion Combat Team, Brodie insisted that it was essential that the Glosters remain in position as directed by General Soule. Carne chose to make his stand on the long, thin crest of Hill 235, where extremely steep slopes except on the northwest and southeast limited the approaches favoring enemy attacks in strength. To prevent the Chinese from observing the change of position, Carne waited until after dusk to move his forces. The Glosters were dug in by 2100, Company A on the northwest and west, Company C and the remnants of Company B on the south and southeast, and Company D on the north and northeast.15
To the left of the Glosters, the 64th Army had shown little of the clumsiness with which its 192d Division opened operations against the ROK 1st Division. Driving out of its shallow bridgehead inside the Imjin River's Korangp'o-ri bend at midnight on the 23d, the 192d slowly, but persistently, forced the 12th Regiment at the right of the ROK line to give ground. The pressure on the South Koreans increased around dawn, after the 190th Division crossed the Imjin at several points southwest of Korangp'o-ri town and sent van units down the boundary between the ROK 11th and 12th Regiments. Also crossing the Imjin during the night in the Korangp'o-ri bend area, the 189th Division of the 63d Army advanced southeast on a course taking it into the gap between the ROK 12th Regiment and the Gloster battalion on Hill 235.16
By noon a battalion leading the attack of the 190th Division drove a wedge more than a mile deep between the 11th and 12th Regiments. General Kang countered by sending a tank infantry force- two battalions of his reserve 15th ROK Regiment and Company A, 73d Heavy Tank Battalionagainst the penetration. By evening the task force drove out the Chinese and established defensive positions in the gap that had been opened between the 11 th and 12th Regiments. By that time the 192d Division had pressed back the 12th Regiment roughly three miles to the southwest of its original positions, widening by the same distance the gap between the South Korean division and the Gloster battalion on Hill 235. The 189th Division, after brushing the right flank of the 12th Regiment, meanwhile began passing through the widening gap between the South Koreans and Glosters.17
As the 12th Regiment gave ground during the afternoon, General Milburn ordered his lone reserve, the 15th Infantry of the 3d Division, out of its assembly on the northwest outskirts of Seoul into positions six miles behind the South Koreans to block a secondary road, Route 1 B, which if the Chinese reached would afford them an easy path to Route 1 and Seoul. Milburn shortly diverted the 1st Battalion of the 15th to clear Route 2X, a lateral secondary road connecting Route I to Route 3 at Uijongbu, after receiving a report that two hundred fifty infiltrating Chinese had set up a roadblock about seven miles west of Uijongbu. The 1st Battalion located the enemy force at 1800, killing twenty before the remaining Chinese broke away into nearby hills. With darkness approaching, the battalion commander elected to await morning before attempting to clear the surrounding area. Meanwhile, as General Milburn committed his only reserve unit, air observers and agents working in the area along Route 1 above the Imjin reported enemy forces moving south toward the river. The North Korean I Corps appeared ready to open its supporting attack along the west flank of the main enemy drive.18
Well before daylight on the 25th General Milburn became convinced that the I Corps would have to give up the Kansas line. As suspected, the North Korean I Corps was joining the offensive, although its initial move ended abruptly when its 8th Division attempted to cross the Imjin over the railroad bridge near Munsan-ni and was blown back with high losses from artillery fire and air attacks.19 But the 190th and 192d Divisions attacking in strength just after midnight drove the ROK 1st Division back another mile before giving respite, widening still more the gap between the South Koreans and Glosters. The 189th Division continued, if slowly, to pass through the gap.20
Before midnight the entire front of the 3d Division was under assault. On Hill 235, scarcely an hour after Colonel Carne redeployed the Gloster battalion on the crest of the hill, Chinese attacked up the more gentle ascents on the northwest and southeast. In repeated rushes, with the lulls between used to bring up reinforcements, the Chinese failed to survive heavy Gloster fire concentrated on the two approaches until daylight, when an assault from the northwest carried the 235 peak. But so few Chinese survived this assault that a small Gloster counterattack easily restored the peak position. While Chinese gunners and mortarmen kept the Glosters under fire, another assault force began forming on the northwestern slopes, only to be almost totally destroyed by a flight of F-80s answering an earlier Gloster call for air support. During what would become a long lull, the Chinese bean again to bring more men forward.21
Other Chinese forces- from the 187th and 188th Divisions and possibly from the 189th- meanwhile moved far enough through the gaps on either side of the isolated Glosters to deliver small arms and mortar fire on the assembly areas of the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 65th Infantry, the Belgian battalion, the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, the British 45th Field Regiment, and the command post of the 29th British Brigade. Some forces of the 188th Division coming down from Hill 675 reached Route 11 a mile and a half behind the Northumberland Fusilier and Royal Ulster Rifle Battalions while those two units were fully engaged in beating back frontal assaults by other forces of the 188th.22
By dark on the 24th there had been no enemy action against the 7th Infantry deployed athwart Route 33 at the right of the 3d Division. With the sector quiet, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, had no difficulty in replacing the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, at the center of the regimental front in midafternoon to allow the latter to join its regiment near the 29th British Brigade command post in preparation for the scheduled attack to relieve the Gloster battalion. But after unproductive opening attacks on the 65th Infantry and Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team and a slow approach to line Kansas, the 29th Division opened more effective assaults on the 7th Infantry between 2000 and midnight of the 24th.23 Two regiments of the division attacking across the Hant'an River hit all three battalions of the regiment. Hardest hit was the 2d Battalion on the right flank, which by 0230 on the 25th was surrounded. On orders of the regimental commander, Colonel Boswell, the battalion gradually infiltrated south in small groups and reassembled some four miles below line Kansas around daylight. The 1st and 3d Battalions held their ground but remained under pressure throughout the night.24
In the eastern half of the corps sector, the remainder of the 29th Division, the 179th Division, and the 81st Division opened and steadily intensified attacks on the 25th Division between dusk and midnight. Simultaneous with frontal assaults on the 35th Infantry at the left, forces of the 29th Division apparently coming out of the adjacent sector of the 7th Infantry to the west drew close enough to place fire on the regimental command post and supporting artillery units. On the right, Chinese penetrated and scattered the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry. Unable to restore the position, General Bradley pulled the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry onto a new line about a mile to the south but gained no respite as the Chinese followed closely:25
In the 24th Division sector at corps right, two companies of Chinese infiltrated the positions of the 19th Infantry during the night. But a greater danger was posed by the 60th Division, which, after again routing the ROK 6th Division, reached and attacked the right flank of the 21st Infantry. The 21st bent its line and tied it to the position of its reserve battalion on the flank. But the 60th, if it should shift to the south past the refused flank and the blocking position set up by the battalion of the 5th Infantry, could slip into the division and corps rear area through the big opening created by the ROK 6th Division's second retreat.26
Because of this danger on his exposed right flank, the continuing and effective heavy pressure on the 25th Division, and the threat of a major enemy penetration through the wide gap between the ROK 1st Division and 3d Division, General Milburn at 0500 on the 25th ordered a withdrawal to line Delta, which, as set out in previously prepared corps plans, lay four to twelve miles, west to east, below line Kansas. He instructed the 24th and 25th Divisions to begin their withdrawals at 0800 but directed the ROK 1st Division and 3d Division not to withdraw until the surrounded Gloster battalion had been extricated. He specifically instructed General Soule to get the Glosters out before withdrawing, "even if you have to counterattack."27
Withdrawal to Line Delta
East of the Imjin
With the Yongp'yong River at its back, the 25th Division faced a canalized withdrawal over two bridges in the southeastern corner of its sector, one on Route 3, the other at Yongp'yong town two miles to the west. Earlier, after the Chinese had captured Hill 664 three miles directly north of the Route 3 crossing, General Bradley had set the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, in a blocking position above the bridge. For the withdrawal he ordered all of the 27th Infantry to cover both river crossings while first the 24th Infantry and then the 35th Infantry pulled back, the 24th using the Route 3 bridge, the 35th using the crossing at Yongp'yong town. To cover the withdrawing 27th Infantry, Bradley deployed his attached Turkish brigade astride Route 3 five miles below the Yongp'yong River. Despite the difficulty of withdrawing while heavily engaged, Bradley's forces succeeded in breaking contact with small losses. By early evening the 27th Infantry and 35th Infantry were deployed on line Delta, left to right, with the Turkish brigade and 24th Infantry assembled close behind the line.28
In the 24th Division sector, General Bryan deployed the 5th Infantry astride secondary Route 3A three miles behind line Kansas to cover the withdrawal of the 19th and 21st Regiments. Attached to the 5th in support were its usual companion, the 555th Field Artillery Battalion, and Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion. Also directed by Bryan to join the covering force was the 8th Ranger Company, which, as an attachment to the 21st Infantry, had been patrolling to the east in search of Chinese coming out of the IX Corps sector and currently was in an isolated position atop Hill 1010 about a half mile off the right flank of the 21st. But before the Rangers could make their move, they were surrounded and attacked by forces of the 60th Division. The 3d Battalion, 5th Infantry, which Bryan earlier had placed in a blocking position along his east flank, meanwhile observed Chinese moving south and west past its position.29 The 60th Division obviously had found and was moving into the open flank.
First the 19th Infantry, then the 21st Infantry, broke contact and withdrew without difficulty. By 1830 both regiments were in position on line Delta and were deployed as before, the 19th on the left, the 21st on the right. Once on Delta, the 21st Infantry was engaged by Chinese moving in from the northeast but turned back these forces with no loss of ground. Later in the evening the 21st made contact with the ROK 6th Division, which General Hoge had managed to redeploy at the left of the IX Corps sector of the Delta line.30
Lt. Col. Arthur H. Wilson, Jr., who had recently replaced Colonel Throckmorton as the 5th Infantry commander, was forced to delay his withdrawal until the 8th Ranger Company, which was attempting to fight its way out of its encircled position, reached him. To assist the attempt, Wilson sent five tanks toward Hill 1010. En route, the tankers met and took aboard sixty-five Rangers, most of them wounded. They were all who had survived the breakout attempt.31
It was late afternoon before the tankers returned with the Rangers and Colonel Wilson got his forces in march order for withdrawing down Route 3A through the positions of the 19th Infantry and into an assembly area four miles behind line Delta. The 3d Battalion led the way south, followed by the 555th Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Battalion, 2d Battalion, and, as rear guard, Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion. A few mortar rounds exploded around the 3d Battalion as it cleared a defile about a half mile from the Delta front. Battalion members assumed that these were registration rounds fired by the 19th Infantry. Actually, they were the opening shots of a large Chinese force occupying the ridges along both sides of the road from the defile north for more than a mile. A crescendo of Chinese small arms, machine gun, recoilless rifle, and mortar fire brought the remainder of Colonel Wilson's column to an abrupt halt and began to take a toll of men, weapons, and vehicles.32
Hardest hit was the 555th Field Artillery Battalion. Its return fire, including direct fire from its howitzers, silenced the Chinese along the west side of the road; but the fire from obviously larger numbers of Chinese on the east side grew in volume and kept most of Wilson's column pinned down. Three attacks by forces of the 1st Battalion were broken up, as was an attempt by the 2d Battalion to deploy. An attack from the south by Company A, 6th Medium Tank Battalion, and a company from the 19th Infantry failed at the narrow lower end of the defile at a cost of two tanks and the infantrymen riding them.33
Searching for a way around the roadblock, rearguard tankers from Company D meanwhile found a track branching west off Route 3A a mile north of the defile and a connecting road leading south to be free of Chinese. Moving out under continuing fire, but not pursued by the Chinese, Wilson's forces followed the roundabout route and escaped without further losses, reaching the lines of the 19th Infantry shortly after dark. During the night, aircraft and artillery bombarded the weapons, vehicles, and equipment left behind: seven tanks, five from Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion, and two from the 5th Infantry's regimental tank company; eleven howitzers from the 555th Field Artillery Battalion; and a host of trucks, more than sixty from the 555th alone. The artillerymen also suffered the most personnel casualties. The initial count was one hundred killed, wounded, and missing, a figure somewhat reduced later as stragglers regained 24th Division lines over the next two days.34
Hill 235
No longer concerned with maintaining the 3d Division's line Kansas positions along the Imjin after receiving General Milburn's early morning withdrawal order, General Soule immediately canceled the attack by the 65th Infantry originally scheduled to start at 0630 to relieve the Gloster battalion and clear enemy forces from the Hill 675 area. The latest report from the 29th Brigade, in any case, indicated that the Glosters were holding their own, that they had "asked for some Arty but OK."35 To rescue the Glosters, the main task seemed only to be to clear Route 5Y and escort the battalion to the rear. More worrisome to General Soule was a report that a large Chinese force (which would have had to be the 189th Division) coming through the gap between the ROK 1st and 3d Divisions was bypassing the 3d Division on the left and moving southeast toward Route 33, the division's main line of communication. During the early morning Soule dispatched the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 65th Infantry, the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, and the 3d Reconnaissance Company to take up positions athwart what appeared to be the line of march of the enemy force to prevent it from reaching the road. Since the Royal Ulster Rifle and Northumberland Fusilier Battalions seemed certain to have difficulty in withdrawing with Route 11 now interdicted by Chinese behind them, Soule left the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, in position west of the 29th Brigade's command post to help cover the two battalions when they came south. Brigadier Brodie strengthened the cover by deploying the Belgian battalion across Route 11 just north of his command post. Except that the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, might be diverted from its covering mission, Soule by daylight on the 25th had committed all reserves available to him except the division's 64th Tank Battalion and the 65th Infantry's tank company. Any force formed to rescue the Glosters would have to be from these units. Soule assigned that task as a joint venture to Brigadier Brodie and Colonel Harris, commander of the 65th Infantry.36
Shortly after giving Brodie and Harris responsibility for organizing the rescue mission, Soule allowed the 7th Infantry, which remained under attack by the 29th Division and whose right flank would soon be completely uncovered by the withdrawal of the 25th Division, to begin its withdrawal. The 2d Battalion, already off the line, led the withdrawal, while the 3d Battalion pulled out of its left flank position and followed a trail leading southwest behind the covering 1st Battalion to reach Route 33 and continue south. Company A fought a difficult but highly effective rearguard action as the 1st Battalion disengaged near noon.37
Meanwhile, at 0800 Brigadier Brodie and Colonel Harris were still conferring at Brodie's command post to decide the composition of the rescue force. Concerned because the force was not yet on the way, Brig. Gen. A. D. Mead, assistant division commander, joined the conference at that time and emphasized the need for speed. Colonel Harris responded that he understood his mission perfectly and that, if left alone, he and Brodie would handle it.38
Major Huth, the British tank company commander who had participated in the unsuccessful attempt to reach the Glosters the day before, tried but failed to convince Colonel Harris that tanks would not be able to reach the Glosters unless accompanied by a strong infantry force. Harris' final decision, with which Brodie agreed, was that the task called for light tanks only. Capt. Claude Smith, whose 65th Infantry tank company thus was assigned the mission, wanted to use his entire company. But Harris believed that one platoon was all that could be profitably employed. Harris assured General Mead, however, that he was prepared to follow up with greater strength if necessary.39
The tank platoon, short one tank left behind for maintenance, started up Route 5Y after 0900. (Map 34) Apparently out of a belated interest in speed, the tankers moved out before an observer from the 10th Field Artillery Battalion, which was to have supported the operation, could join them. Nor were the tankers in communication with the regimental command post.40 The single source of reports on the platoon's progress was a division observer periodically flying overhead.41
Map 34. The British 29th Brigade Sector, 25 April 1951
About the time that Captain Smith's tanks began advancing toward the Gloster battalion, General Kang, the ROK 1st Division commander, attempted a similar but somewhat stronger move, sending the 2d Battalion of his 12th Regiment and two platoons of Company C, 73d Heavy Tank Battalion, north to restore the right flank position lost by the 12th Regiment on the 24th and then to make contact with the Glosters. Under way before 0900, the ROK battalion and American tanks moved up the valley of the small Nullori River for perhaps a mile before Chinese forces from heights edging the valley opened fire and brought the advance to a halt. As of noon, the fire fight continued, with neither side gaining the deciding edge.42 But although General Kang's attempt to reach the Glosters had been stopped, it would shortly prove not to have failed altogether.
The air observer following the progress of the 65th Infantry's tank platoon on Route 5Y meanwhile reported that the tanks had reached the Glosters and that they were on the way out. But the report was incorrect. The tankers had got into a fire fight far short of Hill 235, had used most of their ammunition, and, fearing they would be cut off when they sighted Chinese moving on their flanks, had withdrawn, reaching their company area between noon and 1300. Colonel Harris ordered another try by a different platoon, which, accompanied by an artillery observer and tactical air control party and escorted overhead by two flights of fighters and an observer, left about 1400. A mile out of the company area, the platoon was flagged to a halt by Major Huth, the British tank company commander, who convinced the platoon leader that the light tanks could not reach Hill 235. As Colonel Harris decided against any further attempt and withdrew his tanks, there was, in any case, little reason to try again. Hours before, almost immediately after the early morning planning conference with Colonel Harris, Brigadier Brodie had taken private steps to get the Glosters out. Though he had voiced agreement that the employment of a tank platoon was the practical solution to opening Route 5Y for the battalion, he apparently was unconvinced that the small armored force could succeed and about 0900 had ordered the Glosters to fight their way back. Brodie followed with orders to the Royal Ulster Rifles and Northumberland Fusilier Battalions to withdraw south over Route 11 through the covering Belgian battalion.43 Once the Glosters, Royal Ulster Rifles, and Northumberland Fusiliers reached the 29th Brigade command post area, the brigade was to move back to the Delta line. But the withdrawals of all three battalions would take decidedly different courses.
From its outset at midmorning the withdrawal of the Royal Ulster Rifles and Northumberland Fusilier Battalions was a fight to the rear with Chinese storming down on Route 11 from the Hill 675 area. To escape the Chinese, most of the British troops turned east off Route 11 and made their way out over open country. Worse off were some two hundred wounded loaded on the backs and sides of eight Centurion tanks, which had nochoice but to run the gauntlet. Several tanks were disabled, and most of their passengers were killed. Caught up in the fight, the Belgian battalion became scattered but held its ground. Late in the afternoon Brigadier Brodie finally succeeded in breaking contact and started his somewhat tangled forces, including the Belgians but not the Glosters, toward line Delta. As the 29th Brigade cleared, the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, briefly engaged Chinese near its blocking position, then broke away and followed the British brigade.44 The isolated Gloster battalion meanwhile had attempted its breakout, the course of which was not yet clear to anyone in Brodie's headquarters or that of the 3d Division.
British 29th Infantry Brigade Rest Following Difficult Retreat From the Imjin River
On Hill 235, during the continuing quiet that had settled over the Gloster position following the devastating air strike on the Chinese by the flight of F-80s, Colonel Carne had issued orders for the battalion's withdrawal about 0930. If he knew that the 65th Infantry tank platoon was then starting up Route 5Y toward him, he eschewed any attempt to move south to meet it. Off the left rear of the battalion was a valley leading upslope to a saddle about a mile southwest of Hill 235. Carne did not know the exact location of the 12th ROK Regiment's position, nor did he know that the 2d Battalion of the regiment and the two platoons of Company C, 73d Heavy Tank Battalion, were then attacking generally toward him. But he believed that moving southwest through the valley toward the right flank of the ROK 1st Division would be the quickest way to reach safety and, if the Glosters could make it through the saddle, that they would have a good chance of making it all the way. With the 45th Field Regiment providing artillery support on call, Company A was to lead the withdrawal about 1000, Company C and battalion headquarters and support troops were to follow, and Company D was to bring up the rear. When Carne announced that he would remain on Hill 235 with the severely wounded men (about fifty litter cases), the battalion surgeon, chaplain, and several enlisted medics volunteered to stay with him.45
Since Chinese had been observed in that area during the past two days, Company D commander Capt. M. G. Harvey considered the valley a risky route, particularly for his company, which would be bringing up the rear of the battalion. Even if Chinese were not on the heights bordering the valley, he reasoned, they might be near enough to spot the Gloster movement and set up a trap before Company D could clear the saddle. He preferred to try the unexpected, to move forward off the steep northeast side of Hill 235 where the Chinese had attempted no assault, follow Route 5Y for about a mile, swing west through a lateral valley around the hill mass through which the remainder of the battalion would attempt to pass, then turn south through another valley toward the ROK 1st Division's lines. As Company A led the rest of the battalion into the valley to the southwest, Captain Harvey gave his men, including a dozen members of the support company who had been operating with Company D, the choice of surrendering or going with him on the roundabout route. If a man went down, Harvey warned, he would be left behind. The entire group, about a hundred men, elected the escape attempt. If Colonel Carne knew of Harvey's plan, he did not object. All Glosters, in any case, would now be entirely on their own since, just as they began their withdrawal, Carne received word from brigade headquarters- the last his feeble radio would pick up- that the 45th Field Regiment was under too heavy fire to provide support.46
A few minutes after the Glosters moving into the valley to the southwest cleared Hill 235, Captain Harvey led his group off the north side of the hill. All men had taken off their distinctive berets to prevent easy identification by Chinese who might observe them. Moving alternately at a trot and fast walk, they encountered only two Chinese, whom they killed, on the northern leg of their route and none on the milelong stretch to the west. At the point of turning south, Harvey offered his men a breather, but they refused: They were determined, he recalled later, "to come out or get bloody killed." Appearing overhead as they turned to enter the valley leading south was a Mosquito plane whose pilot waggled wings in recognition and stayed overhead to guide the column toward the 12th ROK Regiment.47
About a mile into the valley, as Harvey's group entered a narrow stretch, thirty or more Chinese riflemen and machine gunners opened fire from the bordering ridges and chased the Glosters into the nearest cover, a muddy ditch about a foot deep. As they crawled through the ditch, the Mosquito pilot's call brought in fighter planes which worked over the ridges but scarcely dampened the Chinese fire. At intervals the ditch petered out, forcing Harvey and his men to dash forward to the next segment. In each instance, Glosters were hit.48
Negotiating a slight bend in the ditch, the Glosters were spurred on by the sight of American tanks a half mile or so down the valley engaged in a fire fight with Chinese on the flanking hills. Spotting the crawling troops a short time later, the tankers- the two platoons of Company C, 73d Heavy Tank Battalion- mistook the muddied, hatless Glosters for enemy and opened fire with machine guns and cannon. Six men were hit before the Mosquito pilot overhead could drop a note identifying the approaching troops.49
The tank company commander with several tanks set out immediately to meet the Glosters. With the wounded inside and others either trotting alongside or riding on the rear of the tanks, the two platoons sprayed the hills to either side with heavy machine gun fire as they escorted the survivors of Harvey's group to safety behind the 2d Battalion, 12th ROK Regiment. A total of forty- Captain Harvey, three other officers, and thirty-six men- were rescued.50
During the time that General Kang's infantrytank group had moved up the Nullori valley and returned with the Glosters about 1400, his 11th and 15th Regiments had fought off hard attacks by forces, estimated at three regiments, of the 190th and 192d Divisions. As the Chinese attacks weakened and then faded out around 1630, Kang pulled his division back to line Delta, setting the tank destroyer battalion, 11th Regiment, and 15th Regiment on line and placing the 12th Regiment in reserve. To his east was the 65th Infantry, which after making no contact with any large Chinese force advancing toward Route 33 had moved on to the Delta line. General Milburn meanwhile released General Soule's 15th Infantry from corps reserve in exchange for the tattered 29th British Brigade. Soule set the 15th next to the 65th Infantry on line Delta and placed the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the right flank of the 3d Division front while keeping the remainder of the 7th in division reserve.51
As the 3d Division occupied positions along line Delta, General Soule's only information on the condition and location of the remainder of the Gloster battalion was a noontime report from a division observer flying over the Hill 235 area. "At CT 182005," the observer reported, "approximately 225 29th BIB soldiers are located. They act as [if] they are lost. They walked to the end of the road, found a dead end-returned to their present positions and set [sic] down."52
The observer unwittingly had reported the capture of the Glosters in the southwest valley. The "road" he mentioned was a trail leading up to the saddle, the "dead end" the saddle itself. When the head of the Gloster column reached the saddle, Chinese machine gunners cupped around it opened fire, wounding several men but generally laying off the column. The fire informed the Glosters that they were trapped. On orders from their officers, the Glosters laid down arms. Chinese appearing from the heights above them, uncertain about what to do with so many captives, initially took the Glosters back down the trail and motioned to them to sit down.53
At the beginning of the Chinese offensive the Gloster battalion had numbered 28 officers and 671 men. In the Solma-ri area to support the battalion were 6 officers and 22 men of the 70th Battery, Royal Artillery, and 1 officer and 45 men of C Troop, 170th Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery. In its initial accounting of losses, 29th Brigade headquarters reported that 622 of these forces were "either KIA, WIA, or missing." Most of the reported casualties later proved captured. From the Gloster battalion itself, 21 officers and 509 men were taken captive, of whom 8 officers and 145 men had been wounded. Two officers and 24 men would die in captivity.54 The high number of Glosters captured served to emphasize how thoroughly entrapped by Chinese Colonel Carne's forces had become.
When General Ridgway demanded a formal report on the loss of the Gloster battalion, General Van Fleet replied that in his opinion, "all reasonable and possible courses of action" had been attempted to save the unit. The failure of relief efforts he attributed to the strength and determination of the Chinese attacks, the Chinese capability to exploit early penetrations by infiltration and enveloping actions, and the limited reserves available to General Milburn, General Soule, and Brigadier Brodie with which to counter enemy successes.55 While he believed that the Gloster position had had to be held as long as possible lest Chinese pour into the 3d Division and I Corps rear areas, Van Fleet privately faulted General Soule for tardiness in discovering how critical the Glosters' situation had become and thus for failing to make timely decisions on when and how to relieve the battalion.56
General Milburn found little fault with either Soule or Brigadier Brodie, although in a report to Van Fleet he drew particular attention to the confusion of instructions surrounding the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team's unsuccessful attempt to reach the Glosters on 24 April. "It appears," he nevertheless told Van Fleet, "that every effort was made to reach the Gloster battalion when conditions over the remainder of the front are considered."57
In line with Van Fleet's private conclusions, General Soule admitted to not having been aware of the Glosters' true situation. Had he known the truth on 24 April, he said later, he would have taken command and pushed troops up Route 5Y to the battalion's position. At the time, he explained, he had believed that Brigadier Brodie had enough force in the Filipino battalion and supporting tanks to reach the Glosters, especially since Brodie did not ask for additional help while preparing to send the 10th Battalion Combat Team forward or while it was en route. Soule himself could not have taken a hand to prevent the withdrawal of the Filipino battalion since he was out of touch with Brodie's operation at the time, having gone to the sector of the hard-hit 7th Infantry.58
Brigadier Brodie took, as he put it, "50% responsibility" for failing to make clear to General Soule how serious the Gloster battalion's situation had become on 24 April. In Brodie's judgment, the 24th was the latest date on which the Glosters could have been rescued. This opinion accounted for his disinterest in the plan to send a tank platoon forward on the morning of the 25th and his consequent order to the Glosters to attempt to break out of their surrounded position. Brodie, in reviewing the action, was complimentary toward, not critical of, American efforts to help the Gloster battalion.59 But behind his unwillingness to assume full responsibility for informing General Soule of the battalion's critical situation was perhaps a belief that Soule should have shown more initiative in finding out for himself.
General Ridgway assessed the operation as an example of the failure of a leader to know his men. Brigadier Brodie, Ridgway believed, should have known that the Gloster commander, Colonel Carne, was much given to quiet understatement and that his reports thus did not reflect the seriousness of the battalion's circumstances. Brodie himself should have determined the correct situation and should have sent or asked for help sooner. In sum, as Ridgway told Brodie personally, "the Gloster battalion should not have been lost."60
Notes
1 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 334-35; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp. 103, 108; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 346.
2 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 336-37; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, p. 108; 1 Corps, Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 18.
3 I Corps, Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 19-20; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 80-81; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
4 This paragraph and the one following are based on Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 35-47.
5 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Report on Action (Johnson, G3), 3 May 51.
6 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 48, 52, 60, and 69, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 14 May 51); Interv, Appleman with Maj Henry Huth, CO, C Sqn, 8th Hussars, copy in CMH; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51.
7 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 52, 24 Apr 51; Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 81-82.
8 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 80 and 96, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 5 May 51, sub: Report of Action Involving the Loss of Gloucestershire Battalion, 29th British Brigade, Tab A, I Corps Report on Action of Gloster Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51.
9 3d Div OI 15-13, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 80, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 13 (Memo to CG fr Brig Gen A. D. Mead, Dept CG, 3d Div, 7 May 51).
10 Interv, Appleman with Gen Soule, 8 Sep 51, copy in CMH; Eighth Army CG Jnl, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub; Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 13 (Memo to CG fr Brig Gen A. D. Mead, Dept CG, 3d Div, 7 May 51); 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 96, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with Huth.
11 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 109 and 138, 24 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with Huth.
12 Later investigation of the withdrawal order came to no clear conclusion. There was no brigade journal record of its issue, and no one at headquarters could recall its scope or exactly who gave it. Available evidence indicates that the order did apply to the entire force. The 3d Division G-3 Journal for 24 April 1951, Entry 129, for example, records an evening report from the 29th Brigade stating in part that the "relief force of 10th BCT and Tks have been ordered back."
13 Interv, Appleman with Huth; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, and Incl 5 (Statement of Col O. P. Newman, CofS, 3d Inf Div); Interv, Appleman with Soule, 8 Sep 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 129, 24 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with Capt M. G. Harvey, CO, Co D, 1st Bn, the Gloucestershire Regiment, 10 Sep 51.
14 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 47-50; Holies, Now Thrive the Armourers, p. 163; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 8 (Memo, G4, 3d Div, to CG, 3d Div, 9 May 51, sub: Air Drop for Gloucester Battalion).
15 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 49-53.
16 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 23; Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0040, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy Operations in the 29th BIB Sector During the Period 211800 to 251800 Apr 51, 9 May 51.
17 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0745 and 1515, 24 Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Eighth Army POR, 24 Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
18 15th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 23; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 2330, 24 Apr 51.
19 Heretofore lacking a truly effective capacity for radar-directed night attacks, the Fifth Air Force now had an MPQ radar detachment in support of each U.S. corps-one north of Seoul, one near Hongch'on, and one near Wonju-and the system now worked with B-29s as well as B-26s. See Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 328-30.
20 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 23-24;1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 1952.
21 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 52-64.
22 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 158, 159, and 165, 24 Apr 51, and Entries 9, 20, 28, 30, 33, 40, and 50, 25 Apr 51.
23 The 7th Infantry later estimated that it had been hit by forces from two divisions. See 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. If a second division was involved, it probably was the 34th which also had participated in the initial attacks at line Utah.
24 3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy Operations, 21-25 Apr 51, 9 May 51; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51, and 161, 25 Apr 51; 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
25 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 20-21; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 80-81.
26 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 19; 24th Div PIR 286, 24 Apr 51.
27 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 24; 1 Corps Withdrawal Plan "Golden" #1, 17 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0500, 25 Apr 51; Rad, Eighth Army AG In no. CX 4329, CG I Corps to CG 3d Div et al., 25 Apr 51 (confirms oral orders); 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 40, 25 Apr 51. Quotation is from last source.
28 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 20, 26.
29 Ibid., p. 24; 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; 21st Inf S3 Jnl, Entries 0421, 0650, 0750, and 0820, 25 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton), 3d Bn, 5th RCT.
30 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 25; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
31 New York Post, 26 May 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton).
32 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 25: New York Post, 26 May 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton); 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51.
33 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with Lt Col Harry E. Stuart, CO, 555th FA Bn, 9 Aug 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton); New York Post, 26 May 51.
34 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with Stuart, 9 Aug 51; Interv, Appleman with Lt Edward P. Crockett, Plat Ldr, 5th Inf Regtl Tk Co; 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
35 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 28, 25 Apr 51.
36 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Rpt, Nar of Opus, Apr 51; 65th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 198; Rpt, CG 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Annex 9, Reserves Available to CG, 3d Inf Div.
37 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div POR 161, 25 Apr 51; 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 144-53 (revised edition, 1970). See the last for a detailed account and appraisal of Company A's rear-guard action.
38 Memo, Brig Gen A. D. Mead for CG, 3d Inf Div, 7 May 51.
39 Ibid.; Intervs, Appleman with Huth, Capt Claude Smith, CO, 65th Inf Tk Co, and 1st Lt Myron Dushkin, 65th Inf Tk Co.
40 At the end of the slow planning session, Colonel Harris explained to General Mead that he had been unable to dispatch the tanks sooner because of the arrangements that had had to be made for communications and supporting fire. See Memo, Brig Gen A. D. Mead for CG, 3d Inf Div, 7 May 51.
41 Intervs, Appleman with Smith and Lt Col Alvin L. Newbury, CO, 10th FA Bn.
42 I Corps Report on Action of Gloster Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51; 73d Hvy Tk Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
43 Interv, Appleman with Newbury; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 90 and 128, 25 Apr 51. See also Intervs, Appleman with Smith; Sgt Young Gladden, Jr., 65th Inf Tk Co; Dushkin; Huth; and Brig Brodie, 10 Sep 51.
44 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 52 and 93, 25 Apr 51; 3d Div, G3, Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51, 14 May 51; 3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy Operations, 21-25 Apr 51, 9 May 51; Ely Jacques Kahn, The Gloucesters: An Account of the Epic Stand of the Gloucestershire Regiment in Korea (London: Central Office of Information, 1951), p. 11; Holies, Now Thrive the Armourers, pp. 166-67; Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Annex 9, Reserves Available to CG, 3d Inf Div.
45 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 64-67.
46 Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors; Interv, Appleman with Harvey, 10 Sep 51; Kahn, The Gloucesters, pp. 13-15; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 64-67.
47 Interv, Appleman with Harvey, 10 Sep 51; Kahn, The Gloucesters, pp. 13-15.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.; Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors.
50 73d Hvy Tk Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors.
51 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 26-27; 65th Inf S3 Jnl, 25 Apr 51, Results of Events; 3d Div POR 161, 25 Apr 51; 15th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
52 3d Div G2 Jnl, Entry 828, 25 Apr 51.
53 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 64-67.
54 Msg, Maj-Gen Anthony Farrar-Hockley thru British Embassy (Brig-Gen Watson) for author, 10 Aug 76; Ltr, Maj-Gen Anthony Farrar-Hockley to author, 16 Sep 76; I Corps Report on Action of Gloster Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51.
55 Rad, C 61606, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 3 May 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 26 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51.
56 Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51.
57 Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51.
58 Interv, Appleman with Soule, 8 Sep 51.
59 Ibid. with Brodie, 10 Sep 51.
60 Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
